























Most philosophers of education assume that the main aim of education is to 
endow pupils or students with ‘personal autonomy’: to produce citizens who are 
reflective, make rational choices and submit their values and beliefs to critical 
scrutiny. The underlying assumption is Socratic: that the unexamined life is not 
worth living, and that goods and forms of perception that cannot be articulated or 
rationally justified are not worthy of our consideration. The unstated assumption is 
Plato and Aristotle’s: that the good life is the life of the philosopher and politically 
active citizen. It is assumed, moreover, that all pupils should be so educated on 
egalitarian grounds.  
 
In this thesis, I dispute these assumptions. I argue that the good life should not 
be conceived in exclusively ‘intellectualist’ terms but that an ordinary life - an 
‘unexamined’ life - is also worth living; that central to the good life in all its forms is 
the engagement in worthwhile activities or ‘practices’; and that the best way to 
prepare pupils for their engagement in these practices is to cultivate a range of moral 
and intellectual virtues.  
 
Instead of foisting on all pupils a universal academic curriculum that produces 
little more than ‘a smattering of knowledge’, I argue that pupils might (1) cultivate 
the intellectual virtues through early specialisation in at least one subject, academic 
or practical, that has the characteristics of a practice, (2) develop the capacity to 
make practical judgements through a study of rhetoric and the stories of human 
experience of the humanities, and (3) cultivate certain moral virtues through 
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This thesis arises out of my dissatisfaction with much of the debate – in 
philosophy of education, among policy makers and researchers, and in education 
generally – concerning the aims of education and the nature of the school curriculum 
that would embody these aims. A series of damaging dichotomies have developed 
that obscure what I take to be crucial questions concerning the nature of the good life 
and how pupils might best be prepared for it.   
 
On one side are ranged supporters of the traditional ‘liberal’ curriculum of 
academic subject disciplines, a curriculum that - it is claimed - trains the intellect, 
initiates into a cultural inheritance, and prepares for future specialisation. Though 
some advocates of this curriculum advocate selection on grounds of academic 
ability, others argue that ‘the best education is necessarily the best education for all’, 
and therefore that all pupils can benefit from an academic education, at least until the 
age of 16. On the other side are ranged those who reject the traditional academic 
curriculum as currently constituted and advocate a variety of alternative (and 
overlapping) conceptions of education and educational aims: for example (1) that 
children best learn through active and collaborative enquiry rather than through 
didactic transmission - i.e. that children should be ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ 
learners; (2) that the aim of education is to produce critical thinkers and problem 
solvers rather than recipients of bodies of subject knowledge; (3) that education 
should allow children to express their latent talents and potentialities; (4) that 
education should prepare pupils or students for a flourishing life by equipping them 
with various life and work skills; (5) that instead of seeking to transmit the 
‘dominant culture’ of the ‘dominant class’, schools should seek to affirm local 
knowledge and a plurality of truths and identities; and (6) that, informed by the 
insights of ‘critical theory’, education should be a vehicle for the transformation of 





None of these positions is, I think, very illuminating. Traditionalists argue that 
the liberal curriculum of academic subject disciplines offers ‘intellectual rigour’ and 
initiates into ‘the best that has been thought and said’; that because it is the education 
traditionally associated with an elite, it is therefore the best education for all. But it is 
unclear why the good life - the best life it is possible for anyone to lead - should be 
the life of the academic, scholar or intellectual; why, or in what sense, the school 
curriculum of academic disciplines should ‘train the mind’ - as opposed to produce 
merely ‘a smattering of knowledge’; or why pupils with little or no aptitude for, or 
inclination towards, academic study should benefit from the experience. Opponents 
of the traditionalist position (we might characterise them as ‘progressives’) variously 
argue that knowledge must be ‘constructed’ rather than ‘poured into empty vessels’, 
that learning must be ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’, and that education should aim to 
produce ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ thinkers, ‘problem solvers’, and reflective 
philosophical citizens; but I think this is no more helpful. Terms like ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ learning, ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ thinking, ‘independent’ learning and so 
forth are, in the educational context, little more than slogans to be brandished about; 
little account is taken (at least by proponents of critical thinking and problem 
solving) of pupils’ differing aptitudes, interests and needs; and education conceived 
instrumentally as a preparation or training for life seems a shallow substitute for the 
riches of a liberal education. It is questionable in any case whether pupils can be 
prepared for adult life by being equipped with a set of ‘life skills’; and apart from its 
being a truism, the notion that education should prepare for life begs the crucial 
question ‘what is the nature of the good life for which we should be preparing 
pupils?’; or, if life is to be conceived as a series of choices between rival conceptions 
of the good life, ‘according to what criterion or standard should these to be 
judged?’  
 
The problem with conceiving education as instrumental to political and social 
change on the lines suggested by critical theory is that it is assumed that society can 
be transformed so as to eliminate injustice and inequality. Though the possibility of 
radical transformation, along with the nature of injustice and inequality, are 
legitimate topics for discussion and enquiry, it is quite another matter to seek to 




fundamentally disagree in their analyses of inequality, injustice and poverty, and on 
how practically to address them, that the premises of critical theory cannot simply be 
assumed in a democracy. In any case, the absence of inequality and injustice 
(supposing this utopian state to be attainable without resort to totalitarian oppression) 
does not in itself guarantee that people would lead fulfilled lives. My worry is that 
by beginning an inquiry into education with the unmasking of power structures and 
forms of inequality and injustice, a consideration of the nature of the good life for 
which school ought to be preparing pupils is neglected; we are in danger of 
‘throwing out the baby with the bath water’. In The German Ideology, Marx and 
Engels did sketch out the nature of the good life that would be possible if man were 
released from enslavement to controlling and exploiting power interests: 
 
… in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity 
but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society … 
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt 
in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after 
dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, 
herdsman or critic’ (Marx & Engels, 1974, p. 54).  
 
In a sense, this whole thesis is a repudiation of this romantic vision of the good life – 
a vision that bears little relation to real human interests and needs. 
 
A further source of confusion in the debate arises from a lack of clarity regarding 
what is meant by ‘liberal education’. The modern curriculum of academic subject 
disciplines is equated by proponents and opponents alike with ‘a liberal education’; 
and yet this curriculum is only a relatively recent development. For most of its 
history, liberal education, the education on which Western civilization was founded, 
was conceived on a quite different model: its central discipline was rhetoric, its 
subject matter was the humanities, and its aim was to produce not a specialist or a 
research scientist but an orator and a citizen. Any discussion of liberal education that 
does not recognise that there are two distinct formulations and traditions involved is 
fated from the outset to be muddled. And yet the distinction is largely overlooked or 




been associated with the education of elites, the rhetorical conception of liberal 
education has potentially more relevance to all pupils.   
 
Among philosophers of education, the central concern might be identified as the 
promotion of autonomy, not in the narrow Kantian sense (though this is not 
precluded) but in the more general sense that education should aim to produce 
people who are reflective, make rational choices, submit their beliefs and values to 
critical scrutiny (as opposed to passively accept the prevailing orthodoxy), and 
generally live a life they have freely chosen. Here lies the key, on the one hand, to 
personal fulfilment (a flourishing life) and, on the other, to the active citizenship 
necessary to sustain a liberal democratic society
1
. In one sense, it would be hard to 
dispute any of this. Nobody would seriously advocate the contrary view that the aim 
of education should be to produce docile and uncritical subjects of a totalitarian state 
fitted solely for their allotted roles. The problem is that by conceiving the good life 
in exclusively ‘intellectualist’ terms, other perfectly valid forms of the good life - in 
particular, the good of leading an ordinary life - have been ruled out. The underlying 
assumption is Socratic: that the unexamined life is not worth living, and that goods 
and forms of perception that cannot be articulated or justified rationally are not 
worthy of our consideration. The unstated assumption is Plato and Aristotle’s: that 
the good life is the contemplative life - the life of the philosopher, or critic, or 
academic, or researcher. It is assumed, moreover, that all pupils should be educated 
for autonomy in the sense described (1) on egalitarian grounds – to assume otherwise 
would be anti-democratic, and (2) because the view that some pupils would be 
limited by intelligence or aptitude is immoral (or at least that notions commonly 
associated with the view that intelligence is inherited - a stratified society and 
eugenics – are immoral) and empirically discredited.  
 
Whether this view is empirically discredited or not is a complex and highly 
politicised question whose proper treatment lies beyond the scope of this thesis. I 
touch briefly on the ‘nature or nurture’ question in Chapter 6 and at various other 
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 A more radical version of this mainstream view, informed by critical theory, would be that education 
should aim to produce people who are open to ‘self-transformation’ and the possibility that society 
might be radically transformed so as to eliminate inequality and injustice; in other words, that 




points in this thesis, but it is not central to my main argument. My view, as a teacher, 
is that pupils do as a matter of fact differ markedly in their aptitude for academic 
work regardless of their social background or upbringing (a view that is shared by 
virtually all my colleagues), just as they differ in personality, but that this need not 
entail a return to selective education and intelligence testing. In fact, I shall argue 
that it is because the good life need not be ‘the examined life’, but rather is the life in 
which a person is able to engage in a range of practices and exercise a range of core 
virtues, that a common school curriculum - a liberal education for all - is possible. 
The perverse effect of foisting an academic education on all pupils on egalitarian 
grounds - i.e. on grounds of ‘entitlement’ - is not to institute equal opportunities or 
equality, but merely to perpetuate and exaggerate a hierarchy of the intellect: a 
meritocracy.    
 
Whatever the truth of the intelligence question, the unfortunate result of the 
position adopted by most philosophers of education is that though a traditional 
academic liberal education is rejected on the grounds that it aims to form the person 
in a pre-conceived ideal and its methods are didactic (which seems to run contrary to 
the notion of cultivating autonomy), it is nevertheless envisaged that all pupils will, 
through their engagement in Socratic dialogue and inquiry, learn to become critical 
thinkers, problem solvers, literary critics, philosophers and politically-engaged 
citizens. Practical and craft subjects are disdained (or go unmentioned) because of 
their past association with a second-rate secondary-modern education, because of 
their association with a narrow vocational training, or simply because they are 
menial rather than intellectual
2
. The good life is equated with the philosophical life 
and the ethical is eliminated from the picture altogether, unless it can be rationally 
justified. That ‘the unexamined life’ can be worth living – that the person who does 
not engage in critical reflection or in literary and intellectual pursuits can lead at least 
as good a life, and exercise at least as good practical and moral judgement, as the 
philosopher, academic or intellectual - is ignored. And, finally, no account is taken 
of the possibility that pupils, regardless of their social background or class, differ 
                                                          
2
 There are, of course, philosophers of education who do recognise the value of practical subjects – 
John White and Christopher Winch are notable examples; and in The Educated Person, D. G. 
Mulcahy (2008) has sought to incorporate practical education within a liberal conception of 
education. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that the overwhelming emphasis is on the aims I have 




markedly in their aptitude, ‘intelligence’, interests, needs and personality. I shall 
argue that to want to engage in philosophy or critical thinking or in radical 
innovation is as much determined by a person’s personality as by any other personal 
quality or capacity.   
 
The twin purposes of my thesis, then, are (1) to define the aims of education in a 
liberal democratic society – aims that are justified in the sense that they are 
underpinned by a coherent view of how a person might be prepared for a fulfilled 
life, an ethical life, as a moral and rational being; and (2) to reconceptualise the idea 
of a liberal education (i.e. education that in some sense cultivates a person as a moral 
and rational being) as the best practical means of realising these aims for all pupils. 
The thesis is structured accordingly in two parts. In Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 4), I seek to 
establish the justified aims of education. In Part 2 (Chapters 5 to 8), I explore the 
nature of the school curriculum
3
 that might enable these aims to be realised, with 
particular reference to liberal curricula of the past.  
 
The chapters are structured as follows. In Chapter 1, I explore the 
‘Enlightenment conception of the autonomous actor’ and argue that the values and 
interests that might enable people to transcend their appetitive desires and lead a 
worthwhile life – a ‘good life’ - cannot be deduced a priori by appeal to pure reason, 
but are mediated through a social, cultural and linguistic tradition. In Chapter 2, I 
explore the key Aristotelian concepts phronesis and eudaimonia and argue that the 
moral virtues and the capacity to exercise practical judgement must be habituated as 
part of upbringing and schooling – otherwise people will not be motivated to act on 
them, or indeed to care about them in the first place. In Chapter 3, I argue that the 
reflective engagement in the practices of ordinary life simply does not require (and 
could not require) ‘critical’ reflection on the nature of the underlying ‘paradigmatic’ 
principles, values and goods of these practices; moreover, that it is in the nature of a 
moral and cultural tradition (particularly when it is liberal and secular, less so when 
it is tribal or theocratic in nature) that it encompasses people’s experiences of 
pursuing heterogeneous goods and living with moral conflict. However, a moral and 
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cultural tradition and its component practices need to be able to evolve, in response 
to changing circumstances and perceived needs, and therefore critical reflection and 
radical innovation have an important role to play. In Chapter 4, I explore the nature 
of the goods and associated core virtues that are essential for human flourishing – i.e. 
for ‘a good life’. In Chapter 5, I provide a brief history of liberal education and argue 
that it is crucial to distinguish between the old rhetorical idea of a liberal education, 
which aimed to produce orator-citizens and whose curriculum was centred on the 
humanities, and the modern ‘research’ ideal of liberal education, which is centred on 
a curriculum of academic subject disciplines, assumes a rationalist conception of 
knowledge, and prepares for specialisation. In Chapter 6, I explore the research (or 
rationalist) conception of a liberal education, and argue that though the curriculum of 
academic subject disciplines is inadequate as a general secondary education, there is 
potentially great value in early specialisation in a subject or field in which the pupil 
has particular aptitude or interest - so long as the subject in question (which might 
just as well be practical as academic) has something of the nature of a practice, and 
its study involves the disciplined acquisition of a conceptually procedurally complex 
body of knowledge and skill. A range of moral and intellectual virtues, particularly 
the latter, can thereby be cultivated. In Chapter 7, I argue that much was lost when 
the research ideal of liberal education displaced the old rhetorical ideal; that the 
humanities (so long as they are conceived as funds of ‘stories of human experience’ 
rather than as academic disciplines) and rhetoric (so long as it is conceived as an 
enriched form of literacy and stripped of its classical and literary associations) have 
much to commend them both as means of cultivating the virtues and of cultivating a 
form of phronesis. However, if certain moral virtues – courage, honesty, justice and 
the caring virtues - are to be habituated, pupils must have the experience of 
practising these virtues (mere instruction is not enough); and therefore various forms 
of challenging experience and service to others should also form a central part of the 







Enlightenment Rationality: the problem of integrating 
reason and desire 
 
A concern with discovering the truth through the exercise of reason, with 
seeking rational justifications for our knowledge, values and beliefs, lies at the heart 
of philosophy and has done so since Socrates pronounced that the unexamined life is 
not worth living. But with the advent of Cartesian rationalism and the Baconian 
(scientific) method in the seventeenth-century, the nature of this concern took on a 
new form. Man was elevated to the status of rational autonomous actor endowed 
with certain inalienable human rights and the relation of the individual citizen to the 
state was conceived not as that of parts to an organic whole but in terms of a social 
contract (a notion originally formulated by Locke and Rousseau and finding its most 
notable recent expression in Rawls’ Theory of Justice). In the West, we are very 
much the inheritors of this tradition of Enlightenment rationality, believing as we do 
in universal human rights, in liberal democracy as the political vehicle for the 
expression of these rights, and in the triumph of reason over prejudice, superstition 
and oppression. In philosophy of education, Enlightenment rationality takes the form 
of a pervasive concern with ‘autonomy’ as a pivotal educational aim. The 
autonomous person is the one ‘who makes his own choices and subjects them to 
rational assessment and criticism’ as opposed to the person who lives in accordance 
with ‘inarticulate custom and habit, suffocating ideology or religious taboo’ 
(Cuypers, 2004, p. 79).  
 
However, with the advent of Enlightenment rationality and the displacement of 
Aristotelianism (which had up till then been the accepted form of exercising reason 
in search of the truth), with the elevation of logic above rhetoric, something was 
inevitably lost, and man was detached from his social, cultural and historical roots. 
As Stephen Toulmin notes in Cosmopolis, ‘the oral, the particular, the local, the 




grounded on abstract, universal, timeless concepts’ (Toulmin, 1992, p. 75). It is only 
in the past half century that there has been a reaction in mainstream philosophy 
against this Enlightenment enthronement of pure reason as neutral arbiter (whether 
in its rationalist, empiricist or Kantian modes) and that there has been an attempt to 
recover earlier traditions. This reaction has taken the form of the humanism 
variously proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michael Oakeshott, John McDowell
1
, 
Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor and Iris Murdoch among others, with Collingwood, 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Dewey in their different ways breaking the mould 
earlier in the twentieth-century; by those working in the Aristotelian tradition of 
moral philosophy that has come to be known as ‘virtue ethics’ – perhaps most 
notably Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Philippa Foot; by 
communitarians such as Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel (most notably in his 
critique of Rawls) and, again, MacIntyre; and by those working broadly in the 
Marxist and critical theory traditions - for example, Habermas, Foucault and 
Bourdieu. In philosophy of education, a movement to recover the Aristotelian 
tradition of practical philosophy and emphasise the importance of ‘practical reason’ 
has been led by David Carr, Wilfred Carr and Joseph Dunne.  
 
Critics of Enlightenment rationality belonging to this broad humanist-
communitarian-Aristotelian revival
2
 generally share the view that deliberative or 
practical rationality
3
 – the rationality that issues in action - is not a property that 
arises (merely) by virtue of an actor being autonomous or self-determining, or 
possessing ‘free will’ in the libertarian sense; but rather is a term that describes the 
                                                          
1
 John McDowell argues in Mind and World for a ‘partially enchanted’ naturalism (or ‘naturalism of 
second nature’) in contrast to the ‘bald’ or ‘scientistic’ naturalism prevalent in modern philosophy 
(McDowell, 1996, pp.73, 84-5). 
2
 This reaction or revival has been characterised in varying terms depending on the commentator in 
question, but its broad nature is clear enough. Eamonn Callan and John White speak of ‘the 
communitarian revival of the early 1980s’ with Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel the authors of 
its most influential texts (Callan & White, 2003, p. 105), while Joseph Dunne speaks of ‘a retrieval of 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy’ and casts the net wider to include Heidegger and Wittgenstein 
(Dunne & Pendlebury, 2003, p. 201). For Wilfred Carr, philosophers from ‘Heidegger to Habermas, 
Dewey to Derrida, Wittgenstein to MacIntyre’ are united in their opposition to ‘theoretical 
philosophy’ (Carr, 2005, p. 622), and Hans-Georg Gadamer is the most significant figure in the 
twentieth-century revival of practical philosophy (p. 624). While for David Carr, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor are the key figures in ‘this broad current of Aristotelian and 
idealist communitarian thought’ (Carr, 2003, p. 189).      
3
 When I speak of Enlightenment rationality in this chapter, I am referring specifically to its 
application to practical reason (and hence ethics) rather than the ‘pure reason’ associated with 




behaviour of a person habituated into certain social, cultural and linguistic practices 
or traditions to whose public norms he adheres and according to which his behaviour 
is assessed or judged. Perhaps Charles Taylor encapsulates the root deficiency of 
Enlightenment rationality according to this view when he argues that Kantians, 
utilitarians and contractarians (like Rawls) all share a procedural rather than a 
substantive conception of ethics. Instead of centring ethics on a shared conception of 
the good set independently of our will, argues Taylor, primacy is given to the agent’s 
‘own desires or his will’ and to some procedure for practical reasoning. The 
consequence is that most modern moral philosophy has ‘a gaping hole’ and is 
rendered powerless to show why it is in anyone’s interest to be moral in the first 
place (Taylor, 1992, pp. 85-7).  
 
In this chapter I shall follow Taylor in arguing that there are serious deficiencies 
in the Enlightenment conception of rationality and in the associated liberal ideal of 
the autonomous actor; and I shall question whether Enlightenment rationality and its 
politics of liberal individualism can, alone, supply the moral norms and wider ethical 
values necessary for rational beings to lead flourishing lives. But contra Taylor and 
MacIntyre, I shall argue that the universal values and moral norms of Enlightenment 
ethics (I am thinking particularly here of Kant) are of vital importance because they 
provide a philosophical and ethical justification of liberal democracy and certain 
pivotal liberal values; and I shall argue that the Moral Law is central to this 
justification. Few in the West would seriously criticise the Kantian notion that all 
people are ends in themselves deserving of dignity and endowed with certain rights 
by virtue of being rational beings; and few would question the achievement of 
modern liberal democracy in guaranteeing these hard-won rights, particularly in the 
light of what we have experienced of alternative political systems. There are few, at 
least in the West, who would advocate a return to slavery, the persecution of 
minorities, the subjugation of women or torture. But it is all too easy to take these 
achievements, these rights and freedoms, for granted. 
 
There has been a great deal of critical analysis of Enlightenment rationality and 
of the ethical theories of Kant and Hume (including by philosophers of the calibre of 




therefore it is unlikely that I shall have anything new to say on these subjects. 
However, there is, perhaps inevitably, a marked contrast between the force and 
general thrust of the criticism, and the disparate, sometimes rather vague nature of 
the solutions that are offered – if solutions are offered at all. In particular, there is 
little sense of how the tensions between Humean and Kantian, and between 
Enlightenment and Aristotelian, conceptions of practical rationality - and hence of 
ethics - might be resolved. I do not claim to have a solution to the problem of ethics, 
and it may well be that it is in the very nature of ethics that it does not admit of ‘a 
solution’, but I think it is worth exploring whether an accommodation or synthesis 
between the Enlightenment and Aristotelian traditions might not be possible. My 
specific aim in this thesis is to explore whether aspects of the two traditions might be 
synthesised in the concrete form of a liberal-humanist education.  
 
Christine Korsgaard, the prominent Kantian, argues that the central task of moral 
philosophy is to find the answer to ‘the normative question’; to explain how the force 
of the normative claims morality seems to make on us can be justified (or vindicated) 
and to explain where the sources of this normativity are located (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 
13). I agree with Korsgaard here, except that, as we shall see, everything turns on 
how ‘the normative question’ is framed. I also agree with Kant that a life consisting 
merely of the blind, slavish satisfaction of sensuous appetites, inclinations and 
desires produces only a transient series of pleasures, whereas it is a sense of inner-
worth and contentment that a rational being seeks (Kant, 1996, p. 143; 2005, p. 
137)
4
; and therefore both the source and force of the normative claims morality 
seems to make on us have their origins in our rational nature. In other words, when 
people are driven, as they must by their very nature as rational beings, to ask the 
question ‘what ought I to do?’ they are launched on a quest for higher values and 
ends - moral, intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual - than the merely appetitive; they are 
engaged in a quest for the truth. It is in this sense that the desire, not to eliminate 
(because that is impossible – even the ascetic has to contend with his body) but to 
                                                          
4 ‘For the inclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and always leave behind a 









On the other hand, it could be argued that morality is rooted in our natural 
sympathies and feelings – our benevolence, for example - and that these are as much 
part of our instinctive nature as our selfish desires. But the problem then is to 
reconcile our conflicting selfish and altruistic inclinations, which suggests that some 
over-arching rational perspective, some set of general moral principles and guiding 
values, is needed after all. However, whether these moral norms must have their 
source in (or find their expression in the form of) the Moral Law, as Kantians argue, 
is another matter.  
 
I shall try to locate the source of our moral norms and of our need to live a life 
that is fulfilled and worthwhile - ‘a good life’ - in the discussion that follows.   
 
 
Enlightenment conceptions of practical rationality 
 
The Enlightenment conception of the autonomous actor has its roots in two 
distinct eighteenth-century conceptions of practical rationality: the Kantian ideal of 
rational autonomy, particularly influential in justifying our notions of universal 
human rights, and the Humean conception of instrumental rationality, from which 
descends our prevailing ethics of utilitarianism.  
 
There are, however, profound problems with both theories.  
 
 
                                                          
5
 Christine Korsgaard goes further and argues that the moral obligations that arise from our rational 
nature (obligations which are therefore unconditional), from our need to justify our actions with 
reasons, are fundamental to our personal identity and to our integrity as a person; and that a life in 
which we failed to live up to these obligations would be, literally, a life not worth living (Korsgaard, 
1996, pp. 101-2).  I agree that a life not informed by moral values - not informed by some conception 
of the life one ought to lead – is, literally speaking, not worth living. However, whether our moral 
values need justifying with reasons is, I think, questionable.   I shall return to the question of ‘critical 





For Humeans, normative reasons (the reasons that explain or motivate our 
actions, and that we recognise as providing a moral justification for our actions) are 
‘hypothetical’. In other words, they depend on our arational motivational or 
psychological states, and our actions are therefore ‘goal-driven’ rather than based on 
norms that could explain our actions by independently furnishing rational or moral 
ends (Cullity & Gaut, 1997, pp. 4-6); or as Hume himself famously remarked, 
‘Reason is … the slave of the passions’ (Hume, 2003, p. 236). In other words, 
reasons are merely rationalisations of our innate passions and desires, not a priori 
principles derived from pure reason. Practical reason is conceived instrumentally as 
involving the selection of the means by which our ultimate desires, our already given 
ends, can best be satisfied.  
 
The problem with this conception of practical rationality is that because our 
needs, interests, desires and ends (or goals) are assumed to come ready-formed, there 
is nothing to distinguish our instinctive appetites or desires (our natural inclinations) 
from ‘higher’ interests, commitments, beliefs or values – from the things that might 
be fostered, or might specially be worth fostering, through education and that might 
be transmitted via a cultural inheritance. We end up with utilitarianism, an empty, 
instrumental rationality that merely better equips us to satisfy our appetitive desires. 
The problem is that though utilitarianism need not entail the mere hedonistic pursuit 
of pleasure but can take account in its calculus of a more complex conception or 
definition of happiness (one that takes account of the public good, that weighs up 
long-run costs and benefits, and that seeks to make qualitative distinctions between 
different pleasures - as John Stuart Mill famously did), utilitarianism says nothing 
about how the higher pleasures and nobler virtues might be cultivated; indeed, it says 
nothing about whether it is desirable to cultivate them at all. There is, in Aristotelian 
terms, no conception of what might constitute ‘a good life’. Instead, the standard of 
morality becomes our freedom to pursue our current ends and thereby maximise 




ethics of utilitarianism is therefore contingent, even ‘parasitic’, on pre-existing 




Hume’s theory of the moral sentiments is admirable in so far as it goes, and in its 
defence of the moral virtues has, on the face of it, much in common with the 
Aristotelian approach to ethics that I shall attempt to defend in Chapter 2. But 
because Hume rules out reason as a motive to action, there is nothing to enable 
people to transcend their appetites and natural inclinations, to prevent them from 
acting purely out of self-interest (or pure selfishness), other than their natural 
‘sympathy’ for their fellows; and this sympathy is left to compete with all the other 
appetites and desires, including the selfish ones, that naturally motivate human 
beings. Moreover, Hume provides no account of moral education, no account of how 
cultural traditions and social practices might play a part in cultivating our moral 
sense or our disposition to act morally; we must presume that Humean moral 




Whereas Hume is all motivation and no reason, Kant might be said to be all 
reason and no motivation. For Kantians, our actions – or more specifically, our will 
to act - ought not to be determined by our motivational states, our instinctive, pre-
existing needs or appetites, but by rationally conceived ends – by ends conceived by 
virtue of our nature as rational beings. Normative reasons are non-hypothetical or 
categorical in nature; and this culminates in the Categorical Imperative of the Moral 
Law. We have the pivotal Enlightenment notion of the morally autonomous 
individual, the ‘sovereign chooser’ whose reason is sole arbiter, the individual 
endowed with certain universal, inalienable rights by virtue of his rationality.  
                                                          
6 In his classic critique of utilitarianism, Bernard Williams speaks of ‘the illusion that preferences are 
already given’, the need rather to take account of what people are ‘capable of wanting’ if they 
‘became informed’ or had ‘a sense of what is possible’ (Williams, 1973, p. 147). However, whereas 
Williams speaks in rather abstract terms of peoples’ capabilities being ‘a function of numerous social 
forces’ (p. 147), I would locate peoples’ capabilities squarely in a cultural inheritance into whose 




Kant has been widely criticised for attempting to eliminate altogether the 
feelings, emotions and passions from the sphere of morality, for austerely insisting 
that the Moral Law must be experienced as a purely rational intellectual obligation 
(see, for example, Kant, 1996, pp. 142-4), because this is so obviously contrary to 
our natural way of thinking and talking about morality, to our sense that a person 
motivated by feelings of sympathy, benevolence, love, pity and compassion (as 
opposed to greed and selfishness) is, by virtue of this, a good person whose actions 
have moral worth. The problem with the Kantian conception of practical rationality, 
as numerous commentators have remarked, is that that though Kant holds practical 
reason to be constitutive of our ends rather than merely instrumental to realising 
them, he supplies us with no positive substantive conception of a person’s ends or of 
the good. As Alasdair MacIntyre notes, ‘as to what activities we ought to engage in, 
what ends we should pursue, the categorical imperative seems to be silent 
(MacIntyre, 1989, p. 197). Kant provides little substantive content to his account of 
the Moral Law, with the result that his actor is divorced from society, culture and 
recognisably human attributes and concerns (see, for example, MacIntyre, 1989, pp. 
197-8; O’Hear, 1999, p. 127; Gaut, 1997, pp. 180-2). The emotions are relegated to 
‘a by-product of our status as dignified rational beings’ (Murdoch, 1985, p. 82) and 
the Kantian actor is reduced to a state of ‘disembodied reason’ (Berlin, 1969, p. 155), 
a transcendental will lying outside time and space (Gaut, 1997, p. 181). 
 
There is much force to these criticisms and I shall return to them later in this 
chapter, but I think that a powerful case can nevertheless be made for the Moral Law 
and its Categorical Imperative. I think moreover that the Kantian answer to this 
question, namely that human beings are subject to the Categorical Imperative of the 
Moral Law as ‘an objective necessity arising from a priori grounds’ (Kant, 1996, p. 
40) by virtue of their very nature as rational beings (i.e. beings subject categorically 
only to the dictates of pure reason), is unassailable – but only so long as the 







The republic of rational beings 
 
If one is seeking a compelling, epistemic, self-justifying account of moral norms 
– an account that appeals neither to our appetitive desires nor to arbitrary authority 
(i.e. to sources that would themselves stand in need of justification), and that can 
survive rational scrutiny taken to its limit – then the Moral Law, or at least 
something akin to it
7
, is in all probability the inevitable outcome
8
. The Moral Law 
might very well be the law that citizens of Kant’s notional Kingdom of Ends (the 
republic of rational beings) would legislate or ‘will’, and submit to on account of 
their will being determined by pure reason alone and their being subject to no other 
motivations, desires or impulses. And in so far as people are rational beings subject 
(or at least potentially subject) only to the dictates of pure reason, Kantian morality 
provides a powerful justification for a set of universal rights or duties that might 
apply to all people regardless of their contingent circumstances – i.e. to people of all 
cultures and societies. Rational beings engaged in framing laws on which a civil 
society of free and equal citizens (equal, that is, before the law) could be founded - in 
other words, engaged in establishing a social contract – might very well look to the 
Moral Law for guidance concerning the general moral principles that underlie those 
laws.  
 
It should be noted that what is considered by many critics to be a central 
weakness in Kant’s account of the Moral Law – namely its failure to explain how 
normative reasons for actions can motivate a person to act (as opposed to the desires 
and inclinations, which count as reasons for action because they are, by definition, 
motivational) – ceases to pose a problem when the Moral Law is considered at a 
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 Kant himself offers two formulations of the Categorical Imperative of the Moral Law: the formula of 
universal law (‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law’ – Kant, 2005, p. 97) and the formula of the end in itself (‘Act in such a way 
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ – pp. 106-7). 
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 For Korsgaard, for example, the normative question arises from ‘the first-person position of the 
agent’ and therefore for moral claims to be justified requires ‘transparency’ – i.e. for us to act not 
‘blindly or from habit’ but ‘in the full light of knowledge of what morality is’ (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 
16-7). Reflective scrutiny demands reasons for our actions as opposed to alien causes, and this in turn 
requires that ‘the free will must be entirely self-determining’, that it ‘must have its own law or 
principle’, and because ‘nothing determines what that law must be’ except that it has to be a law, we 




societal level. As Martha Nussbaum argues, all that is required of an ethical theory 
is, first, that it raises the level of awareness in the population as a whole and, second, 
that it shapes laws and institutions (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 247). Nussbaum even credits 
Kant with the view that world peace will come about not because all people abide by 
the Categorical Imperative but because ‘enough people think this way to make good 
laws that will constrain the behaviour of other people’ (p. 253). Now whether or not 
Kant took this view (if he did, he certainly disguised it heavily in his exposition of 
the Moral Law), it certainly would be a pragmatic view to take as it would go a long 
way to answering the question of how reason can be rendered motivational; it would, 
in effect, eliminate the need to answer the question at all at the personal level. But, in 
fact, not even law-makers need be motivated to abide by the Categorical Imperative 
in their personal lives; all that is strictly required is that in their capacity as law-
makers, they believe good law is founded on the Categorical Imperative.  
  
      So long, then, as Kant is interpreted as framing the ground rules or ‘original 
contract’ (Kant, 1983, p. 77) on which a civil society of free and equal citizens could 
be founded, whether in the form of statute law or in the form of general precepts or 
codes of behaviour in which the population might be educated, the concept of the 
Moral Law is a very powerful one. Moreover, I think the parallel between the 
notional republic of rational beings Kant refers to in his moral philosophy and the 
real, albeit ideal, republic Kant depicts in his political writings – which is also 
founded on certain a priori principles - is an illuminating one. In the former, it is the 
mark of rational beings that they submit themselves to certain limits on their freedom 
of action by only acting on precepts or maxims that can be universalised (so that all 
gain the freedom contingent on having their ends valued, on being treated as ends 
and not means); in the latter, it is the mark of the model republic that all citizens are 
equal before the law (i.e. that the rights and duties prescribed by the law apply 
universally) and that all citizens are free to pursue happiness as they see fit, provided 
that the freedom of others to do the same is not violated
9
. The underlying rationale of 
both republics is therefore that for people to live freely, and hence lead flourishing 
lives, certain limitations on freedom of action must be observed. The law must be 
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 ‘… every person may seek happiness in the way that seems best to him, if only he does not violate 
the freedom of others to strive toward such similar ends as are compatible with everyone’s freedom 




universal (i.e. everyone must be equal before the law) if everyone is to be free; 
equality is therefore the pre-condition for freedom
10
. So though Kant deduces the 
Moral Law by postulating that rational beings must be transcendentally free (which 
leaves Kant open to the criticisms I noted earlier and shall consider in more detail 
later on in this chapter), the Moral Law can also be derived as the limiting condition 
necessary for people’s freedom of action in the empirical world – i.e. for their 
freedom to pursue their own ends within a social framework.  
 
It might be objected at this point that Kant’s whole purpose is to detach morality 
from our motivating impulses and ends; that according to Kant, we are free not 
because we pursue our own ends and gratify our desires but because we abide by the 
Moral Law. But this does not alter the fact that for there to be a Moral Law, there 
must be maxims to which it can be applied, and these maxims can only be generated 
by our ends and our desires. Moreover, for the Moral Law to serve a purpose, more 
than one person must attempt to act on their maxims. In a situation in which our 
actions affected nobody else - on a desert island, for example - there would be no 
need for the Moral Law in the first place because nobody else’s freedom or ends 
could possibly be violated. Therefore the purpose of the Moral Law is to guarantee 
each person’s freedom of action in society; to guarantee their freedom to pursue their 
own ends without hindrance.  
 
Disembodied reason – or the triumph of reason over desire 
 
It follows that because the moral object of the exercise (as I am interpreting it 
here) is to enable people to freely pursue their own ends, it is only to be expected 
that the Moral Law has little or nothing to say about the ends people should pursue 
or about the determining grounds that would guide people’s actions within the limits 
it prescribes. But of course Kant does not intend the Moral Law merely to prescribe 
limits to people’s actions in order to better enable them to pursue their selfish 
interests and appetitive desires. The Moral Law is meant to transform people from 
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 As Iris Murdoch notes of Kantian moral philosophy, the ‘sovereign moral concept is freedom’ 




(in effect) animals blindly enslaved to their passions into morally autonomous 
individuals for whom reason alone is the arbiter; it is meant to represent the 
culmination of human rationality – ‘the starry heavens above and the Moral Law 
within’ (Kant, 1996, p. 191). But when Kant tries to set out how the Moral Law 
transforms our will, and therefore transforms our nature, he runs into all sorts of 
difficulties; and it is here, I believe, that the most commonly levelled criticisms of 
Kantian ethics find their mark. 
 
The root of the difficulty lies, I think, in Kant’s rigid demarcation between two 
sorts of determination of the will, and therefore of our actions. First, there is the 
determination of the will (to action) by pure reason in the form of the Moral Law – 
the only motive for action that is rationally and hence morally justified. And second 
there is the determination of the will by ‘material principles’ motivated by the 
‘lower’ desire for pleasure and arising out of ‘self-love’ or ‘private happiness’ (Kant, 
1996, p. 35). Now Kant is insistent that that the determining principle of the will 
must be pure reason alone; that the Moral Law ‘forces itself on us [my italics] as a 
synthetic a priori proposition, which is not based on any intuition, either pure or 
empirical’ (p. 47); that reason ‘determines the will immediately, not by the means of 
an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain’, and that ‘even the slightest admixture of 
the motives of the latter [the lower desire for pleasure] impairs its strength and 
superiority’ (p. 38). But the result is, apparently, to deny the lower desires - and for 
Kant, all determinants of our actions other than pure reason count as lower desires
11
 - 
any determining or motivating role at all in our behaviour in so far as it can be 
justified on moral grounds. Moral behaviour is detached from the empirical world 
altogether. As Berys Gaut comments, what we really are in Kant’s scheme is a 
disembodied will floating free of time and space (Gaut, 1997, p. 181).  
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 It is extraordinary that Kant lumps together all our appetites, desires, feelings, sentiments (however 
altruistic or noble), sympathies, interests, dispositions, commitments and obligations (other than those 
dictated by pure reason and self-willed via the Categorical Imperative) as material principles 
motivated by the ‘lower’ desire for pleasure and arising out of ‘self-love’ or ‘private happiness’. Even 
the ‘more refined pleasures and enjoyments’, the ones that cultivate as well as delight, the ones that 
may involve ‘understanding and reason’ in considerable measure (Kant, 1996, pp. 37-8), are to be 
regarded as ‘pathological’ (2005, p. 38) because they are ultimately explained, according to Kant, by 
the same low desire for pleasure (1996, p. 37). However, Kant’s approach is justified if one accepts 




Gaut further argues that the logical implication of Kant’s account of the 
transcendentally free agent is that a rational being must wish to be rid of his 
inclinations altogether on the grounds that they are a threat to the autonomy of the 
rational will; and it is true that Kant’s disparaging depiction of the lower desires 
often seems to suggest this. But I think it is clear, even if it is not logically 
compatible with his account of the rational will, that Kant does recognise, albeit 
grudgingly, that the original motives and impulses for our actions (the sources of 
determination of the will) are ‘material principles’ and ‘lower desires’. For example, 
when Kant writes that ‘to be happy is necessarily the wish of any finite rational 
being’ (Kant, 1996, p. 39), he is referring to legitimate material principles of 
determination of the will. And therefore the task is to apply the Moral Law to these 
material principles of action in order to determine which of them can be 
universalised and therefore morally justified. Indeed, when Kant formulates the 
Categorical Imperative as ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the 
same time [my italics] will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant, 2005, p.97), 
this seems implicit in the very phrasing. The maxims that that constitute our original 
motives and impulses for action exist independently of the Moral Law. 
 
However, this dual-aspect theory of motivation, as Korsgaard terms it, remains 
highly unsatisfactory. For if the lower desires are to be regarded as supplying the 
originating cause of (or motive for) the action, then the procedure is simply that of 
judging whether or not the proposed action is compatible with the Moral Law; in 
other words, we are back in the position I outlined earlier, whereby the Moral Law 
can be understood merely as setting limits to our permitted range of actions, limits 
within which we can lead our lives and pursue our interests, whether they be selfish 
or altruistic (Kant regards both as ultimately motivated by the desire for pleasure), 
without hindrance – provided, of course, that we do not infringe the right of others to 
do the same. And though this is, I believe, a perfectly coherent interpretation of the 
Moral Law, it is not at all what Kant intends. It is as if Kant is searching for a sort of 
sublimation in which the action escapes the taint of its original motivating 
determining impulse, but it turns out to be impossible to detail the process by which 
this might be brought about without at the same time eliminating the originating 




The problem is that though the form of the maxim has been specified - i.e. it 
must be capable of being willed a universal law, its actual content has not. As 
MacIntyre notes, the Categorical Imperative provides a test for maxims but ‘does not 
tell me whence I am to derive the maxims which first provide the need for a test’. It 
tells us, allegedly, what we cannot do – tell lies, break promises and so forth – but 
‘as to what activities we ought to engage in, what ends we should pursue, the 
categorical imperative seems to be silent’ (MacIntyre, 1989, p. 197). In fact, if it is 
interpreted as a limiting condition on our actions, there is, as I argued earlier, no 
need for it to tell us what activities we ought to engage in; we are free within the 
limits of the Moral Law to follow our desires and pursue happiness. But the problem 
then is that we are free to engage in activities of no value whatever, perhaps even to 
engage in activities that are destructive of other values and goods in our lives, so 
long as we are inclined to do so and our inclinations do not transgress the 
requirements of the Moral Law (see Gaut, 1997, p. 178). The corollary is that actions 
judged to be of high value or moral worth by any other standard of value or good 
than that of the Moral Law – for example, actions motivated by feelings of altruism 
or benevolence or compassion, or by a desire to display the virtues – count for 
nothing; Kant allows them no moral worth at all.    
 
Moreover, even if we allowed that the Moral Law had substantive content, that it 
gave us adequate guidance on how we should act, Kant provides no account of how a 
person is to develop the will, or strength of will, necessary to transcend his lower 
appetitive desires and submit to the Moral Law, other than as a sort of blinding 
revelation. And yet the existence of the phenomenon of akrasia or ‘weakness of will’ 
suggests that cognition is not enough; a person must also be motivated at a deeper 
level, either by psychological motives grounded in our biologically evolved human 
nature (as Humeans would have it) or by habituated, acculturated dispositions - 
‘virtues’ - grounded in a shared conception of the good (as Aristotelians would have 
it). Even supposing that the Moral Law could be made concrete by the study of 
sufficient numbers of examples of its application in the manner of case law and even 
supposing that all pupils were up to the task
12
, what is to prevent the whole process 
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 The problem here is that regardless of whether the Moral Law has substantive content or not, the 




from remaining a sterile intellectual exercise? How is the theory to be internalised or 
habituated so that it becomes motivational? Moral education that emphasised the 
social value of certain moral precepts in sustaining a civilized society (i.e. that 
appealed to a sort of enlightened self interest), or that appealed to people’s natural 
sentiments, or that simply cultivated certain dispositions or virtues through practice 
regardless of justification, would, one might imagine, be at least feasible. But 
Kantian morality involves none of these. There is a strong sense in which Kantian 
morality, by its very nature, could never be habituated or trained, because it is 
supposed to be self-willed by the autonomous actor out of rational necessity: the 
Moral Law ‘forces itself on us [my italics] as a synthetic a priori proposition, which 
is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical’ (Kant, 1996, p. 47). In this 




Despite, then, the importance of the Moral Law in helping establish the original 
contract on which civil society might be founded, the broader ethical questions ‘how 
should I live?’ and ‘what is a good life?’, which are arguably fundamental to moral 
philosophy, perhaps even definitional of it, are not addressed at all. In fact, by 
relegating these questions to matters of personal choice and the individual pursuit of 
happiness, by advocating that ‘every person may seek happiness in the way that 
seems best to him’ (Kant, 1983, p. 72), Kantian ethics comes to share precisely the 
same defect as Humean ethics. In the end, both reduce to utilitarianism, and the 
defects and limitations of utilitarianism that I detailed earlier therefore apply to Kant 
just as they do to Hume. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
almost any precept can be universalised if formulated carefully enough - suggests that the practical 
application of the Moral Law is not at all straightforward; that the Moral Law does not determine the 
will with the force or immediacy Kant supposes. 
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 In her paper ‘Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?’, Kate Moran argues that contrary to 
what is implied in his account of the nature of the Moral Law, Kant does believe that pupils, and later 
students, require ‘a kind of formal education in learning and applying the moral law’ (Moran, 2009, p. 
471). Interestingly, there is much in common between Kant’s stages of moral education, as detailed in 
his lectures on pedagogy and anthropology, and the sort of moral education afforded by a study of the 
humanities that I describe in Chapter 6. So, for example, Kantian moral education would involve the 
discussion of ‘cases and historical examples’, and a process of questioning and dialogue (a sort of 
‘moral catechism’) in which the teacher ‘slowly draws out of the student basic moral principles’ (pp. 
478-9). But what is lacking is any sense that pupils and students need to be motivated at a deeper level 
or that moral instruction needs to proceed concurrently with practical experience – things, I shall 
argue in Chapter 2, that might be achieved through a habituation of the virtues. In fact, Kant insists 
that children should not develop habits: ‘The more habits that a child develops, the less likely he is to 




If we are to address these central ethical questions, then we must depart from 
Kant’s notional republic of rational beings and re-introduce into the moral equation 
the desires, inclinations and impulses that actually do motivate our actions, along 
with the obligations, commitments, interests and values that derive from our 
contingent circumstances (from social and occupational roles, from cultural norms, 
from family attachments and so forth). Another way of expressing this, as we shall 
see later, is that we must take into account the intrinsic goods (including the virtues) 
that can only derive from a social-cultural inheritance of practices and traditions. 
And this, in turn, means that we must abandon Kant’s rigid demarcation between 




Kant feels compelled to disregard contingent empirical determinants of people’s 
actions as possible sources of morality because he is convinced that the source of 
moral norms lies in our nature as rational beings. And as I argued earlier, I think that 
his insight here is essentially correct. The source of our need to submit ourselves to 
both narrow moral norms and to wider ethical values lies in our very nature as self-
conscious beings given to reflecting on our motives and our ends. But Kant is wrong 
to insist that our submission to these norms must take the form of submission to the 
Categorical Imperative of the Moral Law. Our search as rational beings for moral 
norms and wider values (with intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual and moral values all 
constituting dimensions of a wider ethical system), though it might involve 
formulating universally applicable principles of morality as a limiting condition on 
our actions, must embrace the whole range of our interests, commitments, 
obligations and sympathies. Only then can we begin to answer the greatest questions 
of moral philosophy; only then can we come to discover how we ought to live, and 
what, for us, might constitute ‘the good life’.  
 
 
                                                          
14
 Korsgaard seeks to remedy this deficiency (or deficiency of emphasis as she sees it) in Kant by 
reinstating desires as legitimate sources of motivation, value and obligation in the form of ‘contingent 
practical identities’ (which replace the principle of self-love) and by arguing that the Moral Law 
might be considered part of a ‘double-aspect theory of motivation’ (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 243). But the 
demarcation between reason and desire remains and the defects of Kant’s ‘double-aspect theory of 




An Aristotelian synthesis  
 
In summary, the problem with Enlightenment rationality is that because it takes 
freedom to be the sovereign moral concept, the moral questions ‘how should I live’ 
and ‘what is the good life for me’ go undetermined. There is no shared substantive 
conception of the good on which to draw for our moral or ethical norms. And 
although the public law and the Moral Law prescribe the behaviour we should 
refrain from so as not to infringe the freedom of others, as to what we positively 
should do with our lives, they have nothing to say. But if Enlightenment rationality 
is to be rejected as a source of moral norms and ethical values, then we must surely 
look to the alternative; that practical reason is, at least in part and in some sense, 
habituated; and the classic account of habituated reason is Aristotle’s. Moral 
excellence is therefore not a matter of reason attaining sovereignty over the will, or 
over our desires, but is the result of full and harmonious development, initially 
involving habituation, of the moral and intellectual virtues; and the central virtue in 
Aristotle’s ethical system is phronesis, the ability to make a practical judgement.     
 
It is, I shall argue in the next chapter, the great strength of Aristotelian ethical 
theory that it provides an account of how people might deliberate rationally on an 
ethical course of action and find the motivation to carry it through. By providing an 
integrated theory of reason and desire, of morality and action, Aristotle is able to 
articulate a shared, substantive conception of the good, and supply a clear answer to 
the questions ‘how should I live?’ and ‘what is the good life?’ In fact, Aristotelian 
ethics might be regarded as a synthesis of Kantian rationalism and Humean 
naturalism: by situating human nature in a civilization, ‘higher’ values are 
incorporated in it; and by situating reason in the practices of a civilization, by 
habituating practical rationality so that it becomes second nature
15
, reason is given 
substance (content) and actualised in concrete human behaviour. The missing 
ingredient in Kant’s account is the Aristotelian insight that a person must be 
habituated, cultivated, formed by education and upbringing into a certain sort of 
person; a person with certain dispositions, desires, interests and values - including 
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the ones necessary for rational behaviour. The missing ingredient in Hume’s account 
(necessary to avert a descent into hedonism) is the Aristotelian insight that human 
nature – incorporating our instincts, interests, desires, motivational states and goals – 
is formed in a civilization, a civilization through which higher transcendent interests 
and values (or norms) are mediated.  
 
However, Aristotle’s ethical system raises profound problems of its own and is 
the object of a series of criticisms from both proponents and critics of Enlightenment 
rationality, some relating to Aristotle’s original account and some relating to the 
interpretations of neo-Aristotelians. The most commonly raised objections might be 
detailed as follows: 
1 – The problem of habituation: Aristotle argues that moral virtue – and by 
extension phronesis or practical judgement - must be habituated. But this implies an 
authoritarian view of education, a mindless conditioning that is antithetical to the 
exercise of critical reason. 
2 – The problem of moral conflict: Aristotle argues that moral excellence 
involves a harmonious balance or ‘unity’ of the virtues, and a shared conception of 
the supreme good. But this takes account neither of the moral dilemmas that 
characterise human life, nor of the plurality of values and goods that exist in a 
modern liberal democracy. How could any one set of virtues, values or beliefs be 
selected for habituation? 
3 – The problem of relativism: Any status quo, however objectionable, would 
appear to be justified in the Aristotelian system. Traditions, customs, prejudices and 
superstitions are ethically valid merely by virtue of being handed down and 
habituated. Enlightenment standards of reason and human rights, that are universal, 
give way to an extreme relativism between cultures and traditions.  
 
It is to a consideration of the Aristotelian ethical system and to the most 






Aristotelian ethics: the role of habituation and phronesis 
in moral development 
 
I concluded in Chapter 1 that Enlightenment conceptions of freedom, autonomy 
and practical reason are deficient because, firstly, they say nothing about the wider 
values, commitments and interests that might be worth actively cultivating in a 
civilized society; and, secondly, when moral norms are specified, there is no account 
offered of why we should feel obliged to abide by these norms - of why we should 
be motivated to behave morally. In short, there is no shared, substantive vision of the 
good on which to base, or within which to frame, an answer to the question ‘what 
sort of life should I lead?’ An adequate account of ethical life must incorporate the 
whole range of interests, values and commitments that do, or conceivably might, 
motivate us – including the objects that we designate good, worthwhile, ethical or 
moral as part of our normal linguistic usage and that by their very nature form part of 
a social and cultural inheritance. In this chapter, therefore, I continue my search for 
an ethical foundation for liberal education by turning to Aristotle because his is the 
classic account of an ethical system in which general dispositions of character – or 
virtues - are cultivated through a process of habituation; in which ethical judgement 
(phronesis) is cultivated as a mode of deliberation and perception (rather than as a 
theory of moral obligation) that takes full account of the particularity and complexity 
of a person’s circumstances, and is (potentially) compatible with the pursuit of a 
wide range of goods and ends
1
; and, finally, in which reason is integrated with desire 
so as to explain how a person comes to be motivated to live an ethical life in the first 
place.  
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 Though Aristotle’s conception of the good life – the sort of life in which the virtues can be fully 
exercised – is limited to the political and the contemplative, I argue in Chapters 3 and 4 that this can 
be extended to encompass a variety of practices. My concern in this chapter is specifically with the 




In this chapter I shall explore the two pivotal concepts of Aristotelian moral 
development - ‘habituation’ and ‘phronesis’ - and try to elucidate the relation 
between them, a relation that is notoriously difficult in Aristotle’s account. In 
particular, I shall try to answer the charge that habituation (the moral formation of 
character) and phronesis (the capacity to make ethical judgements) are antithetical to 
each other. The difficulty of integrating habituation and phronesis into a coherent, 
unified account of moral development has led many modern-day Aristotelians to 
foreground phronesis, to conceive it as the skill or capacity of a person to rationally 
‘critically’ justify their actions, values and beliefs, and hence to treat phronesis as the 
necessary condition for moral autonomy. However, I shall argue in this chapter that 
habituation is the central fact of moral education and moral development; that the 
capacity to form ethical judgements, which is usually attributed to a separate stage of 
phronesis, is actually better attributed to the process of moral habituation; and that 
phronesis, if it is to be a fruitful concept, must be conceived in different terms to the 
ones in which it is apparently conceived by Aristotle.  
 
Though I consider the coherence of Aristotle’s ethical system in this chapter, and 
in particular the central Aristotelian concepts of habituation and phronesis, the main 
purpose is not to try and establish what Aristotle meant to say, or could be 
interpreted as saying, but rather to take the broad conceptual framework of 
Aristotle’s ethics as the starting point from which an ethics of liberal education 
might be developed. The implications for education of putting habituation at the 
heart of moral development, of replacing ‘moral autonomy’ with the formation of 
character (which I take here to incorporate the capacity to exercise moral judgement) 
as a primary aim, are far-reaching. 
 
Aristotle’s ethical system 
 
In Aristotle’s ethical system, the cultivation of morality through the formation of 
a virtuous character comprises essentially two stages, the first involving habituation 




reflection on what has been learned
2
. In the first stage, which begins in childhood, 
the moral virtues are progressively acquired or engendered in us by practising them 
(Aristotle, 1976, p. 91); and in the second stage, phronesis (variously translated into 
English as practical judgement, practical wisdom, practical reason, prudence or 
common-sense
3
) is acquired. Phronesis is the architectonic virtue that enables a 
person ‘to deliberate [well] about what is good’ and hence act well by taking into 
account the particular facts of any given situation (p. 209). Developed through a 
combination of moral instruction and experience, it imbues moral virtue with reason 




Underpinning Aristotle’s account of habituated virtue is his great insight that 
moral knowledge (which includes the capacity to deliberate well) is insufficient on 
its own to explain a person’s actions because it does not explain how a person is to 
develop the motivation or ‘strength of will’ necessary to transcend instinctive 
appetites, passions and desires. This is exemplified, on the one hand, by Aristotle’s 
akratic man (the akrates) who having deliberated well on a virtuous course of action 
fails to follow it through - his good intentions giving way unaccountably to 
instinctive appetites and desires; and, on the other, by Aristotle’s pupil unhabituated 
in moral virtue to whom moral instruction falls on deaf ears. To act well, a person 
must be motivated at a deeper psychological and emotional level, and so we have the 
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 Whether or not these stages should be interpreted in chronological or conceptual terms (or both) is 
unclear in Aristotle. I shall address this question in the course of this chapter. I have refrained in this 
chapter from terming the second stage ‘moral education’ because I am following Aristotle in taking 
moral education to encompass both stages.  Admittedly, the terms ‘training’ and ‘instruction’ (as with 
‘didactic’ when used to describe teaching) have come to have connotations of learning by rote, but we 
might note that The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines education as: (1) the process of 
nourishing or rearing, (2) the process of bringing up, and (3) the systematic instruction, schooling or 
training given to the young (Onions, 1983, p. 630). For the OED at any rate, there is no such 
connotation. Henceforth, I shall use the term ‘moral instruction’ to refer to the moral teaching and 
learning that require formal classroom teaching, and refer to habit formation as moral training - or 
simply habituation. 
3
 Henceforth, I shall use the term phronesis regardless of the translation from which I have drawn. 
4
 Whether the term ‘moral virtue’ should be confined to virtue in its full sense (to ‘intelligent virtue’), 
and habituated virtue termed ‘virtuous action’ or ‘unintelligent virtue’ or ‘natural virtue’ in order to 
distinguish it from virtue in its full sense, is a matter of debate. At the end of Book 6 of The 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle slides between describing habituated virtue as ‘natural virtue’ and 
‘virtue’. When phronesis is factored in, habituated virtue is transformed into what Aristotle terms 
‘true virtue’. I shall follow the example of Aristotle in Book 2 and refer to ‘moral virtue’ as being 




Aristotelian notion of habituated, acculturated dispositions or virtues grounded in a 




However, if one side of the Aristotelian coin is that the desire to lead a virtuous 
life is habituated, the other is that a person must be able to deliberate well about what 
is good. It is arguably one of the greatest strengths of the Aristotelian ethical system 
that the ethical, in the form of phronesis, is conceived as a mode of deliberation and 
perception, and therefore has the potential to encompass a much wider range of 
human concerns and interests than rival Enlightenment theories of moral obligation 
and practical reason. The argument for elevating broader ethical above narrower 
moral considerations, indeed for regarding the very notion of moral obligation as 
expressive of ‘a deeply rooted and still powerful misconception of life’, has found no 
more powerful advocate than Bernard Williams in Ethics and The Limits of 
Philosophy (Williams, 2006, chapter 10). Williams argues that ethical considerations 
are not restricted to the notion of moral obligation, to the categorical moral ‘ought’, 
but encompass non-moral feelings (e.g. regret, hope, passion and affection), social, 
cultural and religious influences (including those represented by an inherited 
catalogue of virtues and vices), personal character or personality, and non-moral or 
morally indifferent actions. Other factors than the moral will therefore weigh in the 
balance when it comes to assigning levels of ‘deliberative priority’ (p.183) – for 
example, the notion of importance arising from a person’s commitments, interests or 
desires, and even utilitarian considerations of the greatest happiness. Similarly, 
practical necessity might be determined by considerations other than the moral ‘for 
reasons of prudence, self-protection, aesthetic or artistic concern, or sheer self-
assertion’ (p. 188). The list is potentially almost endless. Moral ‘considerations’, 
argues Williams, can therefore be seen as only one kind of a larger group of ethical 
considerations (albeit an important one), a kind that if allowed to displace the others 
distorts human life by imposing an abstract, restrictive and ultimately impossibly 
demanding conception of duty. However, which interests and commitments would 
be counted ethically justified, and according to which criteria, is quite another 
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matter; one might, for example, be subject to all sorts of sadistic and perverted 
desires, but these could hardly be counted ethical.   
 
True, Williams rejects Aristotle’s ‘teleological universe’ in which ‘every human 
being … has a kind of inner nisus toward a life of at least civic virtue’ (p. 44), and 
argues that Aristotle’s view that ‘ethical dispositions can be fully harmonized with 
other cultural and personal aspirations’ (p. 52) is no longer tenable, the political 
assumptions on which it rested long since having collapsed
6
. And yet if the 
Aristotelian conception of ethics, founded as it is on the apprehension of particulars, 
is prised apart from Aristotle’s metaphysical teleology, I think it contains much of 
what Williams is looking for. By centring ethics on character training and ethical 
perception, rather than on moral theory, the individual actor is freed to make his own 
judgements and to take into account Williams’ wider ethical considerations when he 
deliberates. For Martha Nussbaum the very essence of Aristotelian practical wisdom 
is ‘the ability to recognise, acknowledge, respond to, pick out certain salient features 
of a complex situation’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 305). And as Aristotle himself notes, 
‘phronesis apprehends the ultimate particular, which cannot be apprehended by 
scientific knowledge, but only by perception’ (Aristotle, 1976, p. 215).  
 
The paradox of moral education 
 
There are, as I have already indicated in Chapter 1, a number of objections to 
Aristotle’s ethical system or theory. I shall address all of these in due course but I 
would like to begin by considering possibly the most serious objection, the one 
potentially undermining of Aristotle’s whole ethical system.  The long-standing 
charge is that not only is character training authoritarian and anti-democratic 
(Kristjansson, 2007, p. 31), the very notion that virtue (and hence moral knowledge 
and understanding) can be habituated is nonsensical; that mindless conditioning in 
the form of habituation, and reasoned reflection or deliberation in the form of 
phronesis, are antithetical to each other.   
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Part of the problem (perhaps it is even the whole problem) is that though, in 
Book 6 of The Nicomachean Ethics
7
, Aristotle offers a tantalising account of the 
symbiotic relation between moral virtue and phronesis, between desire and intellect, 
he never quite seems to adequately define and stabilise his terms or to specify the 
relation between them. Phronesis is variously described as ‘the attainment of truth 
corresponding to right desire’ (Aristotle, 1996, p.146), the ability ‘to deliberate well 
about what is good and advantageous’ (p. 149), and ‘a truth-attaining rational 
quality, concerned with action in relation to the things that are good for human 
beings’ (p. 150). Of the relation between phronesis and moral virtue, Aristotle writes 
on the one hand that whereas ‘[moral] virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim 
at, phronesis ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end’ (p. 158); 
and, on the other, that phronesis is not merely a rational means instrumental to a 
moral end but is inseparable from moral virtue – that ‘phronesis is not merely a 
rational state’ (1976, p. 210). Though I think it is clear that Aristotle accords a 
certain primacy, conceptual and developmental, to moral virtue (as is clear from his 
account of the habituation of the moral virtues at the beginning of Book 2), his 
account does not elaborate the conceptual relation between moral virtue and 
phronesis, which is clearly much more complex than a straightforward means-end 
relation. Nor does he elaborate the developmental process by which phronesis (or 
reasoned desire) develops out of habituated virtue (or unreasoned but socially 
directed desire) and ‘imbues’ (if that is the right term) the appetites, desires, 
emotions and perceptions with reason. And though, according to Aristotle, both 
moral instruction and experience play a part in the development of phronesis, the 
relation between the two is unclear, as is the form the instruction might take. In part, 
then, as a consequence of this ambivalence (or straightforward confusion), the 
interpretation of Aristotle’s account remains a matter of live debate; and no question 
is more hotly contested than that of explaining how habituated and hence apparently 
mindless or mechanical virtuous action can be transformed into intelligent virtue 
culminating in phronesis.  
 
In Moral Development and Moral Education (1981), R. S. Peters notes that from 
the beginning there have been two contrasting and diverging accounts of morality: 
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one that emphasises ‘habit, tradition and being properly brought up’ and the other 
that emphasises ‘intellectual training’ and ‘the development of critical thought and 
choice’. Aristotle ‘attempted to combine both, but was led into a paradox about 
moral education which resulted from his attempt to stress the role both of reason and 
of habit’ (Peters, 1981, p. 45). This encapsulates the problem but we are no nearer to 
a solution - if indeed there is a solution. Miles Burnyeat remarks that the vexed 
question ‘can virtue be taught?’ is perhaps the oldest question in moral philosophy 
(Burnyeat, 1999, p. 69), and the Socratic doctrine ‘that virtue is knowledge’ (p. 70) 
has found a forceful advocate in recent times in Bernard Williams. Williams argues 
that a habituation of the virtues, and in particular of phronesis (the intelligent virtue), 
implies a conditioning that is contrary to the notion of free, rational deliberation; that 
Aristotle’s ‘account of moral development in terms of habituation and internalisation 
… leaves little room for practical reason to alter radically the objectives that a 
grown-up person has acquired’; people are in a sense denied the capability of asking 
themselves the Socratic question ‘how should I live?’ (Williams, 2006, pp. 38-40).  
 
In a sense Williams’ charge has already been addressed in Chapter 1. The notion 
of Enlightenment rationality or neutral reason (which we might describe as the heir 
to Socratic rationalism) together with its complement, the notion of the sovereign 
chooser or autonomous actor, is at best incomplete, at worst incoherent, because 
lacking a substantive shared vision of the good, people are unable to answer the 
questions ‘what ought I to do?’ and ‘how should I lead my life?’ To argue that 
objective goods or moral norms must be justified on rational and epistemic grounds 
is to end up in the Kantian impasse I described. Moral norms are emptied of 
substantive content and detached from motivating reasons or desires - unless we 
follow Hume and the utilitarians in eliminating moral norms and higher values from 
the picture altogether (or follow Rawls in identifying goodness with rationality
8
). 
Therefore we must look to the alternative – namely, that our ethics is founded on a 
shared conception of the good rooted in our social, cultural and linguistic practices; 
and the paradigm for this is Aristotle’s ethical system, in which moral virtue is 
habituated. However, we cannot simply accept Aristotle’s account of moral 
habituation by default - i.e. accept it on the grounds that we have rejected (or 
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partially rejected) the Enlightenment account. This is to answer Williams’ charge 
only in a negative sense. If the first principles or premises of ethical deliberation are 
to be regarded as determined by habituation, there is still an apparent paradox at the 
heart of Aristotle’s ethics. We need therefore to attempt to reconstruct Aristotle’s 
account so as to elaborate, and if possible to clarify, the nature of the relation 
between habituation and phronesis; and in so doing determine whether Aristotle’s 
account is fundamentally sound. And in order to do this, we must begin with the 
habituation of moral virtue, the notion which Aristotle apparently accords primacy in 
his ethical theory.  
 
The habituation of moral virtue  
 
The notion that moral virtue - and by extension the ends or goods at which 
people must aim if they are to attain eudaimonia – must be habituated lies at the 
heart of Aristotle’s ethical system. The importance accorded the habituation of moral 
virtue, the formation of virtuous dispositions or right habits, is made clear enough at 
the beginning of Book 2: 
 
‘Moral goodness … is the result of habit’  
‘The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by nor contrary to 
nature; we are constituted by nature to receive them, but their full 
development in us is due to habit.’ 
‘But the virtues we acquire by first exercising them’ 
‘So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the 
earliest age – it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the 
world.’  
(Aristotle, 1976, pp. 91-2) 
 
Now Aristotle’s justification for the habituation of the virtues (which he presents 
when he returns to the theme of the importance of habituation in Book 10) is quite 




virtuous life - to someone who has not undergone a process of prior habituation: ‘the 
soil must have been previously tilled if it is to foster the seed, the mind of the pupil 
must have been prepared by the cultivation of habits, so as to like and dislike aright’ 
(Aristotle, 1996, p. 279). The emotional desire or motivation to lead a virtuous life - 
the very notion that one ought to behave in a certain way because it is intrinsically 
good and not merely pleasurable
9
 to do so - is not present and no amount of 
intellectual argument or persuasion can engender this desire. The argument will 
therefore fall on deaf ears. The very idea of pursuing the good and acting virtuously 
is foreign to him; the only pleasure he can derive is through the pursuit of his 
appetitive desires and passions. His life being governed by appetite, he has no sense 
of shame and only the threat of punishment can drive him to virtuous conduct. Such 
men, remarks Aristotle, ‘have not even a notion of what is noble and truly pleasant, 
having never tasted true pleasure’. ‘What theory’, Aristotle goes on, ‘can reform the 
natures of men like these? To dislodge by argument habits long firmly rooted in their 
characters is difficult if not impossible’ (p. 279).  
 
But though we might agree with Aristotle here (and Hume is surely making the 
same point when he argues that reason is the slave of the passions), it is still unclear 
in Aristotle’s account how the charge of mindless conditioning can be refuted. For 
many commentators generally sympathetic to Aristotle
10
, the key to explaining how 
virtue can be rendered intelligent is the Aristotelian notion of phronesis - the 
intellectual virtue that integrates all the others. Aristotle argues at the end of Book 6 
that phronesis and moral goodness are inseparable, that ‘it is not possible to be good 
in the true sense of the word without phronesis, or to [exhibit phronesis] without 
moral goodness’ (Aristotle, 1976, p. 224). And though he says in the very same 
passage that goodness ‘identifies the end’ and phronesis ‘makes us perform the acts 
that are means towards it’ (p. 225), Aristotle’s distinction between ‘natural virtue’ 
and ‘virtue in its full sense’ (pp. 223-4), the latter requiring intelligence, only makes 
sense on this view if phronesis encompasses deliberation about ends as well as 
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 Pleasurable in the sense of satisfying one’s appetitive desires. 
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 Jessica Moss details this ‘formidable array of interpreters’ as including John McDowell, Terence 
Irwin and David Wiggins (see Moss, 2011, p. 205). It also includes Myles Burnyeat, Kristjan 





11. We must recognise, as David Wiggins argues, that Aristotle’s account is 
confused, his ideas are ‘inchoate’ and ‘sketchily and obscurely’ expressed; and that it 
simply would not make sense for him to confine practical reason to deliberation 
about means (Wiggins, 1980, pp. 232-4). Our understanding  of the virtues, the good 
life (and of the eudaimonia that is consequent on this) and our ends is therefore not 
‘merely habituated’ (i.e. mindlessly conditioned) but is the outcome of rational 
reflection
12
. We must distinguish, with Myles Burnyeat, the desire to be virtuous 
engendered by habituation from the ‘reasoned desire’ that arises ‘from a reflective 
scheme of values’; hence the need for ‘a course in practical thinking to enable 
someone who clearly wants to be virtuous to understand better what he should do 
and why’ (Burnyeat, 1999, pp. 80-1).  
 
The problem with this view, cogent as it is, is that it does not accord with the 
primacy Aristotle clearly accords habituation in Book 2. As Jessica Moss notes, 
Aristotle states again and again that it is moral virtue that makes the goal right. 
Moss argues that there is simply no evidence that ‘he characterizes phronesis in such 
a way that it must include a grasp of ends’ (Moss, 2011, p. 206): 
 
Virtue makes the goal right; phronesis is responsible only for what 
contributes to the goal. That is, practical intellect does not tell us what ends 
to pursue, but only how to pursue them; our ends themselves are set by our 
ethical characters. (p. 205) 
 
But do we take Aristotle’s remarks on habituation in Book 2 at face value? Richard 
Sorabji suggests they are not in accord with Aristotle’s other writings because read 
in isolation, they would make the rest of The Nicomachean Ethics – which includes a 
detailed account of the separate virtues, of finding virtue in accordance with the 
mean, and of phronesis as the culmination of moral virtue - redundant (Sorabji, 
1980, pp. 214-18); and therefore we should take Aristotle as arguing that instruction 
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 It is in fact unclear in this passage of Aristotle’s whether virtue in its full sense is meant to develop 
out of natural virtue or whether the two exist contemporaneously as conceptual qualities. 
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 I shall return to Wiggins’ argument (that deliberation about means cannot be detached from 
deliberation about ends) in Chapter 3, when I consider moral development in the context of initiation 




(and hence phronesis) is essential to completing the work begun by habituation - is 
essential to developing a clear conception of the good life.  
 
In fact, I am not sure that either of these apparently opposed views says anything 
that is fundamentally different. Both are compatible with the basic assertion that 
‘habituation of moral virtue supplies the ends and phronesis supplies the means’, 
because for the end to actually be attained, both means and end - both teaching and 
habituation - are necessary. Moral virtue is no use if it does not translate into 
virtuous action, and since all action is necessarily particular in nature, it must be 
directed by practical reason; and so we might agree with Burnyeat that deliberation 
‘articulates a general good’ and ‘focuses it on a particular action’ (Burnyeat, 1999, 
p.82). The real point at issue arises when it is argued, as most commentators I think 
do, that the ends or ethical first principles can only be justified, and hence only 
established to begin with, by a process of rational and critical reflection; and 
therefore that though habituation may be necessary as part of moral education (and 
justified on psychological and motivational grounds), moral education that consisted 
‘merely’ of habituation, that even incorporated a prior stage of habituation, would 




I shall attempt in the course of this chapter and the next to refute this view. I 
think that Aristotle does accord primacy, conceptual and developmental, to moral 
virtue and its habituation, even if this causes him problems later on when he comes 
to try and define phronesis. I think, moreover, that the primacy of habituation can be 
rationally justified and the charge of mindless conditioning refuted in a very strong 
sense - sufficiently, that is, to reject the notion that moral education must involve, or 
even could involve, the rational justification of the first principles of ethics.
14
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 I do not think Sorabji does, in fact, argue this. Wiggins and (as we shall see later) Kristjansson do 
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14
 Jessica Moss and Jeannie Kerr argue that the real problem with Aristotle’s account of habituated 
virtue, for most commentators who are critical of it or seek to amend it, is the belief or prejudice 
prevalent in moral philosophy since Kant that moral norms must be rationally justifiable (the 
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against accounts that involve the emotions or desires (Moss, 2011, p. 207; Kerr, 2011, pp. 646-7). 




To begin with, there are, I think, two parts to a defence against the charge of 
mindless conditioning: the first concerns the substance of what is being habituated 
(the epistemic aspect) and the second concerns the actual process of habituation (the 
psychological or motivational aspect).  
 
The key to the first part of the defence (here I follow Vasiliou, Moss, and Kerr – 
see Vasiliou, 1996; Moss, 2011; Kerr, 2011) lies in recognising, crucially, that the 
first principles of ethics, the (ethical) goods or ends at which people aim, can by their 
very nature only be apprehended non-rationally. By non-rational apprehension (here 
I follow Moss) I mean specifically the repeated perceptions and experiences of the 
world from which empirical knowledge of that world is necessarily derived (Moss, p. 
255). Just as our empirical knowledge of the natural world is founded on our 
repeated experiences and perceptions of that world
15
, our knowledge and beliefs 
concerning the behaviour that is expected of us are founded on the repeated 
experiences and perceptions (some pleasurable, others painful) of the human world 
produced by habituation
16
; and so habituation in the moral virtues produces the first 
principles or starting points (and therefore the ends) of ethics. However, though they 
are non-rationally apprehended – they cannot be rationally deduced any more than 
can the empirical data of the natural world - there is nothing arbitrary or irrational 
about them. The virtues and social norms being habituated (here I go a step further 
than Moss) are publicly constituted and recognised; they form part of a social, 
cultural and linguistic inheritance that defines our very nature, our ‘second nature’, 
as human beings. They are, in this sense, objective and hence perfectly justifiable on 
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 Inductive reasoning is no more than generalisation from repeated particulars. 
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 Our scientific knowledge of the human world – the knowledge represented by the social sciences – 
clearly belongs to the former category, because the aim is to produce law-like generalisations. By 
contrast, the humanities would seem to be an accumulation of knowledge and belief of the latter kind. 
17
 It should be noted that this argument does not as it stands amount to a defence against the charge of 
relativism – against the charge that even though the values transmitted might not be mindless or 
arbitrary, they might still be abhorrent. I explore how such a defence might be mounted in Chapter 3.  
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 MacIntyre is making essentially the same argument in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) 
when he speaks of a moral tradition as necessarily forming the locus of rational inquiry. To be outside 
the tradition is not to be granted a privileged neutral ‘Archimedean’ vantage point, but rather to be 
excluded altogether from rational debate. I shall consider MacIntyre’s conception of a moral tradition 




The second part of the defence, the other thing that saves the experience of 
habituation in moral virtue from being mindless conditioning in the Pavlovian sense, 
is that upbringing is conducted within the frame of a loving family and a supportive 
community. What motivates the pupil is the desire that is natural in all children to 
emulate their elders, and by pleasing them to gain approval, praise and recognition - 
all of which are pleasurable. It is much more than a question of reward and 
punishment, stimulus and response - though of course these play a part too. Aristotle 
himself recognises this when he notes in Book 10 that  
 
… the instruction and habits prescribed by a father have as much force in the 
household as laws and customs have in the state, and even more, because of 
the tie of blood and the children’s sense of benefits received; for they are 
influenced from the outset by natural affection and docility. (Aristotle, 1976, 
p. 339) 
 
Much the same could be said to apply to adults, for whom an important motivating 
factor is the desire for approval and recognition by family, friends, peers, and (in 
some cases) the public at large, and the sense of satisfaction and fulfilment that 
follows on this. I do not think that we are invoking some mysterious metaphysical or 
psycho-physical property of ‘intrinsic goodness’ nor are we invoking the production 
of quasi-perceptual images, as some Aristotelians claim
19
. We are simply 
recognising that certain forms of behaviour have, on social, cultural and 
straightforward evolutionary grounds, come to be regarded as specially desirable and 
praiseworthy; that they have come to be regarded as the standard by which we 
should be judged. 
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 For example, Jessica Moss argues that ‘repeated perceptions give rise, via phantasia (at work in 
memory) to a generalized but not yet explicitly universal representation’ (Moss, 2011, p. 255); and 
Jana Noel argues that ‘phantasia in the image-producing sense, provides the means for individuals to 
produce in their thinking and reasoning the end good’ (Noel, 1999, p. 283). However, the pitfalls of 
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I shall return in Chapter 3 to the crucial notion that it is only with reference to a 
moral tradition and wider cultural inheritance into which we are habituated that our 
values and moral norms are validated. However, I would like to continue this chapter 
by exploring the implications of my account of habituation for the other pivotal 
concept of Aristotelian ethics - phronesis; for if habituation supplies the first 




The precise relation between habituation and phronesis remains very much a 
matter of debate. Aristotle’s own account of phronesis is, as we have seen, confused 
and sketchy; and therefore there are conflicting interpretations of what Aristotle 
meant, or meant to say, or even ought to have said, but did not. Moreover, there is a 
curious lack of continuity in Aristotle’s account, so that after having emphasised the 
crucial importance of habit formation at the beginning of Book 2, Aristotle makes no 
mention at all in Book 6 of how habituation might relate to phronesis, or of how 
habituated virtue might develop into intelligent virtue. All we have are the twin 
assertions, first, that ‘natural virtue’ and ‘virtue in the full sense’ (intelligent virtue) 
are two distinct ‘qualities’ and that the latter ‘implies phronesis’ (1976, p. 224); and, 
second, that whereas moral virtue (which, following on from Book 1, we presume 
has been habituated) supplies the end at which we aim, phronesis supplies the means 
(p. 222).  
 
However, there is a fundamental problem with this notion that habituation 
supplies the ends and phronesis the means. How can the virtues be habituated other 
than through repeated practice in exercising the virtues and hence in exercising 
practical judgement (phronesis) concerning the exercise of the virtues? Surely it is 
only through some experience of the means that we can have any genuine 
appreciation of the ends. The problem is even more marked when we consider that 
phronesis is supposed to enable us to ‘hit the mean’ with regard to virtuous action (p. 
101). How can a virtue be regarded as having been habituated in any meaningful 




observed in the case of that particular virtue in that particular situation? An example 
might illustrate the point. An important aspect of team games is to develop pupils’ 
appreciation of how to behave towards teammates who ‘let the team down’. The 
teammate who is trying their hardest but either through lack of skill or bad luck 
allows the opposition to score is to be treated with tact and sympathy, to be 
encouraged rather than blamed and humiliated, but also to be given realistic advice 
concerning how to do better next time both in the interests of the team and in order 
to build their own confidence and self-esteem. On the other hand, the teammate who 
makes no effort might more reasonably be blamed and held to account, but there are 
circumstances (one’s teammate might be very upset over something) in which 
assigning blame would be wrong as well as counterproductive. There are subtle 
distinctions and practical judgements to be made here that involve the exercise of a 
range of virtues, such as honesty, compassion, tolerance and respect, but that also 
require considerable situational perception. The very notion that there are two 
distinct stages of moral development, habituation and phronesis, therefore appears 
problematic. 
 
Another problem is that though it is generally (and surely rightly) assumed by 
commentators on Aristotle’s ethics that the development of phronesis requires moral 
instruction, the form this instruction might take and its relation to habituation are 
keenly debated. Aristotle has nothing to say about it at all and concerns himself 
instead in Book 6 almost entirely with what it means to deliberate well. The nearest 
thing we get is the remark that phronesis is not ‘knowledge of general principles 
only: it must also take account of particular facts’ (1996, p. 152), from which we 
might infer that phronesis involves, at least in part, knowledge of general principles, 
and hence the development of phronesis requires instruction in general principles – 
for example, it is logical to assume, the study of Aristotle’s own manual of ethical 




The relation between moral instruction and experience is likewise unclear. For 
example, Aristotle first says (p. 152) that phronesis requires a knowledge of both 
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general principles (presumably the fruit of instruction) and particular facts 
(presumably the fruit of experience); and then says (p. 153) that a young man cannot 
have phronesis because he lacks the experience necessary for a knowledge of 
particular facts. The latter does not necessarily negate the former, but it does leave us 
unclear about the role of moral instruction in the cultivation of phronesis and about 
the form it might take: for example, should it be considered a distinct second stage in 
the development of moral excellence with experience constituting the third and final 
stage?  
 
In the first part of this chapter I have touched on the purpose it would make 
sense to attribute to phronesis given Aristotle’s account of habituation. Now I would 
like to explore the concept of phronesis further, in particular the two factors Aristotle 
identifies as essential to its development: namely, moral instruction and experience. 
First I shall explore the nature of moral instruction and its relation to habituation of 
the moral virtues; then I shall explore the nature of the experience Aristotle also 





I argued earlier that the non-rational process of habituation supplies the first 
principles or ends of ethics. Now the implication of this is that habituation or ‘good 
upbringing’ must precede moral instruction. Burnyeat and Vasiliou both argue (as 
indeed, I think, does Aristotle) that the desire to be virtuous must first be engendered 
by habituation; and Martha Nussbaum makes the point forcefully when she agrees 
with Aristotle’s insistence on ‘a firm basis of good character before [my italics] the 
application of philosophical medicine’ and hence on ‘a sharp distinction between 
character training and the philosophical study of ethics’ (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 318). 
But then we are faced with the dilemma (or apparent dilemma) highlighted by 
Bernard Williams, namely that habituation in the first principles of ethics rules out 
subsequent critical reflection on those principles and thereby renders people 




2006, pp. 38-40). Habituation is, on this argument, little more than mindless 
conditioning.  
 
We have here two diametrically opposed positions. The first is that habituation 
or ‘good upbringing’ must precede moral instruction because (1) knowledge of 
ethical first principles or ends can only be apprehended non-rationally (the epistemic 
argument); and (2) to try to instruct pupils who have not already been habituated 
will, in any case, be futile (the psychological or motivational argument). The second 
is that habituation, in so far as it is deemed necessary at all, must proceed pari passu 
with moral instruction, because unless accompanied by rational reflection on the first 
principles or ends of ethics, habituation amounts to little more than mindless 
conditioning. On the one hand it is argued that without prior habituation, moral 
instruction is rendered futile; on the other hand, it is argued that with prior 
habituation, moral instruction is rendered futile.  
 
How do we resolve these contradictory positions? For when they are taken at 
face value, both lines of argument are, I think, persuasive.  
 
At one level, the answer is straightforward, for I think it is fairly clear that there 
is an element of moral instruction - admittedly highly didactic - from almost the very 
beginning as the desired behaviour is pointed out and described in simple terms to 
the young child: ‘don’t pull her hair, it hurts’ or ‘you could share your sweets, 
couldn’t you’ or ‘that was kind of you, what a good girl’ or even ‘what a horrible 
thing to do!’ How else would the given behaviour be recognised as right or wrong, 
as good or bad? And inevitably with description comes explanation; and with 
explanation comes the invitation to deliberate. As Nancy Sherman notes, the child 
‘can legitimately ask “why”, and some description and explanation will be in order’ 
(Sherman, 1999, p. 243); indeed, the child frequently does ask why – and from quite 
an early age. Elements of deliberation are therefore involved from quite early on as 
the child begins to recognise which behaviour will be judged right or wrong in a 
given situation, and learns to override first impulses. Moreover, as the child begins 




beginnings of deliberation and reflection proper. Inviting the child to consider how 
the other person would feel or be affected, to consider the consequences of their 
actions, forms an indispensable part of moral upbringing from almost as soon as they 
can talk. I think therefore that Kristjan Kristjansson is right when he argues that 
habituation must involve the cultivation of ‘heightened discrimination’ 
(Kristjansson, 2006, p. 109) and ‘the training of perceptual capacities’ (p. 113); and 
Sherman is right when she argues that the emotions ‘cannot be shaped without some 
simultaneous cultivation of discriminatory abilities’ (Sherman, 1999, p. 243). 
Habituation is never mindless or mechanical.  
 
In fact, formal moral instruction in the classroom could be regarded as a natural 
extension and enrichment of this process. The consideration through a study of 
history and literature of how people, real or imaginary, have exercised the virtues 
and dealt with conflicting goods and moral ends provides further experience, albeit 
vicarious (in the sense that deliberation need not issue in action), of exercising 
practical moral judgement. Once again, habituation and moral instruction - 
instruction in both the complex nature of our ends and the practical means to 
attaining those ends - can proceed pari passu.  
 
My point here is that the process of habituation of any given set of moral 
principles or virtues necessarily involves both the experience of having to exercise 
practical judgement (under the guidance of elders), and moral instruction (both 
formal and informal). The crucial question is whether moral instruction should, or 
conceivably could, extend beyond an exploration of the complex nature of socially 
accepted ethical principles (e.g. universal human rights) and core virtues to the 
attempt to provide a rational justification of those ethical first principles and 
cultivate in pupils the capacity to critically reflect on those principles. It is generally 
accepted by Aristotelians that the latter is indispensable to the development of full 
virtue, to the ‘imbuing of virtue with reason’, and that that it belongs to a later, 
conceptually distinct, stage of moral development. So though, for example, Sherman 
concedes that Aristotle’s conception of habituation involves critical rather than 
mechanically repetitive practice (in the sense that it involves attending to a goal, 




pp.246-8), ‘dialectical reasoning’ and ‘rational justification’ are characteristic only 
of ‘the mature student’ who has made ‘the transition to full rationality’ (pp. 244-5). 
Kristjansson argues in similar terms that though habituation cultivates heightened 
discrimination, it does not develop the ‘critical conception’ of what the end should 
be that is required for the development of virtue in its full sense (Kristjansson, 2006, 
p. 109).   
 
However, the problem with this view, as we have seen, is twofold. 
 
First, there is the epistemological problem that the first principles of ethics and 
of ethical action cannot be deduced ex nihilo by pure reasoning in the manner of a 
priori axioms. It is only in the context of a socially culturally situated moral tradition 
that such principles can have any significance. True, it is possible (as I argued in 
Chapter 1) to deduce certain universal human rights from Kant’s categorical 
imperatives and use these as the basis of a social contract. But these provide only a 
framework for ethical behaviour, not the substantial conception of the good and of 
the virtues that might guide a person’s behaviour in any positive sense. 
 
Second, there is the psychological problem that no motive has been supplied for 
ethical action. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a set of ethical first principles 
could be deduced and rationally justified without any reference to the contingent 
empirical world - i.e. principles could be deduced that were universally applicable.  
The problem is that one could only engage in the deduction of such principles (and 
one would only feel the need to engage in the deduction of such principles) if it were 
possible to adopt a neutral Archimedean perspective; and this would be impossible if 
there had been a prior stage of habituation in some given set of principles or virtuous 
dispositions, including the ones one that had been deduced as ethical first principles. 
The clear implication of the notion that people should have a ‘critical conception’ of 
their (moral) ends and should be able to rationally justify their ethical principles is 
that if they find they cannot justify accepted norms, they should reject them; that it is 
ultimately up to individual to choose their ethical principles, their moral codes; that 




And yet without habituation, without any settled disposition to behave according to 
any given set of ethical principles, what would be the motive to act on them? The 
exercise of rational justification remains purely academic - an interesting intellectual 
exercise for those who feel the need to undertake it, but one that remains detached 
from the needs, desires, passions, interests and commitments that do motivate our 
actions. One might act virtuously on occasion, but only if the mood takes one - 
which is to not act virtuously at all.   
 
Some qualification is perhaps needed at this point. It may well be  that a moral 
tradition evolves over time and that rational argument and critical evaluation of 
inherited moral norms on the part of politicians and philosophers (and any other 
interested parties) plays an important part in this. Political or natural events might 
trigger this re-evaluation, or social and economic change, or the ideas of great 
thinkers, or some combination of all these things. My point is that it is only when 
people are habituated in these new or revised values through education and 
upbringing, and when institutions come to embody them, that moral norms can really 
be regarded as having changed and the moral tradition as having evolved. There 
must be a ‘sea-change’ in the culture. However, the status of the individual actor 
situated within this tradition is quite different. The notion that he can deduce for 
himself a comprehensive set of principles of moral behaviour, and then, by some 
supreme act of will, act on them is fanciful. Prophets have sometimes managed this 
act of will but their inspiration was quite different. A moral code was revealed to 
them, usually in a desert or on a mountain top. There was no rational deduction: they 
were called to act by God.  
 
I shall develop this argument concerning the rationality of a moral tradition more 
fully in Chapter 3. My point here is simply to question the premise shared by nearly 
all commentators on Aristotle that instruction in the first principles of ethics together 
with critical reflection on those ends is both feasible and essential if moral virtue is 
to be rendered intelligent, and that the person who has been ‘merely’ habituated 
therefore cannot be virtuous in the fullest sense of the term. Though this is the 
interpretation of Aristotle, or construction put on Aristotle, that is generally thought 




notion that habituation is, as I have argued, the source of the first principles of ethics 
and therefore cannot be rationally deduced or justified on a priori grounds. 
Habituation is not merely a psychological or motivational attachment that, perhaps 
regrettably, has to be appended to any programme of moral instruction; it is the 
central fact of moral education. It follows, I think, that the very notion that moral 
development must culminate in the capacity to critically justify ethical first 
principles or ends, and hence in rational or moral autonomy, is mistaken. 
 
I shall return to the question of moral autonomy in the final section of this 
chapter and I shall develop my argument further in the next chapter, where I explore 
what it might mean to be morally or rationally autonomous in the context of a moral 
tradition; but first I would like to consider the nature of the other element Aristotle 




In Book 6, Aristotle’s famously says the following concerning the contribution 
of experience to phronesis:   
 
… although the young develop ability in geometry and mathematics and 
become wise in such matters, they are not thought to develop prudence. The 
reason for this is that prudence also involves knowledge of particular facts, 
which become known from experience; and a young man is not experienced, 
because experience takes some time to acquire (Aristotle, 1976, p. 215) 
and then 
… error in deliberation is with reference either to the general principle or to 
the particular fact (p. 215)  
 
Unfortunately, Aristotle says little else and his emphasis on the lack of experience of 




the other ingredient of phronesis – moral instruction – is to be imparted. He does not 
elaborate the relation, either conceptual or developmental, between moral instruction 
and experience; nor does he detail the nature of the experience that would develop 
phronesis. So it is left to later commentators to debate what he meant to say and to 
fill out the detail.  
 
Now, phronesis, as conceived by Aristotle, is meant to be the intellectual virtue 
that enables us to decide how, when and to what degree the various virtues – the 
virtues that have already been habituated in us
21
 - are to be exercised in practice. It 
involves the skill, capacity or ability to recognise the aspects of the situation that are 
ethically ‘salient’ (a sort of ‘ethical perception’), to deliberate well, and to arrive at a 
practical judgement concerning the right course of action
22
. The problem is that 
Aristotle’s account of how experience contributes to phronesis reduces to little more 
than the truisms ‘practice makes perfect’ and ‘there is no substitute for experience’. 
There is much wisdom contained here but not enough conceptual substance or 
empirical detail to justify invoking a general skill, ability or capacity of perceiving 
ethically salient particulars and deliberating on a right course of action – the putative 
skill of phronesis. And though it is perfectly legitimate to speak in general terms of a 
person’s ability to make judgements (we might, for example, speak of someone as 
being ‘of sound judgement’), of their practicality, of their ability to solve problems 
and even of their wisdom, it does not follow that a unitary ability, capacity, skill or 
faculty of practical judgement exists or can usefully be identified; even less does it 
follow that this ability can be trained or cultivated. 
 
The general ability of phronesis, as Aristotle conceives it, is supposed to enable 
us - or consists of enabling us - to recognise what is ethically relevant or salient, to 
‘hit the mean’ in action, to make judgements and resolve conflicting ends in both the 
public or political arena and in our personal lives; but what is the nature of the 
experience that would foster this capacity? Would any experience do? Our 
                                                          
21
 ‘... the soil must have been previously tilled’; ‘the mind of the pupil must have been prepared by the 
cultivation of habits’ (Aristotle, 1996, p. 279). 
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experience of practising the virtues, assuming that suitable opportunities arise, and of 
exercising practical judgement may not be one from which we can learn very much. 
We may make the wrong judgements or be accused of bad judgement when things 
go wrong. How are we supposed to know where we went wrong, particularly when 
our intentions were good ones and we acted for the best? How are we to know when 
it was our fault or when it was somebody else’s or when it was unforeseeable 
circumstances that were to blame? After all, perseverance when the going gets tough 
is usually considered to be a virtue. And even if we do think we have learned from 
our mistakes, what is to stop us from getting things wrong next time given that each 
new situation is unique in its particulars? The only thing that can guide us in these 
circumstances, that we can fall back on, is the bedrock of moral judgement afforded 
by our habituation in the virtues. When, as MacIntyre argues, we are faced with 
conflicting goods in a unique set of circumstances in the frame of our own unique 
life narrative, there may well be no optimal rational solution, no right choice. All we 
can do is to try to behave virtuously and honourably once we have decided our 
chosen course of action and to fulfil the commitments we have undertaken: 
 
Yet it is clear that the moral task of the tragic protagonist may be performed 
better or worse, independently of the choice between alternatives that he or 
she makes ... The tragic protagonist may behave heroically or unheroically, 
generously or ungenerously, gracefully or gracelessly, prudently or 
imprudently. To perform his or her task better rather than worse will be to do 
both what is better for him or her qua individual and qua parent or child or 
qua citizen or member of a profession, or perhaps qua some or all of these. 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 224) 
 
Kierkegaard is, I think, making essentially the same point when he argues in 
Either/Or that to act ethically is not so much to make ‘the right choice’ (because 
quite often there is no such thing) as to make a choice and commit oneself to it; to 
fulfil the duties, obligations and responsibilities that arise out of one’s chosen path to 





Here again, you see the importance of choosing, and that which is crucial is 
not so much deliberation as the baptism of choice by which it is assumed into 
the ethical. (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 487)  
 
Indeed, the very fact that we do learn from our mistakes creates problems for 
phronesis. It is almost a truism that a central part of experience consists of making 
mistakes and learning from them, from seeing what works and what does not; and 
that success in life consists not of exercising perfect judgement but of rebounding 
from failure and trying again. But where does that leave phronesis? Is it then the skill 
of avoiding such mistakes, exercising perfect judgement, and leading a perfectly 
integrated and harmonious life; or is it the skill that arises out of having learned from 
one’s mistakes? Neither definition seems very helpful. By contrast, the value of the 
experience afforded by a process of moral habituation, at home and at school, is 
precisely that our judgement is guided and that our mistakes are pointed out to us by 
those responsible for our upbringing and our education. We are not left to our own 
devices, as we are to a great extent in adult life - though, admittedly, neither are we 
likely to be confronted with the great choices and dilemmas that characterise our 
lives as independent adults.   
 
Moreover, why do we think that ethical experience and judgement in one field 
will translate into ethical experience and judgement in a quite different field? Isn’t it 
in the very nature of experience of ethical particulars that the experience is to some 
extent particular to the field in question – for example, to teaching, medicine, law, 
soldiering, business or mountaineering?
23
 And isn’t the ethical knowledge of any 
given field or practice contingent in turn on a degree of general knowledge and 
understanding, both practical and theoretical, of that field or practice? And doesn’t 
the engagement in practices of one sort or another constitute a large part of our lives? 
One could argue that it is precisely through a process of initiation into a practice that 
the frame is provided in which moral instruction and experience are, under the 
watchful eyes of the master or expert practitioner, able to reinforce each other, and in 
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But if ethical judgement results from experience and moral instruction 
proceeding pari passu, the one reinforcing and explicating the other, it seems that 
habituation has accomplished the whole task of moral education. First we have 
upbringing and schooling, in which a general habituation in moral virtue is 
accomplished through the concurrent process of experience (i.e. the repeated 
perception and experience of ends that are socially and culturally validated) and 
moral instruction; and then we have the habituation of ethical judgement and further 
refinement of moral virtue through initiation into specific practices (which begins at 
school and continues into adult life), where, again, experience and moral instruction 
proceed concurrently. On this argument, it makes no sense to conceive phronesis as 
a distinct conceptual stage of moral development set apart from habituation and from 
the moral instruction that necessarily accompanies it.  
 
The elusive nature of phronesis when it is conceived independently of moral 
habituation is, I think, strikingly illustrated in Daniel Russell’s account (perhaps the 
definitive one) in Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (2009). Russell notes that 
phronesis ‘is not a monolithic virtue of the practical intellect, but includes an array 
of more practical capacities’ (Russell, 2009, p. 20) and then sets out to elaborate 
what these practical capacities or virtues might be. In particular, he notes of the 
element of nous
25
 in phronesis that it involves  
 
... developed problem-solving ability resulting from experience, and is no 
more ‘intuitive’ than the problem-solving abilities of builders, physicians and 
other technical experts ... Such abilities are analogous to those that 
differentiate an experienced builder from an apprentice, say ... good patterns 
of deliberation become habitual and automatic. After all, skills that require 
complex reasoning and deliberation, such as carpentry or medicine, can with 
experience take the shape of settled problem-solving abilities that function 
automatically. (pp. 22-3) 
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But as to the precise nature of the instruction or experience that would produce this 
developed problem-solving ability and that would therefore contribute to the general 
capacity to weigh up conflicting ends and to specify the appropriate ends that 
phronesis demands, Russell is silent. All we are left with is the analogy with 
initiation (i.e. habituation) into specific practices. Russell goes on to note that 
phronesis is more than the sum of the various practical virtues since ‘it grasps a 
broad conception of human goods and ends’ (p. 24). But, again, how such a grasp 
might be developed and the nature of the moral instruction and experience that 
would be needed to grasp this broader conception is not elaborated.  
 
I would argue that it is only through initiation into practices, together with a 
process of general moral habituation at home and school, that a person can come to 
recognise virtues, values, goods and ends, along with the conflicts that might arise 
between rival ends. There is no ‘skill’ of integrating one’s diverse activities and 
engagements in practices into a perfectly coherent and harmonious whole; it is only 
by enduring the hard vicissitudes of life, guided so far as possible by the virtues and 
our experience of exercising them, that we can come to understand what, for us as 
individuals, might constitute ‘a good life’.  
 
Phronesis and autonomy 
 
In what sense then – if any – can phronesis be usefully defined or conceived? I 
have argued in this chapter that phronesis is simply the capacity to exercise practical 
judgement (i.e. to apply moral principles and be guided by the virtues), and that it is 
cultivated by a concurrent process of habit formation and moral instruction (both 
formal and informal) that takes the form, first, of general schooling and upbringing, 
and second, of initiation into various practices. It is by means of this initiation into a 
moral and cultural inheritance that a person cultivates the capacity to make practical 
judgements within the frame of a moral tradition. However, because it is no more 
than the outcome of this process of moral training, it is a moot point whether or not 
phronesis should itself be termed a virtue. I would dispute that there is some putative 




resolving moral conflict and balancing conflicting goods
26
, because I cannot see 
what prior experience or instruction could rehearse a person for living the life of an 
independent adult; nor can I see how a person could conceive the nature of ‘the good 
life’ for them in advance of the lived experience of pursuing and realising various 
goods in the course of their adult life – except that they do know it involves 
exercising the virtues. Phronesis is not an architectonic intellectual virtue, rather, 
merely, the capacity to exercise the moral virtues – a capacity (or skill or ability) that 
improves and is progressively developed with practice.    
 
However, much more is generally attributed to phronesis by those working in 
the Aristotelian tradition than that a person is able to exercise ethical judgement (or 
practical reason) and act virtuously. Yes, it is argued, habituation is the starting point 
of moral education, and Aristotle’s emphasis on motivation and the cultivation of 
right desire is fully justified; but phronesis is the culmination because with it comes 
the capacity of individuals not merely to act out of habit but to deliberate about ends, 
which in turn entails the capacity to critically justify their principles, values and 
beliefs. If phronesis enables problems, conflicts and dilemmas to be resolved, it is on 
account of this critical capacity and the theoretical understanding of one’s principles, 
values and beliefs that is thereby gained. 
 
Kristjansson exemplifies this general approach when he argues that the person 
who has been ‘merely’ habituated cannot be regarded as virtuous in the fullest sense 
of the term because he does not yet understand the ethical first principles that justify 
moral virtue as the supreme good, and therefore cannot apply these principles 
critically in practice; and that only a study of the underlying moral theory together 
with its practical implications (detailed by Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics) will 
reveal these principles - a study that, along with the relevant experience, is central to 
the development of phronesis. Aristotle has, after all, provided ‘a fully fledged moral 
theory about happiness (eudaimonia) as the ultimate good and unconditional end of 
human beings’ (Kristjansson, 2006, p. 112) - a theory, moreover, in which Aristotle 
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has demonstrated that it is an empirical fact that the moral virtues are essential to our 
own good. Hence  
 
With the development of phronesis, a qualitative transition from the mere 
‘that’ of ethics to the ‘why’ takes place. In other words, the new phronimoi 
perfect and perhaps partly revise their perceptions of the ‘that’ in light of 
their grasp of the explanatory first principles of ethics, thus reaching the final 
stage of moral development. (p. 110) 
 
So for Kristjansson, as for most commentators, Aristotle’s account of ethical 
development culminates in the phronimos who has reached the state of moral 
excellence. By contrast, the initial stage of moral development is that in which a 
person (probably a young child, but it could also apply to an adult) is ‘impenetrable 
to the voice of reason’ and ‘the only teaching method in moral education from which 
they can learn is habituation’ (2007, p. 20). 
 
This notion that phronesis involves an understanding of first principles, which 
necessarily involves the capacity to critically justify them, could be seen as reflecting 
a wider concern among philosophers (especially evident among philosophers of 
education) to promote rational and moral autonomy. The notion of ‘moral autonomy’ 
is usually associated with Kantian self-determination of the will by appeal to pure 
reason; but it might be used in a more general sense to describe the capacity of a 
person to critically justify, and if necessary re-formulate, their first principles, values 
and beliefs by adopting (in some sense) a rational standpoint outside the moral 
tradition in which they have been habituated. Moral autonomy in this more general 
sense merges with ‘personal autonomy’, the notion that a person should be able to 
choose on rational grounds their principles, values and beliefs. In arguing for the 
cultivation of the critical capacity of phronesis, for ‘critical virtue’, Kristjansson’s 
position is not really that far from the position of Christine Korsgaard, the prominent 
Kantian. Korsgaard writes that we are essentially self-conscious beings who reflect 
on our perceptions, thoughts and desires; and it is precisely our need to submit our 
perceptions, desires and impulses to ‘reflective scrutiny’ – to justify our actions and 




1996, pp. 92-3). The motives for our actions must be ‘transparent’: we must be able 
to justify the claims which morality makes on us ourselves as individuals (i.e. from 
the ‘first-person’ position or standpoint) and hence ‘act in the full light of knowledge 
of what morality is and … believe that our actions are justified’ (pp. 16-17). David 
Bakhurst writes in a similar vein, though he differs from Korsgaard in grounding 
rational autonomy in enculturation rather than in the self-determining law of a free 
will (The Moral Law). For Bakhurst, we must reflectively endorse the beliefs and 
values we have inherited (Bakhurst, 2011, p. 151), subject them to ‘critical scrutiny’ 
(p. 76) and thereby make them our own. Only then are we free – free in the sense of 
being rational and autonomous. 
 
I think, however, that all these views are profoundly mistaken. As I have argued 
in this chapter, the first principles of ethics cannot be rationally deduced a priori as 
universal principles but are publicly constituted; they necessarily form part of a 
social, cultural and linguistic tradition; and moral instruction and experience only 
have significance when considered part of a process of habituation into this tradition. 
Moreover, since there is no optimal solution to moral conflict, to the balancing of 
heterogeneous goods, an ethical or moral life is not so much the life of a person who 
engages in rational deliberation by applying certain general underlying moral 
principles as the life of a person who virtuously discharges the duties, obligations 
and commitments they have undertaken. In any case, as I shall argue in Chapters 3 
and 4, it is only by engaging in practices within the unique context of an individual 
life that the goods of practices can be accessed, and therefore that the nature of the 
possible conflicts between ‘rival’ goods can be appreciated. On this argument, the 
notion that phronesis can be conceived as an all-purpose moral conflict-resolving 
capacity is even less plausible. In fact, it is in the nature of a moral and cultural 
tradition (I have in mind a tradition that is broadly liberal and secular as opposed to 
totalitarian or theocratic) that it encompasses people’s experience of pursuing 
heterogeneous goods and coping with moral conflict and moral dilemmas. There is 
no need to find a standpoint outside the tradition. 
 
And yet notions of rational autonomy, moral autonomy and personal autonomy 




are often held to be central to the aims of education. Can we simply discard them? A 
much more convincing account of the notion of autonomy is, I think, the one 
elaborated by Michael Bonnett and Stefaan Cuypers. They argue that instead of 
trying to conceive autonomy in terms of self-determination or rational choice, it 
makes more sense to root it in notions of authenticity, personal identity and ‘true 
self-expression’: 
 
Things matter to us in relation to our authentic concerns, that is, those 
concerns for the expression of which we are willing to accept personal 
responsibility, and that constitute our sense of our own existence. It is only 
by expressing them and feeling the world’s response, either actually or 
through acts of imagination, that we discover what our thoughts really mean 
and what the world means to us. In this way we can come to understand our 
feelings and beliefs, and the things we have learned, in terms of our sense of 
our own existence (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003, pp. 330-1).  
 
I am arguing in this chapter (the argument will be more fully developed in the next 
two chapters) that the autonomy and authenticity Bonnett and Cuypers speak of can 
only be cultivated in the context of a moral tradition and its component practices, 
and in the context of an individual life led (and life narrative formed) within the 
frame of this tradition. And this is the antithesis of the notion that a person can make 
practical judgements and resolve moral conflict by applying certain ethical first 
principles - principles that a person can articulate and justify, principles that enable a 
person to adopt an impartial standpoint from which to adjudicate rival goods. Where 
I disagree with Bonnett and Cuypers is in their concluding that we need ‘education 
for authentic development’, education in which the content of the curriculum is 
determined by the ‘interplay’ of teacher and learner, and in which teachers are 
facilitators of ‘authentic learning’ (p. 339). The conclusion I would draw is that in 
order for pupils to learn how to truly express themselves as adults and lead 
worthwhile lives, they need to be prepared for initiation into a variety of practices – 
practices that taken together constitute a moral tradition, and the engagement in 
which is central to living a worthwhile life. On this account, education would aim to 
prepare pupils for their initiation into such practices, and educational activities might 




In Chapter 3, then, I shall argue that moral development is best conceived as a 
process of initiation into an evolving moral tradition, a tradition carried on by a 
moral community comprising families, schools and a variety of institutions and 
practices. I shall consider the circumstances in which a moral tradition can be 
rationally justified and how rational reflection can be carried on within that tradition, 
and so address another of the key objections to Aristotle’s ethical theory, namely the 
‘relativist’ charge that it validates the status quo, that any tradition, however 
objectionable, can thereby be justified. In Chapter 4, I shall specifically consider the 
nature of the goods of practices – goods that are central to a flourishing life. I shall 
also argue that to have moral knowledge or understanding and to be able to make 
moral judgements need not involve the articulation of moral principles but rather a 
kind of moral sympathy or intuition; and therefore that to lead a good life and to be a 
good citizen need not necessitate the engagement in moral philosophy. In Part 2 of 
this thesis, I shall explore how educational activities might themselves be conceived 





I would like to conclude this chapter by returning to phronesis. I have argued 
that phronesis cannot usefully be conceived, even in some idealised form, as an 
architectonic intellectual virtue incorporating all forms of practical judgement, 
because it is impossible to specify the nature of the experience and moral instruction 
that might produce it in practice. Even a lifetime’s experience would be insufficient; 
one would need, rather, the experience of all the lives it is possible to live. However, 
it is possible to conceive phronesis in the more restricted sense of ‘political 
judgement’, with politics the practice or ‘master-craft’ in which it is cultivated. 
Traditionally, the art of politics was taught to pupils not through the academic 
discipline of political science but through the art of rhetoric. Rhetoric is usually 
defined nowadays as the art of persuasive speaking - as in one sense it is; but I shall 
argue in Part 2 that rhetoric involved something much more substantial than this. It 




public and private; in other words, it aimed to cultivate phronesis. However to 
achieve this end, it did not try to produce moral or political philosophers versed in 
the first principles of their respective subjects; rather it aimed to ground pupils in the 
subject matter of the humanities, particularly history and literature, whose stories of 
human experience represent a compendium of all the lives it is possible to live and 
all the moral dilemmas it is possible to face, and thereby provide ethical and 
psychological insight into human behaviour, human needs and the nature of the 
moral dilemmas that might be encountered within the tradition. It achieved its ends 
by initiating into a moral and cultural tradition or inheritance, not by trying to 
discover an external standpoint from which to adjudicate on moral questions and 
moral conflicts by appeal to pure reason.  
 
Though the experience afforded by rhetoric of making practical and political 
judgements is necessarily vicarious, founded as it is not on first-hand experience but 
on the experience of others, it is experience of a sort. And so though in this chapter I 
have questioned the value of conceiving phronesis as an architectonic intellectual 
virtue, I shall argue in Part 2 that we have in rhetorical training the makings of a 





The rationality of traditions 
 
In the last chapter, I examined Aristotle’s account of moral development, noted 
the confusion surrounding the respective places of habituation and phronesis in this 
account, and concluded that moral development is best conceived as a process of 
habituation into a moral and cultural tradition or inheritance. On this argument, 
phronesis is not the critical capacity of a morally autonomous being, but simply the 
capacity of a person to exercise the virtues in practice - a capacity that is the natural 
outcome of a process of moral habituation that involves both moral instruction and 
guided experience. However, I have yet to answer the objection that any system of 
values, however objectionable, can thereby be justified; that the moral and cultural 
inheritance in question might well be abhorrent.  
 
In this chapter, I shall try to answer this objection. I shall consider in more detail 
the nature of moral traditions and argue that for citizens to be able to reflect 
individually and collectively on their beliefs and values, the necessary condition is 
not some putative personal autonomy (autonomy in the sense that individuals are 
able to critically evaluate and choose their moral principles and values) but that the 
tradition and its component practices have the capacity to evolve, the precondition of 
which is a free society. However, citizens must have been initiated – and therefore or 
habituated - into the practices that make up that moral tradition in the first place. 
Similarly, the necessary condition for being able to deal with moral conflict and 
choose between heterogeneous goods is not the possession of a putative external 
standpoint from which to adjudicate between rival goods but to have been initiated 
into the moral and cultural tradition that mediates these goods; for it is only within 
the frame of this tradition and its practices that its characteristic goods and nature of 
the conflicts between them can be understood. In making these arguments, I shall 
attempt to answer the charge that moral habituation is antithetical to rational 
reflection on moral values, that it serves merely to perpetuate the moral and political 




It is all very well to argue that the culmination of moral development and 
therefore the principal aim of education is personal autonomy, the capacity to subject 
one’s values and beliefs to critical scrutiny and to make rational choices. But in what 
sense and with reference to what criteria could critical reflection on ethical principles 
evoke an extra-ethical justification (or rejection) of those principles? For an 
individual acculturated in a tradition and habituated in its values, it is, I shall argue, 
simply not intelligible to speak of stepping outside that tradition in order to assume 
an extra-ethical Archimedean standpoint
1
 from which to make inter-cultural 
comparisons and critical judgements. The traditions that mediate our ethical values – 
let us call them moral traditions - and into which we are habituated are, I shall argue 
in this chapter, not arbitrary restraints or impositions but generally speaking have 
evolved over a lengthy period of time in response to people’s collective needs2, their 
circumstances, and their perceptions of the world and their place in it – perceptions 
which, of course, moral traditions serve in part to form. The ethical principles that 
underlie a moral tradition can never be justified by appeal to reason alone because 
the source of the original premises or archai on which any such justification or 
argument must ultimately rest, is some shared conception (and perception) of human 
needs and ends on the part of people who are socially, culturally and historically 
situated, and whose nature is, in part, biologically determined (i.e. determined by 
evolutionary forces). It is precisely this shared empirically determined conception of 
‘the good’, of what might constitute ‘a good life’, which is embodied in a moral 
tradition. Moreover, if, as Aristotle believes, it is an empirical fact, a fact of human 
nature, that there exists a set of substantive virtues both conducive to and constitutive 
of eudaimonia, the ultimate human good or telos, then the moral tradition that 
mediates these virtues can also legitimately be regarded as empirically founded – 
and, in that sense, rationally justified.   
 
Nevertheless, moral and cultural traditions (along with human nature and human 
needs, goods and ends) do evolve, and therefore the processes of critical reflection 
and rational justification must, presumably, have a role. If non-rational habituation 
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 An objective vantage point from which something can be observed in its totality. 
2
 By human needs, I mean the need for sustenance in all its forms – material, emotional, psychological 
and spiritual; not merely the need to satisfy appetitive desires. People’s collective needs and ends 




were the only source of ethical knowledge and practice, there would be no change, 
no evolution, and no escape from inherited norms - from the status quo. The 
argument I would like to develop in this chapter is that the sort of rational reflection 
that contributes to the evolution of a moral tradition and the re-habituation of 
people’s values is not that of an individual exercising his rational autonomy and 
coming up with new principles and theories ex nihilo, but rather of people 
collectively engaging in practices – for example, in moral philosophy and politics - 
over a substantial period of time; and the pre-requisite for participating in such 
practices is precisely to have been initiated – and therefore habituated – into their 
characteristic modes of thought. For example, profound changes in attitudes over the 
past hundred years towards women and ethnic and religious minorities have been 
provoked in large part by rational argument and protest on the part of certain 
individuals; but it is only when new ethical principles are legitimated as moral norms 
through a transformation of the wider political culture and its institutions, and 
through a re-habituation of people’s values (in large part through education), that it is 
possible to speak of the evolution of a moral tradition.  
 
To make sense of the process by which a moral and cultural tradition and its 
component practices evolve, I shall argue that it is important to make a conceptual 
distinction between two kinds of engagement in practices: ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ 
engagement, in which practitioners work within the frame of the accepted 
‘paradigm’; and ‘revolutionary’ or ‘critical’ engagement, in which practitioners 
question the paradigm and engage in radical innovation - which is much rarer. 
 
The rationality of a tradition 
 
The notion that rationality must be conceived, in some sense, as situated within a 
tradition has been argued by – among others - Gadamer, Wittgenstein, Oakeshott and 
MacIntyre; and in philosophy of science, Popper and Kuhn have also argued it. For 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, our rationality is irretrievably grounded in ‘historically 
effected consciousness’ (Gadamer, 2003, p. 340). A state of perfect enlightenment is 




truth is something asserted by a linguistic, cultural and historical tradition in the 
course of the tradition being understood (p. 486). The tradition, practice or 
conversation involves a whole series of reciprocal dialectical relationships between 
subject and object, subject matter and language, present and past, and question and 
answer (pp. 373-9). For Michael Oakeshott, it is ‘only in the practice of an activity 
that we can acquire the knowledge of how to practise it’ (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 121) 
and this means that questions and problems can themselves only be formulated from 
within the activity - they must ‘spring from the activity itself’ (p. 121). To behave 
rationally, then, is ‘to behave appropriately in the circumstances’ (p. 121), which 
means to be faithful to the tradition and its idiom, and to exhibit ‘the knowledge of 
how to behave well that belongs to our way of living’ (p. 130). Oakeshott’s analysis, 
though it is not derived from hermeneutics, thus closely parallels Gadamer’s.  
 
Interestingly, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have argued that essentially the 
same view of rationality holds in the natural sciences. For Popper, the knowledge, 
values and norms of science can be regarded as objective, not in any Platonic sense 
(there is always the possibility that they may be falsified – at least if the knowledge 
is empirically founded), but simply by virtue of their being publicly validated within 
a tradition: ‘It is … the public character of science and of its institutions which 
imposes a mental discipline upon the individual scientist, and which preserves the 
objectivity of science and its tradition of critically discussing new ideas’ (Popper, 
1986, pp. 155-6)
3. Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a ‘paradigm’ is also tradition-based. 
Kuhn argues that a paradigm ‘stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community’ (Kuhn, 1996, p. 
175). Central to Kuhn’s thesis in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996) is the 
notion that ‘normal science’ can only be carried on within the confines of the 
paradigms that constitute the current orthodoxy; in other words, without the 
orthodoxy, there is no science.   
 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account in After Virtue (1985) of the internal goods of 
practices and the rationality of traditions is particularly germane to this thesis 
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 Paul Hirst makes the same point in justifying his ‘forms of knowledge’ thesis: ‘our experiences 




because though it parallels the accounts of Gadamer and Oakeshott in many respects, 
it is the only one framed explicitly in Aristotelian terms of habituation (or initiation) 
and of a shared conception the good. However, when it comes to explaining how 
traditions evolve and to elucidating the nature of the critical reflection and rational 
justification that are involved, I think that Kuhn’s formulation of the rationality of a 
tradition in terms of its ‘paradigm’ and his distinction between normal and 
revolutionary science is the more illuminating. I shall therefore be making particular 
reference to MacIntyre and Kuhn as I develop the main argument of this chapter. 
 
I shall draw on MacIntyre’s account in three important respects in my account of 
the nature of rational reflection and rational justification: first, that the goods and 
virtues cultivated within a practice can only be accessed by initiation into that 
practice; second, that practices embody a living tradition of enquiry in part 
constituted by ‘a continuous argument’ as to the nature of the goods ‘the purpose of 
which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose’ (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 
222)
4
; and thirdly, that the sum of the set of shared beliefs, institutions and practices 
of a given community constitutes a moral tradition, which necessarily forms ‘the 
locus of rational enquiry’ - in other words, rational inquiry and reasoned argument 
can only be conducted by people initiated into and situated within a given moral 
tradition. The pivotal concept here, I think, is that goods and virtues are internal to 
the practice in question and constitute ends-in-themselves; that to be initiated into a 
practice is to undergo an apprenticeship, to submit oneself to the authority of a 
tradition, and in so doing gain access to the skills, knowledge and standards of 
excellence that constitute the tradition, as well as develop the virtues (justice, 
courage and honesty, for example) that both enable us to achieve and are partially 
constitutive of these goods. All the rest follows from this. And though it is not 
entirely clear which activities or engagements should count as practices, MacIntyre’s 
conception of human flourishing in terms of the initiation into practices is, I think, a 
very fruitful one, and accurately reflects our experience of what it is to be, or of what 
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 The same point is made, as we have seen, by Gadamer and Oakeshott.  
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However, MacIntyre’s notion that a living tradition of inquiry is in part 
constituted by ‘a continuous argument’ as to the nature of its goods is a puzzling one 
given the role he also attributes to internal goods and to initiation on the 
apprenticeship model. It could be taken to imply that a moral tradition and its 
practices are in a continuous state of flux; that initiates are engaged in a continual 
process of critical evaluation and rational justification of underlying goods, 
principles and values in order that these may be ‘reflectively endorsed’. And yet I 
think it is perfectly clear that the sort of reflection and criticism envisaged by 
MacIntyre is not that of the rationally autonomous actor adopting some external 
standpoint but that of the person initiated into the practice applying internally 
validated standards of judgement and discrimination. What, then, is the nature of the 
argument, reflection, criticism and innovation that must be carried on if a moral 
tradition and its component practices are to evolve; that would enable liberal values 
and human rights to be fostered, as opposed to the abhorrent values that often 
characterise totalitarian regimes; and yet that does not assume rational or moral 
autonomy as a foundational principle? In what sense need the argument be a 
continuous one? Need all practitioners be involved in it all of the time? And if 
practitioners are agreed on the nature of the inquiry and its goods, and are fruitfully 
engaged in applying agreed theoretical principles to practical problems, why would 
an argument need to be carried on at all?  
 
To answer these questions, we might begin with MacIntyre’s own assertion in 
Whose Justice? Which  Rationality? that the rationality of traditions has its roots not 
in ‘self-sufficent, self-justifying epistemological first principles’ (MacIntyre, 1988, 
p. 360) but in contingent historical conditions - in ‘some condition of pure historical 
contingency, from the beliefs, institutions, and practices of some particular 
community which constitutes a given’ (p. 354). Even when the adherents of a 
tradition come to adopt certain truths as ‘first metaphysical or practical principles’, 
these principles, argues MacIntyre, will themselves be understood to require a 
rational justification that is ‘at once dialectical and historical’ (p. 360). The argument 
is, I think, a plausible one and seems to fit with our experience of a range of 
practices that incorporate rival traditions of thought. For example, philosophers will 




very reason, just as economists will often refer to themselves as working within the 
Keynesian, classical or Marxist traditions. Much of the argument in these subjects 
takes the form of continuing debate between adherents of these rival traditions and is 
rooted in differing perceptions of human nature and historical experience – and so 
we have ‘a continuous argument’ as to the nature of the goods involved. And yet 
there cannot be rival traditions of thought in the first place without a parent 
discipline of which certain modes of inquiry, certain standards and norms, certain 
central questions and an agreed body of knowledge are recognised as definitive. 
Practitioners cannot ally themselves to any one tradition within the discipline 
without having first being initiated into the discipline
6
. Moreover, it is because a 
disciplinary practice encompasses rival schools of thought that it is important that 
those who would make a contribution are first initiated into the standards, norms, 
knowledge and accepted modes of inquiry – both those that are accepted and those 
that are disputed - of the practice. Otherwise, they have no means of appraising rival 
claims and stand merely to be indoctrinated. As Richard Rorty notes, even the 
revolutionary or prophet must have first been acculturated, because ‘abnormal and 
“existential” discourse is always parasitic upon normal discourse’ (Rorty, 1979, p. 
365). 
 
However, not all practices encompass rival schools of thought - at least not to 
this degree. Obvious examples are the natural sciences (except at the very frontiers 
of knowledge), applied sciences, craft practices and professions. It is unclear why 
doctors, lawyers, teachers, nurses, plumbers and craftsmen, or even research 
scientists, should feel the need to engage continually - or even to engage at all - in 
critical inquiry into the goods of their respective practices; even less that they should 
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 For example, Marx had the highest regard for the classical economists Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo, without whose analysis and analytical tools (the concept of surplus value was developed by 
Ricardo) he would not have been able to develop his own critique in Das Kapital.  Even Kant, who 
deduced his transcendental a priori propositions from pure reason, worked within a broad 
philosophical tradition and famously acknowledged his debt to David Hume for waking him from his 
‘dogmatic slumber’ (Kant, 1977, p. 5).   
7 See appendix for some reflections on why most teachers are not engaged in critical enquiry – and 




A conception of ‘the rationality of a tradition’ that does not require practitioners 
to engage in continuous argument as to the nature of the goods (moral or otherwise) 
of the tradition or practice, and yet explains how traditions evolve – even how 
revolutions are possible – is Thomas Kuhn’s in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1996). Though, as its title suggests, Kuhn’s thesis concerns natural 
science, much of the argument can, I think, be generalised to apply to other 
traditions, practices and disciplines. Central to Kuhn’s thesis is the notion that 
‘normal science’ can only be carried on within the confines of the paradigms that 
constitute the current orthodoxy. Certain theories, notes Kuhn, must become 
generally accepted as paradigms – as ‘some implicit body of intertwined theoretical 
and methodological belief’ – because otherwise the scientific community lacks any 
basis for the selection, evaluation and criticism of factual evidence; one is left merely 
with a ‘morass’ of facts that ‘seem equally relevant’ (Kuhn, 1996, pp. 15-17). In fact, 
the paradigm simultaneously supplies the tools to solve recognised problems within 
the discipline and defines the problems that might be solved. In which case, whole 
periods are characterised not by ‘continuous argument’ as to the nature of the 
paradigm or the goods of the practice but by orthodoxy and normality, and by 
progress produced by the application of accepted theory to practical problems  - 
‘normal puzzle-solving research’ - across a range of fronts (p. 179). Whole periods 
are characterised by activity carried out within the frame of the paradigm; indeed, it 
is the paradigm that enables progress to be made. The paradigm change associated 
with scientific revolution is therefore the exception rather than the rule. However, 
when revolution does occur, when a new paradigm replaces the old, it is not because 
the old paradigm and its constituent theories are suddenly proved false and an 
alternative paradigm proved true, but rather because two conditions obtain. First, the 
old paradigm proves increasingly unable to explain newly observed observations and 
does so to such a degree (for there are nearly always some anomalies) that it loses 
the confidence of the scientific community; and second, an alternative paradigm is 
available (usually the invention of a person of exceptional imagination and creative 
power - i.e. a scientist of genius) which can better explain the empirical evidence and 






Now, Kuhn’s account is controversial. There are many lines of criticism, perhaps 
most notably that by arguing against the notion that scientists make steady progress 
toward some objective truth, toward a theory that is a better representation of ‘what 
nature is really like’ (rather that a better paradigm is simply a better instrument for 
discovering and solving the puzzles of normal science), Kuhn is subscribing to some 
sort of relativism - a charge that he, of course, refutes. But I do not think these 
particularly affect the argument I am trying to develop in this chapter. The criticism 
that does bear on my argument is that Kuhn over-dramatises the distinction between 
normal and revolutionary science; that the conceptual change Kuhn characterises as 
revolutionary and as involving a dramatic shift in paradigm is evolutionary in nature. 
This line of argument is particularly associated with Stephen Toulmin, who argues 
that this evolution takes the form of a continual process of innovation and selection, 
of frequent revision rather than episodic revolution, and of conceptual change rather 
than ‘paradigm-switches’ (see Toulmin, 1972, Chapter 1, especially pp. 98-130).8  A 
full discussion of the ‘revolution or evolution’ question is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but the very nature of the controversy and the vast body of critical comment 
(both for and against) that has been generated and continues to be generated forty 
years on, suggests in itself that there is truth in both the evolutionary and the 
revolutionary positions; or to put it another way, that ‘normal science’ is more 
innovative than Kuhn takes it to be, and revolutionary paradigm change is more 
evolutionary in nature.   
 
However, there are I think certain insights contained in Kuhn’s thesis that might 
command more general assent, and that are particularly relevant to the argument I 
wish to develop here. The first and most important is that for scientific research and 
applied science to be carried on at all, there must be a generally accepted paradigm – 
or conceptual system - within which scientists can assess the facts that are relevant, 
accumulate a body of knowledge and theory, build on previous research, formulate 
research questions and assess the empirical evidence. Kuhn argues that a shared 
paradigm or ‘disciplinary matrix’ involves, in addition, the use of symbolic 
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 ‘Instead of a revolutionary account of intellectual change, which sets out to show how entire 
‘conceptual systems’ [paradigms] succeed one another, we therefore need to construct an evolutionary 
account, which explains how ‘conceptual populations’ come to be progressively transformed’ (p. 




generalizations, beliefs in particular models that supply scientists ‘with preferred or 
permissible analogies and metaphors’ (Kuhn, 1996, p. 184), standards involved in 
making predictions, conducting experiments and judging theories, and the tacit 
knowledge imparted through scientific education (pp. 180-191). The second is that 
scientists are likely to become dissatisfied with a paradigm when, and only when, it 
ceases to be of value as a frame within which to carry out research. So long as new 
observations and experimental findings can be accommodated within the paradigm, 
so long as it has explanatory value, research can be carried on and there is no need 
for paradigm change – for ‘scientific revolution’. The third, which largely follows on 
from the first two, is that most scientific research, most of the time, consists of better 
articulating and applying the paradigm rather than of questioning it with a view to 
replacing it; in other words, it does not involve radical innovation. The fourth is that 
radical innovation, whether it contributes to ‘paradigm change’ or concerns the 
application of existing theory to practical problems, is generally-speaking produced 
by scientists of exceptional imagination and creative power.  
 
It is in the sense conveyed by these insights that Kuhn’s account of the 
rationality of a tradition is, I think, more illuminating than MacIntyre’s in shedding 
light on how a tradition evolves. True, MacIntyre describes the possibility of 
‘epistemological crisis’ afflicting an entire moral tradition (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 361); 
the possibility of circumstances in which the dominant beliefs of a tradition cannot 
any longer adequately explain the facts of reality (the empirical facts); the possibility 
that a rival or alien tradition is seen to better explain these and is therefore superior 
in its truth claims, its ‘standards of rational justification’ (p. 365); and he proposes 
that because the claims of a rival tradition are not accessible from within the tradition 
faced with crisis, ‘imaginative conceptual innovation’ (p. 362) is needed for radically 
new concepts and theories to be devised. There are clear points in common here with 
Kuhn’s thesis of paradigm change. But Kuhn, I think, better describes the periods of 
normality in between and gives actual substance to the notion of epistemological 
crisis.   
 
It may well be that Kuhn’s thesis does not apply in every respect to every 




science. Nevertheless I think there are two things in particular we can take from it 
that illuminate the nature of the rationality of a tradition and the goods of a practice, 
and therefore that are relevant to the argument of this thesis. First, that those working 
within a tradition or practice, even if they are researchers (as opposed to those 
engaged in professional practice, in the application of existing knowledge and skills), 
will generally not be engaged in reformulating or critically justifying the underlying 
principles, values and goods of their tradition or practice; they simply have no need – 
indeed, it would be counterproductive for them to attempt to do so. Second, that 
those who are engaged in reformulating a paradigm that better explains the empirical 
evidence are usually people of exceptional talent and imagination. On both counts, 
the notion that the individual must be rationally and morally autonomous, that he 
must be engaged independently in the critical justification of his values, beliefs and 
first principles, and that he must be involved in a continuous argument as to the 
nature of the goods of the practices in which he is engaged, must be rejected. 
 
It also follows, I think, that the person who is so intellectually engaged, perhaps 
because of the nature of the practice in which they are involved (the academic 
disciplines of philosophy and politics are obvious examples), and perhaps because 
they have the intellectual capacity and the sort of personality that would cause them 
to want to be so engaged, is not by mere virtue of that fact morally superior to the 
person who is not – superior either in the sense of being a fully fledged morally 
autonomous citizen or in the sense of leading the flourishing life that only the person 
endowed with moral and rational autonomy could lead.  
 
I shall return to this question of ‘the value of an unexamined life’ in the next 
chapter. First, however, I would like to consider another argument commonly 







Competing ends and moral conflict 
 
I have argued in the last section that it is not possible for a person to stand 
outside a tradition and critically reflect on its values, and I have attempted to do this 
by invoking the notion that rationality is internal to a tradition and its practices, that 
initiation into the tradition is required if the goods of the tradition are to be accessed 
at all, and that the tradition (or paradigm) provides the frame that makes inquiry 
possible in the first place. But the case for the rational and moral autonomy of the 
individual might still be argued in this sense: without personal autonomy and the 
capacity to engage in critical reflection, how is the individual to choose between 
competing ends, to judge which ends are relevant or should be given priority in any 
given situation, and so resolve moral conflict – conflict that might occur within the 
frame of a given practice or between the rival goods of different practices, whether 
in public affairs or in the private affairs of an individual? This was supposed to be 
the great virtue of phronesis: that it would enable such deliberation in matters both 
public and private.  
 
The argument is put forcefully by David Wiggins. An individual must deliberate 
about his ends because there is very often no way of separating deliberation about 
means from deliberation about ends: our ends rarely come ready-specified or 
hierarchically ordered; the ends or ‘concerns’ (as Wiggins terms them) that are 
relevant in any given situation may not be obvious at all; our concerns may make 
‘competing and inconsistent claims’; and even when the concerns do seem clear, 
there may be no satisfactory means for promoting them. All of this suggests that we 
are involved in a continual process of evaluating and re-evaluating our concerns, 
interests and ends (Wiggins, 1980, pp. 232-5). But is this actually the experience of 
people in their daily lives? One could argue that it is part and parcel of normal life 
for an individual to have to assess priorities, to choose between rival ends or goods, 
but that this need not (and generally does not) involve calling into question the 
underlying values or virtues in which they have been habituated; rather that this 
process can be accommodated within the bounds of the moral tradition and its 




involved in a continual process of evaluating and re-evaluating their concerns, 
interests and ends because the same sorts of conflicts and dilemmas reoccur in the 
familiar contexts of work and family life; and to have been initiated into a practice - 
to be professionally competent - is to be able with relative ease to resolve the sorts of 
problems and conflicts one faces at work and at home. By contrast, the 
circumstances and situations that might lead a person to call into question their core 
values and beliefs are exceptional (I shall consider these shortly).  
 
I think, therefore, that Wiggins goes a step too far when he speaks of ‘the 
indeterminate character of our ideals’ as ‘constitutive of human freedom’; he places 
too great an evaluative burden on the ‘situational appreciation’ of the phronimos, the 
‘man of highest practical wisdom’ (p. 234). He speaks of the latter as the man who 
‘brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns 
and genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the deliberative context’ 
(p. 234), but how is a person to judge whether an ethical concern or consideration is 
genuine without recourse to some guiding, foundational set of values and beliefs? 
Isn’t the purpose of habituation (initiation) into a moral tradition and its component 
practices to cultivate precisely these shared values or virtues?  
 
Joseph Dunne argues likewise that we very often do not know our ends in 
advance, that deliberation will very often involve defining or redefining the end; that 
it is only in action, through experiment and with experience that an acceptable end – 
an end appropriate to the particular case - can be identified (Dunne, 1993, pp. 352-3). 
Dunne is particularly concerned to demonstrate that mastery of a practice cannot be 
reduced to the straightforward application of general rules, procedures and formulae 
which apply regardless of the particular situation; that the judgement and common 
sense of the practitioner cannot be eliminated and replaced by a sort of ‘technical 
rationality’ (pp.197-9). Now I agree with Dunne here; and I agree that bureaucratic 
attempts to implement ‘a practitioner-proof mode of practice’ are particularly 
destructive in education. But again, I think that the judgement and discrimination of 
the practitioner who has mastered a practice reside precisely in his ability to 
recognise – and recognise without inordinate difficulty – what is ‘ethically salient’ 




this ability need not, and generally does not, necessitate anguished soul-searching or 
the reformulation of the recognised goods and ends, principles and procedures, 
modes of thought and expression, of the practice. As I have argued, most 
practitioners’ forms of engagement in their practices are normal and ordinary, not 
revolutionary or radically critical. 
 
I think it is worth clarifying at this point exactly what is meant and what is 
implied when we speak of an individual engaging in critical reflection on their 
principles, values and beliefs. Mere exposure to a reasoned argument, however 
forceful or cogent, does not in itself provide a motive or reason for us to engage in 
deliberation or reflection ourselves; even less does it provide a motive or a reason for 
us to act. There must be some prior interest or need on our part to listen to and 
engage with the argument; and if reflection is to issue in action, this interest or need 
must be both intellectual and emotional. What sort of circumstances or events might 
provoke this interest or need, and motivate us to question our deepest principles, 
values and beliefs? Things that come to mind are the encounter with a moral 
dilemma, the experience of a personal tragedy or of profound injustice, a dramatic 
change in personal circumstances or in the wider world (produced, for example, by 
war or natural disaster), or perhaps even a life-changing encounter with another 
person, a book or an idea. Such events or circumstances might well trigger profound 
soul searching and critical reflection on values, ends and ethical first principles, and 
this reflection might in turn lead to a rejection of existing values and beliefs. But 
even in these exceptional circumstances, this need not follow - particularly if we 
come to recognise (as Aristotle did not) that moral conflict and tragedy are 
inescapable features of the human condition
9
; that goods and virtues are essentially 
heterogeneous in nature and can only fully be appreciated by practitioners engaging 
in various practices (a point I shall develop more fully in the next chapter)
10
; that it is 
in the nature of a moral and cultural tradition and its component practices that these 
encompass people’s experiences, historical and imaginative, of pursuing 
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 See MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 142-5. 
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heterogeneous goods and dealing with moral conflict
11
; and that, as I noted earlier, 
practices themselves often encompass rival traditions of thought - politics is the 
obvious example in any liberal democracy. For all these reasons, I would argue that 
there is no necessary need for an individual faced with moral conflict to question the 
validity of the over-arching moral and cultural tradition merely by virtue of being 
faced with moral conflict.   
 
In fact, it may well be that the experiences detailed have a transformative effect 
of a quite different sort - for example, a heightened awareness of certain goods and 
virtues valued within the existing moral tradition; it was simply that the individual 
concerned had hitherto not ‘lived up to’, or had not had reason to live up to, these 
ideals
12
. We might always have desired to behave differently – to exercise more self-
discipline in our daily lives, or to act more courageously, or to be more generous, or 
even to devote ourselves selflessly to some worthy cause; but the will was lacking. A 
traumatic experience might then have the effect not of causing us to question or even 
reject our core values but rather of causing us to pursue them with renewed purpose.  
 
A more intractable problem – and a problem that evidently exists in Britain – 
arises when is when there is conflict between the values of a minority or faith 
community and the Enlightenment values of liberal democratic society. Clearly, as I 
argued in Chapter 1, these Enlightenment values of liberty, equality and human 
rights take precedence and must be enforced. They are, by definition, universal and 
all members of society must be educated in them (at school if not at home) so that 
they understand their rights and the rights of others. Of course, the conflict remains 
real enough for individual members of these communities who feel they have to 
choose between rival sets of values - values concerning, for example, the place of 
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 I develop this argument further in Chapter 8 in relation to the humanities’ ‘stories of human 
experience’. 
12 An attitude of resigned resignation, of stoical endurance, is another possible response. 
13 The problem then arises of whether human rights, because they are universal, should be enforced 
internationally. The dilemma is that on the one hand they clearly ought to be enforced (most 




Rival moral traditions and relativism 
 
Up to now I have followed MacIntyre in arguing that for an individual to gain 
access to the goods of a moral tradition, and to be able to engage in rational inquiry 
and reasoned argument within the frame of that tradition, he must be acculturated 
into it. However, it follows from this that there is no ‘extra-ethical’ standpoint, no 
neutral or Archimedean position, from which the putative morally autonomous actor 
could make inter-cultural comparisons or critical judgements. It might be objected 
that this implies that all traditions are morally justifiable and that an extreme 
relativism is inescapable. Indeed, by in a sense conferring objectivity on a whole 
cultural inheritance, Aristotelianism (which I take to include MacIntyre’s 
restatement) is always open to the charge that any practices, values and moral norms 
are justified so long as they happen to be the prevailing ones; that any status quo, 
however objectionable from a liberal Enlightenment standpoint, can be justified; and 
that the only guard we have against this is the autonomy (personal, rational and 
moral) of the individual. I shall now argue that this chain of argument does not 
necessarily follow and that the charge of relativism can be refuted.    
 
MacIntyre answers the charge as follows. First, he insists that rational inquiry 
and reasoned argument can only be conducted by people initiated into and situated 
within a given moral tradition. To possess ‘any concept of truth adequate for 
systematic rational enquiry’ requires a person genuinely to adopt and be committed 
to the standpoint of a tradition. We cannot simply move between traditions 
temporarily adopting the standpoint of one and then another, as if acting a succession 
of parts; for to imagine this is not to adopt the viewpoint of arbitrator, a neutral view 
from above, but to exclude ourselves altogether from any conception of the truth and 
from rational debate (MacIntyre, 1988, pp. 367-8)
14
. The ‘neutral standing ground’ 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of liberal democracy or of universal human rights, people have been habituated into a quite different 
system of values. Why, then, should they be receptive to Western liberal values? The danger is that 
we end up trying to enforce liberty and human rights ‘through the barrel of a gun’. I have no answer 
to this dilemma.   
14
 Richard Rorty makes the same point in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) when he argues 
that education has to start from acculturation and that ‘to attempt abnormal discourse de novo, without 
being able to realize our own abnormality, is madness in the most literal and terrible sense’ (Rorty, 




(p. 367) from which the charge of relativism must be issued is therefore illusory. It 
is, as Thomas Nagel famously put it, a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel, 1989). But we 
are still left with the problem of adjudicating between rival moral traditions, some of 
which may be abhorrent. MacIntyre therefore goes a step further. He asserts that 
different moral traditions are not in fact insulated from each other; that a moral 
tradition faced with ‘epistemological crisis’ can transcend itself by drawing on the 
resources of another moral tradition (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 361). When the dominant 
beliefs of a given tradition can no longer adequately explain the facts of reality (the 
empirical facts), it may be that a rival tradition – a tradition which can better explain 
these facts - will come to be seen as superior in its truth claims, as superior in its 
‘standards of rational justification’ (p. 365). However, because the claims of a rival 
tradition are not accessible from within the tradition that is in crisis, ‘imaginative 





Now, MacIntyre writes that ‘as a matter of fact for very long periods traditions 
of very different kinds do indeed seem to coexist without any ability to bring their 
conflicts and disagreements to rational resolution’ (p. 366); in other words, they 
coexist without an epistemological crisis being provoked in one or other of them. 
But then the following questions arise. In what circumstances could traditions that 
had hitherto merely been in a state of inert coexistence come to interact so as to 
provoke an epistemological crisis?
16
 And what form would this ‘imaginative 
conceptual innovation’ take given that MacIntyre has defined rationality as internal 
to a given tradition? In fact, is one all-encompassing tradition not the inevitable 
outcome in the long run?  
 
Let us consider some possible triggers of an epistemological crisis: a natural 
disaster; a new scientific or geographical discovery, or explanatory theory; the rise of 
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 MacIntyre addresses this problem of ‘untranslatability’ in Chapter 19 of Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? where he argues that the problem might be overcome through the acquisition, so far as 
possible, of the ‘language-in-use’ of another tradition (language here encompassing the tradition’s 
whole system or constellation of practices, customs and beliefs) as a ‘second first language’ (p. 387).  
16
 When such traditions coexist in a single society, the likelihood of a crisis being provoked would 





a new religion; internal strife in which minorities who perceive themselves to be 
oppressed or dispossessed rise up in revolt; defeat or victory in war; the collision of a 
peaceable people with a warlike people, or of an innovative people with a tribal 
people, or of a technically more advanced with a technically less-advanced people; 
and the confrontation between democracy and dictatorship, secular society and 
theocracy, capitalism and communism (or pre-capitalistic modes of production). 
History and the ‘culture clashes’ of the contemporary world provide countless 
instances of these things. But in considering these examples, in attempting to give 
concrete form to the notion of epistemological crisis, is it not apparent that we are 
dealing with events, movements and phenomena that form part of a more complex 
and dynamic whole? Is it not apparent that these things encompass every aspect of 
human social, cultural, political and economic life; that, in fact, they constitute 
nothing less than human history in its entirety? In speaking of epistemological crises, 
are we not really merely asking the straightforward question ‘which societies have 
stood the test of history?’  
 
There are all sorts of possibilities concerning the future course of human history 
but given the fact of modern science (by which I mean the whole body of academic 
disciplines that employ the scientific method and deal in empirical facts) and its 
transformation of the world in which we live, it is difficult to conceive of a future in 
which Enlightenment rational values framed in a liberal, secular society and 
underpinned by the naturalism of evolutionary biology (which seeks to provide 
natural as opposed to metaphysical explanations of human values, goods and needs) 
do not play a central role. The success and dominance for better or for worse of 
Western civilization and its values must surely be attributable in large measure to its 
better explaining ‘the facts of reality’ (witness the achievements of science and 
technology) and apparently to its better meeting certain fundamental human needs 
(most notably, for freedom, needs that, as we have seen, arise by virtue of human 
rationality. By the same token, the art, music and literature of Western civilization 
(whether ‘high’ or popular) have a unique status on account of their secular nature. 
In the Renaissance, Western civilization broke free of its Judaeo-Christian religious 
inheritance (broke free in the sense that man rather than God became ‘the measure of 




‘humanism’ was born, or re-born, from its classical beginnings. It is precisely 
because the culture of Western civilization is the culture of secular society that its 
values and its appeal are universal.  
 
On this argument, there is, it seems, a certain inevitability attached to the 
eventual triumph of Western secular liberal democracy and its Enlightenment 
rationality (or rationalism) simply because it is the moral tradition that concerns 
itself with universal values, human rights and the rule of law. I therefore disagree 
with MacIntyre in his view that liberal individualism and its Enlightenment 
rationality represents merely another moral tradition, the implication being that it 
could somehow be dispensed with or replaced by another. For even if it is incoherent 
as a stand-alone ethical system (as Macintyre argues, and as I argued in Chapter 1), it 
answers, I think, to a fundamental human need: the need of rational beings to 
envisage the possibility of universal values. And any future society, any moral 
settlement will therefore have to incorporate it as a central fact.  
 
In order, then, to refute the charge that Aristotelianism
17
 is relativist and justifies 
any status quo, all it is necessary to demonstrate is that a moral tradition can evolve. 
And MacIntyre has done this (as have Gadamer and Oakeshott) by conceiving of 
practices as living traditions of inquiry. It could even be argued that there is a certain 
inevitability that when practices and moral traditions are free to reflect on their own 
goods, this reflection will eventually encompass the possibility of universal values 
(values transcending any particular culture or society), that society at large will be 
led to a certain enlightenment of reason, and that a certain secularisation of society 
will be the outcome. As Anthony O’Hear writes, ‘in so far as rational reflection is 
part of our practices, there is within our practices the wherewithal to transcend total 
particularity, and to move into a more universally acceptable context’ (O’Hear, 1999, 
pp. 210-11). 
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 I am using the term broadly to denote the view that rationality and morality are contingent on 





True, Macintyre contrasts his conception of a living tradition to the conservative 
conception of a tradition as advocated by Edmund Burke
18
, but the real power of 
MacIntyre’s conception of a practice as a living tradition lies, I think, in the contrast 
it invites us to draw between life in a free society (free in the sense that practices are 
free to evolve) and modes of life in societies that do not permit reflection on their 
goods, values and beliefs in any circumstances – indeed, that do not allow their 
members freely to engage in practices at all. It is the status quo in societies in which 
tribal taboos or religious dogmas are transmitted without modification or evolution 
that cannot be rationally justified; and it is when external goods are imposed – as, for 
example, in a totalitarian state - that objectionable value systems can arise. I am not 
arguing that people in a tribal society or theocratic state cannot lead lives that are 
fulfilled and worthwhile; it is conceivable that even slaves in Ancient Greece led 
perfectly happy and fulfilled lives as slaves - so long as they had good masters who 
treated them well. The problem is that when it becomes practically feasible for 
people to lead lives other than the ones they do in fact lead, questions of freedom and 
justice (or ‘social justice’) inevitably arise. As soon as reason assumes a central role 
in practices, there is the possibility of reflection on universal rights and moral 
imperatives – of something akin to the Moral Law; the possibility of some sort of 
‘enlightenment’ of reason, and with it, inevitably, a measure of disenchantment with 
traditional customs, beliefs and institutions. On this argument, the crucial distinction 
to make is between tribal, theocratic and totalitarian systems on the one hand, and 
secular liberal democracies on the other. For it is only in the latter that practices can 
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 MacIntyre characterises Burke’s conception of a tradition as ‘dead’ on the grounds that Burke 
exalts habit and prejudice over reflective behaviour (MacIntyre, 1989, p. 230; 1985, p.222) and hence 
allows no space for rationality. But it is abstract rationality and theory – not rational reflection – that 
Burke is really arguing against, his point being the pragmatic one that because ‘the nature of man is 
intricate’ and involves a ‘gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns’, because ‘the 
objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity’ and government involves both ‘balances 
between differences of good’ and ‘compromises between good and evil’, and because ‘the real effects 
of moral causes are not always immediate’ (Burke, 1968, pp. 152-3), no theory or idealised model 
could be adequate to the reform of government. And so it could be argued that Burke’s view of 
politics is essentially the same as MacIntyre’s – i.e. that it is a practice. Moreover, a notable 
difference between MacIntyre’s conception of a practice on the one hand, and Gadamer and 
Oakeshott’s on the other, is that whereas the former condemns Burke’s defence of prejudice in 
somewhat intemperate terms (culminating in the bizarre observation that ‘the true nihilists in history 
were all kings’ – see MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 228-30), the latter regard prejudices as a vital part of a 
person’s being. For Gadamer, the root of legitimate prejudice lies in legitimate authority. The 
acknowledgement and knowledge that another ‘is superior to oneself in judgment and insight’ results 
in the judgment of the other taking precedence; the prejudices of the other are thereby legitimised 
(Gadamer, 2003, pp. 279-80). A defence of prejudice so defined is, I would have thought, implicit in 





flourish, and the encompassing moral traditions are able to evolve in response to 
changing human needs, conditions and circumstances. 
 
Concluding note: habituation, reflection and freedom 
 
I have argued in this chapter that habituation into the values, beliefs and 
practices that together constitute a moral and cultural tradition (along with the 
institutions that mediate them) is the essential precondition for realising the goods of 
a flourishing life
19
. I have also argued that reflection and criticism (or ‘critical 
reflection’) have a crucial role to play in enabling a tradition and its practices to 
evolve - because otherwise, we are condemned to the status quo, however 
objectionable or fossilised from the Enlightenment liberal standpoint. But what form 
would this reflection take?   
 
My argument is that there are essentially two forms of reflection. The first is 
carried on within the frame of practices, which supply the tools to engage in a range 
of inquiries and solve a range of problems - inquiries and problems whose nature 
cannot be appreciated unless one has been initiated into the practices concerned. 
Reflection on conflicts between the goods of practices can likewise be carried on 
within the frame of practices and the overarching moral and cultural tradition, 
because the tradition and its component practices constitute, in part, inquiries into the 
nature of these conflicts - conflicts, again, whose nature can only be understood by 
those initiated into the tradition and its goods. This sort of reflection, I have argued, 
characterises people’s ordinary engagement in practices.  The second form of 
reflection, by contrast, seeks to evaluate, justify and if necessary reformulate the 
underlying goods, principles and values of practices; in other words, it calls into 
question the frame or paradigm itself. This sort of reflection, I have argued, 
characterises people’s critical engagement in practices. However, there are two pre-
conditions for such reflection to be undertaken. First, that the existing frame or 
paradigm is widely perceived as inadequate (whether for the purpose of engaging in 
                                                          




inquiry or for defining goods worth pursuing) - in other words, that there is a need 
for radical innovation or revolutionary change
20
; and second, that practitioners have 
the combination of aptitude, interest and personality needed to engage in such 
reflection and radical innovation.   
 
We are now in a position to return to the question originally posed by Bernard 
Williams – ‘Is later reflection on one’s values precluded by earlier habituation, by an 
earlier conditioning of the mind?’ Habituation is, I am arguing in this thesis, 
essential if values are to be transmitted at all. It is the pre-condition for civilized 
society; and, yes, to be habituated in certain values or virtues is, in one sense, to be 
conditioned in those values and virtues. But to speak of the mind being conditioned 
or (if we accept that habituation is, necessarily, a sort of mental conditioning) of the 
mind being conditioned to such a degree that subsequent reflection on one’s values 
and beliefs is impossible, a requirement of a quite different order must be introduced: 
quite simply, the possibility of such reflection must be eliminated. There must be no 
opportunity permitted for argument, debate, or freedom of expression either in public 
or (if there are sufficient numbers of informants) in private; and all transgressions 
must be severely punished. We need, in short, the full apparatus of the totalitarian 
state, or a tribal or theocratic society. The necessary condition, then, for people - 
individually and collectively - to be able to reflect on their values and ends is simply 
that the moral tradition in which they have been habituated and its constituent 
practices are able to evolve; and the necessary condition for such an evolution is not 
freedom from habituation but a free society.   
 
In this chapter, I have argued the vital importance of being initiated into a moral 
and cultural tradition. In the last chapter, I argued that the process of initiation begins 
with the habituation of the virtues, out of which develops the capacity to exercise 
practical judgement. But what are the core virtues that ought to be cultivated in a 
liberal society, the virtues that might constitute a substantive moral tradition; and is 
it possible to identify a corresponding set of goods (or types of good) that all citizens 
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would want to pursue in order to lead good and fulfilling lives? The aim of a liberal 
education would then be to cultivate these core virtues and to prepare pupils for 
realising the corresponding goods, and thereby prepare them for leading ‘a good 
life’. 
 
In Chapter 4, I shall consider the core virtues and goods that might be cultivated 
in a liberal society. In so doing, I shall argue the value – and the good - of leading 






The nature of the good life and the virtues needed to 
sustain it 
 
In this chapter, I consider the sorts of virtue that are required (1) for people to 
lead flourishing lives and (2) for the sustenance of the liberal society that provides 
people with the freedom to lead the lives of their choice. A central task, perhaps the 
central task, of a liberal education would then be to cultivate these virtues. But is 
there a set of substantive core virtues that would save liberal society from 
degenerating into a mere market for consumer choice, a mechanism for satisfying 
people’s current preferences and appetitive desires? Are the virtues required for 
people to lead flourishing lives the same as the virtues that sustain liberal society? 
And what are the ingredients of a flourishing life? The key to answering these 
questions lies, I shall argue, in recognising that central to people’s justified self-
esteem and self-respect, to their sense of fulfilment, is their engagement in 
worthwhile activities; and that worthwhile activities are best conceived something 
along the lines of practices as Alasdair MacIntyre conceives them. 
 
MacIntyre’s account of practices has evoked much interest among philosophers 
of education, but its implications have largely been confined to the question of 
whether teaching and philosophy of education are practices. In the case of teaching, 
the broad concern has been to demonstrate that teaching cannot be reduced to a 
technocratic practitioner-proof ‘best practice’ formula or set of ‘competencies’, to a 
process whose outcomes can be measured and made the subject of performance 
targets – notions that appeal to politicians and bureaucrats but make teachers’ lives a 
misery; rather, that teaching is an art involving complex judgements on the part of 
professional practitioners who need to respond to the demands of particular students 
in particular situations – an art whose goods cannot be measured (or can only 
partially be measured) by test results. How could we ever measure a student’s love 




MacIntyre’s conception of a practice in terms of internal goods and standards of 
excellence, the virtues, and practitioner autonomy is an attractive one, and provides a 




However, though it is a central feature of MacIntyre’s conception of a practice 
that practitioners need to be initiated into them, and that this involves a lengthy 
process of apprenticeship, the notion that pupils might benefit from being prepared 
for such apprenticeships through, for example, the cultivation of the requisite virtues, 
or that their education might itself take the form of being initiated into various 
practices, or being initiated into a moral tradition, has not to my knowledge been 
explored. Instead, those philosophers of education who subscribe to what might 
broadly be termed ‘liberalism’ - to the core liberal values that according to John 
White have ‘animated progressive British politics since the mid-nineteenth century’ 
(White, 2003, p. 147) - take the prime aim of education to be personal autonomy. 
And, as I argued in Chapter 2, those who work in the Aristotelian tradition believe, 
by and large, that the cultivation of phronesis (or intelligent virtue, or ‘critical 
virtue’, as Kristjansson terms it) involves pupils developing the capacity to critically 
justify their values and beliefs. For example, Wilfred Carr, one of the standard-
bearers of the Aristotelian tradition in philosophy of education, argues that phronesis 
must be raised to ‘the level of reflective awareness’ so that the limits and limitations 
of practices can be transcended and practitioners can ‘confront the limits of their 
own self-understanding’ (Carr, 2004, pp. 62-3). Practitioners must, in effect, be 
practical philosophers. Besides, the elusive nature of phronesis – of the putative 
general ability to deliberate on and solve practical problems taking into full account 
the ethical particulars of the situation - makes it difficult to specify the nature of the 
curriculum that would serve to cultivate it. The traditional curriculum of academic 
subject disciplines could be conceived as an initiation into various practices, 
admittedly a very narrow range of practices, but the justification usually proposed is 
quite different - namely, that the academic disciplines have a unique value in 
                                                          
1
 The Good Life of Teaching (2010), Chris Higgins’ exploration of how a virtue ethics of teaching 
might be constructed, is a notable example. Wilfred Carr’s seminal paper Philosophy and Education 
(2004), in which Carr argued that education should be conceived as a practice, and philosophy of 
education as practical philosophy in the Aristotelian tradition, was inspired in part by Macintyre’s 




‘training the mind’2. Likewise, many faith schools could be thought of as initiating 
pupils into moral traditions (as indeed they do), but inevitably the emphasis is on the 
spiritual nature of a worthwhile life, and teaching takes the form of working out the 
ethical implications of revelation. There are no particular implications for the wider 
curriculum, or for the conception of worthwhile activity in terms of practices.  
 
My concern is to follow through the implications of conceiving worthwhile 
activity on the lines of MacIntyre’s practices (i.e. in terms of various goods and 
virtues) in a different direction: first, by specifying a central aim - perhaps the central 
aim - of education to be the preparation of pupils for a fulfilled life by fostering in 
them the virtues necessary for the engagement in practices, whose goods they will 
thereby be able to realise; and second, by conceiving the school curriculum 
something on the lines of a set of educational practices that would best foster these 
virtues – practices into which pupils would be initiated. In the last chapter, I drew 
partially on MacIntyre’s conception of a practice in order to argue that moral 
autonomy was an illusory objective. Here I shall build on MacIntyre’s conception of 
a practice - being a form of activity whose internal goods can only be realised 
through a process of initiation - by attempting to shed more light on the precise 
nature of these goods and thereby identify the virtues that, because they are needed 
for the successful engagement in practices (whose goods they also in part constitute), 
are also essential ingredients of a good life. In the process, I shall argue that practices 
need to be conceived differently in some important respects and I shall draw on the 
distinction I made in the last chapter between the ordinary and the critical
3
 
engagement in a practice in order to develop more fully the inference I made that 
‘the unexamined life is worth living’. I shall argue that a much wider range of 
activities can be counted worthwhile than Aristotle envisaged - worthwhile in the 
sense that their goods are conducive to a flourishing life. 
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 I shall consider the value of the academic subject disciplines together with the notion of mental 
training as an educational aim in Chapters 6 and 7. Interestingly, MacIntyre himself subscribes to a 
traditional liberal academic education for all pupils (though extended to encompass practical skills 
like car maintenance) on the grounds that we need an ‘educated public’. I shall discuss MacIntyre’s 
position later in this chapter.   
3




It is crucial for the purposes of this thesis to consider the nature of the good life 
and the specific goods and virtues that might contribute to it because school curricula 
have traditionally assume, and for the most part continue to assume, a very narrow 
conception of the good life concerned almost exclusively with the life of the mind. 
Pupils have, I shall argue, been prepared for lives as philosophers and orators 
(politicians), a state of affairs that could have been justified in the context of the 
Athenian polis but cannot possibly be justified today. In this chapter, I shall therefore 
try to identify the core virtues necessary for all pupils to lead worthwhile lives as 
adults in a modern liberal democracy – the virtues that the school curriculum ought 
to be cultivating.    
 
 
Practices, goods and virtues 
 
What makes an activity worthwhile in the sense that it is conducive to human 
fulfilment and therefore ‘a good life’? MacIntyre, I believe, comes close to 
answering this question in his conception of ‘a practice’. A practice is defined by 
MacIntyre in the following terms: 
 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal 
to that form of activity are realized in trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 187).  
 
Initiation into a practice generally takes the form of an extended apprenticeship in 
which the pupil submits to the authority of the master, who embodies ‘the best 
standards realized so far’ (p. 190). And the virtues play an important role, being the 
acquired human qualities or dispositions that enable us to achieve the goods internal 





But what are the ‘goods’ that are internal to a practice? MacIntyre’s account of 
the nature of the goods of practices, the goods that contribute toward a flourishing 
life and produce the state of eudaimonia, is painted in fairly general terms, but from 
it we can deduce that there are, broadly speaking, two kinds of goods involved. First, 
there is what MacIntyre aptly describes as ‘the good of a certain kind of life’ (p. 
190), the good of experiencing a certain mode of being and of possessing a distinct 
and satisfying identity. It arises out of a commitment to achieve certain ‘standards of 
excellence’ (p. 187), but also involves association with certain sorts of people and, 
on the basis of a shared interest or sensibility, the cultivation of certain distinct types 
or fellowship and friendship. Chris Higgins, I think, encapsulates this good very well 
when he writes ‘It is inside such worlds of practice that practitioners encounter thick 
and distinctive notions about what it is worthwhile to participate in, excellent to 
achieve, and admirable to become’ (Higgins, 2010, p. 240). Second, there is the good 
of exercising certain moral and intellectual virtues, both as a means and necessary 
condition of cultivating the good of leading a certain kind of life, and as the result or 
outcome of engagement in practices – i.e. as an end-in-itself. To be engaged in a 
practice that requires and cultivates courage, honesty, patience, reliability and 
generosity (for example) is to be and to have become a courageous, honest, patient, 
reliable and generous person; and to display these qualities when the situation 
demands is to possess a set of publicly recognised values and standards (perhaps 
even to possess transcendent values) that lend purpose and meaning to a person’s 
life.  
 
Whether the internal goods of practices should be conceived as distinct goods or 
as aspects or dimensions of the same good can be debated. MacIntyre himself is 
somewhat ambivalent on the matter; and perhaps it is only a matter of interpretation 
or exposition. Higgins distinguishes four types of good: ‘outstanding works or 
performances to appreciate’, ‘a rich moral phenomenology to experience’, 
‘excellences of character to display’, and ‘a biographical genre through which to 
shape a meaningful life’ (Higgins, 2010, p. 250). I have, in effect, grouped the first, 
second and fourth of these together as inseparable components of the good of a 




this is that though a virtuous character is developed in large part through the 
engagement in practices, it is (I shall argue) a virtuous character that sustains us and 
renders life still worthwhile when circumstances dictate that we cannot realise the 
goods of practices or the good of a certain kind of life. The important thing, 
however, is that the goods (if we assume for the sake of argument they are plural) are 
internal – internal in the sense that initiation into the practice is required to realise 
them, and that they are ends-in-themselves worth striving for.  
 
There are, however, a number of ways in which I would qualify the picture 
MacIntyre paints of practices and their goods.  
 
First, MacIntyre conceives internal goods as end-in-themselves, as constituents 
of a worthwhile life, because they embody the virtues – i.e. the goods either 
comprise the virtues or are of value as ‘arenas’ in which the virtues might be 
exercised. But though the exercise of the virtues, the leading of a virtuous life, is the 
good that is most obviously ethical, there is a broader ethical dimension to leading ‘a 
certain kind of life’ that goes beyond the exercise of the virtues, important though 
that is. To lead a certain kind of life is to adopt a mode of living, working and being 
that involves a transcendence of the self and the appetitive desires that is, by its very 
nature, profoundly ethical. To lead the life of an artist, craftsman, sportsman or 
professional (for example) is to lead a life that is at once worthwhile, good and 
ethical. It involves adherence to a range of standards and criteria of value; it involves 
the mastery of a recognised body of knowledge and skill - i.e. the acquisition of 
expertise; and it involves corresponding duties, obligations and commitments. These 
things certainly entail the exercise of certain virtues (particularly courage, honesty 
and justice – the ones MacIntyre cites as most obviously directly implicated in any 
practice) but more is entailed than ‘merely’ the exercise of the virtues4. I have in 
mind here something of Kierkegaard’s conception of the ethical life as the life in 
which a person commits himself to a vocation or profession or to family life, accepts 
the duties and obligations entailed, and consequently finds meaning in life - as 
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‘lead the life’ but do not adhere to some (or any) of the relevant values. On this argument, their access 
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opposed to the life of the aesthete who tries to satisfy all his desires and remains 
forever ‘the accidental man’ (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 157). I also have in mind 
Bernard Williams’ criticism of narrow conceptions of moral obligation, categorical 
duty and impartial good on the grounds that a man’s ‘projects’ (comprising coherent 
sets of interests, concerns and desires) or ‘ground project’ might be in large part be 
what constitutes his character and gives meaning to his life (Williams, 1981, pp. 5-
14). I am taking ‘the ethical’ in the form of the good of a certain kind of life to 
encompass exactly such projects.  
 
The good of a certain kind of life might also be conceived in terms of meaning 
or meaningfulness. In Meaning in Life, Susan Wolf speaks of activities or projects 
that are meaningful because as well as wanting to engage in them (i.e. there is an 
element of subjective attraction), we perceive them as having objective value or 
worth ‘the source of which lies outside our selves’ (Wolf, 2010, p. 31); and though 
meaning and morality often complement each other, to engage in an activity because 
we are passionate about it, to ‘act out of love’, need not entail any sense of acting out 
of duty or ‘doing good’. Philosophers, argues Wolf, need to recognise that as well as 
acting out of self-interest in the hedonistic sense) or moral duty, people can act for 
‘reasons of love’; that as well as happiness and morality, the engagement in projects 
or activities from which we derive meaning is also central to a flourishing life. I 
think this is essentially right, and one way of recognising this is to broaden our 
conception of the ethical to encompass the value derived from meaningful activity 
(alternatively we might broaden our conception of self-interest to encompass the 
ethical). What is lacking, as Wolf herself admits (p. 47), is an account of the nature 
of the objective value of these projects or activities, an account that would re-assure 
us that lawnmower racing, for example, has only limited value as a worthwhile 
activity. Wolf is dubious that ‘a community of valuers’ could be the source of 
criteria of objective value because ‘whole societies can be wrong’ (p. 46). But if we 
conceive worthwhile activity in terms of practices rooted in (and in part constituting) 
a moral and cultural tradition, all within the frame of a free society, then we have, I 
believe, the criteria we need. Moreover, if we conceive a moral life as a virtuous life 
(Wolf, by contrast, conceives morality in Kantian terms of equality of respect (pp. 




the virtues) in a meaningful life through its contribution to realising the goods of 
practices can be much more clearly described. That practices involve a sustained 
period of apprenticeship, the mastery of a complex body of knowledge and skill, and 
provide an arena for the exercise of various virtues is, I suspect, more than sufficient 





Second, I think it is important to note that the good of leading a certain kind of 
life is not exclusively moral or ethical in nature: it incorporates a subjective as well 
as an ethical component or dimension. The person being initiated into a practice 
must have the requisite aptitude, interest and motivation to engage wholeheartedly in 
the practice – or in the case of a practice that is one’s occupation, at least to engage 
in it with a degree of enthusiasm or commitment; otherwise, the goods of the 
practice will not accrue
6
. Clearly, one must have the requisite aptitude; unless the 
requisite body of knowledge and skill is mastered, and the requisite expertise is 
gained, the practice obviously ‘cannot be practised’ and therefore the goods of the 
practice are denied. But equally, the practitioner who, though he or she has mastered 
the skills, reluctantly ‘goes through the motions’, perhaps because circumstances 
gave him or her no choice, cannot lead a fulfilled life except in a very diminished 
sense. It is the subjective attributes of individual capability and motivation rather 
than character that are the determining factors here. On the other hand, if there were 
no ethical or moral dimension to the activity to begin with, there would be no 
internal goods to access, and therefore no sense of leading a worthwhile or a good 
life, however pleasurable the engagement in the activity - like eating chocolate, for 
example.   
 
My point here is that if the practitioner does not feel fulfilled, they cannot be 
fulfilled - a point that Wolf makes forcefully (pp. 21-2). The good of leading a 
certain kind of life can only have any meaning or significance if it is actualised in the 
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 I consider in more detail how a hierarchy of practices might evolve later in this chapter when I 
consider Rawls’ conception of self-respect. 
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 In An Aims-based Curriculum, Michael Reiss and John White speak of the need for pupils’ 
‘wholehearted engagement’ in intrinsically worthwhile school activities (Reiss & White, 2013, p. 16). 





practitioner’s sense of satisfaction in doing something worthwhile. It is unlikely that 
a practitioner would gain no sense of satisfaction at all from engaging in a practice, 
that they would realise none of the goods of the practice in any measure. But one 
could well envisage a person feeling a sense of regret, or frustration, or even active 
resentment because their ambitions had been thwarted, because they had been 
compelled by circumstances or against their wishes to engage in an activity or an 
occupation. On the other hand, it may be that one’s aspirations are unrealistic 
(nothing but being an actor or an artist or a film director will do), or that one has 
psychological problems of a compulsive-obsessive type (perfectionism, for example) 
that render any occupation less than satisfying. Either way, there is a subjective 
dimension to accessing and realising the goods of practices. In preparing a person for 
leading an ethical life, we therefore have also to consider the needs and capabilities 
of the person concerned.  
 
A distinctive feature of any practice is that particular modes of understanding, 
perception, reasoning, imagination and judgement are cultivated; but in order for 
judgement to be exercised, the practitioner must have a large measure of autonomy. 
Work on a production line, where the worker has to perform a series of mechanical 
tasks requiring little judgement or autonomous action, and which quite possibly has 
to be engaged in because it is the only employment available, would therefore seem 
to be an obvious example of an activity that could not be counted a practice. Both 
ethical and subjective dimensions, as I have described them, are lacking – unless, 
perhaps, the person concerned has a special fascination with mechanical processes 
(perhaps because he or she is autistic) or is incapable of exercising much autonomy, 
in which case it is conceivable that the job is more fulfilling than it might appear to a 
normal person. However, the situation is more complex than at first sight, which 
brings me to my third point. An apparently ‘mindless’ activity with no obvious 
internal goods might yet be of vital social or national importance (contributing, for 
example, to famine relief or the war effort), in which case there would be 
compensating external goods - public goods - that might well make the job seem 
worthwhile and contribute to a sense of fulfilment, at least in some degree. Many 
occupations give rise to some such public good and this is often reflected in an 




and self-respect of the practitioner – one thinks of doctors, nurses, firemen, soldiers, 
policemen and women, and even teachers, all of whose work is in some sense their 
‘vocation’. Even when there is little social status or public recognition attached to a 
particular occupation, or even when it is despised (the tax collector comes to mind), 
that the work is remunerated (sometimes very well) generally indicates that it has 
social value
7
. A boring, distasteful or dangerous job might be judged worth doing 
solely for the money, for the goods that money can buy or facilitate. But again, that it 
is remunerated makes it, generally speaking, ‘an honest job’, a job that needs to be 
done; and out of this comes an ethical dimension and a degree of self-respect. And 
therefore I do not think MacIntyre’s hard and fast distinction between the internal 
goods of a practice, which make an activity ethically worthwhile, and the external 
goods (he cites prestige, status and money – p. 188), which are of dubious moral 
value, can be sustained. There is both an internal and an external dimension or aspect 
to the good of leading a certain kind of life; and both internal and external (public) 
goods have ethical value in the sense that they contribute to a worthwhile life.    
 
My fourth point, which is closely related to my third point, is that I do not think 
it is possible to make a hard and fast distinction between activities that count as 
practices and those that do not.  Most occupations lie somewhere between the 
extremes of ‘mindless’ activity on a production line and complete professional 
autonomy. An occupation, or at least certain aspects of it, might therefore have some 
of the characteristic features of a practice but not others, or have the characteristic 
features but to a lesser degree. Indeed, the engagement in any practice, even one of 
those cited by MacIntyre as exemplary (football, architecture, chess, fishing, physics 
and music), necessitates undertaking some routine or mechanical activities that, 
though essential to the greater good, are in themselves boring or onerous. Paul Hager 
notes that MacIntyre’s association of practices with games, crafts and traditional 
occupations, and his neglect of modern occupational roles, points to ‘his somewhat 
romantic attachment to the pre-industrial past’, a past that pre-dates division of 
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labour and specialisation (Hager, 2011, p. 551). For example, MacIntyre denies that 
bricklaying can be designated a practice, presumably because it is too specialised 
and too mechanical; but as Hager argues, there is a rich history and tradition behind 
bricklaying ‘as is evident from the stunning arches and intricate features of 
innumerable historic buildings around the world’. MacIntyre’s position would then 
seem to reflect little more than ‘armchair philosopher ignorance’ combined with 
unconscious class assumptions about manual work (p. 551). In any case, in judging 
bricklaying according to external criteria (I am assuming here, of course, that 
MacIntyre was not trained as a bricklayer) – i.e. that it appears mechanical, repetitive 
and ‘mindless’ - MacIntyre is failing to apply his own criterion concerning the 
internal goods of practices, namely that these can only be appreciated by those who 
have been initiated into the practice: ‘Those who lack the relevant experience are 
incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods’ (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 189).   
 
Outside the professions, most work in an advanced industrial or post-industrial 
economy is necessarily highly specialised and offers only a partial opportunity to 
access the goods detailed above. One is hard put to speak of the good of leading ‘a 
certain kind of life’ involving the mastery of a complex body of knowledge and skill, 
or the good of cultivating the virtues, when the occupation in question is that of 
supermarket manager, cashier, shelf loader, delivery man or security guard
8
.  But 
almost any job, however mundane, repetitive and mechanical, has an ethical 
dimension in the sense that it is possible ‘to do it better or worse’ and to exercise at 
least some of the virtues, whether it be in the course of performing the task (i.e. 
conscientiously rather than negligently) or in the way in which one relates to one’s 
fellow workers. Nelson Mandela provided a poignant illustration of this when he 
recounted his experience of prison life: 
 
To survive in prison, one must develop ways to take satisfaction in one’s 
daily life. One can feel fulfilled by washing one’s clothes so that they are 
particularly clean, by sweeping a corridor so that it is free of dust, by 
organising one’s cell to conserve as much space as possible. The same pride 
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 I have worked as cashier, shelf loader and security guard and can testify that nobody I worked with 




one takes in more consequential tasks outside prison, one can find in doing 
small things inside prison. (Mandela cited in Whitaker, 2013) 
 
The problem is that in the case of activities offering little opportunity for 
independent judgement or autonomy (prison life being an extreme example), there is 
no fulfilment to be derived from goods intrinsic to the activity - i.e. from internal 
goods; and though the virtues might be exercised if previously habituated (Mandela, 
after all, was an educated man of exceptional character), the activity itself does little 
to foster or cultivate them. Activities other than a person’s work occupation, 
activities that could be deemed worthwhile, would then assume all the more 
importance as sources of fulfilment: leisure activities, hobbies, serious intellectual 
and artistic pursuits, sport and family life, for example; and the habituation of the 
virtues in upbringing and schooling would assume paramount importance. The 
virtues equip us to engage successfully in a range of worthwhile activities (or 
‘practices’), and when we engage in activities that are not particularly worthwhile in 
themselves as we often have to in life, they help to sustain us by providing purpose 
and meaning to our lives, by serving as goods-in-themselves worth striving for. 
 
I am not at all arguing that workers should be satisfied with their ‘station’ or that 
any occupation can be fulfilling so long as the worker has a sufficiently positive 
attitude. It is all very well for proponents of positive psychology to argue that it is a 
matter of what people ‘choose to perceive’ about their jobs; that work can be made 
more fulfilling if only workers ‘focus on those aspects that are personally meaningful 
and pleasurable’ (Ben-Shahar, 2008, p. 107); and that if such a change of focus is not 
possible, we simply need to find alternative employment that ‘corresponds to both 
our passions and our strengths’ (p. 103). But this is little comfort to those who, 
because they have to earn a living, are engaged in cleaning the latrines, or stacking 
shelves, or patrolling the premises at night as security guards – jobs that somebody 
will end up doing in any industrial society. The onus is then on government, 
employers and unions to try to improve the working conditions of people who are 
not engaged in very fulfilling occupations by changing - so far as it is possible - the 
nature of the job to allow more autonomy, more responsibility, more opportunities 




Of course, a more radical transformation of industrial society might also be 
envisaged. There is a particular problem with utopian solutions on ‘communist’ lines 
designed to strike at the twin evils (as Marx saw them) of division of labour and 
specialisation, in that they undermine the very practices (practices necessarily 
entailing a high degree of specialisation) that mediate the goods of a worthwhile life; 
and this is apart from the obvious totalitarian dangers. But the position I am 
defending in this thesis certainly does not preclude a radical transformation of 
society - a transformation, for example, in which disagreeable tasks are shared out 
among the population, economic goods are shared more equally, economic growth is 
managed so that it is ecologically sustainable, and (most radical of all) absolute 
limits are put on the individual’s consumption of commodities9. However, in a 
liberal society there will always be some onus on individuals to try, on the one hand, 
to choose (and to train for) the occupations that offer them the greatest possibility of 
fulfilment; and on the other, to ‘make the most’ of the occupation that they happen to 
be engaged in, even if it is not the one they would have chosen had they the choice. 
And here, again, it is the virtues that are of paramount importance.  
 
The good of the unexamined life  
 
Before I go on to consider the precise nature of the virtues that are worth 
cultivating, I would like to explore further one particular aspect of the argument I 
have developed above concerning the nature of the goods of practices - one that has 
significant implications for the nature of the school curriculum. Part of my purpose 
in attempting to detail the goods of worthwhile activities – of activities that might 
contribute to a flourishing life - has been to try to demonstrate that a wide variety of 
activities (academic, practical, artistic, sporting, professional, caring, and so forth) 
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 In this respect, Ivan Illich’s critique of industrial society is particularly interesting in that it seeks a 
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creation) of ‘use values’. Unlike ‘industrial tools’, by which the user is passively acted on, convivial 
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action’ rather than satisfy demands created by the producer, and their production and use is 
practicable for the many and not merely the few (Illich, 1990, pp. 20-26). Illich developed his critique 
of industrial society in a series of books published in the 1970s, but his critique seems all the more 
relevant now given that the continuing association of progress with economic growth seems 




can count as worthwhile in the sense of having both the subjective and the ethical 
dimensions that make them conducive to a good life. It also follows that a variety of 
forms of engagement in practices can count as worthwhile - in particular, that to 
engage in a practice and to access its goods does not, generally speaking, require a 
person to be ‘critically’ engaged in justifying and reformulating the principles, 
values and goods that underlie the practice. Contra MacIntyre, there is no need for 
the individual to be involved in a continuous argument as to the nature of the goods 
of the practices in which he is engaged (this was my argument in Chapter 3).  
 
It is certainly the case that some practices by their very nature lend themselves 
more than others to critical engagement, to the quest for rational justification and 
‘epistemic goods’ (i.e. to  quest for ‘the truth’), and to ‘rational autonomy’ on the 
part of the practitioner. Philosophy is an obvious example, but the engagement in 
any academic subject discipline with a corpus of pure, theoretical knowledge, will 
sooner or later involve getting to grips with questions of justification and proof, 
particularly where there are rival theories and schools of thought to choose from. It is 
also the case that, regardless of the nature of the practice, most practitioners will 
want to innovate in some sense of the term (local innovation being part and parcel of 
the exercise of practical judgement) - but within the frame of the paradigm, because 
it is the paradigm that defines the nature of problems to be solved and their solutions 
in the first place (as I argued in Chapter 3). Radical innovation or ‘paradigm change’ 
certainly has its place in a range of practices – and not only the academic disciplines. 
But as we move from the pure to the applied disciplines, from the academic 
disciplines to other kinds of practice (the professions, crafts, leisure activities, family 
life and so forth), the nature of a person’s engagement is less likely to be ‘critical’, 
and more likely to revolve around the mastery of a recognised body of knowledge 
and skill (whether articulated or tacit), and the practical exercise of skill and 
judgement. The engagement might well involve innovation - but at a localised and 
practical level. For example, the family doctor’s main concern is the treatment of her 
patients; her interest in medical research, by contrast, is likely to be limited to its 
applications to current practice rather than the precise nature of the research, the 




the radical re-structuring of the health service or of patient care is likely to be 




By the same token, there will be some people for whom the wholehearted 
engagement in a practice is only possible if the form of that engagement is critical. 
For them, the life of the academic, philosopher, intellectual, research scientist, 
radical innovator or reformer will represent ‘the good life’. But such people are 
suited by their aptitude, interest and personality for this critical engagement. There is 
no reason to suppose that this is true of all people, just as there is no reason to 
suppose that everyone would wish to engage in doctoral research if only they had the 
opportunity
11
. I am simply arguing that there are many different ways in which 
people can lead flourishing lives, in which people can lead the best life that it is 
ethically possible for them to lead; and that the ‘ordinary’ everyday engagement in a 
practice is just as conducive to realising the goods of a practice as the ‘critical’ or 
radical or even revolutionary engagement on the part of that rare practitioner who 
has the aptitude, interest and motivation (as well as the opportunity) to institute 
radical reform or produce radical innovations.  
 
And yet the claim that only ‘the examined life’ is worth living is tacitly implied 
by nearly all those engaged in moral philosophy. As Iris Murdoch (who is a notable 
exception) remarks, ‘the fact that an unexamined life can be virtuous’ has been either 
forgotten or ‘theorized away’ by philosophers (Murdoch, 1985, p. 1). The notion that 
endowing pupils with ‘personal autonomy’ and the capacity ‘to think critically’ (and 
hence preparing them for active political and intellectual life) is the central aim of 
education - that these are essential to human flourishing - is so entrenched that it is 
worth exploring further the possibility that ‘an ordinary life’, too, is worth living. 
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 Time considerations alone are an important determining factor here. Speaking from personal 
experience, it is very hard indeed to find the time to engage in serious academic research and 
simultaneously ‘hold down’ a full time job outside academia and have a family, especially when there 
are young children.  
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 Indeed, it might be argued that it takes a certain sort of person to be a philosopher (or academic or 
researcher), a person not only with the intellectual aptitude but the personality. One clearly needs an 
analytical mind, but also, I think, a tendency to introspection. The trait that leads a person to need to 
stand back from life and analyse what others take for granted might even be considered a sign of 
psychic imbalance, a mental disorder, particularly if the capacity to act or to form normal loving 




Can a person be a good citizen and lead a flourishing life without taking an active 
part in political life or actively deliberating on the political issues of the day? Can a 
person deliberate well and make good judgements if they have not reflected on their 
ethical principles - as, for example, they might if they made a critical study of 
Aristotle’s ethical works? Can a person make good moral judgements without 
deliberating at all in the sense of articulating the ethical principles involved? 
 
Unfortunately, a recurrent concern with the philosophical and political 
dimensions of ethical life to the exclusion of other conceptions of worthwhile 
activity and eudaimonia has typified thinking on education from classical times to 
the present day. This is true of Aristotelian inspired virtue ethics, liberal conceptions 
of education (both the rhetorical and the research traditions), modern civic education, 
programmes designed to foster ‘critical thinking’, and virtue epistemology - 
according to which pupils should be motivated by a love of ‘epistemic goods’. The 
possibility that an ordinary sort of life, the life of a person engaged neither in critical 
justification nor in active politics, can be virtuous and worthwhile in the fullest sense 
seems to have been neglected. By contrast, the life of the critical thinker and/or 
politically active citizen has been held up as the ideal for which all should strive.  
 
This bias against the practices and forms of engagement in practices that typify 
ordinary life can be traced all the way back to Plato and Aristotle, who believed that 
the life of the philosopher devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and truth, the 
contemplative life, is the only one really worth living - or as Socrates famously put 
it, ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. Aristotle qualifies this by arguing that 
the active political life - the life in which phronesis and the virtues can be exercised 
to the highest and most harmonious degree - is not only a necessary pre-condition for 
engagement in philosophy or contemplation (because it sustains the life of the polis) 
but is a good worth striving for in its own right. And so in Aristotle’s ethical system, 
the ideal of the good life and of eudaimonia (the condition or state of flourishing that 
is thereby achieved), the ideal of the most complete life it is possible for any human 
being to live, requires engagement either in philosophy or in politics.
12
 Absent, 
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 Aristotle follows Plato and Socrates in regarding the contemplative life – the pursuit of sophia or 




however, from the Aristotelian ethical scheme is any notion that people might live 
virtuous lives and contribute to the ethical life of the community - that they might 
even live ‘the best life it is possible for them to live’ - by participating in a range of 
practices other than politics or philosophy; i.e. that they might lead ordinary lives.   
 
How did this state of affairs arise? The answer can, I think, be traced directly to 
the nature of the polis that Aristotle assumed as the frame for his ethical system. 
Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia and the form of life in which it might be 
realised depends in turn on certain very specific social and economic conditions 
obtaining in the polis. The conditions are, first, that the population of the polis is 
small enough to allow all citizens to engage actively in politics; second, that there is 
a large class of slaves engaged in menial activity so as to free an elite of educated 
citizens (‘free men’) to engage full-time in politics and/or contemplation13; and, 
third, that though people differ in their natural capacities (in their ‘natural virtue’), 
the virtues can be habituated and something approximating to the ideal citizen 
formed given the requisite upbringing and education – so that Greek democracy can 
function effectively.  
 
Now, it is fairly obvious that these conditions bear little or no relation to those 
actually obtaining in a modern liberal society – indeed in any modern industrial 
society. In a modern liberal state, the population is vastly greater than in an Ancient 
Greek city state and so democracy must be representative (in Britain a member of 
parliament might represent an electorate of anything up to 100,000). Most citizens 
have to work for a living and they specialise in the fields and occupations in which 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regarding an active and virtuous civic life (a political life) as also essential to the attainment of the 
supreme good, not merely as a means to the former but as an end in itself – hence the subject matter 
of The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics. Moral development therefore culminates in phronesis, 
the architectonic virtue that enables right judgement in both private and public affairs. The debate on 
whether Aristotle favours contemplation or politics is an extensive one, but I think it is clear that 
Aristotle himself is somewhat ambivalent on the matter (see Nagel, 1980). I think it is indicative of 
this that when in The Politics Aristotle asks whether ‘the active life of a statesman’ or ‘the 
contemplative life’ is the better one, and notes how important it is to answer the question, he proceeds 
not to answer his own question (Aristotle, 1981, p. 395). 
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the nemesis of slave-holding’ (Whitehead, 1950, pp. 77-8). John Dewey talks in similar vein of the 
existence in Western culture of an indulgent parasitic leisured class made ‘luxurious and effeminate’ 




their particular aptitudes or interests or motivations gain them the greatest reward; 
only a very small number will have the opportunity to be engaged in political 
decision-making or academia. And finally, it is nowadays generally accepted that 
people differ widely in their aptitudes, personalities, interests and levels of 
motivation, whereas Aristotle distinguished mainly between those who were capable 
of exercising the virtues in at least some measure (citizens) and those who lacked the 
capability altogether (slaves). As soon as we introduce these new factors or 
variables, the ethical picture changes radically. Aristotle’s rigid, idealised conception 
of the path to eudaimonia and the good life via a life of political engagement and 
contemplation can be rejected in favour of a more flexible individualised conception 
of the goods and virtues that might contribute to human flourishing. When the nature 
of social, political and economic life in a modern state is taken into account – in 
particular, the division of labour and differences in people’s aptitudes, interests and 
motivation – it is clear that for most people, the eudaimonic life envisaged by 
Aristotle is neither feasible nor desirable. Not everyone has the aptitude or (even if 
they had the aptitude) the motivation or interest to lead a public or a contemplative 
life. Even if everyone did have the aptitude, motivation and interest, preparation for a 
life of political and contemplative activity is only going to culminate in a worthwhile 
life if the virtues cultivated find outlet and expression in a suitable public arena 
where the art of judgement (phronesis) can be developed and actualised through the 
experience of leading an active political or contemplative life; otherwise, 
eudaimonia is denied. And clearly only a minority of pupils will find this outlet. In 
any case, as I have argued, there is no reason to suppose that a flourishing life need 
involve either political activity or philosophy. 
 
The problem with liberal education on this account is that it has from the very 
beginning been conceived as preparing pupils either for a life of political activity 
(Cicero’s via activa) or a life of contemplation; and therefore as producing a political 
administrative cultural and academic elite. It has, in effect, assumed Aristotle’s 
conception both of the polis and of eudaimonia, and has, as a result, been literary and 
academic in nature. Moreover, those philosophers of education who conceive the 
primary aim of universal education to be the development of autonomous citizens 




undeveloped and incapable of leading flourishing lives), have unwittingly subscribed 
to the same conception of liberal education. Even those who wish to replace subject 
disciplines with programmes to develop ‘critical thinking skills’, didactic methods 
with ‘communities of enquiry’, subscribe broadly to the same ends. The unfortunate 
result is that an education designed to produce an elite of academics and orators has 
been foisted on all pupils regardless of their needs or interests.   
 
However, it could be argued that a degree of rational or intellectual autonomy – 
the capacity to make up one’s own mind by critically scrutinising an argument and 
the available evidence – on the part of citizens is essential for the sustenance of the 
polis and liberal democracy; that to lead a good life requires a person to both be 
fulfilled in their personal life and to be active as a citizen. I think there is no doubt 
that to engage actively in politics, the capacity to engage critically and intellectually 
is a great advantage. We expect our politicians to make difficult decisions 
concerning the nature of conflicting public goods and to be able to justify their 
decisions with rational arguments. But is the academic or intellectual necessarily a 
better citizen than the ordinary person in the street?  
 
MacIntyre seems to imply that this is the case when he argues that for ‘shared 
rational deliberation’ in a democracy, an ‘educated public’ is necessary, and that an 
educated public would be constituted by ‘educated generalists, people who ‘can 
situate themselves in relation to society and to nature because they know enough 
astronomy, enough geology, enough history, enough economics, and enough 
philosophy and theology to do so’ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 17). He even 
argues that pupils should all study mathematics ‘up to and including the differential 
calculus’ (p. 14) – in other words, to a good A-level standard. But this is fantastic. 
Even if it were assumed that everyone had the intellectual capability or aptitude for 
an academic education, which I think is a wildly optimistic assumption made on 
egalitarian grounds
14
, one still has to face the fact that most people do not wish to 
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 I realise that there are many philosophers of education and educationalists who would disagree 
profoundly with this assertion. Their view is that so long as they are taught by sufficiently competent 
and inspiring teachers, all pupils can learn philosophy and mathematics (along with other academic 
disciplines) to a high level. All I can say is that speaking as a mathematics teacher, I profoundly 




engage in sustained critical reflection on their moral and political principles for the 
simple reason that they lack the desire, interest or need. Indeed, the claim that only 
those who have a serious interest in moral philosophy or in politics can lead an 
ethical or virtuous life in the fullest sense, whether as a person or a citizen, would 
seem, on the face of it, a preposterous one. This scholar’s conceit is surely disproved 
by the exemplary lives and characters of a multitude of good decent people who 
simply get on with their lives and who find motivation and inspiration in sources 




Many people find inspiration in religion - in revelation rather than in rational 
reflection. Christians, for example, feel called to display selfless love (agape); no 
rational justification is required in the sense of the formulation of an ethical theory. 
Moreover, as I noted in Chapter 2, the emotional capacity to love and to care arises 
not from rational calculation but from our particular experience of loving family ties, 
above all from ‘the loving relation between parent and child’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 
83). Richard Smith writes that analytic philosophy’s concern with the ‘clear-headed, 
ratiocinative chooser-as-calculator’ neglects ‘the manifold ways in which we 
‘experience our identifications and commitments’’, and yet these experiences and 
callings are sometimes ‘in the most important areas of our lives’ (Smith, 2003, p. 
165). That these other sources of ethical knowledge and motivation can be the most 
powerful of all is demonstrated by all those ordinary people (ordinary simply in the 
sense of not being academics, philosopher, critical practitioners or radical 
innovators) who treat others with notable respect, compassion, generosity and 
kindness in their daily lives. In any case, as I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, most sorts 
of deliberation, including on moral dilemmas, are carried on within the practices that 
together comprise a moral tradition by drawing on the knowledge, values and 
emotional responses into which people have been habituated.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
matter. However, the main arguments of this thesis are not premised on the assertion that there are 
differences in intellectual ability. I shall address the other shortcomings (as I see it) of a universal 
academic curriculum in Part 2.  
15
 In fact, I shall argue in Part 2 that rhetoric provides a better training for the politician or active 
citizen than either academic training or a course in ‘critical thinking’; and that if we want an educated 
public in the sense of politically aware and reflective citizens able to make practical judgements, then 
a training in rhetoric (with stories of human experience as its subject matter) is the better means of 




Another way of putting this argument is that moral knowledge can take the form 
of intuition born of experience rather than of rational deliberation from first 
principles. Gerald Dworkin warns of the dangers of over-intellectualising our 
conceptions of moral autonomy: ‘If we think of the process of reflection and 
identification as being a conscious, fully articulated, and explicit process, then it will 
appear that it is mainly professors of philosophy who exercise autonomy’ (Dworkin, 
1988, p. 17; and cited in Smith, 2003, p. 168). He goes on to cite the example of a 
farmer ‘living in an isolated rural community, with a minimal education’, who  
 
… may without being aware of it be conducting his life in ways which 
indicate that he has shaped and molded his life according to reflective 
procedures. This will be shown not by what he says about his thoughts, but in 
what he tries to change in his life, what he criticizes about others, the 
satisfaction he manifests (or fails to) in his work, family, and community 
(Dworkin, p. 17).   
 
To know that ‘this is good’ and ‘that is right’ by virtue of having been initiated 
into a moral tradition and its component practices is therefore not to possess some 
inferior knowledge or understanding – inferior because not subjected to critical 
analysis and reflection, inferior because not deliberated on or articulated. For 
Bernard Williams, the crucial distinction is between the form moral knowledge takes 
at the public level and the form it takes at the private level. At the public and 
institutional level, there is clearly a need for rational justification because ethical 
norms and guidelines must be articulated (for example, in medical ethics), even 
when moral conflict cannot be resolved by ethical theory and when moral 
uncertainty arises (as Williams believes it must) because our basic values are 
incommensurable (Williams, 1981, p. 76). Moral philosophy clearly has an 
important role here in at least clarifying the issues involved. But at the private level, 
moral sentiment and moral intuition are the characteristic forms of moral knowledge 
and understanding: 
 
For the intuitive condition is not only a state which private understanding can 
live with, but a state which it must have as part of its life, if that life is going 




of life which human beings lack unless they feel more than they can say, and 
grasp more than they can explain [my italics]. (p. 82)  
 
By the same token, to be a good citizen need not entail critical analysis and reflection 
on one’s ethical principles. A person can possess good moral judgement and 
practical wisdom on both private and public matters by virtue of their moral 
sentiments and moral intuition, as well as by virtue of their experience of engaging 
in a variety of practices. 
 
There is certainly an important role for philosophers, academics and intellectuals 
(indeed, for anybody with a serious interest in political and philosophical questions) 
in framing ethical guidelines and policy at the public level, and in informing and 
contributing to public debate on ethical and moral issues. But it is quite unwarranted 
to credit those professionally engaged in philosophy, politics, academia or 
intellectual life in general with a uniquely privileged position or standing – social, 
moral or political. Of course, philosophers, politicians and academics have their own 
special contribution to make to the polis, to the well-being of liberal society. But so 
do other practitioners: those who save or protect lives (including the lives of 
philosophers, academics and politicians), who engage in scientific research (where 
the potential for public good is enormous on the part of those rare practitioners with 
the necessary talent), who farm and produce the food that sustains human life, who 
through their imaginative power as artists illuminate the human condition, who care 
selflessly for others - and even those who make us laugh, because they too illuminate 
the human condition. Indeed, the epitome of a practice that is almost universally 
accessible, that does not require intellectual engagement or justification, and yet 
whose goods are of incalculable ethical value both to the individual and the wider 
community, is ‘the family’ founded as it is on ties of unconditional love and 
affection.  
 
In summary, then, the life of the politician or philosopher is not the only form 
that the good life can take. We can conceive of a range of conceptions of human 
flourishing and the good life reflecting the range of aptitudes, needs, interests and 




practices. A person can be a good citizen and lead a flourishing life by engaging in a 
range of practices and occupations none of which necessarily requires sustained 
critical reflection or philosophising on underlying values and principles. In other 
words, the unexamined life can be worth living. An education conceived primarily as 
preparing pupils for public or academic life, for producing philosophers and 
statesmen, is therefore not necessarily the best education for all pupils. What is 
certain, however, is that the role of the virtues is crucial, both in practices and in 
those activities and occupations that, on the face of it, offer little in the form of 
internal or external goods, but which people are compelled by circumstances to 
engage in.  
 
I shall now consider the core virtues that ought to be cultivated - the virtues that 
any citizen would need to access at least some of the goods I have identified as 
essential to a flourishing life; for it is the cultivation of these virtues that ought to 
constitute the main aim of the school curriculum.   
 
Three models of civic virtue  
 
I have argued that in a modern society, a much broader range of conceptions of 
eudaimonia and human flourishing must be envisaged than was the case in 
Aristotle’s Greek city state, where slaveholders were able - at least in principle - to 
devote themselves full time to contemplation (philosophy) and politics. 
Nevertheless, it is the pre-condition for engagement in practices of any kind (as well 
as for the integration of these practices into a coherent whole) that certain virtues 
have already been habituated to some degree; and this is the task of education. The 
questions we must now answer, then, are ‘what are the virtues whose habituation16 is 
the essential pre-condition for the engagement in practices?’ and ‘how might these 
virtues best be cultivated?’ It is the cultivation of these virtues that would then be the 
prime aim of school education. Though we are no longer envisaging eudaimonia or 
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 By habituation, I mean a concurrent process of habit formation and moral instruction the outcome 
of which is phronesis – the capacity to exercise the moral virtues in practice. This capacity is refined 
through initiation into the practices of adult life and through general experience of exercising the 




the good life in identical terms for all’, we can still speak of a core set of virtues into 
which all should be habituated - virtues the possession of which is the pre-condition 
both for individuals to engage on their own quests for the good life and for the wider 
life of the polis (i.e. liberal democracy) to be sustained.   
 
Let us first consider three contrasting approaches to identifying and cultivating 
the core civic virtues of citizens in a liberal democracy
17
, and see to what extent they 
fulfil the requirements identified above. 
 
1 - Rawlsian liberalism and the equality of self-respect 
 
The set of virtues that come to have normative status in a society – the virtues it 
is deemed are desirable and worthy of recognition in the citizen, and that must 
therefore be cultivated in succeeding generations – both depends on and is partly 
constitutive of the wider values (moral, spiritual, intellectual and aesthetic) and 
political principles on which that society is founded. In a liberal democracy, liberty 
and justice (or ‘social justice’) are the paramount principles and therefore a natural 
approach to formulating a code of ethics and a shared conception of the good in a 
liberal democracy (assuming this to be our task) is to begin by articulating these 
principles.  
 
John Rawls has argued that a whole political-social-ethical system can be 
derived from certain a priori principles of social justice, principles that Rawls 
famously justifies by invoking a notional ‘original contract’. Neutral reason takes the 
form of certain categorical principles of social justice (Rawls regards himself as a 
successor to Kant in this respect), which provide the framework in which people’s 
diverse interest, beliefs, values and ends are accommodated. For many, not least in 
the field of philosophy of education, it is egalitarian liberalism founded on Rawls’ 
principles of justice that is the preferred solution to the dilemma of Enlightenment 
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 I take the term liberal democracy here to encompass social democracy. The autonomy of citizens is 




liberalism I discussed in Chapter 1 (that though it provides a frame of human rights, 
it does not provide us with any substantive conception of the goods worth pursuing 
within that frame) precisely because it promises to combine liberal autonomy and 
social justice.  
 
In Rawls’ scheme, people are free to pursue their own ends and conceptions of 
the good – indeed, it is central to the very notion of rational autonomy that they do 
pursue their own freely and rationally chosen ends (people are ‘sovereign choosers’); 
and so instead of some teleological or perfectionist conception of a shared or 
‘supreme’ good, of an ideal of ‘the good life’ at which all should aim, we have 
‘goodness as rationality’ in which the fundamental values of freedom (liberal 
autonomy or freedom to choose one’s own beliefs and values) and equality in the 
form of ‘justice as fairness’ are combined. The essence of justice as fairness is that 
people are entitled not only to pursue their own ends but to be accorded an equality 
of valuation of their differing preferences, accomplishments and ways of life (their 
own conceptions of the good) on account of their fundamental moral equivalence as 
citizens and rational beings. And, as a result, qualitative distinctions between 
practices – distinctions that would imply a hierarchy of goods and values – are ruled 
out altogether. So whereas I have argued that that utilitarianism is deficient on 
account of its not recognising qualitative distinctions between goods (i.e. the ‘higher’ 
interests that might exist apart from people’s current preferences), for Rawls it is 
essential that no such distinctions are publicly recognised or validated because to do 
so would be to deny people’s moral equivalence as rational beings - beings who are 
free to pursue their own ends and their own conceptions of the good.   
 
The problem with Rawls’ thesis is that it is inevitable that some practices (or 
communities of interest or ‘social unions’ as Rawls terms them) will be judged to be 
of greater social or economic value than others and hence more worthy of public 
recognition and remuneration. So, for example, though model railway enthusiasts 
will find affirmation, self-respect and mutual appreciation within their community of 
shared interest, and shopkeepers will gain self-respect and financial reward through 
doing ‘an honest job’, neither group can expect too much by way of public 




philosopher, artist or statesman (for example) may well gain a certain public 
recognition and status on account of their activities being judged by the community 
to contribute significantly to the public good - as well as be accorded higher market 
value in response to forces of supply and demand. Moreover, it is difficult to see 
how this can be avoided, particularly in a society in which people’s aptitudes (Rawls 
speaks of ‘natural endowments’), motivations and achievements differ. Even in a 
totalitarian state where opportunities and outcomes might conceivably be equalised, 
it is likely that the doctor who saves peoples’ lives would be accorded a respect and 
public status denied to the shopkeeper.  
 
Rawls even suggests at times that qualitative distinctions between goods, and 
therefore between people who have attained those goods, within practices must be 
avoided. For the social union to be consistent with equality of self-respect, it must 
not be a meritocracy in miniature in which hierarchical values and perfectionism 
cause some to be excluded or their achievements to be devalued, but must be 
inclusive and participative. Of course its members will have certain values in 
common arising from their shared interest, but achievements will be equally valued. 
This is, I think, what Rawls has in mind when he compares a social union to a game 
in which ‘the sides are more or less evenly matched’, ‘all sense that they are playing 
well’ and ‘a good play of the game is … a collective achievement requiring the 
cooperation of all’ (Rawls, 1972, p. 526). Indeed, it is implicit in the very term 
‘social union’ that a community of shared interest should be inclusive, should be 
defined by the interests and enthusiasms of its members, and should encourage all 
members to participate and value their contributions. Many clubs, amateur societies 
and voluntary groups would meet these criteria and they perform a valuable social 
function. But it is central to the notion of a practice as MacIntyre conceives it (and as 
Rawls himself recognises elsewhere in his work in relation to communities of 
interest or social unions) that it enables the individual pursuit of a good through 
initiation into certain values, objective standards and criteria of excellence - i.e. into 
a hierarchy of values - that have their source in the authority of a tradition.  
 
Rawls feels compelled to argue against ‘perfectionist’ hierarchies of goods on 




and therefore that equality of self-respect would also be denied them – self-respect 
being the primary good that, according to Rawls, a rational man desires above all 
else (p. 440). But the premise is, I think, a false one. The problem is that Rawls fails 
to distinguish between the public recognition, status and reward that flows from 
activities and achievements accorded special value by society at large (whether it be 
exceptional achievement or merely accomplishment in a difficult or specially 
demanding practice) - a recognition that can, by its very nature, only be accorded 
relatively few people; and the recognition accorded people by their peers - the 
recognition that follows on accomplishment in a practice or occupation or activity 
whose goods are more widely accessible, and that can be accorded all people.  
 
People can of course have self-respect even when denied the respect of others, 
provided that they have a strong enough personal code of values (values that would 
themselves be rooted in wider social, cultural, religious or philosophical traditions) – 
one imagines the situation of dissidents in a totalitarian state. But in normal 
circumstances, the respect and esteem of others is an important ingredient in a 
person’s self-respect and self-esteem18, and it is likely to be accorded anybody who 
behaves virtuously and responsibly, who abides by accepted norms, displays the 
recognised virtues and undertakes the requisite duties and responsibilities of the 
activity they are engaged in. So though commitment to a humble occupation or 
passion, or to one’s family, may not earn public recognition or status, there is no 
reason it should not earn people the respect and appreciation of those around them, 
and hence dignity, self-respect and the sense that one is leading a worthwhile life.   
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 I am distinguishing here between ‘self-respect’ and ‘self-esteem’ on the grounds that a clear 
conceptual distinction can be made between them (Rawls uses the two terms interchangeably). Self-
esteem is a person’s psychological or psycho-emotional sense of worth, the degree to which a 
person’s feelings towards him or herself are positive or negative. It derives from the attitudes, feelings 
and reactions you have experienced of other people to you (and the comparisons that are made 
between you and other people) – a view of you that is incorporated into your own self-image. Self-
respect, on the other hand, is a person’s moral sense of worth. Inculcated and developed through 
upbringing and education, it is gained through a person’s undertaking right courses of action, 
accepting responsibilities and discharging duties, and displaying virtuous qualities or traits of 
character. It is therefore self-respect rather than self-esteem that is the concern of this discussion. 
However, though self-respect and self-esteem are conceptually distinct, and a person might have one 
without the other, the relation between the two is in practice complex (see Sachs, 1981) with the result 




My argument, then, is that the effect of Rawls’ attempting to enforce equality of 
moral personality and equality of valuation of people’s goods in the interests of 
‘social justice’ is to eliminate (or at least deny public validity to) the hierarchy of 
values, goods and virtues that are fostered by practices; that this in turn undermines 
practices making them harder to sustain; and that as a result, the self-respect and 
sense that one is leading a worthwhile life that derive from pursuing the goods 
internal to practices, from living according to publicly recognised norms and 
displaying publicly recognised virtues, is compromised. The attempt to make social 
justice - conceived as ‘justice as fairness’ and embodied in ‘goodness as rationality’ - 
the foundational principle of liberal society, to in effect make it the architectonic 
virtue, merely has the result of denying people the possibility of leading a good life 
at all in any substantive sense. People merely express their current preferences, 
satisfy their appetites and maximise utility.  
 
2 – Pendlebury’s civic virtues and Socratic education 
 
It has however been proposed that the virtues that might sustain a deliberative 
democracy (and hence sustain the egalitarian liberalism of Rawls, though liberal 
democracy need not be conceived only in Rawlsian terms) – certain civic virtues – 
might themselves be cultivated. Shirley Pendlebury suggests that the educational 
task in a deliberative democracy is to develop ‘a respect for and capacity to apply 
rules of evidence and principles of reason, with due regard for accepted general 
beliefs’ (Dunne & Pendlebury, 2003, p. 209) and that the distinctive virtues of ‘a 
deliberative character’ might include ‘reciprocity, mutual respect, openness, a 
willingness to give reasons and to listen to the reasons given by others’ (p. 208).  
 
Could a set of civic virtues form the core values of liberal society? The problem, 
I would like to argue here, is that thought the qualities or virtues Pendlebury details 
are laudable so far as they go, they are not the substantive ones pupils need to engage 
in practices; to treat Pendlebury’s ‘deliberative virtues’ as if they are the core virtues 
to be cultivated in education is therefore to deprive pupils of the means of accessing 





There is a strong Socratic flavour to Pendlebury’s conception of deliberative 
democracy and the sort of rationality she takes it to imply. When she talks of ‘a 
respect for and capacity to apply rules of evidence and principles of reason’, she is 
adhering very much to an Enlightenment conception of ethics and rationality, to the 
view of neutral reason as arbiter that I have argued against in Chapters 1 and 3. She 
adds the qualification that reasoning be conducted ‘with due regard for accepted 
general beliefs’, which presumably means that diverse goods and values can flourish 
within the frame of liberal democracy and are deserving of respect provided that they 
do not conflict with the core values of liberal democracy or with each other - i.e. 
with other people’s right to pursue different goods and live by different values. 
However, a mere willingness to listen (if that is what is meant by openness) and a 
tolerance and due regard or respect for the goods and values of others can only take 
us so far. It is in the very nature of commitments, values and beliefs that they are not 
lightly discarded that they are not diluted or compromised on merely because 
somebody else does not share them. We might tolerate, and in this limited sense 
‘respect’, the different values and beliefs of others if they do not interfere with our 
own; but what if we regard the views of others as misguided and profoundly 
mistaken, even antithetical to or destructive of our own values and beliefs? Could we 
really respect their views in these circumstances? Of course, civilized debate is 
relatively easy to carry on in the debating chamber or drawing room; the problems 
arise when beliefs, values and commitments come into conflict and a course of 
action needs to be decided on - problems that are particularly acute in a ‘multi-
cultural’ liberal society. If substantive values are fostered in faith communities, for 
example, how are incompatible ends to be reconciled? How is the community to be 
integrated? 
 
The tacit assumption is that people do, in fact, share certain underlying values 
concerning the nature of liberty and justice, and that pure reason together with the 
resources of empirical science will provide the means to resolve disputes, perhaps 
even reveal a universally applicable set of values or virtues
19
. Indeed, once we get 
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 The advent of ‘positive psychology’ (or ‘the psychology of happiness’) - the notion that a scientific 




beyond the basic civilities essential for any conversation or debate to take place, 
mutual respect and reciprocity are only possible in any meaningful sense if the 
participants do share certain underlying values. Otherwise, fruitful engagement will 
be impossible. One could go further and argue that for liberal democracy to work, 
the only values, beliefs and commitments that people hold non-negotiable are the 
ones that underlie liberal democracy - namely, certain principles of egalitarian justice 
and liberal autonomy as detailed by, say, John Rawls. In fact, Rawls quite openly 
argues that for a citizen to adhere too strongly to any particular commitment or set of 
commitments (i.e. to the exclusion of others) is undesirable and unhealthy. But the 
effect, as we have seen, is to deny people the possibility of leading a good life at all 
in any substantive sense. ‘Higher’ values, commitments, goods and virtues atrophy 
as people pursue their appetitive desires and aim to satisfy their ever multiplying and 
increasingly unsustainable material wants.  
  
The difficulty in seeking to derive the foundational values and goods of a society 
solely from a core of liberal civic virtues is mirrored in proposals to put Socratic 
questioning and self-examination at the heart of the educational process. A political 
commitment to deliberative democracy and Enlightenment rationality finds 
reflection in education and philosophy of education in the form of a powerful 
movement to make the promotion of the civic virtues (along with the skills and 
knowledge) necessary for deliberative democracy a central aim of education; and so 
we have ‘education for autonomy’20. The result is a broad movement to develop 
‘thinking skills’ and ‘thinking classrooms’ (which includes ‘Philosophy for 
Children’ and a host of other approaches and initiatives21) and the notion that at the 
heart of education in a deliberative democracy should be the cultivation of 
communities of inquiry in which pupils engage in Socratic dialogue, learn to 
question their and others’ assumptions, question authority and explore new meanings 
(Kennedy & Kennedy, 2011, pp. 279-81). In short, we should have ‘Socratic 
education’.  
                                                          
20 John White, for example, argues that since ours is a liberal democratic society, education must 
prepare children for membership of this society, and therefore that the fundamental aims of education 
should derive from the core values of a democratic society: political equality and personal autonomy 
(White, 2004, p. 21). 




Interestingly, it is Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Humanity (1997) who has 
made one of the most powerful pleas for Socratic education. Though she still regards 
the humanities as an essential component in a liberal education (because they 
develop the narrative imagination and hence a capacity to empathise with others), 
she argues that at the heart of a liberal education that ‘cultivates humanity’ should be 
the development of ‘the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s 
traditions’ (p. 9) and of citizens who can think for themselves. But by arguing that 
‘logical analysis is at the heart of democratic culture’ (p. 36) and that ‘Socratic self-
examination’ should be central to education, she is adopting the very Enlightenment 
conception of rationality and the autonomous actor that I have been arguing against 
in this thesis.
22
   
 
The problem is this: is the critical examination of norms and traditions – 
including those encompassing the natural sciences - not something that is undertaken 
and can only be undertaken within practices? After all, practices are in part 
constituted by reflection on the nature of their own goods. And isn’t it a pre-
condition of engaging in such reflection or argument that one is already initiated and 
acculturated into those practices?
23
 As Kuhn argues in relation to the natural 
sciences, the dominant paradigm supplies both the tools to solve recognised 
problems within the discipline (or practice) and defines the problems that might be 
solved. Not to be conversant with the concepts and methods of the paradigm is 
therefore to be left with nothing to think constructively, usefully or fruitfully about
24
. 
                                                          
22 Indeed, she follows Seneca in rejecting the old Athenian conception of liberal education founded 
on rhetoric, which ‘emphasised uncritical assimilation of tradition’, in contrast to the Socratic 
education that really does make its pupils free by making them ‘able to take charge of their own 
thought and to conduct a critical examination of their society’s norms and traditions’ (p. 30). I shall 
defend the rhetorical conception of phronesis in Chapter 7. 
23
 I argued in Chapter 3 that the notion of a neutral Archimedean vantage point from which rival 
moral traditions might be adjudicated is a fiction. However, it is characteristic of living traditions – 
traditions in which practitioners are free to reflect on the goods mediated by the tradition – that they 
are able to evolve in response to changing circumstances and needs.     
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 Note that this point, if accepted, demolishes the argument for the teaching of general thinking skills. 
Without prior subject knowledge, the nature of the problem in question (the aspects of the problem 
that make it problematical or interesting or fruitful as a problem in a given subject discipline) cannot 
be grasped in the first place. There is nothing to think about. The same might be said to apply to 
‘Philosophy for Children’ programmes. They might encourage children to play with ideas but the play 
is necessary only because serious engagement with those ideas is, as yet, impossible. There is great 
merit in encouraging pupils to play with ideas, to ask questions and to speculate, to develop in them 
interest and curiosity, as well as certain dispositions or virtues essential to a democratic society. But it 




Moreover, isn’t it a central insight of Aristotle’s that the virtues must be habituated? 
If an Aristotelian conception of ethics is adopted, if goods and virtues are regarded 
as internal to practices, and rationality itself is regarded as internal to a moral 
tradition as I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3, then Socratic education, education for 
deliberative democracy, and even Philosophy for Children (in so far as it is justified 
on the grounds that it contributes to deliberative democracy) are fundamentally 
flawed. 
 
Communities of inquiry might well have a valuable role to play in cultivating the 
democratic spirit, in developing respect for the rights of others, and in motivating 
children to learn. My argument is that as a means of developing ‘the capacity for 
critically examination of oneself and one’s traditions’, they are misconceived 
because the notion of the morally and rationally autonomous individual on which 
they are premised is, as I have argued, illusory. Nussbaum argues that armed with 
the capability of practical reason or phronesis, people are able to come to a reasoned 
judgement of their best interests. But if this reasoned judgement is to differ from 
merely working out how to satisfy current appetites and desires so as to maximise 
utility, then a person’s interests, values and beliefs must themselves have been 
formed or cultivated as part of, or as a result of, the educational process; and for this 
formative education to happen, there must be a set of values or virtues that it is 
agreed are worthy of being cultivated or habituated - a set of virtues that will, in 
effect, form part of a shared conception of the good. By educating for deliberative 
democracy and for the liberal society, we neglect to initiate children into the 
practices and traditions that mediate these substantive goods, values and virtues. 
Deprived of the rationality of a tradition, they are equipped only with the hollow 
instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment. They are in a sense freed to pursue 
their own ends (i.e. they have ‘freedom of choice’) but deprived of access to the 
internal goods of practices, to the goods that make life fulfilling and worthwhile for a 
rational being, these ends inevitably reduce to the appetitive and material.
25
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
for Children’) for ‘the reconstruction of childhood education’ (Kennedy & Kennedy, p. 281) or an 
‘epistemological shift’ on the part of educators (Haynes & Murris, 2011, p. 299). 
25 Anthony O’Hear draws attention to the limitations of Socratic Education in ‘Education, Value and 
the Sense of Awe’ (O’Hear, 2004a). The Socratic presumption ‘that what can’t be so expounded and 




3 – Patricia White’s civic virtues 
 
In Civic Virtues and Public Schooling (1996), Patricia White identifies the 
‘democratic dispositions’ necessary for citizenship in a democracy – the dispositions 
necessary to reinforce and vivify the basic democratic values of justice, freedom and 
respect for personal autonomy (White, 1996, p. 1). In addition to the ‘bedrock’ 
democratic dispositions of ‘justice, tolerance and personal autonomy’ (p. 3), she lists 
the following: social hope - the belief that it is worth striving for ‘a fuller realisation 
of democratic values’ (and the loss of which produces apathy); courage – especially 
the courage to speak and act independently, but also the courage to compromise; 
self-respect and self-esteem; friendship – the recognition of its intrinsic value as a 
form of commitment; trust, both personal and social (i.e. trust in the institutions of a 
democratic state); honesty; and decency – or good manners.    
 
White’s conception of the civic virtues is, I think, a more convincing and 
substantive one than either Rawls’ or Pendlebury’s. It also shows a sensitivity to 
human nature and human emotional needs that is lacking in more austere accounts 
that emphasise rationality as the central human characteristic, important though that 
is. Courage, honesty, decency and friendship are all substantive virtues (and goods) 
that contribute significantly to human fulfilment and are vital to the sustenance of a 
civilized society; and yet they are not incorporated by Pendlebury in her conception 
of the deliberative virtues necessary to sustain liberal democracy. A particular 
strength of White’s account is, I think, her inclusion of decency as a civic virtue. 
White notes that decency is often neglected in discourse about democracy or rejected 
as superficial and bourgeois, but it is essential because it enables us to have 
relationships with strangers – relationships ‘characterised by something like a 
mixture of goodwill, politeness, helpfulness, and forethought for others’ needs and 
wants’ (p. 79). It need not imply an inauthentic life, a suffocating bourgeois 
                                                                                                                                                                    
explicit verbal formulation’ (p. 81) - the point I argued earlier in this chapter. But even more 
importantly, we can only reason well about value if we are predisposed ‘towards the good and the 
virtuous’ (p. 81); towards values that are ‘beyond rationality in a formal sense’ but that are mediated 
by our cultural inheritance, by our very form of life, and that ‘we then learn the meaning of in 
experience’ (p. 79). By contrast, a prematurely ‘rationalistic and dialectical approach to value’ 





existence; rather, the straightforward desire to express one’s goodwill ‘in an 
appropriate way’ (p. 85). Seen from this perspective, the manners and rituals of 
polite society are not arbitrary restrictions on our behaviour running counter to our 
notions of moral and rational autonomy, but rather means of expressing our goodwill 
to others and our concern for their feelings, and they can be habituated from an early 
age
26
. As such, they have a vital role to play both in facilitating civil life and in 
paving the way for the more substantive ‘caring virtues’ that I shall discuss in the 
next section. 
 
Where I think White’s account is deficient is in its paying insufficient attention 
to the vital importance of engagement in worthwhile activity (or ‘practices’) in 
directly cultivating the virtues through a process of habituation, and hence in 
fostering self-esteem and self-belief
27
; and in its correspondingly putting too much 
emphasis on the role of discussion, reflection and analysis, valuable though these 
are. It is all very well to ‘encourage students to believe they can accomplish 
worthwhile projects and become admirable people’ or ‘seek to give them the 
intellectual tools with which they can take charge of their lives’ (p. 34) or to 
encourage ‘an exploration into the individual’s own personal bases of … self-
esteem’ (p. 36), and these things certainly have their place; but it is ultimately only 
through concrete experience, real social interaction and worthwhile achievement that 
the virtues are habituated, and a real sense of self-esteem and self-belief is 
constructed or discovered. Though courage, honesty and decency are all necessary in 
some degree to the successful engagement in practices, and ought therefore to be 
fostered as part of the school curriculum preparatory to adult life (in part through the 
engagement in educationally worthwhile activities), a range of other virtues not 
mentioned by White are of at least equal importance in this regard and therefore need 
incorporating in any scheme of civic virtues. These are the virtues of work - the 
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 A striking example is the formal manner in which even quite young French children are expected to 
present themselves to guests. This is regarded as at least as important as saying ‘please’ and ‘thank 
you’, because it teaches early on that the feelings and needs of others have to be taken into 
consideration – a process that begins with the formal acknowledgement of the presence of the other 
person. Pamela Druckerman documents this in French Children Don’t Throw Food (Druckerman, 
2012). This is certainly my experience of numerous family introductions in France. 
27
 Practices assume even more importance if it is recognised, as White rightly points out, that the 
virtue of courage is crucially dependent on people having a sense of competence and confidence in 
themselves - the sense of ‘confidence in competence’ (p. 25) that comes of mastery and achievement 




‘intellectual virtues’- comprising industry, application, perseverance, concentration, 
attention, care, accuracy, exactness, and so forth.  
 
Drawing in part on White’s scheme of civic virtues but making practices and the 
virtues cultivated through them central to ethical life, I would like to conclude this 
chapter by proposing a set of core virtues that a liberal education might seek to 
foster.  
 
The core virtues of ordinary life 
 
As we have seen, Patricia White has identified a series of ‘democratic 
dispositions’ and these are a good starting point. However, I would categorise them 
rather differently. Self-belief and self-esteem are eudaimonic states of mind (or 
aspects of well-being) that arise in large measure out of worthwhile activity and are 
contingent on the exercise of a range of virtues; they are goods rather than virtues or 
dispositions. Likewise, social hope, confidence and trust in democratic institutions 
are in large measure contingent on the sense of having a stake in society that comes 
from leading a fulfilled and flourishing life; in other words, they are contingent on 
possessing self-belief and self-esteem as a citizen. Friendship and personal trust 
involve the virtues rather than constitute virtues themselves, though they are clearly 
goods of great value. White follows Aristotle in noting the particular value of 
‘character friendship’ where ‘the bond is the other’s character and the good that the 
other instantiates’ (p. 41) and where the relationship involves ‘mutual well-wishing 
and well-doing’ (p. 42) – the active mutual exercise of good will. Likewise, personal 
trust and loyalty arise when individuals are honest, decent and courageous. And 
finally, ‘personal autonomy’ is not in itself a virtue or a good, but rather an umbrella 
term that describes a person’s pursuit of goods through their engagement in practices 
and their exercise of habituated virtues including phronesis (if we are to term that a 
virtue). It does not, I think, make sense to speak of personal autonomy as a general 
capacity or disposition to pursue goods and exercise virtues because it is only 
through the initiation into practices and by the habituation of various virtues that 









That leaves courage, honesty and decency, along with justice, as the genuine 
‘first order’ dispositions or virtues. Now, I would certainly categorise justice, 
courage, honesty, and decency as core virtues (with courage and honesty being 
grouped together as comprising the virtues that contribute to moral integrity’); but I 
would, in addition, incorporate two other important categories of virtues - the ‘caring 
virtues’ (including decency) and the ’intellectual virtues’; and I would add 
temperance – the capacity of a person to exercise restraint in the satisfaction of their 
appetitive desires.  
 
In summary, I am tentatively proposing five broad categories of virtues that 
together might be deemed to constitute the core virtues essential for human 
flourishing in a liberal democracy and therefore that ought to be cultivated, so far as 
possible, in school as part of a liberal education: (1) the ‘intellectual’ virtues; (2) the 
‘caring’ virtues; (3) justice; (4) courage and honesty; and (5) temperance.  
 
These categories are certainly not intended to be definitive or exhaustive. Any 
number of lists of virtues can be constructed and categories defined, beginning with 
Plato’s four cardinal virtues, three of which appear above29. Rather, my purpose here 
is to give some indication of the virtues that would need to be cultivated to prepare 
pupils for their engagement in practices in order that they may access the goods I 
detailed at the start of this chapter, the goods that they must access if they are to lead 
flourishing lives, as well as to prepare them for their role as citizens in a liberal 
democracy. As a consequence, there are some differences in emphasis between my 
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 In Chapter 2, a parallel difficulty arose in defining phronesis – the capacity to exercise the virtues 
in practice - as a virtue. I suggested that it might be better to regard it as the outcome of a process of 
moral training. In fact, it could be argued that the concepts ‘personal autonomy’, phronesis and ‘the 
good life’ are all one and the same.    
29
 Sincerity and loyalty, for example, do not fall easily into any of the categories in my list – and yet 
they are plainly virtues. The virtues I have included in my list could be categorised quite differently. 
For example, in Sikhism, righteousness, honesty and justice are incorporated under Sat, the virtue of 
truthful living. The absence of vice can also be conceived as a virtue. To take another example from 
Sikhism, freedom from the vices of ambition, envy, greed and jealousy constitutes Santokh, the virtue 




list and the list constructed by Katherine Dahlsgaard (in Seligman, 2007) as 
representative of the virtue catalogues of all the major religions and philosophical 
traditions - which comprises (1) wisdom and knowledge, (2) courage, (3) love and 
humanity, (4) justice, (5) temperance and (6) spirituality and transcendence
30
. I am 
not incorporating wisdom or phronesis as virtues themselves, rather as goods that 
arise from the exercise of other virtues and out of the engagement in practices (the 
good of achieving mastery in a particular field along with the capacity to exercise 
judgement in that field being one of the goods I detailed earlier in this chapter as 
contributing toward a flourishing life). I am also treating transcendence and humility, 
which are often designated core virtues, as goods that may be sought through 
particular kinds of practice (for example, through religion or art) rather than as core 
virtues. I think that to do the latter would be inappropriate in a liberal secular society. 
In any case, to expect schoolchildren and teenagers to exhibit genuine humility or 
‘transcendence’ would, in my experience, be to expect too much; these are the fruits 
of adult experience. And finally, I am including the ‘intellectual virtues’.31  
 
In what ways then do the virtues I have detailed contribute to realising the goods 
of practices and to sustaining liberal democracy - the precondition for practices to be 
freely engaged in at all? Let us consider them in turn.   
 
I have incorporated the intellectual virtues, by which I broadly mean the 
dispositions governing our attitude to work (industry, application, perseverance, 
concentration, care, accuracy, exactness and so forth), as core virtues because they 
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 Katherine Dahlsgaard and her team (which included Martin Seligman) found that almost every one 
of these traditions endorsed these six virtues: ‘So we see these six virtues as core characteristics 
endorsed by almost all religious and philosophical traditions, and taken together they capture the 
notion of a good character’ (Seligman, 2007, pp. 132-3). 
31 The University of Birmingham’s ‘Jubilee Centre for Character and Values’ distinguishes three 
categories of virtue: civic character virtues (examples: service, citizenship, volunteering), moral 
character virtues (courage, self-discipline, compassion, gratitude, justice, humility, honesty), and 
‘performance character virtues’ (examples: resilience, determination, creativity, confidence, 
teamwork) – see Jubilee Centre for Character & Values (n.d.). I would categorise service, citizenship 
and volunteering more as activities that a virtuous person would engage in, as ways in which the 
virtues can be exercised, as goods rather than as virtues themselves; and I would question whether the 
suggested performance character virtues or ‘performance traits’ (traits that enable people to ‘manage 
their lives effectively’) should all be characterised as virtues, as opposed to attributes of personality 
and aptitude in which people naturally differ. I shall discuss how the intellectual virtues might be 




are essential for undertaking the lengthy period of apprenticeship training that is 
needed if a practice is to be mastered; and they are therefore are essential for 




A sense of justice (along with tolerance and respect for the autonomy of others) 
is clearly a crucial virtue to foster in a liberal democracy. Kant’s Moral Law is one 
source of our belief in the principle of universal human rights but is more in the 
nature of a rational justification; it is of great value in framing a social contract but, 
as we saw in Chapter 1, not so obviously a source of motivation for the individual to 
behave morally
33
. The belief and motivating impulse on the part of the individual 
that all people have an equal right to be valued is a disposition that needs to be 
habituated from an early age – a laborious process involving continual 
reinforcement, as any teacher will testify. Even though the average 13 year-old (say) 
has a much more developed sense of justice than the average five or six year-old, and 
has a particularly keen sense of perceived injustice, there is still a long way to go. 
Casual prejudice, bullying, belittling of others, and general thoughtlessness when it 
comes to giving others their due are all too common unless checked by a responsible 
adult – and this is despite what has been taught on the subject, and discussed and 




The caring virtues are clearly essential to sustaining good relations and healthy 
relationships with others, both within practices and in people’s personal lives, and 
therefore are also essential to leading a flourishing life. They include kindness, 
compassion, empathy and generosity. Whereas justice is directed toward humanity as 
a whole (i.e. it is political), the caring virtues are directed toward individuals. 
Decency might also be incorporated under this category because it involves showing 
consideration for the feelings of others in the rituals of everyday life. And though 
decency can be exhibited independently of the other caring virtues (one can be a 
well-mannered villain, a cultivated criminal), they are, as I have argued, more likely 
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 I shall consider in detail how the intellectual virtues might best be cultivated as part of the school 
curriculum in Chapter 7.  
33
 Religious beliefs in justice – the belief that all are equal in the eyes of God - are particularly potent 
in motivating people to act precisely because they are founded on faith, and therefore involve a large 
measure of habituation.  The Christian belief in agape, the love of humanity, is an example. 
34




to reinforce each other.
35
 The caring virtues assume even more importance if it is 
recognised that political justice (which, in a sense, is the virtue of care directed 
toward humanity as a whole) often has its origins in the individual’s experience of 
caring for others at a personal level. For Thomas Lickona, perhaps the best known 
exponent of traditional character education, educating caring public-spirited citizens 
encompasses care for others at both a personal and a political level; it encompasses 
both ‘works of mercy’ and works of justice. Educating pupils or students to care for 
others (for example, through community service programmes) leads naturally to 
‘educating them in social justice’ (Lickona, 1992, pp. 319-22). Otherwise, the danger 
is that calls for ‘justice’ or ‘social justice’ amount to little more than hollow slogans; 
or are accompanied by hatred and resentment and degenerate into retribution and 
totalitarian repression. It was Nelson Mandela’s humanity that enabled him to turn 
righteous indignation and anger at injustice, ultimately, into a positive force for 
justice, just as it had done for Mahatma Gandhi before him.    
 
Courage and honesty are the ingredients of moral integrity, and therefore also 
vital to a sense of self-belief. Without moral integrity, a person cannot deliberate 
well or act as a responsible practitioner or deal with the moral conflict that arises 
when, for example, the demands of different practices need to be reconciled; nor is a 
person likely to enjoy the character friendships that Aristotle highlighted. In a variety 
of ways, direct and indirect, courage and honesty reinforce and complement the other 
categories of virtues.  
 
Temperance – the capacity to restrain one’s appetitive desires - is clearly 
essential both for the engagement in practices and the exercise of the other virtues. 
To seek hedonistic pleasure at every opportunity, to be ruled by one’s appetitive 
desires, is clearly antithetical to the pursuit of higher goods, which necessarily 
involves a sustained period of apprenticeship and the disciplined acquisition of a 
body of knowledge and skill; and it is antithetical to the exercise of the virtues, 
which by its very nature involves sacrificing or at least suspending selfish interests 
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 I shall consider in more detail how these caring virtues might be cultivated as part of the school 





and appetitive desires. There is an important connection here with the virtue of 
decency in that the habituation of temperance is to a great extent mediated through 
manners, customs and social rituals. For example, to have learned as a child that one 
should serve others before oneself, that one should not help oneself to the largest 
slice of cake and that one should not gorge on sweets between meal times, is to have 
begun to learn the virtue of temperance.    
 
In fact, it is significant that a degree of selflessness – Iris Murdoch speaks of a 
‘disciplined overcoming of self’ (Murdoch, 1985, p. 95) - characterises all these 
virtues. Whereas the intellectual virtues are selfless (or self-transcending) in the 
sense that they are directed toward works and achievements, the caring virtues are 
selfless in the sense of being directed toward other people. We might even seek to 
integrate or unify the virtues into an architectonic virtue or ‘supreme good’ - we 
might call it love, agape, selflessness, service, duty or even humility - that would 
permeate the political life of the polis as a foundational value and guide individuals 
in their quests for a good life. Though I argued earlier that humility was better 
classified a good than a core virtue on account of its religious associations, Iris 
Murdoch argues that at heart it amounts to an acceptance of death, which is in turn 
‘an acceptance of our own nothingness which is an automatic spur to our concern 
with what is not ourselves’ (p. 103). For Murdoch, this rare and unfashionable virtue 
is as good a candidate as any in terms of which to define ‘the Good’. She writes of 
the humble man that ‘although he is not by definition the good man perhaps he is the 
kind of man who is most likely of all to become good’ (p. 104).  Whether this degree 
of selflessness is compatible with the qualities needed to ‘get on’ in a secular liberal 
democratic society, particularly when it is founded on a market economy (one thinks 
of ambition, drive, assertiveness, confidence, sociability, charisma and so forth – 
qualities that are now held in such esteem that they might be termed the virtues of 







Concluding note to Part 1 
 
I think it is clear that the core virtues or dispositions necessary for human 
flourishing and the core virtues necessary for the sustenance of liberal democracy are 
essentially the same. They have little to do with rational or moral autonomy, but 
much to do with the engagement in the social practices of ordinary life. They are the 
virtues that enable citizens to engage in practices (and that are cultivated in part 
through the successful engagement in practices), and at the same time to integrate the 
practices in which they are engaged into a coherent whole.  
 
How a liberal education might best foster these core virtues is therefore of 
crucial importance. For those who choose to engage in political or intellectual life, 
special skills, qualities and attitudes will be needed in addition to these core virtues, 
not the least of which is the desire to pursue a political or an intellectual career. 
Liberal education has traditionally put great emphasis on preparing pupils for one or 
other of these callings, which has led many critics (most famously John Dewey) to 
condemn it as an elite education. There is much truth in this criticism. But there is 
also, I think, much that can be learned from a study of liberal curricula, past and 
present, about the cultivation of the core virtues and ‘character building’ 
(traditionally a particular concern of English public schools) that is applicable to 
ordinary life. A consideration of how liberal curricula have sought to cultivate the 
virtues and to build character will, in turn, shed more light on the nature of these 
virtues. By the same token, the rhetorical conception of liberal education, which 
aims to produce the politically active citizen who can deliberate wisely on matters of 
practical human affairs by cultivating, humanising and moralising within a tradition, 
has a much wider value and relevance than might superficially be obvious - 
particularly if traditional associations with literary culture and aesthetics are stripped 
away. In fact, if phronesis is conceived in this sense rather than as involving critical 
justification or as contributing to some putative moral and rational autonomy, then 
we have in rhetoric the means by which it might be cultivated.  
 





Two traditions of liberal education 
 
John Henry Newman’s celebrated vision of liberal education as involving a 
cultivation of the mind or intellect – ‘it is an end in itself ... it is an acquired 
illumination, it is a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment’ - is 
widely regarded as definitive of the idea (Newman, 1982, p. 85).  Newman 
contrasted liberal education with education that aims explicitly to prepare for life or 
work by equipping the pupil with various skills – i.e. that is instrumental to some 
other end. The crucial distinction to make was the one between education that ‘rises 
towards general ideas’ and education that ‘is exhausted upon what is particular and 
external’; the one whose end is ‘philosophical’ and the other whose end is 
‘mechanical’ (p. 85). But perhaps a better definition – better because it elaborates 
what is meant by ‘an end in itself’ – is this: liberal education is an education that 
cultivates or forms the person in the image of an ideal – moral, intellectual, and 
aesthetic – of what it is to be human. A liberal education will therefore seek to 
initiate into a moral, cultural and intellectual inheritance, and its pedagogy will be 
correspondingly didactic. It is formative education. As such, it can be contrasted on 
the one hand with vocational education or training, and on the other with 
‘progressive’ education – i.e. education that seeks to enable pupils to creatively 
express their inner selves.     
 
In the modern age, the idea of liberal education has come to be associated with 
an academic curriculum of subject disciplines: disciplines that together encompass 
the knowledge it is thought most worthwhile for pupils to possess, disciplines that 
introduce pupils to the range of distinct ‘forms’ that knowledge can take1, disciplines 
that it is believed  best develop the mind. And yet this modern academic curriculum 
bears little relation, either in its content or its philosophical justification, to the old 
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liberal ideal of education that predominated for some two thousand years in the West 
- from Classical Rome right up to the mid nineteenth-century English public school.  
  
Though the old liberal education also aimed, in a sense, to ‘train the mind’, it 
took the specific form of producing an orator – a person who could deliberate well, 
speak eloquently, and by persuading others carry through his judgements into action. 
This ideal required in turn that school education concern itself with two things: first, 
a systematic training in the art of rhetoric; and second, an initiation into a moral and 
cultural inheritance centred on the humanities - the subjects that together encapsulate 
our collective experience of the human condition, our values, feelings, interests, 
ideals, beliefs, fears and imaginings. By acquiring a personal culture or paideia, a 
person was formed in a certain image or ideal – at once, civic, moral, intellectual, 
aesthetic and spiritual - of what a human being could be. Moreover, though this 
education sought to cultivate and form the intellect, of equal importance was that it 
cultivated and formed a person’s character: an orator had to be a good person, not 
merely somebody who could rouse the crowd. From its beginnings in Isocrates’ 
school of rhetoric, through Cicero’s extolling of the Roman orator and Castiglione’s 
depiction of the perfect Renaissance courtier, right up to the ethos of the modern-day 
English public school, there has been something of this concern to produce a good 
citizen, a person of integrity who can take on responsibility and act in the public 
arena. To this end, liberal education in its older sense has concerned itself with the 
cultivation and formation of the character of the whole person, the person who can 
both make a wise judgement and carry it through into action; and this in turn has 
necessitated attending to the habituation of the moral virtues and the inculcation of a 
moral code of conduct through, for example, the notion that a school must have an 
ethos and through physical activity, team games and service to others (these last 
things representing the distinctive contribution of the English public school). 
 
I shall begin this chapter with an outline of the history of liberal education that 
recognises this fundamental fact that there are two traditions of liberal education. I 
shall try to explain how these two distinct conceptions or strains of liberal education 
- the rhetorical (or ‘oratorical’ or ‘liberal arts’) and the ‘research’ (or ‘philosophical’ 




academic subject disciplines embodying the ‘research’ ideal came to supplant the old 
liberal education founded on rhetoric, the classics and the humanities. In the process, 
I shall explore how these rival traditions represent quite different and distinct 




A brief history of liberal education 
 
The vital importance of education as a means of forming a person’s mind and 
character, of cultivating the moral and intellectual virtues, was recognised by both 
Plato and Aristotle. When we speak of liberal education in its old rhetorical sense, it 
is Aristotle who is of particular interest for his emphasis on practical reason or 
phronesis (right judgement, practical wisdom or prudence), whose cultivation 
requires in turn that the moral virtues be habituated. But whereas Aristotle 
emphasises the habituation of the moral virtues, he has little to say about how moral 
or ethical knowledge might be cultivated. He regards the cultivation of phronesis as 
necessitating some combination of moral instruction and life experience, but, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, he does not elaborate the sorts of experience or instruction that 
would cultivate phronesis in practice. Moreover, like Plato before him, he is 
disparaging of the claims of teachers of rhetoric (the Sophists) to be able to teach 
pupils the art of politics – the capacity to exercise practical judgement or phronesis 
in public affairs: ‘It is only the experts in a given art who can judge its products 
correctly and understand by what means and methods perfection is achieved’ 
(Aristotle, 1976, p. 341). And yet Isocrates, his great rival, claims precisely this - and 
puts rhetoric at the very heart of the educational endeavour. For Isocrates, rhetoric is 
not merely the art of speaking persuasively (which, if unqualified, would be of 
dubious ethical value); it is the art of making right judgements about practical, 
political and human matters. Educated people are those who ‘can form an accurate 
judgement [doxa] about a situation and in most cases can figure out what is the best 
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 I am much indebted to Bruce Kimball’s seminal study Orators and Philosophers (1995) in the 
discussion that follows.  The term ‘research ideal’ is Bruce Kimball’s. In this thesis, I shall distinguish 
the Roman (rhetorical) and classical humanist variants of the ‘old’ liberal education, and contrast 
these with the curriculum of academic subject disciplines, the modern-day embodiment of the 
‘research’ ideal, which constitutes the ‘new’ liberal education. Broadly speaking, I shall distinguish 




course of action’ (Isocrates, 2004, p. 177). For Isocrates, eloquence is the outward 
expression of inner thought and wisdom. To form right judgements necessitates, in 
turn, the cultivation of a personal culture or paideia, the understanding of people as 
social, political, historical and cultural beings - the sort of understanding that a study 
of the humanities might develop. Self-knowledge and practical wisdom together 
constitute the knowledge of how to live.   
 
It is therefore Isocrates and the Sophists who, by undertaking to teach the art of 
politics (political oratory or rhetoric) and humanise in a literary cultural inheritance, 
are the founders of the Western tradition of liberal education – not Plato, Socrates or 
Aristotle (see Castle, 1961, pp. 49-60; Jaeger, 1939, pp. 283-328; Marrou, 1964, p. 
120
3
); for it was the study of grammar, rhetoric and classical literature rather than 
dialectic and philosophy (as Plato and his successors conceived it) that formed the 
basis of liberal curricula in the West for some two thousand years. It is clear that by 
cultivating the capacity to deliberate on right courses of action, the old liberal 
education founded on rhetoric actually cultivated - or, at least, aimed to cultivate - 
the elusive architectonic virtue of Aristotle’s ethical system, phronesis; and did so 




In Ancient Rome, the teaching of grammar and rhetoric was developed in 
impressive detail and the Roman curriculum was to remain the exemplar of a liberal 
education, still recognisable in the curriculum of the Elizabethan grammar school 
and even the nineteenth-century English public school. The technical devices of 
poetry and prose were studied systematically so that pupils might express their 
thoughts and feelings with eloquence, and a whole series of preliminary exercises in 
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 ‘On the whole it was Isocrates, not Plato, who educated fourth-century Greece and subsequently the 
Hellenistic and Roman worlds’ (Marrou, p. 120). Werner Jaeger traces the ‘cultural ideal’ of 
humanism squarely to Protagoras and the Sophists: ‘We are ... using the word humanism ... in its basic 
sense, to connote the cultural ideal which after long incubation in the mind of Greece came to birth at 
last in the teaching of the Sophists’ (Jaeger, p. 298).  
4
 It remains a puzzle why Aristotle, who wrote a whole treatise on rhetoric (The Art of Rhetoric), was 
unable to see, or to acknowledge, that the systematic teaching of rhetoric might have educational 
value; indeed that the object of rhetoric could be construed as phronesis. The Art of Rhetoric and The 
Nicomachean Ethics seem to be worked out in total detachment from each other, with the ethical and 
educational implications of the first left unexplored. One possible explanation is political: that 
Aristotle’s school of philosophy was in direct competition with Isocrates’ school of rhetoric (see 
Miller, 2007, pp. 189-90; Lawson-Tancred, 1991, pp. 4-8). Another is simply that Aristotle’s didactic 




composition – the progymnasmata – culminated in ‘the Praise and Denunciation of 
Laws’ in which pupils had to deliberate on the merits and demerits of an imaginary 
piece of new legislation or an existing law - ‘was the law honourable and just, was it 
expedient, was it practicable, and was it necessary? (Bonner, 1977, p. 272) – and 
then propose a course of action. For Cicero, whose De Oratore (‘On the Ideal 
Orator’) was the definitive statement of the idea of a liberal education, the purpose of 
a liberal education was not merely to cultivate the mind (though that was important 
and provided solace in old age) but to equip the orator-statesman with the eloquence 




In the late Roman, early medieval period, the curriculum was formalised into the 
so-called ‘seven liberal arts’ comprising the trivium of grammar, dialectic and 
rhetoric (which came to form the basis of the grammar school curriculum) and the 
quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy (which were, at least in 
principle, studied in the medieval university), with philosophy and theology (the 
‘queen of the sciences’) studied last of all (see Curtis & Boultwood, 1965, pp. 91-2). 
With the advent of medieval scholasticism and the re-introduction into Europe of the 
works of Aristotle, dialectic assumed a greater role, with the ‘syllogistic activity’ of 
disputation becoming the dominant teaching method (p. 108), and rhetoric lapsed; 
the emphasis in Western Christendom was on theological exegesis rather than the 
production of orator-statesmen. But with the re-discovery of classical literature and 
the advent of Renaissance humanism came a recovery of rhetoric and a curriculum 
centred on the humanities – particularly on literature and history, with some moral 
philosophy sometimes added. As well as the study of Christian texts, classical Latin 
and Greek were learned so that pupils might develop literary appreciation, learn to 
compose poetry and prose themselves, and be inspired by the virtuous actions, 
thoughts and sayings of exemplary figures from classical history. So was born the 
studia humanitatis or artes liberales curriculum (Kimball, 1995, pp. 78-80). 
 
From the Renaissance, through the Enlightenment, and right up to the early 
nineteenth-century, the study of the classics formed the heart of a liberal education 
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throughout Europe. However, with the advent of the Enlightenment and the scientific 
method, and the explosion of knowledge that accompanied it, particularly in the 
sciences, it was inevitable that change must come; indeed, it is remarkable how long 
the old liberal curriculum survived. It had also been noted by increasing numbers of 
critics that the classical curriculum had degenerated for most pupils into little more 
than a ‘grammar grind’ (the tendency had been apparent from the beginning; even 
Erasmus had argued against the rote learning of grammatical rules). By the early 
nineteenth-century, reforms had been instituted in France by Napoleon, who declared 
both literary culture and exact science (in the form of mathematics) to be 
indispensable elements in a liberal education; and in Prussia by von Humboldt, who 
ensured that mathematics, natural science, German and the classics were given equal 
weight (Parker, 1868, p. 68).  
 
However, the classical curriculum continued unchanged in England in the great 
public schools right up until the latter half of the nineteenth-century, by which time 
the demand for change (reinforced by concerns at the growing technical superiority 
of rival nations, particularly Germany) had become irresistible. Finally, the public 
schools along with the new state secondary schools followed continental Europe in 
incorporating the sciences and a range of other ‘modern’ subject disciplines (English, 
history, geography and so forth) into their curricula. English literature came largely 
to replace classical literature, and the classical languages, having lost their original 
justification, soon disappeared altogether from the curricula of state schools. The 
new liberal curriculum of academic subject disciplines was born and the ideals of the 
old liberal education were soon forgotten.  
 
The research ideal and the rhetorical ideal 
 
The story so far could be characterised simply as a natural process of evolution 
in which modern subjects were gradually incorporated into the curriculum and the 
classical languages were displaced. On this argument it was inevitable that modern 
literature would eventually find its place in the curriculum - that Shakespeare would 




worthy of study as classical history; and that the importance of the natural and social 
sciences would be recognised. In outlining a brief history of liberal education, I have 
correspondingly limited myself largely to an account of the rhetorical tradition (the 
scholastic detour warranted only a line) because it is the rhetorical tradition that has 
predominated for most of the past two thousand and more years. It was Isocrates and 
the Sophists, not Plato and Socrates, who founded the Western tradition of liberal 
education; it was grammar, rhetoric and classical literature that formed the school 
curriculum, not philosophy and logic. 
 
But this is not the whole story. The new liberal curriculum of academic subject 
disciplines represented a quite new conception of the nature of knowledge and the 
purpose of education - in fact, it represented an alternative conception of liberal 
education that had been present from the very beginning in classical Greece. I would 
argue that that there have been two distinct conceptions of liberal education and two 
quite distinct philosophical justifications - two rival strains or traditions – 
identifiable throughout the past two thousand years. And though I have argued that, 
historically, it was inevitable that the modern liberal curriculum should emerge (or 
evolve) in the end, this is not quite the same as offering a philosophical justification; 
and it does not explain how the ideals of the old liberal curriculum came to be so 
totally eclipsed within such a short space of time – or indeed why they survived for 
so long.   
 
The only coherent attempt at providing a philosophical justification for the new 
liberal curriculum of academic subject disciplines was produced as recently as the 
1960s by Paul Hirst. But this ‘forms of knowledge’ justification (that each subject 
discipline or group of subject disciplines has a characteristic ‘form of logic’ 
associated with it and that a complete education of the mind should involve a pupil’s 
initiation into all of these forms of knowledge
6
) is the subject of continuing 
controversy in philosophy of education, and does not satisfy the many critics who 
argue that the modern curriculum of academic subject disciplines has no over-
arching educational aim at all other than to prepare a minority of pupils for 
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specialisation and hence for higher education. John White is perhaps the most 
notable of these critics and argues that the modern curriculum is not ‘an aims-led 
curriculum’ but ‘a subject-led curriculum’, a curriculum that instead of having a 
proper rationale simply prescribes a list of academic subjects to be taught (see Reiss 
and White, 2013; White, 2004). The purpose of school education, then, is to get 
these subjects taught and known at some elementary level as part of ‘a broad and 
balanced curriculum’. But as John Dewey noted, pupils who study a curriculum 
segregated into specialist subjects ‘such as is appropriate to the man who wishes to 
become an expert in a given field’ too often emerge from the process with ‘a 
smattering which is too superficial to be scientific and too technical to be applicable 
to ordinary affairs’ (Dewey, 1966, pp. 286-7). A further consequence is that because 
the academic curriculum of subject disciplines has come to be synonymous with 
‘liberal education’, critics of the former naturally reject the latter, and the ideals of 
the old liberal education come also to be rejected – ideals that deserve serious 
consideration on their own merits.  
 
However, there are merits in the study of subject disciplines that also deserve 
serious consideration (merits that relate not to their purported value as ‘forms of 
knowledge’ but rather to their value as specialist studies7) and these are, I think, best 
brought out if we consider the new liberal curriculum as the latest manifestation of a 
long-standing tradition in liberal education, a strain in liberal education with its own 
distinct political-philosophical justification.  
 
In Orators and Philosophers (1995), his seminal study of the evolution of liberal 
education, Bruce Kimball argues that the modern academic conception of liberal 
education (he terms it the ‘liberal-free ideal’) can, in the first instance, be traced 
specifically to certain Enlightenment ideals of rationality and intellectual freedom. 
The term liberal became associated for the first time with an open-ended sense of 
freedom, with freedom from constraint and prejudice and, above all, with the 
relentless quest for the truth that was embodied in ‘the New Science’. Its 
methodology, whether rationalist or empirical, was ‘critical and open-ended’ 
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(Kimball, 1995, p. 118), and appeal was to reason and to empirical sense data, not to 
historical precedent. However, argues Kimball, the displacement of the old liberal 
ideal (the ‘artes liberales ideal’) by the modern liberal ideal can only fully be 
understood in the light of a tension that was apparent from the very beginning in a 
dispute between Plato and Isocrates over the nature of knowledge. On the one hand, 
there is Plato following Socrates in extolling philosophia - the critical rationalist 
quest for the truth - and damning the Sophists (the travelling exponents of rhetoric); 
and on the other, there is Isocrates extolling Sophia - a kind of political wisdom that 
is the fruit of a training in rhetoric and the acquisition of a personal culture or 
paideia. And this tension between the philosophers and the orators has manifested 
itself over two thousand years, with sometimes the former and sometimes the latter 
conception predominating (though never exclusively so), right up to the present day. 
So, for example, medieval scholasticism, the Enlightenment, the research ideal of the 
nineteenth-century German university taken up in America in the 1860s and 1870s 
(first at John Hopkins, Cornell and Harvard), and the modern-day academic 
curriculum are representative of the former ideal; and the Roman oratorical 
education, the early Christian ‘liberal arts’ curriculum, Renaissance humanism, the 




 centuries (sparked by the revival of 
classical studies in Germany) and the modern-day ‘classical Christian’ revival in 
America
8




Socrates might even be described as the ‘folk hero’ of the Enlightenment 
(Kimball, 1995, p. 116), the epitome of moral and intellectual integrity; and the 
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Socratic ideal of intellectual independence and moral autonomy, of ‘rationality, open 
mindedness and critical thought’ (Hardarson, 2012, p. 229) - the view that education 
is about emancipation ‘conceived in terms of something like the promotion of critical 
(rational) open-mindedness’ (Carr cited in Hardarson, p. 227) - remains very much 
the ideal in the world of education, even among those who question the curriculum 
of academic subject disciplines. Cicero, on the other hand, has served as the model 
for those who conceive the aim of education as initiation into a cultural inheritance.  
  
Kimball identifies seven characteristics of the liberal-free ideal: (1) freedom 
from a priori standards; (2) an emphasis on intellect and rationality; (3) critical 
scepticism; (4) the ‘new virtue’ of tolerance; (5) a tendency toward egalitarianism; 
(6) an ethic of individualism; and (7) the pursuit of knowledge and truth as an end-
in-itself (Kimball, pp. 119-23). The artes liberales ideal has, by contrast, the 
following characteristics: (1) ‘the goal of training the good citizen to lead society’; 
(2) ‘the prescription of values and standards for character and conduct’; (3) respect 
for and commitment to these values and standards; (4) a recognised canon of 
classical texts to provide ‘both stylistic and ethical models’; (5) the identification of 
an elite who embody the prescribed personal and civic virtues; (6) ‘a dogmatist 
epistemology’ as opposed to a Socratic approach to enquiry; and (7) the attainment 
of this liberal ideal of personal development as an ‘end-in-itself’ (pp. 37-8). Looking 
at these lists, it is striking how closely the conclusions of Part 1 of this thesis 
concerning the aims of school education match the artes liberales or old liberal ideal 
as articulated by Kimball. However, one of my conclusions was that a liberal or 
‘free’ society was the essential pre-condition for the aims of liberal education to be 
realised, and in this respect it is the liberal-free ideal that would seem better matched. 
There is a distinct air of Plato’s Republic, of totalitarianism, about the artes liberales 
ideal; and this suggests that a modern liberal education could not be modelled 
exclusively on either ideal.  
 
The only significant instance of the research tradition manifesting itself in school 
education before the advent of the modern curriculum of academic subject 
disciplines is the scholastic education of the medieval era. But in accounts of the 




to denigrate Scholasticism for its over-concern with dialectic and hair-splitting – 
something exemplified by the question ‘how many angels can dance on the head of a 
pin?’; for its narrow concern with theological exegesis; and for its downgrading of 
literary study. It has been compared unfavourably with the humanism that followed, 
regarded even as something of an aberration in the evolution of liberal education.   
 
Perhaps it is only to be expected that, viewed from a modern secular perspective, 
the humanism of the Renaissance, which put man unequivocally centre stage
10
, is 
more attractive than the medieval scholastic concern to reconcile Christian dogma 
with the logic of Aristotle. But a strong case can be made that, despite its 
shortcomings, scholastic education was a coherent programme well suited to its time; 
that in many ways it exemplified the research ideal. In From Humanism to the 
Humanities, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine argue that by providing students with 
basic literacy in Latin, ‘a lively and rigorous training in logic and semantics’, and 
even the skills of the notary, the scholastic curriculum ‘equipped students with 
complex skills and fitted them to perform specialised tasks’ (Grafton & Jardine, 
1986, pp. xii-xiii). It was, moreover, an education that was ‘open to the low-born of 
high talents’, in contrast to the new humanism, which stamped an elite with ‘an 
indelible seal of superiority’ and fostered a docile attitude towards authority (p. xiv).  
 
Though teachers and students were limited to a Christian frame of reference, 
there was considerable freedom within that frame. The overriding concern was to 
reconcile Church doctrine and dogma with the newly rediscovered logic of Aristotle 
– in particular, to collect and reconcile a diverse, often contradictory mass of Church 
Council decisions and papal decrees by means of reasoned inquiry. The result was a 
series of systematic expositions or summae of human knowledge, incorporating 
theology and a range of other subjects, and a formalised method of teaching centred 
on the lectio and the disputatio. Though the process began with the master reading 
and explaining the text to his students, the discussion that followed involved students 
raising any objections they could think of to the thesis – objections would have to be 
raised in syllogistic form – and the master resolving them in similar fashion. The 
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objection or problem might be raised by the master himself in the form of a quaestio, 




In time, new forms of knowledge came to be recognised as valid, as did new 
justifications, rational and empirical, of that knowledge (perhaps most importantly, 
Francis Bacon’s new method of induction); and so the scholastic method came to be 
superseded as a mode of inquiry. Nevertheless, there is much that can be said in its 
favour. As Curtis and Boultwood remark, an important educational principle was 
established, namely ‘that every weighty question has two sides and that a rational 
decision can only be reached by a careful study of both of them’ (Curtis & 
Boultwood, 1965, p. 101). And though it was assumed, as it had to be at the time, 
that the teachings of the Church could ultimately be validated, these teachings were 
not merely to be accepted ‘on authority’ but to be justified by rational inquiry in 




Just as it can be argued that scholasticism has been unfairly maligned, a strong 
case can be made that the humanism that succeeded it has been correspondingly 
‘idealized and romanticized’ (Oakley, 1992, p. 72). Grafton and Jardine complain of 
‘a mystification of arts education’ that ‘has clouded our intellectual judgement of the 
progress and importance of the liberal arts’ down to the present day (Grafton & 
Jardine, 1986, pp. xiv-xv). They argue that the actual classroom practice of 
Renaissance humanist teaching was far removed from the ideal, and that the 
outcomes claimed for it were largely illusory – with the exception of a small number 
of brilliant scholars. Humanism was supposed to cultivate, mould character and 
produce leaders of integrity; but in practice, for most pupils, the relentless grind and 
‘ruthless drilling’ necessary to produce a degree of fluency in Latin and Greek, left 
little time for wide reading in the exemplary classic texts (p. 27). Instead, the effect 
of the teacher attempting to discuss ‘every phrase, almost every word, that presented 
a problem of interpretation or revealed a novel shade of meaning’ produced not a 
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rich familiarity with antique culture or a coherent set of values, but rather an 
‘accumulation of fragments’, a ‘profusion of tiny details’ (p.20). This judgement is 
certainly borne out by the nineteenth-century contributors to Frederick William 
Farrar’s Essays on a Liberal Education (1868), who are (with one exception) 
scathing about the claims made for an education centred exclusively on the classics. 
While admitting that future scholars may be superbly served by a classical education 
and that some elements of a classical education might train the mind, they argue that 
the results for the majority of pupils are dismal – that those who had been forced to 
endure a classical education were, as Lord Houghton noted in his concluding 
remarks, apt to regard the toils of their boyhood ‘with unmitigated disgust’ 




In Community of Learning (1992), Francis Oakley
14
 argues that the elective 
system (in which undergraduates chose the subject or subjects they wish to study for 
their degree) – a system much criticised in America by proponents of the old 
rhetorical liberal ideal - has, despite its shortcomings, much to recommend it; that it 
should not be judged, as scholasticism (which was, in a sense, its precursor) has been 
judged, against ‘noble humanist ideals’ that bear little relation to ‘actual humanist 
pedagogic practice’ (Oakley, 1992, p. 72). His argument is, I think, a persuasive one. 
But two things should, I think, be noted. The first is that Oakley’s concern is with 
higher education – with the university, not the school (or ‘high school’). One might 
perfectly well argue that the research ideal is appropriate for higher education but 
not, or at least not exclusively, for school education. Now, it could be argued that if 
we accept the research ideal of the university, it follows (though Oakley himself does 
not follow this argument through) that the central task of school education must be to 
provide a grounding in and exposure to a range of subject disciplines so that pupils 
can identify their area of future specialisation. But this would be to assume, first, that 
all pupils will go on to specialise - and specialise, moreover, in academic subject 
disciplines; and second, that school education should have no other aim than 
preparation for higher study – neither of which assumptions is, I think, tenable.15 The 
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second thing to note about Oakley’s argument is that in criticising an over-
romanticised view of humanism, he is taking aim at the pedagogic practice of the 
Renaissance, at a literary curriculum centred on the classics. I shall argue in Chapter 
7 that a much better exemplar of the liberal rhetorical tradition – better in the sense 
of exemplifying the educational aims defended in Part 1 of this thesis – is the old 
Roman education, whose aim was to produce the orator-citizen, and which (because 
Latin was the vernacular) was not encumbered to the same degree as its humanist 




The critical importance of distinguishing these two traditions, conceptions and 
ideals of liberal education – the research and the rhetorical – should now be clear, as 
is the importance of considering what they achieved in practice. The questions I 
would now like to pose are these: ‘which conception of a liberal education (if any) 
best embodies the educational aims defended in Part 1 of this thesis?’ and ‘what 
form would a modern liberal curriculum take that did embody these aims?’    
 
In the next two chapters, I shall attempt to answer these questions by considering 






The research ideal: a justification of specialist study 
 
This chapter considers whether, or to what extent, secondary school education 
should be founded on the research ideal
1
. Central to the research ideal is that the 
truth can only be established - that knowledge can only be justified as valid - if we 
submit our beliefs to a continual process of critical and rational examination. Only 
that which passes the test, which is not refuted, can be accepted (or at least 
provisionally accepted) as justified knowledge or truth. Implicit in this is that 
knowledge cannot be justified merely by reference to a priori standards or sources of 
authority, because these would themselves stand in need of rational justification. 
Another way of stating the research ideal is that the aim of education is, in some 
sense, to develop or cultivate the powers of the intellect - to train the mind. As we 
saw in the last chapter, this accords  with a conception of liberal education that is in 
direct line of descent from Plato, Socrates and Aristotle; a conception that derives 
from the Greek belief that the ultimate good is the cultivation of the rational mind 
through the pursuit of truth.  The best-known formulation of this ideal in modern 
times is probably John Henry Newman’s, according to which the aim of a liberal 
education is to cultivate the mind:  
 
This process of training, by which the intellect … is disciplined for its own 
sake … is called Liberal Education. (Newman, 1982, p. 115)   
 
In practice, the research ideal is pursued through the division of knowledge into 
academic subject disciplines, each with its own characteristic methods, mode of 
discourse, terminology and standards. This chapter explores the nature of the 
educational benefits that arise from engaging in specialist study and how these 
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benefits might be conceived – for example, as ‘mental training’, the acquisition of 
various intellectual virtues, or as initiation into ‘forms of knowledge’; it considers 
the level of study that is necessary for these benefits to accrue; and it asks whether 
non-academic subjects might not do just as well as academic subjects for the purpose 
of deriving these benefits, even if they are not pursued in the name of the research 
ideal. It considers the extent to which a ‘broad and balanced’ curriculum of subject 
disciplines (i.e. the study of a range of subjects to GCSE level) can deliver these 
benefits, and whether the modern secondary school curriculum of academic subject 
disciplines can be regarded as constituting a liberal education in itself; or whether it 
is merely of preparatory value to those going on to specialise in higher education. 
The chapter concludes by questioning whether liberal education should be conceived 
at all in the spirit of the research ideal. 
 
The academic curriculum  
 
 
The modern curriculum of academic subject disciplines could be seen as 
standing in direct line of descent from the so-called ‘seven liberal arts’ of the late 
classical and early medieval periods, which comprised the subjects of the trivium 
(grammar, logic and rhetoric
2
) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and 
musical theory) with the trivium broadly speaking encompassing the humanities and 
the quadrivium the sciences. Except that the two were sharply distinguished. The 
trivium formed the core of school (and higher) education, and the subjects of the 
quadrivium together with philosophy might be studied if the student progressed to 
university - though the student could opt instead to continue his study of rhetoric, or 
to study theology, medicine or law. Moreover, even within the trivium, the subjects 
were logically arranged so that the study of grammar and logic in the earlier years 
preceded the study of rhetoric. Rhetoric - the capacity to argue a case and come to a 
reasoned judgement - represented the culmination of school education. The notion 
that school education should comprise all these subjects (or their modern 
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equivalents), and that they should be taught and studied simultaneously, involves a 
quite foreign conception of liberal education.   
 
I shall return to the justification of the old liberal curriculum, specifically the 
trivium, in the next chapter. But how is the modern curriculum of academic subject 
disciplines to be justified? Specifically, how does it encapsulate the ‘research’ ideal?  
 
In the first half of the twentieth-century, the study of the academic disciplines 
was justified on the broad grounds that collectively they are the ‘storehouses’ of 
knowledge (Mulcahy, 2008a, p. 74), and that acquaintance with them will best 
enable us to cultivate our minds and understand the world
3
. This line of thought is 
exemplified in Matthew Arnold’s famous formulation of liberal education as 
involving a study of ‘the best which has been thought and said in the world’ (Arnold, 
1993, p. 190), which is still invoked by those who conceive (liberal) education 
primarily as a means of transmission of a cultural inheritance centred on a canon of 
great books and great works – for example, Anthony O’Hear and Chris Woodhead4. 
But a more closely argued justification of the curriculum of academic subject 
disciplines – indeed, the most famous defence of liberal education conceived in this 
disciplinary sense - is Paul Hirst’s. Hirst’s thesis is that the academic subject 
disciplines (the ones that largely make up the modern school curriculum) constitute a 
complete liberal education by virtue of their acquainting pupils with the major 
disciplines or ‘forms of knowledge’ necessary for a complete development of mind. 
Each discipline can be justified as a distinct means of structuring experience, each 
involving its own characteristic publicly constituted methods, symbols and modes of 
reasoning. The outcome of liberal education conceived as an acquaintance with the 
forms of knowledge is ‘the growth of ever clearer and finer distinctions in our 
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experience’ (Hirst, 1974, p.52); and through it we ‘come to have a mind in a fuller 
sense’ (p.40). In other words, the aim is to cultivate the mind.5   
 
This emphasis on subject disciplines structuring experience by means of a 
conceptual scheme or cognitive framework has the result that that the subject matter 
of the disciplines is typically theoretical rather than practical, pure rather than 
applied, and analytical rather than descriptive. Central to Hirst’s conception of 
liberal education is the pursuit of rational knowledge and the development of rational 
mind. True, not all the subjects typically studied in the modern academic curriculum 
involve the strict application of deductive and inductive forms of reasoning – 
literature and the arts are obvious examples. But, as Hirst argues, even literature and 
the arts can be considered as producing rational knowledge in the disciplinary sense 
that their pursuit is carried on within a certain conceptual apparatus or cognitive 
structure – i.e. their pursuit is structured round the use of public symbols and 
involves accepted standards and modes of discourse. The aesthetic is itself a mode of 
reasoning, thinking and understanding, and involves definite criteria of judgement 
and standards.  
 
However, there are a number of objections that can be raised against the school 
curriculum of academic subject disciplines. The first concerns the abstract theoretical 
nature of the subject disciplines, which makes them simply too difficult for many 
pupils; in other words, not all pupils possess the aptitude for academic study (or, let 
us say, the aptitude necessary to make academic study worthwhile). The second 
concerns the level of specialised study that is needed for the mind to be developed 
(or the intellect ‘formed’ or ‘cultivated’) in any sense, which makes it unlikely that 
the educational benefits envisaged by Hirst relating to the initiation into various 
‘forms of knowledge’ would be realised as part of school education – even among 
pupils with the aptitude for academic study. The third is that the aims of the research 
ideal can just as well be realised by specialisation in subjects that are not academic in 
nature – i.e. practical subjects. And the fourth is that there are other legitimate 
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educational aims, other goods, than those represented by the research ideal; and that 
these goods are neglected when the curriculum is limited to the study of academic 
subject disciplines. I shall argue that, taken together, these objections count 
decisively against the universal academic curriculum.   
 
The fourth objection forms the subject matter of Chapter 7, where I consider the 
goods associated with the rhetorical ideal of liberal education, and Chapter 8, where 
I consider character education. In this chapter, I would like to consider the nature and 
value of the goods specifically associated with the research ideal, and how these 
goods might best realised in the curriculum. I shall begin by arguing the limitations 
of the curriculum of academic subject disciplines as a means of realising the goods 
associated with the research ideal (the goods in whose name the academic 
curriculum is usually justified) – which is the theme of the first two objections. And 
I shall go on to argue that the research ideal might be just as well be realised in 
several important respects through the specialised study of practical subjects, when I 
consider in the second half of this chapter what exactly is meant by ‘mental training’ 
(or ‘the cultivation of the mind’), and consider how this notion might fruitfully be 
conceived.   
 
I shall take the first two objections in turn.   
 
The ‘aptitude’ objection 
 
The first feature of the research ideal that makes it an inappropriate model for a 
school curriculum applicable to all is that the rewards of academic disciplinary 
study, of research and scholarship motivated by a desire to attain the truth, are 
ultimately, by their very nature, open only to those who have the necessary aptitude 
for it; and because this may be a minority of pupils, the danger is that the academic 
curriculum serves only to produce ‘an intellectual aristocracy’. Of course, 
proponents of the academic curriculum have been aware of the problem of pupils’ 




form. The view put forward by R. S. Peters and David Carr in Britain, and Robert 
Hutchins and Mortimer Adler in America (to name some of its most prominent 
advocates), is that a ‘liberal’ curriculum of academic subject disciplines, because it is 
the best education and the best means of training the mind, is necessarily also ‘the 
best education for all’ (Adler cited in Mulcahy, p. 76). In fact, it is nothing less than 
a moral entitlement (see Carr, 2003, pp. 208-211). All pupils can benefit from 
travelling at least some of the way along the path. As Peters notes, ‘it is a question of 
how far the individual child can go in developing a theoretical structure for practical 
activities rather than a question of which children can do this and which children 
cannot’. Peters adds for good measure that ‘a quality of life is not the prerogative of 
an intellectual elite’ (Peters, 1970, pp. 177-8).  
 
But the argument that all pupils can move some way along the same track, 
though at different speeds and needing different amounts of support - that, as Adler 
puts it, it does not matter whether a half-pint or gallon container is being filled so 
long as each container is ‘filled to the brim with the same quality of substance’ 
(Adler, 1984, p. 3) - is a very crude argument indeed; and though laudable in its 
concern to produce equality of opportunity, takes no account of the nature of pupils’ 
differing aptitudes, motivations and needs
6
. The fallacy inherent in this argument 
was recognised in the mid-nineteenth-century by the contributors to Farrar’s Essays 
on a Liberal Education (1868) in relation to the study of the classical languages, the 
favoured discipline of the time for training the mind. Henry Sidgwick describes the 
problem in forthright terms:  
  
It is not surprising that simple-minded people have thought that since a 
complete study of Latin and Greek was felt by some of those who had 
successfully pursued it to have been … a fine literary education, therefore 
half as much Latin and Greek ought to produce about half as much of the 
same kind of effect … (Sidgwick, 1868, p. 129) 
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 Nor does it take account of the possibility that there are other goods than ‘the cultivation of the 





The problem, noted Sidgwick, was that many pupils had been ‘so exhausted with 
linguistic struggles’ that they were ‘not in a state to receive delicate literary 
impressions’ (p. 116). And because, for one reason or another, they did not ‘last the 
course’, they finished not with ‘half a literary education’ but with next to none at all.  
 
The problem with this objection (and indeed this whole discussion) is that any 
suggestion that pupils differ in academic ability and, critically, that these differences 
are qualitative rather than merely quantitative in nature – that it is not simply a 
question of some pupils having to work harder than others to achieve the same 
learning objectives
7
 (or of pupils differing merely in their aptitude for particular 
subjects or activities - something that most people would probably not dispute) - 
raises immediately a host of highly contentious and politicised questions that are 
almost impossible to resolve through rational debate
8
. These include the problematic 
nature of intelligence as a concept (especially ‘general’ intelligence or ‘IQ’), 
contested empirical evidence concerning the relative influences of inheritance and 
environment (the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate), and the nature and validity of the 
egalitarian assumptions underlying our chosen educational aims. We might agree 
with D. G. Mulcahy that equality of opportunity can just as well be taken to justify 
pupils being given different programmes of study so that their differing needs – 
intellectual, social, emotional and cultural - can be met; that Adler’s argument is not 
founded on some ‘self-evident principle’ but is merely a slogan, a claim for which no 
evidence is provided (Mulcahy, 2008a, pp.84-5).
9
 But to argue that pupils’ differing 
needs can be identified is to invite these same objections, even if teachers (unlike 
philosophers) are continually engaged in the practical task of identifying and 
catering to pupils’ differing needs.    
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 Taking mathematics as an example, it is blindingly obvious to most teachers of mathematics (I 
include myself and my colleagues, past and present) that pupils differ in their capacity not merely to 
do mathematics or to grasp new concepts; they differ in their capacity to think mathematically. Really 
able pupils think in a quite different way to their average or below-average peers.     
8
 A good example is the debate between Hans Eysenck and Leon Kamin. Eysenck and Kamin, both 
leading professors of psychology, both immersed in the research on intelligence, disagree on almost 
everything, including on how particular studies should be interpreted (see Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). 
As Ian Deary remarks, they seem further apart at the end of the debate than they were at the beginning 
(Deary, 2001, p. 114).  
9
 Mulcahy also notes the presumption that the intellectual life represents the perfection of life, that the 
life devoted to caring for others (for example) is somehow inferior. This argument that the intellectual 




The legitimate concern here is that any attempt to identify or measure pupils’ 
aptitudes or academic ability too early – in effect, to institute selection or streaming 
by aptitude or ability – is likely to reinforce advantages and disadvantages of 
background and upbringing (social, cultural, ethnic and other); and that school 
education should be centred on a common curriculum for this reason. But we might 
accept the need for a common curriculum on these grounds (we might even adhere to 
the belief that pupils do not differ in their ‘innate’ academic ability or potential – i.e. 
believe that academic ability is not innate) and yet question the assumption of Peters 
et al. that the intellectual life is the ideal after which all should strive and its 
corollary that practical and craft subjects should be excluded from a liberal 
education. The notion that the intellectual life - the contemplative life - represents the 
greatest good, and that the life devoted to practical pursuits or merely caring for 
others (for example) is somehow inferior, is one that I disputed in Chapter 4 and will 
return to later in this chapter when I consider the value of practical pursuits in 
relation to specialist study. First, however, I would like to consider the other 
objection to the academic curriculum - one that renders it inadequate as a means of 
cultivating the mind even if it is assumed that all pupils are equally capable of 
academic study. 
 
The ‘superficial knowledge’ objection  
 
Even if one does assume that all pupils are capable of academic study and 
research (the implication being, for example, that anyone can become a physicist or 
mathematician so long as they devote enough time to the study of physics or 
mathematics), the problem remains that it is necessary to go a considerable way 
along the road of specialised disciplinary study before the rewards or goods 
specifically associated with the development of mind or ‘mental training’ (including 
an acquaintance with Hirst’s ‘forms of knowledge’) accrue in any degree. Pupils 
who study a given academic subject discipline merely to GCSE level and no further 
as part of a broad and balanced curriculum (which necessarily includes most pupils 
in most subjects), therefore gain none of these things, or at least gain these things in 




described by John Dewey: ‘a smattering which is too superficial to be scientific and 
too technical to be applicable to ordinary affairs’ (Dewey, 1966, p. 287).10   
 
Paul Hirst’s seminal ‘forms of knowledge’ justification of liberal education has 
been the object of intense debate since it was proposed in the 1960s. The debate has 
centred on problems of selection (i.e. which subjects or groups of subjects are to 
judged representative of distinct forms of knowledge), number (i.e. how many 
distinct forms of knowledge can or should be identified) and conceptual (i.e. can 
forms of knowledge, as Hirst defines them, usefully be distinguished at all). But I 
think there is a much more basic practical flaw in Hirst’s thesis. Even if we accepted 
that the acquisition of Hirst’s ‘forms of knowledge’ were a legitimate educational 
aim, that the concept were a fruitful one, this basic problem remains: to study an 
academic discipline at an elementary level, in the manner that academic disciplines 
are currently taught, is to begin an apprenticeship or a process of training that will 
culminate in mastery of the parent discipline – its characteristic vocabulary, 
methods, theories and body of factual knowledge - if one goes on to specialise in the 
subject concerned. An elementary programme of study, by contrast, can generally do 
little more than introduce the pupil or the student to the basic vocabulary and syntax 
of the subject. The notion that an introductory course - a GCSE, for example - can 
initiate pupils into a form of knowledge is, I think, hopelessly unrealistic.  
 
Hirst appears to recognise the dilemma that ‘some specialist study within a 
discipline’ is ‘necessary to understanding the form of knowledge in any developed 
sense’ – and yet specialist expertise in all the disciplines is a practical impossibility; 
and so he argues that acquaintance with ‘at least paradigm examples’ of the forms of 
knowledge of the disciplines – for example, gravity in physics and photosynthesis in 
biology – will be sufficient to initiate pupils into the characteristic modes of thought 
of the disciplines, and hence educate the mind (Hirst, 1974, p. 48). But I think this is 
equally unrealistic. Let me illustrate my argument with reference to examples from 
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 Inevitably, one’s own experience colours one’s attitudes here. My experience is precisely that of 
gaining ‘a smattering’. I would add that most of what I learned was quickly forgotten for precisely the 
reasons Dewey gives. For the subject matter to be rendered memorable and meaningful, it would 




the natural and social sciences
11, which constitute two of Hirst’s stated forms of 
knowledge
 12
.   
 
Economics makes an interesting case study because though not a mainstream 
subject at GCSE, it is increasingly popular (as is its social science cousin 
‘psychology’) as a specialist subject at A-level - being seen as relevant, interesting 
and as possessing academic rigour. Now the purpose of studying economics is 
clearly to be able to answer, or at least have some notion of what is involved in 
answering, questions of the following type: ‘how can unemployment be cured 
without creating an inflationary spiral?’, ‘what is the best way to get out of a 
recession?’, ‘does higher government borrowing force up the rate of interest?’, ‘is a 
policy of ‘monetary easing’ inflationary?’, ‘under what circumstances are floating 
exchange rates preferable to a single currency?’ and ‘how can a debt crisis be 
resolved?’ But to even begin to answer these topical questions requires an 
understanding of some basic macroeconomic theory – for example, Ricardo’s 
doctrine of comparative costs (the justification for international free trade), Keynes’ 
multiplier (how changes in savings, investment or consumer spending produce 
multiplied effects on National Income and employment that end when equilibrium is 
restored), the classic Hicks-Hansen ‘IS-LM’ model that synthesises the fiscal and 
monetary sectors of the economy (together with an awareness of its limitations), and 
what is meant by ‘the money supply’13; together with some knowledge of the 
historical background and political context of these elements of economic theory. 
The problem is that much of the theory is only introduced at first-year undergraduate 
level. Some of it may be touched on at A-level, but it will certainly not be developed 
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 I have chosen here subjects I have studied formally - to A-level in the case of physics and to degree 
level in the case of economics – so that I have (or at least once had) some first-hand acquaintance 
with the subject matter I am discussing.   
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 Hirst classifies the distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge as ‘mathematics, physical sciences, 
human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy’ (p.  46).  
13
 ‘The money supply’ is a good example of a basic term that can be given a technical definition at an 
introductory level, but that is conceptually highly complex. It does not refer to the printing of bank 
notes and their scattering by helicopter across the population (Milton Friedman was once much 
criticised for proposing this crude ‘helicopter’ transmission mechanism); rather it involves such 
factors as the growth of bank deposits, the level and structure of government borrowing, the 
availability of private credit, the level and structure of interest rates, and judgements concerning the 
overall ‘liquidity’ of the system. However, it is only when we come to consider its relation to other 
economic variables and its place in economic theory (for example, whether the money supply should 
be considered as exogenous or endogenous to the economy) that we begin to engage in economic 




at a theoretical level. An introductory GCSE course, by contrast, will, necessarily, 
concern itself largely with familiarising the pupil with the extensive technical 
vocabulary of the subject, with the structure of the economy and the banking 
system
14
. Now, to successfully complete this introductory course is itself a major 
undertaking requiring considerable application on the part of the student. Study skills 
will be developed, general knowledge gained and the appetite may well be whetted 
for more specialised study. But there is no way that this introductory study can, in 
itself, develop the capacity to think economically or to apply economic theory in 
answering economic problems. It is hard therefore to see how the introductory or 
GCSE-level course could serve as ‘mental training’ or as acquainting pupils with 
Hirst’s ‘forms of knowledge’ in any shape or form.   
  
Likewise, an elementary GCSE-type course in physics will typically introduce a 
whole range of topics, an extensive technical vocabulary of terms and symbols, 
various rules and conventions (for example of diagrammatic representation and 
experimental procedure) and begin to develop the conceptual language of the 
subject. Explanation at this stage will be largely descriptive. For example, the 
concepts ‘gravitational force’, ‘centripetal force’, ‘weight’ and ‘weightlessness’ will 
be explained in simple terms and Newton’s law of universal gravitation will be 
mentioned (though not necessarily stated). However, the concepts will only be 
developed theoretically (i.e. mathematically) at A-level, where it becomes possible 
for students to apply a range of theories and formulae in conjunction with each other 
to solve problems such as calculating the force of gravity at the Earth’s surface and 
the ‘speed of escape’ from the earth’s gravitational field. True, the concept of gravity 
is introduced in the elementary course, but then it is already familiar to pupils 
through the story of an apple falling on Newton’s head and their experience that 
what goes up must come down. A limited number of elementary principles, laws and 
equations are introduced and applied to solve elementary problems - for example, the 
equations of motion and Ohm’s law. But most of what is introduced is descriptive 
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 For example, the nature of the difference and the relation between national income, gross national 
product and gross domestic product; between the ‘current’ and ‘capital’ accounts of the balance of 
payments; between the public sector borrowing requirement and the national debt; and between fiscal 
and monetary policy – the list could be extended indefinitely. All these must be covered as part of an 
introductory course. But though technical, the treatment will be descriptive rather than conceptual or 




and definitional. Consider, for example, the following elementary terms or concepts 
relating to the single topic of ‘electricity and magnetism’: magnetic flux, magnetic 
field, magnetisation, static electricity, electric charge, insulators and conductors, 
electric discharge, potential difference, capacitance, electric cells, electric circuits 
(series and parallel), electric current (AC and DC), resistance, electromagnets, 
electrolysis, devices for measuring current, voltage and resistance, types of electric 
light and domestic electric installation, magnetic forces on conductors, 
electromagnetic induction (the principle of the electric motor), dynamos and 
transformers. The question is ‘does this mass of information constitute as it stands a 
coherent body of conceptual and theoretical knowledge’? Does it give us an insight 
into how physicists (or scientists more generally) structure experience and engage in 
a distinct world of discourse involving ‘high critical standards according to complex 
criteria’ sufficient to ‘form the mind’ (Hirst, 1974, p. 45)? Has there been ‘sufficient 
immersion in the concepts, logic and criteria of the discipline’ to enable the pupil’s 
‘experience … to be widely structured in this distinctive manner’ (p. 47)? The 
answer, I would suggest, is ‘clearly not’.  
 
Hirst recognises that ‘some specialist study within a discipline’ would be 
necessary to understanding the form of knowledge ‘in any developed sense’; and 
suggests that the study of ‘at least paradigm examples’ of the forms of knowledge 
would do provided that the study is ‘sufficiently detailed and sustained to give 
genuine insight so that pupils come to think in these terms, using the concepts, logic 
and criteria accurately in the different domains’ (p. 48). He does not elaborate on 
these paradigm examples but earlier has given as examples of the ‘central concepts’ 
peculiar in character to the form of the sciences those of ‘gravity, acceleration, 
hydrogen and photo-synthesis’ (p. 44). Let us, then, consider ‘gravity’ as a core 
concept and paradigm example of the natural sciences.  
 
There are immediately two problems here. The first is that gravity is not a 
concept that one can consider in any developed sense in isolation. Some topics - 
electricity and magnetism, waves, particles and materials, for example - are not 




gravity is a central concept in physics, would require an extensive conceptual 
knowledge of space, forces and mechanics, not to mention an understanding of the 
relation between space and time (Einstein’s theory of general relativity), and even 
the relation between general relativity and quantum mechanics (the quest for a 
unified theory of ‘quantum gravity’). One would, in effect, be doing A-level work, 
and more, though in a more restricted field. The second problem – of course - is that 
the other topics of physics (along with chemistry and biology) could not just be 
dropped from the curriculum. This would be to deprive the pupil, first, of an 
adequate general knowledge, and second of the broad introduction necessary for 
future specialisation.  
 
The point I am making is that what is of practical value or general interest in 
physics (which might range from applied mechanics in the form of ‘how a car engine 
works’ to general questions concerning the nature of the universe – questions of the 
sort that fascinate children) is better introduced in the form of general knowledge 
and given a descriptive treatment with minimal theoretical underpinning; and it is 
probably better introduced in contexts that make it more interesting, more 
memorable and more applicable to everyday ‘real-life’ application, including 
through ‘popular science’, television documentaries and film dramatisations. The 
rest is of little or no value unless it is developed theoretically - and hence 
mathematically – at a higher level. And unless theoretical concepts are developed to 
the level at which they can be applied, and to the level at which they can be related 
to each other to form an overall view, it is difficult to see what in the way of 
‘thinking skills’ is developed or ‘mental training’ effected in the Hirstian sense. One 
is left with a mass of disconnected half-digested technical information that cannot be 
integrated into a meaningful whole, that cannot be applied practically or to solve 
problems, and that is likely to be forgotten as soon as the course is over.   
 
I am not arguing here that knowledge below a certain threshold is worthless; 
merely that mental training in the Hirstian sense is unlikely to be effected. There is, 
in fact, a strong case for delaying the theoretical treatment of subjects and making 
introductory courses general and descriptive in nature. David Ausubel argued the 




By any reasonable pedagogic criterion … high-school biology should 
concentrate on those broad biological ideas that constitute part of general 
education – physiology, evolution, development, inheritance, uniformities 
and diversities in life, ecology, and man’s place in nature – rather than on a 
detailed and technical analysis of the physical and chemical basis of 
biological phenomena or of the morphology and function of intracellular 
microstructures. This is particularly true for the substantial number of 
students who will receive no further instruction in biology. (Ausubel, 1968, 
p. 355) 
 
There is great value in the sort of general education (or general knowledge 
education) Ausubel is advocating here - so long as it is structured coherently by 
topic. Clearly, as I argued earlier, application is required and study skills are 
developed; and pupils have the opportunity to think reflectively, reason well and 
argue a case. In fact, what is being developed here is not ‘critical’ or ‘creative’ 
thinking’ (because, as I argue in Chapter 7, that requires specialist subject 
knowledge), nor various mental faculties, nor even the intellectual virtues (I shall 
return to these later in this chapter in relation to specialist knowledge), but rather 
rhetorical skill. I shall argue in Chapter 7 that the acquisition of general knowledge 
is an important component of rhetorical training.  But clearly we have moved a long 
way here from Hirst’s conception of the value of a liberal curriculum of academic 
subject disciplines.    
 
The value of specialised study 
 
I have argued that an academic curriculum of subject disciplines is an inadequate 
basis for secondary education, even for those with the aptitude for it, because the 
educational benefits claimed for specialist disciplinary study – benefits or goods 
usually conceived in terms of some sort of development of the mind or ‘mental 
training’ (I shall return to the precise nature of these shortly) - only accrue in any 
significant degree when the pupil studies a subject to quite an advanced level; and 
clearly not all pupils will go on to specialise, certainly not in academic subject 
disciplines. Moreover, any benefits that do derive from this specialist study will not 




development of mind through an acquaintance with all the forms of knowledge) 
because it is not possible to specialise in all the disciplines.    
 
However, a quite different justification of the study of the academic disciplines, 
of liberal education conceived as a means of pursuing the research ideal, can be 
argued - namely, that the main value of a ‘broad and balanced’ curriculum of 
academic subject disciplines is that the disciplines are studied at an introductory 
level preparatory to selection and specialisation. The real value of GCSE courses 
then lies in their being first stages towards the acquisition of a body of knowledge 
that will only be complete on graduation from university. A broad range of subjects 
is therefore necessary pre-16 to enable selection and the subject matter must be 
determined ‘top-down’ by the entrance requirements of universities. On this 
argument, the full benefits of a liberal education only accrue to the graduate who has 
engaged in specialised study and has mastered a discipline – or at least mastered it to 
a high degree.  
 
In The English Tradition of Education, Cyril Norwood
15
 writes that central to a 
liberal education is the acquisition of precisely this specialist knowledge. His words, 
written in 1929, are, I think, worth quoting at length: 
 
If you have once gained sound knowledge on anything, however limited in 
range it may be, you have a standard, and you know what knowledge is. And 
in a world of many opinions, you will have the standard which will enable 
you to judge between them. You will know that you have to ascertain what 
the facts are, which is in itself not an easy process, and then, facing those 
facts, and giving to each its proper value, form a deliberate judgement. To 
ask the right questions, and from the answers to form a right judgement, that 
is the rare fruit of a good education.  
 
That is the justification of the modern curriculum which on the basis of a 
common general education offers to each boy who is fit for it a specialized 
course in the subject for which he has the most capacity. It is based on the 
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 Sir Cyril Norwood was a prominent English public school headmaster and author of the influential 





hope that by the acquisition of true knowledge in one portion of the field, he 
will know that it is to be looked for in every other … and that what matters in 
life is sound judgement based on ascertained truth. (Norwood, 1929, pp. 93-
4) 
 
For Norwood, to know ‘the value of knowledge’ is to have had one’s mind and 
one’s powers of judgement trained, developed and formed; and to have had one’s 
mind trained through specialised study is to have learned the value of the pursuit of 
true knowledge. This is a quite different justification of the modern curriculum to 
that of Peters and Hirst, or indeed to that of Newman, and it is often overlooked, 
even though I think it is the more coherent justification.   
 
However, if there are significant educational benefits to be derived from 
engaging in specialist study – benefits that go beyond the ‘mere’ acquisition of 
subject knowledge and expertise in that subject area - then this would constitute a 
powerful argument for allowing all pupils to specialise early in at least one subject 
(i.e. to study it in depth) as part of their general secondary education. Moreover, it is 
conceivable that the benefits of specialisation would accrue, not only from the study 
of academic subject disciplines pursued in pursuit of the research ideal, but also from 
the pursuit of a range of other subjects and from the engagement in other forms of 
activity.   
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall therefore attempt to answer the following 
questions: In what sense (if any) does specialised study cultivate or ‘train’ the mind? 
Are some subjects better for the purpose of ‘mental training’ than others? Do 
specialist subjects need to be academic in nature – or might practical subjects also do 
the job? Is ‘mental training’ not better conceived in terms of the cultivation of certain 
values and virtues, and of practical judgement? What are ‘the intellectual virtues’? 
And finally, should liberal education be conceived at all in the spirit of the research 






Mental training and the intellectual virtues 
 
There are different ways of describing and conceptualising the educational 
benefits or goods that might accrue from specialised study. We might speak of 
specialised study in terms of engagement in a practice, and of certain virtues (moral 
and intellectual) being cultivated by initiation into that practice; or of the mind being 
educated or cultivated - of its cognitive faculties being trained; or of certain ‘thinking 
skills’ being developed, including the ability or capacity to reason well and develop 
an argument; or we might emphasise the disciplined acquisition of an organised 
body of knowledge
16
 and skill, and speak of the wider value (moral, intellectual, 
epistemic) of having acquired expertise in one particular area - even of the 
transformation of the person and his perception of the world.  
 
The notion that education can ‘train the mind’ carries connotations of the 
somewhat discredited ‘faculty psychology’ of the nineteenth-century (the notion that 
the mind can be regarded as comprising several distinct faculties, each of which is 
capable of being developed or trained as if it were a muscle) but when interpreted in 
the currently fashionable terms of ‘thinking skills’, or the cultivation of certain 
‘intellectual virtues’, there appears to be no such connotation. There is, I think, no 
question that specialised study in some sense ‘trains the mind’ provided that this 
study involves the disciplined acquisition of an organised body of knowledge 
(understanding, skill, know-how), and provided that this knowledge has ‘a certain 
structural complexity a grasp of which requires sustained effort, reflection, 
concentration, persistence, and the like’ (Baehr, 2013, p. 251). It is because 
specialised study, by its very nature, requires concentration, persistence, attention to 
detail and so forth, that the engagement in it must, to some degree, cultivate these 
qualities or capacities – cultivate them in so far as they can be regarded as habits or 
dispositions (rather than innate qualities) and in so far as the student has the aptitude, 
interest and motivation to engage in the particular subject (a point to which I shall 
return later). These attributes, qualities or capacities are the ones we might usefully 
designate ‘the intellectual virtues’. Likewise, it is because specialised study involves 
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the disciplined acquisition of a body of knowledge and skill involving concepts and 
procedures of some complexity, and because it requires relevant facts to be 
ascertained or categorised, and agreed standards and criteria of judgement to be 
applied (as opposed to merely mechanical procedures being followed), that more 
general powers of reasoning, judgement and discrimination are likely to be 
cultivated. Even if a person lacks the expertise necessary to form a judgement, to 
ascertain the relevant factors in a particular case, he is able - as Norwood argued - to 
appreciate the value of the expertise possessed by others.   
 
It seems to make sense here to distinguish the general capacity to reason well (to 
argue a case, to form a judgement) from the capacity to exercise the ‘intellectual 
virtues’ associated with the capacity of a person to acquire a body of knowledge and 
expertise in some particular area, because although both might be cultivated through 
specialised study (especially academic disciplinary study), there are other factors 
affecting the former. First, it could be argued that students differ in their capacity for 
academic study precisely because they differ in their capacity for logical reasoning 
of an abstract theoretical nature – in other words, it could be argued that this capacity 
is, in some degree, innate
17
; whereas the intellectual virtues are dispositions that can 
be cultivated by all. I recognise that this proposition is a highly contentious one but I 
think it does need to be stated, and that the possibility needs to be given serious 
consideration
18
; however, as it is not central to the argument of this thesis (and 
would be impossible to adequately address in this thesis), I shall leave it to one side. 
                                                          
17 By innate, I mean simply that there is a general factor (‘g’) of cognitive ability or intelligence on 
which human beings differ, that IQ tests can measure this difference, that IQ scores are stable over 
most of a person’s life, and that this general factor of intelligence is substantially heritable. Of course 
this set of assertions is highly contentious and would probably be disputed by most educationalists. 
However, it is generally accepted by those engaged in the field of psychometrics and therefore 
deserves proper consideration (see American Psychological Association, 1995; Deary, 2001; 
Herrnstein & Murray, 1996, pp. 22-3).  
18 As I have alluded in the last note, there is a staggering gulf in this respect between educationalists, 
who mostly subscribe to an egalitarian ideal, and those engaged in psychometric research. The two 
groups might as well exist on different planets. For example, the claim of those engaged in 
psychometric research that intelligence is substantially heritable is particularly contentious for many 
educationalists who view social and economic disadvantage as the main cause of pupils’ poor 
academic performance – of their apparently low IQ. And yet the psychometric evidence is that though 
environment has a significant effect on human intelligence differences, ‘by far the largest part of the 
environment’s influence can be traced to the non-shared unique environment. Families [our shared 
environment] have little effect.’ (Deary, p. 79; see also American Psychological Association, pp. 88 & 
96) Since families mediate social and economic factors in the lives of children, this ought to be cause 




Second, and more germane to this thesis, the general capacity to reason and form 
judgements is closely bound up with the verbal or linguistic capacity of being able to 
express oneself clearly, concisely and logically – the very capacity or skill that the 
old liberal education sought to cultivate through the study of grammar and rhetoric, 
but that is less likely to be cultivated through the specialist study of practical or craft 
subjects. 
 
I shall therefore delay a consideration of the capacity to reason well and how it 
might best be cultivated to the next chapter when I consider liberal education 
conceived in the light of the rhetorical ideal. The focus of the remainder of this 
chapter will be the goods and virtues that are cultivated by specialised study – 
specifically, the intellectual virtues. 
 
Educationally worthwhile activities 
 
The intellectual or epistemic virtues might include such things as ‘curiosity, 
open-mindedness, creativity, reflectiveness, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, 
intellectual courage, intellectual rigour, and intellectual honesty’ (Baehr, 2013, pp. 
248 & 258); or alternatively ‘disinterested curiosity, patience, intellectual honesty, 
exactness, industry, attention, concentration, doubt, courage, discrimination and the 
recognition of excellence in thought and conduct’ (Oakeshott, 2001, pp. 59 & 74). 
The corresponding goods might include an appreciation of the value of knowledge 
(and of its acquisition) in all fields; heightened powers of perception, cognition and 
imagination; the capacity to reason well and arrive at a wise (practical) judgement; 
the possibility of leading ‘a certain kind of life’ – the life of an artist, a physicist, a 
craftsman or a teacher, for example (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 190); ‘the gift of self-
knowledge and of a satisfying intellectual and moral identity’ (Oakeshott, 2001, p. 
72); and, finally, the good of leading a virtuous life – the life of a person who 
possesses a range of moral and intellectual virtues – as an end in itself.19 
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But what are the subjects or activities best suited to the purpose of developing 
and cultivating these intellectual virtues? Which subjects or activities have 
educational value as means of cultivating these virtues, and are therefore intrinsically 
worthwhile? Three contrasting perspectives that might shed some light on the nature 
of an educationally worthwhile activity are those of Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard 
Peters, and Michael Reiss and John White – and I shall consider these in turn.  
 
First, the engagement in specialist study might be conceived in terms of 
engagement in a practice on the apprenticeship model as conceived by Alasdair 
MacIntyre. I have already discussed the nature of practices in some detail in Chapter 
4 in relation to the goods that might constitute a worthwhile life but it might be 
worth summarising here their key features. Practices are coherent complex socially 
established forms of cooperative activity; their scope is wide and they range from 
sports, crafts, arts, trades and professions to academic subject disciplines; to engage 
in them requires an extended period of apprenticeship; engagement in them involves 
the realisation of goods and standards of excellence that are internal to the activity 
concerned; the goods of practices might broadly be characterised as being of two 
kinds – (1) the good of leading a certain kind of life and (2) the good of leading a 
virtuous life; as well as being partially constitutive of these goods, various virtues 
(moral and intellectual) must be exercised in realising them; and, finally, a practice 
embodies a living tradition of enquiry into the nature of its goods.  
 
The difference is that here we are considering goods that are specifically 
educational rather than goods that make an adult life worthwhile; activities that are 
worthwhile in the sense that they prepare pupils for leading worthwhile lives as 
adults (which includes preparing pupils for their successful engagement in practices 
as adults) rather than activities that are necessarily worthwhile in themselves – 
though of course the former does not preclude the latter. We might therefore be more 
concerned to cultivate the widest possible range of moral and intellectual virtues 
(and put a premium on those activities that best meet this requirement) than to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
think, arise from the engagement in practices, because to engage in a practice necessarily entails 
‘specialised study’ – except that the verbal capacity to reason well is less likely to be developed in 




cultivate the good of a certain kind of life in the sense of providing a vocation – 
though, again, vocational aims are not precluded by educational aims. We might also 
be concerned to encourage engagement in activities that, after a period of 
apprenticeship, give the greatest scope for the exercise of responsibility, 
discrimination, judgement and imagination. None of these considerations would 
apply if the aim were simply to provide vocational training
20
. Nevertheless, practices 
as MacIntyre conceives them – and occupational vocations often are good examples 
of practices (and might well fulfil all the desirable criteria I have just specified) - 
possess many characteristics that would mark them as educationally worthwhile. 
They certainly possess intrinsic value (i.e. they are worth engaging in for their own 
sake); they cultivate particular modes of understanding, perception, reasoning, 
analysis, imagination and judgement; they involve the disciplined acquisition of a 
body of knowledge and skill, whether practical or theoretical; and they cultivate a 
range of virtues. The problem is that a very wide range of activities can count as 
practices. Are football, chess, farming, physics and literature (all of which MacIntyre 
counts as practices) equally suited to specialised study as part of the school 
curriculum? Do they have equal educational value? Some of the selection criteria I 
have just detailed might need to be brought into play here.  
 
In Ethics and Education (1970), Richard Peters sought to answer the problem of 
curriculum selection by drawing a sharp distinction between worthwhile activities 
and the ‘serious pursuits’ he judged suitable for incorporation into the school 
curriculum. Worthwhile activities, which are roughly analogous to MacIntyre’s 
practices, are defined as those activities pursued for the sake of ends intrinsic to 
them; whereas serious pursuits, in addition to possessing intrinsic value, have ‘a 
wide-ranging cognitive content’, ‘illuminate other areas of life and contribute much 
to the quality of living’ (Peters, 1970, p. 159), and ‘thus insensibly change a man’s 
view of the world’ (p. 160). This leads Peters to agree with Hirst that academic 
subject disciplines – subjects involving ‘science, history, literary appreciation, 
philosophy and other such cultural activities’ - are of the greatest educational value 
and should constitute the school curriculum.  But though literature clearly 
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illuminates many areas of life (because in a sense its subject matter is life itself), is 
this true of, say, mathematics or physics? And can’t the disciplined study of a craft 
or engagement in a trade or profession (say farming), which does not have ‘a wide-
ranging cognitive content’, nevertheless ‘change a man’s view of the world’ in a 
variety of ways, even if these are not always articulated? Are certain moral and 
intellectual virtues not equally well, or even better, fostered through the engagement 
in practical activities? Peters and Hirst seem here almost exclusively concerned with 
the life of the mind as if the only life worth living is that of the philosopher, 
academic or researcher. The ordinary life, the ‘unexamined’ life, seems to be of very 
limited value – a view I argued against in Chapter 4.  
 
However, I think Peters is much more interesting when he departs from Hirst to 
consider the educational value of absorbing and worthwhile pursuits that have 
‘limited cognitive content’ but may hold great interest (particularly though not 
necessarily only) to pupils ‘who are ... not very interested in the more theoretical 
types of pursuit’ (p. 176). Likewise, he notes, ‘more intelligent children’ should not 
be excluded from such practical activities (p. 177). For example, Peters writes of 
cooking that  
 
... it can be delighted in for the opportunities for skill and ingenuity which it 
affords ... It will, of course, be enhanced as an art if understanding develops 
about its underlying principles and if it is not just conducted on a rule of 
thumb basis. But in so far as it tends to become pursued for its own sake, for 
the values intrinsic to it, rather than purely instrumentally, it can come to 
contribute substantially to a quality of living. (Peters, 1970, p. 177)   
 
He goes on to qualify his earlier argument concerning the educational value of 
serious (i.e. academic) pursuits: 
 
It was argued in the first part of this book that ‘education’ implies both 
cognitive content and the disinterested pursuit of what is worthwhile. If 
activities such as cooking come to be practised in such a way that they satisfy 




despised on that account. But if [the cognitive perspective] cannot be 
[developed] in the case of some children, that is no reason for concluding that 
such activities have no educational value. (p. 177) 
 
I would simply take the argument one step further and argue that since the good life 
need not centre on ‘the examined life’ or ‘the life of the mind’ (the argument I 
proposed in Chapter 4), educational activities need not possess ‘a wide-ranging 
cognitive content’.  However, I think Peters’ suggestion that practical centres of 
interest might serve as the starting point for explorations of the relevant history and 
literature (i.e. for study that is more ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual’ in nature, though not 
necessarily highly theoretical) is very interesting: 
 
It may be that a boat is an exciting centre of interest that will provide an 
incentive for sustained effort. But the effort need not be directed simply 
toward building better and better boats. It can also be directed outwards 
towards history ... towards literature and poetry which abound with tales of 
boats, and to elementary science which provides theories about the tides, 
winds, and oceans which constitute the relevant environment. (p. 178) 
 
The danger of a topic centred or integrated theme approach is that because it is 
not centred on a recognised subject (or practice), it may lack rigour or ‘real academic 
discipline’; that, at worst, it may degenerate into ‘a pot-pourri of trivia’ chosen 
because of its supposed interest to the young (Shipman, 1971, p. 103).  I think it is 
important therefore to draw a sharp distinction between ‘general knowledge’ and 
‘specialist knowledge’, both of which have educational value, but which serve 
conceptually quite distinct educational ends or aims. General knowledge 
encompasses subject knowledge at an introductory and largely descriptive level and 
might well be organised by cross-curricular theme or topic to make it interesting 
and/or relevant to the pupil. As well as serving to introduce subjects that might later 
be specialised in as part of higher education or be specialised in as part of general 
secondary education, it forms (I shall argue in the next chapter) a vital part of 
rhetorical training – of liberal education conceived in the spirit of the rhetorical ideal. 




disciplines, but as funds of stories of human experience. In fact, I shall argue that 
rhetoric can provide the conceptual frame that integrates and unifies the ‘general 
knowledge’ curriculum. Specialist study, on the other hand, cultivates a range of 
virtues and goods, not because of its subject matter, but on account of the process by 
which a complex body of knowledge and skill is mastered. Is the topic of ‘boats’, 
then, an example of a general knowledge topic or a specialist subject? The answer is 
‘both’. In so far as boats are ‘a centre of interest’, we are speaking of general 
knowledge. However, the craft of boat-building and the art of sailing (for example) 
are specialist practical subjects with the characteristics of practices. Of course, the 
study of a general knowledge topic may provoke an interest in the study of a related 
specialist subject; they may complement each other. But educationally, they serve 
quite different ends.  
 
In An Aims-based Curriculum (2013), Michael Reiss and John White argue that 
central to school education should be the pupil’s ‘wholehearted and successful 
engagement’ in intrinsically worthwhile activities. Since the sense of ‘personal 
fulfilment’ essential for a flourishing life arises out of ‘wholeheartedness of 
involvement’ in intrinsically worthwhile activities in later life (Reiss & White, 2013, 
pp. 14-15), it makes sense that pupils experience this sense of engagement by way of 
preparation. Reiss and White spread the net wider than MacIntyre and incorporate 
any activities that can be engaged in wholeheartedly and with utter absorption – 
hence, cookery, pigeon racing, physical exercise, travel and writing novels are all 
cited. But though there should be an element of choice, there is a case for making 
compulsory those worthwhile activities that (1) are less likely to be engaged in 
outside school – for example, a foreign language and religious belief (including 
atheism); and (2) are judged beneficial for every student’s flourishing in later life – 
for example, literature, basic mathematics, the non-literary arts, aspects of history 
and a wide range of ‘background’ knowledge in the physical and social sciences. 
Some subjects might be introduced as ‘taster courses’ leaving further study optional. 
But it is crucial, argue Reiss and White, that for at least some of the time students are 
able to choose to engage in the activities that are most likely to give them the 
experience of wholehearted involvement, whether it is ‘gardening, studying 




of science, engineering, literature, or art and design’ (p. 19). The obvious question 
here, I think, is do activities have educational value merely on account of their being 
absorbing? An activity might be absorbing but lack the characteristics of a practice – 
that is, lack the complex body of knowledge and skill whose mastery both requires 
and cultivates a range of moral and intellectual virtues.    
 
What can we learn from these varying perspectives on educationally worthwhile 
activities? There are, I think, three things. First, that an educationally worthwhile 
activity has something of the nature of a practice and involves an extended period of 
apprenticeship (hence the need for specialisation); second, that it must (as I noted 
above) involve the disciplined acquisition of a body of knowledge and skill 
involving concepts and procedures of some complexity, and requiring the exercise of 
judgement, discrimination and imagination; and third, that for the benefits or goods 
to accrue, the pupil or student must have the capacity, aptitude, interest and 
motivation to engage in the practice – and that they must therefore be allowed to 
choose the activity to be pursued. The second criterion would seem to count against 
the inclusion of sports and games, but not rule them out altogether. Clearly sports 
and games involve judgement in game situations, but there is little in the way of 
conceptual or relational knowledge, and the procedures and skills involved tend to be 
mechanical ones requiring a vast amount of repetitive practice or ‘drill’ in order to 
perfect. An analogy might be drawn with music, but though the instrumental player 
needs to put in hours of practice, there is potentially vast conceptual complexity – 
technical, intellectual and imaginative - involved in composition, interpretation and 
performance. Similarly, the first criterion would seem to rule out the acquisition of 
general knowledge of a descriptive nature, valuable though this is in other respects. 
Though an integral part of education (particularly, as I shall argue, rhetorical 
education) and of subject knowledge in any field, the acquisition of general 
knowledge in a particular field does not, in itself, constitute initiation into a practice 
because it does not involve the acquisition of a complex body of knowledge and 
skill. So, to take an example from Reiss and White’s list, the study of transport 
systems would be a doubtful candidate for inclusion, unless informed by conceptual 
knowledge from other disciplines (history, economics and engineering, for example) 




Applying the criteria I have outlined, I think it is clear – and this is the crucial 
point - that practical as well as academic subjects can count as educationally 
worthwhile activities, and hence as subjects worthy of inclusion in the curriculum. 
The acquisition of a body of practical or craft knowledge and skill, though rooted in 
engagement with materials rather than abstract concepts and theories, involves the 
development of judgement, discrimination and imagination to a very high degree; 
and though concepts of an abstract theoretical nature might not be involved, 
relational knowledge – the understanding of how more concrete concepts relate to 
each other – certainly would be, and this knowledge might well be highly complex in 
nature
21
. Moreover, practical subjects are potentially accessible on grounds of 
aptitude, interest and motivation to a much wider range of pupils than the academic 
disciplines. As Richard Sennett argues, ‘nearly everyone can become a good 
craftsman’ because ‘the rhythm of routine in craftsmanship’ and  ‘the dialogue with 
materials’ have their root, not in abstract reasoning, but in experiences (he notes 
particularly the childhood experience of play) and sensations common to all people 
(Sennett, 2009, p. 268). Christopher Winch notes that though there is a tacit 
dimension to craft knowledge, so that one could never acquire it merely from the 
study of a textbook or manual, the exercise of a craft can be appraised and evaluated 
according to the established standards of a tradition involving a publicly constituted 
language; in fact, it is often appraised and evaluated according to a highly complex 
set of criteria involving a complex evaluative vocabulary. ‘Know-how’ (as craft 
knowledge might be termed) ‘occupies a conceptual space which is partially 
constituted by talk about the skill, including descriptions of it’ (Winch, 2013, p. 
286). The same could be said of the performing arts. Complex evaluative (though 
never exhaustive) vocabularies have arisen in art, music and dance precisely to try to 
do justice to the conceptually complex - though often tacit - nature of the subject 
matter.  
Would apprenticeship training on the Continental model fulfil these criteria? 
Provided that the process of initiation into the occupation in question fulfilled the 
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and justify an argument, because of the non-verbal nature of much of the subject matter. In this case, 
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However, I shall argue in the next chapter that the verbal capacity to reason well is best developed 




above criteria, I see no reason why not
22
. The important thing is that apprenticeship 
training is carried on alongside general education
23
 and that it is distinguished 
sharply from the sort of low-level task-based or ‘on the job’ training that has often 
characterised English training programmes – for example, National Vocational 
Qualifications (Wolf, 2002, p. 166). The success of the German system
24
 lies 
precisely in that upper-secondary general education continues in tandem with the 
apprenticeship (the ‘dual system’), and that apprentices are trained thoroughly by 
skilled masters ‘partly in workshops, classrooms or laboratories’ sponsored by 
employers over a three-year period, not just ‘on the job’ or for a few hours a week in 
a school workshop (pp. 162-3). It is also worth noting that there is no expectation 
that apprentices will stay in their apprenticeship trade. Though many will have 
gained a vocation, the value for others lies in the experience of mastering a skill or 
craft and of having been socialised into adult working life (p. 167). In fact, there is 
no reason that pupils should not specialise in a craft or an art form that probably will 
not provide them (or provide them directly) with a vocation so long as the above 
criteria are fulfilled; though, in practice, it is unlikely that pupils will take no account 
at all of possible future vocations, just as it is unlikely that a pupil’s passionate 
interest in a particular field will have no relevance at all to some future occupation.       
 
In summary, the educational value of the research ideal lies in the virtues that are 
cultivated as a result of the engagement in specialised study together with the 
experience of what it is to exercise judgement and discrimination in a particular field 
(because to be able to exercise judgement and discrimination in one field is to 
appreciate the value of knowledge generally). However, there is no particular need 
for specialised subject knowledge to be academic or theoretical in nature. For pupils 
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 Even Cyril Norwood, one of the great advocates of a liberal education,  concedes ‘I see no reason 
why, if the ideal of knowledge for its own sake is preserved, if the general culture of the boy is 
assured, his further studies should not have direct reference to the special occupation which he is 
afterwards going to take up. I do not see why these studies may not also be “liberalising”, capable of 
setting the mind free’ (Norwood, p. 90). As I have argued, I would interpret mental training and the 
desire for knowledge and truth in terms of the acquisition of various virtues (predominantly 
intellectual but also moral) and the associated goods rather than the intellectual’s quest for critical and 
rational justification, but I think Norwood is essentially right.  
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 I shall consider the nature of this general education in the next chapter in the context of the 
rhetorical ideal  
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 I refer here specifically to the German system, but vocational education on the apprenticeship 





not academically inclined – whether by aptitude, motivation or interest - there would 
therefore be no point engaging in specialised academic study. Wholehearted 
involvement and absorption are, as Reiss and White suspect, crucial to engagement 
in intrinsically worthwhile activity, so long as the activity fulfils the criteria I have 
outlined. The mind, then, is cultivated, not in the sense of producing a philosopher or 
academic or researcher motivated by the need to furnish explanatory theories and 
critical justifications, but in the specific sense of cultivating the moral and 
intellectual virtues necessary for the successful engagement in the practices of adult 
life – and hence for living a good life. It is in this sense that the research ideal has 




Serious confusion arises, however, when the benefits of specialised study are 
conceived, not as virtues constitutive of the internal goods of practices, but as means 
to the achievement of an epistemic end – namely ‘epistemic autonomy’; and when, 
to this end, a raft of conceptually quite distinct attributes or capacities (some of 
which I listed earlier) come to be conflated under the rubric of ‘intellectual virtues’. 
The project of ‘virtue epistemology’, increasingly influential in philosophy of 
education, amounts, in effect, to a new justification of liberal education – liberal in 
the research sense that though little attention is paid to its practical curriculum 
implications, the overall aim is epistemic. It counts the dispassionate pursuit of the 
truth, the cultivation of the intellectual virtues, and the development of mind as an 
end-in-itself as the highest aims of education. In other words, it makes Aristotle’s 
(mistaken) assumption that the contemplative life, the life of the philosopher or 
academic or intellectual, is the only one worth living. However, it also involves, I 
shall now argue, a series of profound and educationally damaging misconceptions.    
 
By relating the intellectual virtues to ‘a ‘love’ of epistemic goods’ (Baehr, 2013, 
p. 250) and hence to the pursuit of the truth, to ‘deep understanding’, ‘strong 
cognitive achievement’ (Kotzee, 2013, p. 165; Baehr, 2013, p. 251) and ‘epistemic 




virtues so conceived a central educational aim (perhaps even the overriding one), 
several related problems arise. First, education is reduced to the narrow pursuit of 
academic subject knowledge informed by the research ideal. Second, no account is 
taken of the possibility that people differ in their aptitudes, interests and motivations 
– including in their aptitude for academic study. Third, it is assumed that only the 
examined life – the life of the intellectual or philosopher – is worth living (an 
assumption I argued against in Chapter 4). And fourth, by emphasising cognitive 
agency at the expense of cognitive achievement (i.e. ‘deep understanding’ rather 
than mere subject knowledge), the central role of the disciplined acquisition of 
subject knowledge in cultivating the intellectual virtues, and the practicalities of 
pupils attaining the requisite subject knowledge, are not addressed; so, for example, 
Baehr outlines a range of classroom strategies for developing the intellectual virtues, 
but has nothing to say about how the ‘deep understanding’ of ‘epistemically worthy 
subject matters’ (Baehr, 2013, p. 251) he argues is necessary for developing these 
virtues is to be attained in practice at secondary level (the very problem I highlighted 
earlier in this chapter).   
 
In fact, the notion that intellectual virtues are means of achieving some putative 
epistemic ends (Baehr, 2013, p. 250) is, I think, fundamentally opposed to 
MacIntyre’s conception of a practice (a conception I have argued in this thesis is 
essentially the right one) according to which the goods internal to the practice, 
including certain virtues, are only revealed in the course of initiation into the 
practice. Moreover, by setting up the life of the intellectual (who seeks continually to 
rationally justify his beliefs and actions, possesses the whole gamut of intellectual 
virtues and an insatiable desire for knowledge) as an end in itself, as the epitome of 
the good life rather than recognising it as something sought after by a certain sort of 
person
25
 (as I proposed in Chapter 4), the more limited but realistic aim of 
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cultivating in the normal pupil (or person) some of the intellectual virtues to some 




I would like to focus on two particular misconceptions that I think underlie the 
virtue epistemology thesis. First, a false distinction between knowledge (factual, 
mechanical, passive) and understanding (conceptual, flexible, active) that has its 
roots, on the one hand, in a certain ‘progressive’ narrative of educational pedagogy, 
and on the other, in a longstanding bias against practical or craft activities; and 
second, the lumping together of a range of conceptually distinct qualities and 
attributes under the rubric ‘intellectual virtues’, and the consequent association of 
these qualities and attributes – apparently by little more than word association – with 
an intellectualised conception of the aim of education. I shall consider these in turn.    
 
Deep understanding, epistemic ends and craft knowledge 
 
First, proponents of virtue epistemology draw a sharp conceptual distinction 
between mere subject knowledge and the sort of deep knowledge or understanding 
sought (and acquired) by the person endowed with the intellectual or epistemic 
virtues. For Wayne Riggs, the latter derives from the epistemic trait of ‘searching for 
pattern and coherence in one’s experiences and beliefs’ (Riggs, 2007, p. 223), from 
truth-directed virtues ‘aimed at making sense of our world, or of some part of it in 
which we have a specific interest’ (p. 234). Duncan Pritchard distinguishes different 
grades of cognitive achievement ranging from ‘weak cognitive achievements’ that 
involve knowledge that is ‘merely acquired’ to ‘strong cognitive achievements’ that 
involve ‘cognitive agency’ and ‘cognitive autonomy’, and hence ‘understanding’, on 
the part of the pupil (Pritchard, 2013, pp. 239-242). The ultimate aim of education is, 
on this account, not ‘knowledge’ but ‘understanding’: 
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Rather than transmit information to passive minds, what serious education 
sets out to do is to enhance the cognitive agency of the child. (Kotzee, 2013, 
p. 165) 
 
But is this distinction warranted? Clearly the memorisation of times tables, for 
example, involves rote learning - the acquisition of information rather than 
knowledge - and does not in itself imply or involve any conceptual understanding of 
multiplication. But has anyone ever argued or supposed that the acquisition of 
knowledge, whether ‘actively’ acquired or ‘passively’ transmitted, could involve 
merely such rote learning? Is the distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ learning 
– the former associated with didactic ‘transmission’ and the latter with collaborative, 
investigative and discovery pedagogies – justified?  
 
The notion that knowledge is ‘actively constructed’ by the learner and that as a 
consequence, learning is only meaningful if conducted through a process of guided 
discovery is, on the face of it, an implausible one. As the cognitive psychologist 
David Ausubel argued back in the 1960s, ‘meaning can never be anything more than 
a personal phenomenological product that emerges when potentially meaningful 
ideas are integrated within an individually unique cognitive structure’ (Ausubel, 
1968, p. 475). Meaningful learning can just as well be produced by didactic 
exposition as by discovery or investigation. The active-passive distinction involves, 
on this account, a basic misconception. Besides, notes Ausubel, the notion ‘that 
every man must discover for himself every bit of knowledge … is, in essence, a 
repudiation of the very idea of culture’. The miracle of culture is precisely ‘that the 
accumulated discoveries of millennia can be transmitted to each succeeding 
generation … and need not be discovered anew by each generation’ (p. 475). 
 
At the very least, then, we must distinguish (meaningful) knowledge from 
information. But what of the distinction between knowledge and ‘deep’ 
understanding – is this valid? The problem is that virtue epistemologists distinguish 
understanding from knowledge on the grounds that the learner who attains the 
former is motivated by a love of epistemic goods, a quest for the truth (the sort of 




whereas the learner who attains ‘only’ the latter is not; which would seem to rule out 
altogether more prosaic ends such as gaining a vocation, mastering a craft or 
practice, and generally taking pride in doing a job well. But does it really make sense 
to characterise the knowledge of a person who has mastered the body of knowledge 
and skill needed for professional practice (for example, a doctor, nurse, engineer, 
lawyer, architect, dancer or builder) but has no particular inclination to engage in the 
quest for deeper truths, explanations, patterns or ‘coherence’ (i.e. who has not 
engaged ‘in research’) as, on this account, deficient in their cognitive agency – as 
deficient in the epistemic virtues? The absurdity of this position is epitomised by 
Riggs, who cites Aristotle, Newton, Galileo and Einstein as ‘such exemplars of 
epistemic virtue’ precisely because ‘they all directed their intellectual energies 
towards making sense of it all’, because they were the kind of people ‘who sincerely 
and conscientiously attempt to find out the truth …’ (Riggs, 2007, pp. 224-5). Is the 
aim of education really to make of each pupil an Aristotle or a Newton? And are 
Aristotle, Newton and the like the only exemplars of a fulfilled life?    
 
For those who are not motivated in the main by ‘pure intellectual curiosity’ (p. 
223) and feel no need to philosophise, but rather find meaning and fulfilment in 
work, in recreation and in their social engagement with others (which includes most 
people, including many who are highly intelligent in the academic sense), it makes 
little sense to speak of epistemic ends. A more fruitful approach, I think, is to adopt 
the analogy of the craftsman motivated by the desire to do a job well for its own sake 
and to realise the goods of a practice. The most illuminating account of the practice 
of the craftsman in this regard is Richard Sennett’s in The Craftsman (2009). I noted 
earlier (citing Christopher Winch) that craft knowledge or know-how, though often 
tacit in nature, can nevertheless be conceptually highly complex and might well 
involve the exercise of judgement, discrimination and imagination to a high degree. 
Sennett takes the argument a step further by elaborating a philosophical and 
epistemological justification of craft practice, not merely as a vocational necessity (a 
means, regrettably necessary, of earning a living), but as an end in itself, a mode of 
living and engaging with the world
27
. For Sennett, the central distinguishing feature 
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of craft practice as opposed to intellectual endeavour is ‘a dialogue between concrete 
practices and thinking’ mediated by ‘sustaining habits’ that ‘establish a rhythm 
between problem solving and problem finding’ (p. 9), and involving ‘a constant 
interplay between tacit knowledge and self-conscious awareness’ (p. 50). In fact, any 
practice might be seen to involve this central distinguishing feature of the craft 
workshop: 
 
… the absorption into tacit knowledge , unspoken and uncodified in words, 
that occurred there and became a matter of habit, the thousand little everyday 
moves that add up in sum to a practice. (p. 77) 
 
It is not a weakness of craft practice that it involves tacit knowledge (knowledge 
that cannot (fully) be codified or verbalised), that it involves trial and error, or that it 
begins with the concrete and the particular; rather, this is its strength. By contrast, to 
be motivated by an epistemic end would involve the attempt to conceive in advance 
a rational solution, to construct a theory or model that would explain the empirical 
facts and serve as a comprehensive plan or ‘blueprint’ for action. The dangers of a 
‘disconnection between head and hand’ are, however, all too obvious, whether they 
take the form of utopian planning, computerised design
28
 or the bureaucratic attempt 
to impose on practices (teaching and nursing are good examples) managerial 
solutions that identify optimal outcomes, best practice procedures and targets in 
detachment from the day-to-day experience and judgement of individual 
practitioners. Even though quantifiable gains in efficiency are possible, there are 
potentially appalling costs – as, for example, when health care is modelled on a 
system originally devised by Henry Ford for maximising the production of auto parts 
(p. 47). Both the quality of the service or product and the motivation of the 
practitioner (no longer an autonomous professional or master of his craft, but a 




                                                          
28
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respect. However exhaustive the specifications, it can never fully replicate the lived experience, the 
situational perspective of the person ‘on the ground’ (pp. 39-45). 
29
 In his paper ‘Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge’, Duncan Pritchard agrees 




The intellectual virtues misconceived 
 
The second misconception that, I think, underlies the virtue epistemology thesis 
lies in its conjoining a range of conceptually distinct qualities, attributes and 
capacities under the rubric ‘intellectual virtues’. In modern virtue epistemology, the 
intellectual virtues are the ‘dispositional properties of persons that bear on the 
acquisition, maintenance, transmission, or application of knowledge and allied 
epistemic goods such as truth, justification, warrant, coherence and interpretative 
fineness’ (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p. 257). The fact that some of these virtues ‘tend 
to the moral’ and could just as well be accounted moral virtues, is judged, rightly, I 
think, to be of subsidiary interest; the important thing, from the perspective of virtue 
epistemology, is that they make people ‘better or worse epistemic agents’. Yet it is 
curious that though a great deal of literature has emerged in virtue epistemology 
concerning such highly technical, even esoteric, matters as the nature and value of 
knowledge, the difference between true belief and knowledge, the relative merits of 
internalism, externalism and agent reliabilism, the nature of virtuous motivation, and 
the regulative role of the virtues, hardly any thought has been given to the nature of 
the virtues themselves
30
. Hardly any thought has been given to whether a long list of 
qualities, attributes and capacities – including such nebulous ones as curiosity, open-
mindedness, creativity and autonomy – can usefully be lumped together and 
designated ‘the intellectual virtues’, or indeed to whether the cultivation of these 
‘virtues’ in the name of attaining some epistemic end should be, or could ever 
practicably be, the prime aim of education.   
 
Proponents of virtue epistemology usually include at some point in their writings 
a list of the intellectual (or epistemic or cognitive) virtues – for example, curiosity, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
precisely this tacit knowledge, a sensitivity ‘to the concrete facts of the situation’ and a repertoire of 
‘rough-and-ready rules of thumb’ drawn from years of experience (Pritchard, 2005, pp. 236-7); and he 
cites empirical evidence concerning the diagnostic strategies employed by medical practitioners. But 
his conclusion is only the limited one that virtue epistemology should be conceived as a form of 
‘reliabilism’ and hence ‘epistemic externalism’ – not as a form of ‘epistemic internalism’; in other 
words, that the epistemic goal of forming true beliefs need not involve the subject’s validation of his 
judgements through rational reflection. I would draw a more radical conclusion – namely that it 
makes no sense in these circumstances to speak of epistemic ends or goals at all. 
30
 As Linda Zagzebski and Michael DePaul note, virtue epistemologists ‘have not gone very far in 




open-mindedness, creativity, reflectiveness, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, 
intellectual courage, intellectual rigour, and intellectual honesty,’ (Baehr, 2013, pp. 
248 & 258); or intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, humility, courage, trust, 
autonomy, and fairness (Zagzebski & DePaul, 2007, p. 3). But two things seem to be 
neglected. First, that the qualities or attributes cited are conceptually quite distinct 
(or that, at the very least, they stand in need of careful definition before any use 
could be made of them) and therefore cannot be conflated under a general heading; 
and second, that the capacity of a person to develop any particular ‘virtue’ depends 
on a complex range of factors: the nature of the subject being studied or activity 
undertaken, the depth of study, and the aptitude, interest, motivation, personality and 
circumstances of the person in question.  
 
Let us first attempt to categorise the intellectual virtues cited above according to 
their familial likeness as descriptors of certain qualities or attributes.  
 
First, there is curiosity. Here, I think, two distinct senses of the term need to be 
identified. On the one hand, there is the straightforward everyday sense of having an 
interest in or a passion for a particular subject. On the other, there is curiosity in the 
sense of possessing the intellectual desire to explain, to question, to criticise, to 
reflect on the significance of the facts, to generalise and formulate hypotheses, and to 
engage in ‘research’ – in other words, intellectual curiosity. This in turn demands the 
capacity to be able to engage in abstract reasoning, in theorising (i.e. it requires a 
certain level of ‘intelligence’) together with the sort of personality (introverted, 
perhaps) that would dispose or motivate a person to engage in solitary intellectual 
endeavour to begin with. This second sense of curiosity is, I think, clearly distinct 
from the first. The problem is that curiosity in this second sense tends to be used by 
virtue epistemologists in a more general overarching sense as a quality that all ought 
to possess or would possess if only properly educated – i.e. as a quality whose 
deficiency would mark a person as falling short of an ideal – rather than as 
something that merely characterises the state of mind and personality of a certain 
sort of person … namely, the intellectual or scholar. This assertion will be regarded 
as contentious by some philosophers of education and as being contrary to 




teachers. My experience and the experience of my colleagues over 20 years is that 
intellectual curiosity, the desire to pursue the truth for its own sake (as opposed to 




Second, there is ‘creativity’. Creativity is often cited in lists of the intellectual 
virtues but clearly is not limited to intellectual or cognitive endeavour but can be 
manifested in a range of artistic, practical and craft activities, in business innovation 
- indeed in any activity involving management, planning or design. Therefore 
creativity, along with its close relations ‘innovation’ and ‘problem solving’, need not 
necessarily be conceived as serving (or as being motivated by) epistemic ends. To be 
intellectually creative, on the other hand, probably does involve epistemic ends – but 
then one would probably not be intellectually creative unless one were not also 
intellectually curious.  
 
Third, there is a range of character traits relating to a person’s capacity to engage 
in work: industry, application, perseverance, concentration, attention, care, accuracy, 
exactness and so forth. But these can just as well be cultivated through practical or 
craft activity as through academic endeavour. The same applies to a range of moral 
traits, or traits tending towards the moral, that also serve ‘epistemic ends’: courage, 
honesty, temperance, patience, humility, integrity, open-mindedness, tolerance and 
so forth.  All of these can just as well be cultivated (to a lesser or greater degree) 
through practical or craft activity, or through vocational endeavour, and therefore 
need not be regarded as serving epistemic ends.  
 
Surveying this classification of the virtues, a clear distinction emerges, I think, 
between the qualities or attributes of character that can be cultivated by all people; 
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 In independent schools, this is recognised, indeed institutionalised, in the form of ‘scholarship’, the 
notion that a small select group of pupils - ‘scholars’ - are suited by aptitude, interest and motivation 
to the pursuit of a significantly more advanced and intellectually demanding programme of study than 
is the norm. The scholar is typically the pupil who will stay behind at the end of the lesson to ask 
questions, take the discussion further or propose his or her own theories and hypotheses – i.e. who 
possesses intellectual curiosity to a high degree. Though scholars will invariably possess high 
academic ability, the mere possession of academic ability (or ‘intelligence’) does not make a pupil a 





and the specifically intellectual qualities or attributes that will be cultivated by the 
relatively few and that are in large measure innate – innate in the sense that they are 
determined by the individual’s aptitude, motivation, interest, personality and 
circumstances. Though there is no doubt an innate element in the traits of character 
listed (characteristics that are sometimes apparent from an early age and are 
apparently unrelated to background or upbringing), they can probably be habituated 
to a considerable degree in most people - even though there will always probably be 
individual differences. And this task is all the easier in that they can be cultivated 
through a variety of activities and engagements, practical as well as academic. 
These, I would argue, are the qualities or attributes properly designated virtues. And 
it is precisely because these desirable dispositions or virtues can be habituated (or 
cultivated or fostered), as Aristotle envisaged, that there is no necessary connection 
with epistemic ends or with ‘a love of epistemic goods’ (Baehr, 2013, p. 248).   
 
Much the same applies to creativity. Though people differ in their innate 
capacity to come up with ideas, to solve problems, to innovate or to formulate new 
theories (not everyone is an Einstein
32
), creative thinking and problem solving can be 
carried on in a vast range of practices, activities and engagements, at all sorts of 
different levels, and in relation to all sorts of problem, practical and theoretical. 
Moreover, in the practice of craft activity, there is no strict demarcation between 
creative endeavour and the routine exercise of skills. To have mastered a craft is to 
be engaged in a continual process of problem solving and problem finding, as 
Sennett has pointed out: it is simply that the engagement involves knowledge that is 
tacit rather than explicitly formulated in abstract theoretical terms. 
 
In summary, the project of virtue epistemology, by designating a range of 
desirable dispositions, attributes and qualities ‘intellectual virtues’ and then 
conceiving these as serving specifically epistemic ends, serves - in effect - only to 
justify an academic ‘intellectualist’ conception of liberal education. Whereas, as I 
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 Even if one were to subscribe to the ‘ten-thousand hour rule’ – the notion that genius is a myth and 
that outstanding performance and achievement in any field are the result of some ten thousand hours 
of concentrated purposeful practice (Syed, 2001) – there is still the possibility that people differ in 
their capacity and motivation to undertake ten thousand hours of practice. All we have done (it could 
be argued) is to redefine genius, or exceptional talent, as the innate capacity to engage in ten thousand 




have repeatedly argued through this chapter and thesis (particularly in Chapter 3), 
not everyone has the mix of aptitude, personality, interest and motivation necessary 
to engage in academic study to a high level; and even if we did suppose equality of 
academic aptitude or capability on egalitarian grounds, there is no need to engage in 
academic study in order to develop the virtues necessary to lead a fulfilled life and to 




Though the research ideal has merit for the small minority of pupils with the 
aptitude and inclination for sustained academic study culminating in higher-level 
study or research (i.e. for those for whom the pursuit of knowledge and truth as an 
end-in-itself can serve as a motivating ideal), a host of wider educational benefits in 
the form of intellectual virtues and associated goods can be gained by all pupils from 
the engagement in specialised study, academic or practical. This engagement need 
have little to do with the cultivation of the mind in an intellectualist sense, or the 
pursuit of ‘epistemic goods’, but rather is motivated by the desire to access the goods 
of a practice and gain the sense of justified self-esteem and self-respect that 
accompanies mastery of that practice. There is therefore a powerful argument for 
pupils being allowed to specialise early in at least one subject of their choice at 
secondary school and pursue that subject to a higher level than would normally be 
the case. A range of intellectual virtues can be developed and the mind can, in this 
sense, be trained – so long as the subject or activity in question has something of the 
nature of a practice, its study involves the disciplined acquisition of a conceptually 
and procedurally complex body of knowledge and skill, and the pupil or student has 
the interest and motivation to ‘engage wholeheartedly’ in it.  
 
Though the existing secondary curriculum of academic subject disciplines has 
preparatory value for those going on to specialise in one or more of those disciplines, 
the notion that it constitutes a complete liberal education in itself by virtue of its 
cultivating the mind in various forms of knowledge (a variant on the research ideal) 




be required for anything like an understanding of the respective forms of knowledge 
to be developed; and one could not in any case specialise to the required level in all 
the subject disciplines.   
 
However, there remain important educational aims that cannot be developed 
merely through specialist study (whether or not it is motivated by the research ideal, 
unless it takes the form of a study of the humanities undertaken in a humanistic 
spirit. By contrast, the old liberal education founded on grammar and rhetoric, and 
drawing on the humanities for stories of human experience, as well as a range of 
topical general knowledge, simultaneously aimed (1) to cultivate in a moral and 
cultural inheritance, and (2) to cultivate the capacity – at once verbal, humane and 
moral – of being able to reason well, structure an argument and form a wise 
judgement (Aristotle’s architectonic virtue ‘phronesis’) on matters concerning 
human and political affairs. I turn to the rhetorical ideal of liberal education in the 





The rhetorical ideal: a justification of rhetoric and the 
humanities 
 
I argued in Chapter 4 that central to a fulfilled life are the goods that are realised 
through the engagement in practices – in particular, the good of leading a certain 
kind of life and the good of leading a virtuous life. In the last chapter, I argued that 
liberal education conceived in the spirit of the research ideal (i.e. as a sort of mental 
training) had value if this mental training was conceived in terms of cultivating the 
intellectual virtues necessary for the engagement in practices, something best 
effected through the specialised study at school of at least one subject - a study that 
would itself represent an initiation into a practice. Various moral virtues would also 
be cultivated to some degree.  
 
However, though pupils would thereby be well prepared to engage in practices 
as adults, and to realise the goods associated with them, to lead a virtuous life 
requires more than just the habituation of the virtues (which I take to incorporate 
habit formation, moral instruction and guided experience - initially as part of 
upbringing and school education, and later through the engagement in various 
practices as an adult). To lead a virtuous life requires practical judgement in the 
exercise of the virtues, not only within the frame of practices, but also concerning 
one’s personal life and the political life of the community, where there will 
frequently be conflicting goods to reconcile. The problem, as I noted in Chapter 2, is 
that people cannot be trained to resolve the moral conflicts and dilemmas that life 
will ‘throw’ at them, particularly when, as MacIntyre reminds us, it is in the very 
nature of heterogeneous goods that they admit of no rational or ‘optimal’ solution to 
conflicts between them. One can only fall back on the virtues and such experience as 
one has been able to muster; and though a prior habituation in the virtues involves 
‘guided experience’ in exercising practical judgement (at home, at school, and within 




or rehearsal for the conflicts and dilemmas of adult life - for balancing or reconciling 
the conflicting goods of different practices (for example, work and family life), and 
for balancing or reconciling duty, self-interest and the interests of others.  
 
It is here, however, that liberal education conceived in the rhetorical sense has its 
value. In the humanities, which form the subject matter of rhetoric, we have a 
compendium of stories of human experience that, though ‘second hand’, will shed 
some light on the nature of the moral conflicts and dilemmas (both public and 
private) that people have had to face or could conceivably face in their lives (both 
public and private), together with the conflicting nature of the goods they might 
strive for and the nature of the virtues they might exercise. And in the exercises of 
rhetoric training, we have practice - albeit vicarious - in articulating these goods and 
exercising practical judgement in a range of complex situations involving conflict 
between them. Rhetoric cannot produce in any developed sense the capacity to 
resolve moral conflict, to lead a good life, or to exercise ethical perception, but it can 
certainly enhance our capacity to make good judgements and lead good lives. A sort 
of phronesis might then be cultivated.  
 
We saw in Chapter 5 that the rhetorical (or artes liberales ) ideal could be 
identified as having characteristics ranging from the provision of a canon of 
exemplary texts and a dogmatist epistemology to the prescription of civic values and 
the training of a political elite; but I shall argue in this chapter that if the aim of 
rhetorical education were encapsulated in a single idea, it would be to cultivate the 
capacity to make political judgements; indeed, if political is interpreted in a broad 
sense, it would be to cultivate the capacity to make practical judgements on human 
affairs, both public and private. As a consequence, the structure and content of the 
curriculum will be radically different from that of the modern liberal curriculum of 
academic subject disciplines.  
 
The best historical exemplar of liberal education conceived in the rhetorical ideal 
is not the so-called classical humanist curriculum of the nineteenth-century (which is 




education), nor even the humanist curriculum on which the Renaissance was founded 
and which saw Shakespeare educated at his Elizabethan grammar school, but the 
curriculum of ancient Rome. Apart from being worked out, as we shall see, in 
remarkable pedagogical detail, the Roman curriculum was the only one informed 
consistently throughout by the overriding aim of producing a citizen and an orator, a 
person who could make practical judgements on human affairs. It is also significant 
that whereas curricula of subsequent periods were dominated by the perceived need 
to effect a training in the ‘classical’ languages (to some extent in Greek but primarily 
in Latin), in the Roman curriculum rhetoric was studied in the vernacular, because, 
of course, Latin was the language of everyday life.
1
 In this chapter I shall describe 
the Roman curriculum and show how it differs markedly from the modern academic 
curriculum in its subject matter, in its manner of treatment of this subject matter and 
in its concern with means of expression. I shall argue in the process that the 
systematic study of grammar and rhetoric (conceived in the modern sense of prose 
rather than oratory) might form the core of a curriculum that aims to cultivate, or at 
least to improve, the capacity to make practical judgements on human affairs. 
 
However, the rhetorical training of the Roman orator was a demanding one – 
probably at least as demanding academically as the specialised study of any of the 
modern academic subject disciplines. It might reasonably be argued that to foist a 
rhetorical training on all pupils would be as counterproductive as subjecting them all 
to the current academic curriculum; that not all pupils have the aptitude, interest or 
motivation to engage successfully in rhetorical training. I shall therefore seek to 
draw a distinction between rhetoric conceived as formal training for political life, 
which would involve deliberation on complex political matters (for example, through 
highly structured essays); and rhetoric conceived as initiation into a fund of stories of 
human experience, with emphasis on the issues of ordinary life as well as the major 
political issues of the day, and perhaps involving more informal approaches to 
discussion and debate alongside basic literacy conceived on the rhetorical model. By 
the same token, stories of human experience need not be mediated only through 
history and literature; popular media such as film and television would serve just as 
well.   
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The Roman curriculum 
  
The Roman curriculum had a clear aim - to produce an orator who could 
deliberate well and argue his case with eloquence; and it was accordingly structured 
around the core disciplines of grammar and rhetoric (with grammar studied 
preparatory to rhetoric). Literature, history and myth were all taught but they were 
integrated into the curriculum rather than taught as separate subject disciplines. Their 
value lay in their providing the subject matter - the stories of experience and moral 
exemplars - on which grammar and rhetoric could draw; and in the case of literature, 
in cultivating knowledge of certain canonical texts (with Homer and Virgil heading 
the list) and thereby developing the literary culture also thought essential for the 
complete orator.  
 
Moreover, this integrated curriculum was structured in remarkable detail
2
. 
Grammar centred on the pupil learning verse scansion, parsing (the analysis of 
sentences into their component parts involving recognition of the eight parts of 
speech, declension of noun cases and conjugation of verb tenses) and the correct use 
of speech (divided into faults in the use of single words - or ‘barbarisms’, and faults 
in syntax - or ‘solecisms’) with reference to the usage of educated speakers and to 
literary authority.  The grammar stage also involved the study of the poets: reading 
aloud, memorising, and commentary both on their subject matter (including on any 
moral to be drawn) and their literary style. Literary analysis and criticism involved, 
in turn, a systematic study of poetic devices (most notably of tropes and figures
3
); of 
allusions (particularly to mythology but also to legend, historical figures, customs 
and geographical locations); etymology; arrangement or structure; and propriety - the 
sense of appropriateness to the character or occasion. 
  
Rhetoric, which followed grammar, centred on a carefully graded series of 
preliminary exercises in composition, or progymnasmata, that began with maxims 
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 I draw particularly in this section on Stanley Bonner’s Education in Ancient Rome (1977), which is 
probably the definitive account of the Roman curriculum. 
3
 Tropes included metaphor, metonymy, antonomasia, synecdoche, onomatopoeia, periphrasis, 




and fables and culminated in the thesis (in which the pupil had to argue both sides of 
a question) and the ‘Praise and Denunciation of Laws’ (in which the pupil had to 
offer reasoned advice on the merits and demerits of an imaginary piece of new 
legislation) (Bonner, 1977, p.272). The exercises began with instructive sayings, 
maxims, fables and mythological narratives, which pupils had to reproduce in their 
own words, explain in short essays or argue for or against with regard to their 
plausibility. There followed commonplaces, panegyrics and invectives, speeches in 
character, descriptions and comparisons. Last came theses, the discussion of laws, 
the suasoria (in which the student was required to offer advice to a famous historical 
figure or body of people facing a critical situation or dilemma) and the controversia 
(in which a particular legal or criminal case was examined and the course of action 
of the accused was either defended or denounced). In the suasoria, any proposed 
course of action had to be shown to be lawful, honourable, just, and necessary, as 
well as clear, consistent and enforceable. Deliberative themes ranged from the 
political, historical and speculative to the ethical and practical everyday – for 
example, ‘should one marry?’, ‘should one have children?’, should one take to 
seafaring?’, ‘should one engage in politics?’, ‘does the soldier deserve more credit 
than the lawyer?’, and ‘do the gods care for humanity?’ (p. 271). 
 
Taken together, these exercises ‘accustomed boys to précis or to elaborate and 
expand, to tell a story vividly and convincingly, to use their imaginations, to improve 
their style and composition, and to argue for and against a proposition’ (p.331). In 
other words, they learned how to deliberate well and to arrive at a practical 
judgement taking into account all relevant considerations. At the same time, they 
developed a considerable literary culture and underwent a considerable moral 
training, which began with the copying and learning by heart of moral maxims at 








The characteristic features of a rhetorical education 
  
I would like now to argue that the Roman rhetorical curriculum differs in 
structure and content from the modern curriculum of academic subject disciplines in 
three crucial respects: in its subject matter, in its manner of treatment of this subject 
matter and in its concern with the means of expression of this subject matter. In 
elaborating these differences, I shall seek to justify training in the disciplines of 
grammar and rhetoric as the better means of developing practical reason and 
practical judgement.  
  
(1) Subject matter 
 
First, the subject matter of rhetorical education is drawn from the humanities 
rather than the sciences - and from the humanities treated in a particular way: not 
primarily as disciplines worthy of study because of the forms of knowledge they 
reveal, or as means of pursuing knowledge and truth for its own sake, or even as 
means of training the mind, but as repositories of stories and lessons of human 
experience. The old humanities are the subjects that, by their very nature and subject 
matter, have the potential to cultivate and to humanise – to ‘form a person’. They 
develop knowledge and understanding of the human world and of the human 
condition: not the human as biologically and socially evolved animal subject to the 
laws of evolution or psycho-social behaviour or economics (and therefore amenable 
to scientific explanation), but the human as person whose moral, intellectual, 
aesthetic and spiritual values are transmitted via a cultural inheritance. And it is 
history and literature above all that distil this human experience
4
, that together with 
our lived experience provide the bedrock of knowledge and values on which we 
might form a practical judgement on humane and political matters.
5
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 Though I am focusing here on history and literature, primarily because they are recognised school 
subjects, the humanities have traditionally also incorporated law, theology, politics, ethics and 
metaphysics. It might be noted here that law, especially Common Law, stands as the supreme 
example of knowledge justified by precedent – as opposed to knowledge deduced from theoretical 
principles, axioms and causal laws.   
5
 The notion that education involves initiation into a moral and cultural inheritance is perhaps most 




 Consider how English and history differ from the other subjects of the modern 
academic curriculum in their subject matter and its manner of treatment. Despite 
their being taught as subject disciplines rather than as core elements of an integrated 
curriculum (as they would have been in the old liberal curriculum), the core subject 
matter remains stories of human experience that are potentially relevant to all pupils 
regardless of their capacity for literary criticism or historical research; and whether 
these stories are real (as in history) or imaginatively conceived (as in literature or 
film), they offer the possibility of deepening our knowledge and understanding of the 
human condition, as well as extending the range of our moral imagination and 
sympathy. For example, it is usual in GCSE English to study a work of American 
literature that deals with the issue of race prejudice - Harper Lee’s To Kill a 
Mockingbird, Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Hucklebery Finn and Alice Walker’s 
The Color Purple are good examples. But there is no need for pupils to have a 
literary sensibility to be able to appreciate the human drama and moral and political 
message that is conveyed in these works, even though the message is the more 
powerful for having been conveyed in a classic work of literature - in the case of 
Huckleberry Finn, in one of the greatest of all works of American literature
6
. 
Likewise, there is no more powerful means of conveying the horror of Nazi 
Germany and the Holocaust to children than through the story and diaries of Anne 
Frank
7
. The humanities can humanise precisely because they are centred on such 
stories of human experience. The human drama is centre stage.   
  
Martha Nussbaum draws attention to the particular role of literature in showing 
us that human nature is irredeemably flawed (and we are flawed), that our loves and 
commitments are tangled, and that our values are often in conflict – even in ‘tragic 
tension’. By doing so, literature has the power to make us more tolerant and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘liberal learning’ seems to incorporate both the rhetorical and the research ideals of liberal education 
that I have sought to distinguish between in this thesis; and it regards liberal education as a process in 
which school is very much preparatory to specialised academic study at university for the minority of 
pupils who have the capacity to benefit from it.  I have therefore not invoked Oakeshott as much as I 
otherwise might have done in the course of this thesis.  
6
 Personally, I never really ‘got the point’ of Great Expectations, Julius Caesar or the short stories of 
D. H. Lawrence at school and so studying them was a chore. I lacked the literary sensibility and the 
emotional maturity. But Huckleberry Finn left an indelible mark and there are scenes (for example, 
the cruel ‘tarring and feathering’ of the King and the Duke) that remain vivid and affecting. 
7 I once devoted a Year 6 history lesson to the story of Anne Frank and read several passages at 
length from her diary. One girl went home that evening (I heard the next morning from her mother) 
and demanded a plane ticket so that she could fly to Amsterdam and see the house where Anne Frank 




understanding: ‘Knowledge of difficulty breeds a tenderness to the flawed object, 
toward also oneself, seen as flawed’ (Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 212-3). But the 
adventures of virtuous heroes engaged on quests, which are often of a spiritual 
nature, are of equal value. As John Buchan argued in his essay ‘The Novel and the 
Fairy Tale’, the classic novel will endure as great literature because, like the folk 
tale, legend and fairy tale, it deals in enduring themes of human experience and 
human longing; because it shows us that despite ‘the stubborn brutality of things’, 
human nature can transcend itself and there is reason, after all, to be optimistic 
(Buchan, 1939). And Roger Marples argues that the moral value of literature lies in 
its enhancing ‘the ability to empathise with another’s predicament’, something it 
achieves through ‘our imaginative engagement with fictitious characters’ whose 
circumstances might be quite different from our own.  In this way, art in general and 
literature in particular can contribute ‘to our capacity for both sensitive perception 
and response to the particular circumstances and predicaments with which we all 
have to contend’ (Marples, 2014).  
 
The role of history in a rhetorical education is just as central. In fact, there is a 
striking similarity between the methods of rhetoric and those of history. The 
rhetorical stages of inventio and dispositio involve respectively the identification or 
discovery of arguments that will render one’s case plausible and persuasive, and the 
logical arrangement of those arguments. The historical method
8
 involves the attempt 
to reconstruct (necessarily ex post facto) why people behaved as they did in the past 
(assuming their actions to be rationally motivated), and to construct a plausible 
narrative framework to explain past events. Both involve the construction of a 
plausible argument through the selection of evidence judged relevant to the case; and 
it is in this, above all, that they stand in marked contrast to the scientific method. In 
order to craft a narrative, a judgement has to be made as to which facts or factors are 
relevant to the question in hand and how the available evidence is to be interpreted, 
which inevitably involves value judgements, both moral and political, together with 
a degree of empathy on the part of both the historian and the orator. There are, 
moreover, strong imaginative and stylistic elements involved in constructing a 
plausible narrative, and this gives both history and rhetoric a literary dimension.   
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 I am discounting here the extreme positions that history is governed by deterministic laws and that 




Since rhetorical argument is founded in large part on the interpretation and 
evaluation of past events
9
, on historical precedent, one could even argue that rhetoric 
and history are two sides of the same coin. Whereas in history, one seeks to explain 
why people acted as they did in the past and to interpret and evaluate their actions, in 
rhetoric one seeks to argue how people should act in the future by evaluating 
different possible courses of action. As R G Collingwood argued, history can be 
conceived as no less than a ‘science of human affairs’ (Collingwood, 1970, p. 115), a 
‘school of moral and practical wisdom’ (p. 99). By studying how people dealt with 
practical real-life problems and dilemmas in the past, by re-enacting their thoughts, a 
person learns how to interpret similar situations in the present and is provided, in 
effect, with ‘a guide to action’ (pp. 99-100). However, the thoughts, words and deeds 
of great people from the past may not be particularly relevant to ordinary people 
making practical judgements in everyday life
10
. Social and recent documentary 
history is probably of more relevance here, as are literature and other art forms that 
deal in the experiences of ordinary human beings. 
 
Finally, if it is stories of human experience and insights concerning human 
nature that are required (as opposed to literary criticism), why limit the humanities to 
the traditional subject matter of literature and history? There is a strong case for 
broadening the traditional humanities and arts curriculum to encompass the popular 
arts and media such as film and television. Film and television are such powerful 
forms of communication that it would be absurd not to draw on them for our stories 
of experience; indeed, they are central to our experience of the modern world. I shall 
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 Rhetorical arguments need not all be rooted in historical precedent: maxims, fables and parables can 
be drawn on, as can a range of more general enthymemes (or ‘topics’) dealing in human nature and 
common sense. 
10
 For example, in the passage quoted from above, Collingwood cites the historian attempting to 
understand why Nelson walked about the deck of the Victory ‘covered with decorations’ in full view 





(2) Form of reasoning 
  
Second, the forms of reasoning involved in rhetoric (as in practical deliberation 
on human affairs) differ markedly from those involved in academic research, where 
the aim is to produce explanatory theories by means of the deductive-inductive 
method of science or by means of the deductive method of logic, involving a priori 
rules and axioms. The distinction was originally made by Aristotle in his treatise on 
rhetoric: whereas in academic research, a logical proof can be formulated by the 
formal methods of syllogistic inference (deductive and inductive), rhetoric can 
achieve demonstrative proof only by the informal methods of enthymeme
11
 and 
example, and its conclusions can never be more than probable or true ‘for the most 
part’ (Aristotle, 1991, p.77). Explanatory theories are of little use when practical 
judgements are required on right or expedient courses of action because practical 
decisions in human affairs – ‘should we go to war?’, ‘should private schools be 
allowed?’, ‘should I have children?’ – rest on the interpretation of the past, the 
prediction of the future, and the values and beliefs of the individual making the 
decision. The value of the humanities is that they can furnish precisely the examples 
and analogies needed to support a practical judgement.   
  
Errors in rhetorical reasoning have traditionally been categorised into a set of 
‘informal fallacies’ – informal in that they concern the use (and misuse) of language 
in rhetorical argument, whereas ‘formal fallacies’ concern errors of valid inference in 
deductive reasoning
12
; and a study of these fallacies might well form part of a 
rhetorical education - though, of course, faulty logic can be identified without 
recourse to traditional means of classifying particular types of fallacy. It is worth 
noting that a number of informal fallacies - including argumentum ad antiquitatem 
(the appeal to tradition), argumentum ad hominem, argumetum ad ignorantiam (the 
argument that something is true simply because it has not been proved false) and 
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 The enthymeme is a practical syllogism. 
12
 Well-known examples include argumentum ad hominem (argument directed to the person), post 
hoc ergo propter hoc (after here therefore because of here), ignoratio elenchi (irrelevant conclusion) 
and petitio principii (begging the question – or assuming what you are trying to prove). Informal 
fallacies can be divided in turn into fallacies of relevance (in which the premises are logically 
irrelevant to the conclusion) and fallacies of ambiguity (in which there is ambiguity in the language 




post hoc ergo propter hoc – though they involve errors of reasoning in the sense that 
a certain assertion does not in itself constitute conclusive proof of the argument, may 
well form part of a rhetorical proof. In other words, the assertion may add to the 
weight of the argument, constitute ‘supporting evidence’ or make the conclusion 
more probable. For example, in seeking to answer the question ‘should we take 
military action in (or against) Syria?’, the experience of taking military action in Iraq 
in apparently very similar circumstances is of obvious relevance; and yet the analogy 
or precedent does not in itself constitute a valid premise or proof of any particular 
argument. That a majority of people, even a majority of experts, believe something 
does not amount to proof either (because they could all be wrong) but it may still be 
persuasive; indeed, our core liberal principle of democratic legitimacy involves 
nothing more than a majority vote. And most strikingly of all, justice in criminal law 
requires the verdict to be ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ with overwhelming weight of 
evidence being the determining factor. In civil law, a mere preponderance of 
evidence is often sufficient to secure a conviction. In all these cases, we see that it is 
rhetorical argument rather than scientific proof that is involved in making a practical 
judgement. 
 
(3) Form of expression 
  
Third, the power of rhetoric as an educational tool lies in its developing the 
capacity to think clearly, to develop an argument and to arrive at a reasoned 
judgement by means of a systematic training in grammar (which is preparatory to 
rhetoric) and the art of prose composition (rhetoric proper). The old liberal education 
recognised that the capacity to reason well and the capacity to express one’s thoughts 
eloquently in speech or writing were intimately related, perhaps even inseparable; 
that it was by learning to write prose that one learned to construct an argument. The 
emphasis placed in classical oratory on familiarity with an extensive and exhaustive 
repertoire of rhetorical devices and embellishments designed to persuade and move 
the audience, on literary style and on delivery – Quintilian spoke of streams of 
eloquence flowing ‘as mighty rivers flow, filling whole valleys’ (Quintilian , 1920, 
pp. 365-7) - is apt to detract from the fact that great attention was also paid to the 




developing this skill was the systematic teaching of the art of writing prose. As I 
noted earlier, the stages of inventio and disputatio, in which the elements of the 
argument were identified and arranged, were central to rhetoric and they involved, 
moreover, a remarkably detailed and systematic analysis of the subject matter of the 
argument. With the inevitable demise of classical oratory and of the embellishments 
of the ‘ornate style’, rhetoric might nowadays be construed simply as the art of 
writing plain unadorned prose. 
  
The vital role of grammar and rhetoric in writing modern prose, together with 
what the modern study of rhetoric might entail, and the close relation between 
writing well and thinking well, are all strikingly brought out by Robert Graves and 
Alan Hodge in The Reader Over Your Shoulder (1943), one of the best guides to the 
writing of modern prose ever written. Graves and Hodge begin by noting that since 
the purpose of prose is to convey an argument of some sort to the reader, the ideas 
must be arranged in logical sequence and expressed with clarity and concision; the 
intelligent reader should not be forced to have to re-arrange the author’s ideas in his 
mind, or be left wondering what the author meant, or be getting ‘bogged down’ in 
impenetrable prose. This is perhaps, self-evident. However – and this is where the 
real interest lies – they go on to catalogue in exhaustive detail the principles of clear 
statement and graces of prose (altogether they enumerate 41 separate categories) that 
must be adhered to in order to achieve this end; and then proceed to apply these 
principles by producing ‘fair copies’ of prose extracts from leading writers, thinkers 
and public figures of the day. To compose good prose then, one must adhere to the 
following rules amongst others: (1) define clearly ‘who, which, what, where, when, 
how much and how many’; (2) avoid ambiguity of word or phrase, self-evident 
statement, material omission, undeveloped themes, circumlocution, memory strain, 
usage of the same word in different senses, and rhetorical devices suited only to 
oratory or conversation (such as over-emphasis, poeticality, elegant variation and 
duplication); (3) define and stabilise one’s terms; (4) use punctuation to denote the 
quality of connection between sentences and their parts; (5) ensure that every word 
or phrase is in its right place in the sentence; (6) arrange sentences and paragraphs in 




not re-arrange them in his mind’; and (8) ensure that ‘ideas should not contradict one 
another, or otherwise violate logic’ (pp. 210-12).  
  
Graves and Hodge’s forensic examination of some 50 prose extracts13 to see 
whether they meet these criteria, their systematic analysis of the errors of clear 
statement and graces of prose by category, is remarkable in that they are not merely 
making a list of grammatical and stylistic errors (the sort of task undertaken by the 
typical ‘good English’ guide) but are engaged in a rigorous analysis of the thoughts, 
ideas and arguments the author is trying to convey – i.e. an analysis of their 
substance and coherence. In other words, they are concerned not merely with 
grammar but with rhetoric in its modern sense; and grammar is seen to serve a 
rhetorical end rather than constitute an end in itself. The principle that logic should 
not be violated necessarily entails awareness of the informal fallacies of relevance 
(even if they are not categorised and named as such); and Graves and Hodge’s 
principles of grammar and grammatical construction entail, and are in large part 
driven by, an awareness of the informal fallacies of ambiguity - for example, 
equivocation (where ambiguity or confusion in the argument is caused by failure to 
define or stabilise the meaning of a word or phrase), and amphiboly (where poor 
grammatical construction is the cause). Grammar, rhetoric and logic, it turns out, are 
inextricably bound up with each other. 
  
Graves and Hodge note that they are merely following the ancient Greeks in 
finding that in working out a set of principles for prose, it is impossible to confine 
oneself to orthology (the study of the proper formation of words), accidence (the 
study of the grammatical relation of words) and syntax (the study of the grammatical 
relation of phrases and sentences) - which, taken together, constitute grammar; one 
has also to include logic – ‘the study of the proper relation of ideas’ (p. 127). And in 
this they are surely right. Having to consider the manner in which the thought is 
expressed forces us to consider the thought itself; and having to consider the logical 
coherence of the thought or argument forces us in turn to consider its plausibility. Is 
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 The extracts were chosen from the prose works of eminent people of the day (including T S Eliot, 
Aldous Huxley, J M Keynes, F R Leavis, Eric Partridge, Herbert Read, Bertrand Russell and A N 





it a good argument? Is it justified? Is the course of action advocated the right one in 
the circumstances? Have all relevant factors and considerations been taken into 
account?  
 
This is the substance of rhetoric.  
 
Before considering objections to the rhetorical ideal of liberal education, I would 
like to consider two other forms in which a liberal education has historically been 
conceived, two other curricula that have sometimes been taken to exemplify the 
rhetorical or artes liberalis ideal as outlined in Chapter 5
14
: the classical humanist 
curriculum of the 19
th
 century and the literary curriculum (representing the ideal of 
literary culture) espoused by Matthew Arnold and F R Leavis.   
 
Other conceptions of liberal education in the spirit of the rhetorical ideal 
 
(a) Classical humanism 
 
By the nineteenth-century, liberal education in England had become associated 
with a narrow education in the classics and was justified on grounds of ‘mental 
training’ and the cultivation of a literary sensibility rather than as means of 
producing an active citizen capable of judgement
15
. The shift in emphasis is apparent 
in the definitions offered by Henry Sidgwick in his illuminating essay ‘The Theory 
of Classical Education’ published in Farrar’s Essays on a Liberal Education of 
1867
16. Sidgwick defined the aim of a liberal education as being ‘to impart the 
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 The artes liberales ideal was identified by Roger Kimball as having the following characteristics 
among others: ‘the goal of training the good citizen to lead society’; ‘the prescription of values and 
standards for character and conduct’; a recognised canon of classical texts to provide ‘both stylistic 
and ethical models’; and ‘a dogmatist epistemology’ as opposed to a Socratic approach to enquiry 
(Kimball, 1995, pp. 37-8). 
15
 In France and Germany, by contrast, the classics now shared the curriculum with mathematics, 
natural science, history, French or German – and other subjects. It was Napoleon who instituted the 
main reforms in France by insisting that liberal education had two factors: literary culture, represented 
by Latin; and exact science, represented by mathematics (Parker, 1868, pp. 67-8).   
16
 I shall henceforth refer to these as ‘Farrar’s essays’. First published in 1867 and edited by the 




highest culture’ and to develop pupils’ ‘active, cognitive and aesthetic faculties’ to 
the highest level (Sidgwick, 1868, p. 87); and the aim of a classical education, which 
formed the core of a liberal education, as being to produce someone who can 
‘translate elegantly and correctly from Latin and Greek into English prose’ and can 
compose prose and verse in Latin and Greek (p. 86). The crowning stage of rhetoric 
no longer involved oration (and hence deliberation and judgement) in the vernacular 
on themes of general interest, as it would have in the Rome of Cicero, but had 
become merely the art of literary composition in Greek and Latin. The aim of 
producing the active citizen who could speak on any subject and who could form a 
right judgement had, in effect, been lost sight of; and for many pupils, the process of 
learning the classical languages had become a grind, ‘dreadful and unremitting’, 
involving hours of ‘miserable drudgery’ (Farrar, 1868, p. 215). However, it was still 
thought that this classical liberal education was the best preparation for public life. 
 
This narrowing of the curriculum made it an easy target for critics who argued 
that it had little relevance to the modern world, and that mental training could just as 
well be effected by the study of a range of modern subjects (English, modern 
European history, modern languages and, above all, science) that were more relevant 
to the needs of pupils. Concerns that economically and industrially, Britain was in 
danger of falling behind other countries – most notably Germany – in its failure to 
recognise the need for science education and technical training only reinforced the 
argument. Nevertheless, there were a number of arguments adduced in favour of 
classical humanism by its proponents and these are worth revisiting. Sidgwick 
identified three main arguments’: that a knowledge of Latin and Greek enables us 
better to understand the grammar and vocabulary of our own language; that the study 
of classical literature is unrivalled as a means of cultivating literary taste; and that a 
classical education is a superb means of ‘mental training’ – of developing the 
intellect. Let us consider these in turn.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
contemporary educationalists arguing the pros and cons of the classical curriculum as it then stood in 
the great English public schools. They broadly supported reform and argued that the curriculum 
needed to incorporate modern subjects (above all, English) as well as the classics (see Curtis & 




The first argument - ‘that we cannot understand our own language without a 
knowledge of Latin and Greek … both in respect of its grammar and in respect of its 
vocabulary’ (Sidgwick, 1868, p. 95) – is one that Sidgwick utterly refutes. He 
concedes that ‘learning the rules of Latin usage would, no doubt, sharpen our 
perception of the rules of English usage’ but he argues that to speak English with 
accuracy and precision, ‘we have but one rule to follow, - to pay strict attention to 
usage’. Moreover, it is through a study of English literature, not classical literature, 





The second argument commonly adduced in support of a classical education was 
that it acquainted pupils with Greek and Latin literature, a literature from which the 
highest literary enjoyment and taste could be derived. Sidgwick rejects this out of 
hand and marshals a range of arguments in support of his case – arguments, again, 
that most modern educators would probably regard as self-evident. For example, he 
argues that classical literature can be read in modern translation; that there is a whole 
range of modern literature - not least, English literature - whose study would equally 
well cultivate literary taste; that for most of us, the intellectual life of our own age is 
more important than the historical study of literature (rewarding as that may be to 
some); and that the familiarity with classical allusions and similes necessary to 
appreciate, say, Milton, can be derived without too much inconvenience by other 
means. But perhaps most important of all, the degree of proficiency in the classical 
languages needed to be able to read and appreciate classical literature was simply 
beyond that which the average pupil is able to attain, even when the curriculum was 
centred on the classics. In Farrar’s essays, contributor after contributor complains of 
the gap between the literary claims made for a classical education and what was 
actually achieved - with only a minority of scholars proving the exception. Sidgwick 
notes that many pupils had been ‘so exhausted with linguistic struggles’ that they 
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 Farrar, writing in the same volume of essays, is even more scathing about the value of a classical 
education in this regard and argues that the study of Greek and Latin composition ‘has distinctly 
injured our own English language, and done mischief to some of our great writers’ (Farrar, 1868, p. 
225). He goes on to cite the falsetto tones, vaporous inanities, meaningless ornamentation, artifice, 
tasteless variation and open plagiarism that have disfigured and spoilt the work of innumerable poets 
and writers from Milton and Dryden to Pope and Gray; and he compares the results to ‘rootless 
flowers stuck in a child’s garden’ (p. 225). The effect was to encourage little more than verbal 




were ‘not in a state to receive delicate literary impressions’ (Farrar, 1868, p. 116); 
and J. W. Hales speaks of most pupils’ ‘pretence at mastering Latin and Greek’ and 
asks ‘What hope could they ever have of enjoying Virgil in the original?’ (Hales, 
1868, p. 310).  
 
Part of the problem, observed Sidgwick, was the mistaken belief that linguistic 
understanding and literary appreciation could only fully be gained if boys learned to 
compose prose and poetry in Latin and Greek (i.e. to translate from English into 
Latin and Greek). The result of this burden was less likely to be literary appreciation 
than ‘mechanical ornamentation, generally clumsy and often grotesque’ (Sidgwick, 
1868, p. 112) – the same point Farrar made18. Another was that inevitably only small 
excerpts (‘minute parts’) of the products of classical literature were studied, and 
hence only ‘a perverted appreciation’ was attained (p. 112). Far better that the 
‘crowning stage’ of liberal education (p. 123) – rhetoric – should be taught in the 
vernacular so that boys should have the opportunity to elaborate an argument as a 
whole, to use the whole range of the English language and to draw on wider 
resources than merely literature. And this is, I think, the crucial point of difference 
between the classical humanist curriculum and the rhetorical curriculum. Classical 
humanism was no doubt a superb education for the classical scholar, but the old aim 
and ideal of producing an orator and a citizen had largely been lost sight of. The 
Romans declaimed in Latin precisely because it was the vernacular. 
 
However, it is the third argument that Sidgwick finds the most persuasive – 
namely that the study of the classical languages can be regarded ‘a species of mental 
gymnastics, a method of developing the intellectual faculties’ (p. 113). Sidgwick 
separates the rhetorical or linguistic from the specifically mental or intellectual 
aspects of this mental training. Regarding the former, he argues that ‘translation from 
a Latin or Greek author into English prose, under the guidance of a competent 
teacher, is a very vigorous and efficacious training in the use of our language, and 
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 Milton had made the same criticism as early as 1673 in his tractate on education. It was ‘… a 
preposterous exaction, forcing the empty wits of children to compose themes, verses and orations, 
which are the acts of ripest judgment … These are not matters to be wrung from poor striplings, like 




gives considerable insight into the nature of speech, and its relation to thought and 
fact’ (p. 114); but then qualifies this by questioning whether learning a foreign 
language is ‘absolutely necessary’ after all. ‘The normal function of a language is not 
to represent another language, but to express and communicate facts’ (p. 124), in 
which case why not study language through the study of other subjects (for example, 
the sciences) and learn the use of words as one learns the knowledge of things. On 
specifically mental training, Sidgwick writes that the study of a classical language 
‘up to a certain point’ affords  
 
… a large amount of material that not only exercises the memory, but 
enforces constant attention and close comparison: rules and generalisations 
have to be borne in mind, as well as isolated facts; habits of accuracy and 
quickness in applying them are rapidly developed, and the important faculty 
of judgement is perpetually educed, trained and stimulated.’ (pp. 126-7)  
 
W. Johnson, the only contributor to Farrar’s essays to defend the classical method of 
parsing and composition in Latin, argues in similar vein that the task of translating or 
reducing a text forces the pupil to attend to the thoughts or ideas contained in the 
text, forces him to discriminate and reason, forces a sort of scholarly discipline and 
attention (Johnson, 1868)
19. However, this ‘training of the cognitive faculties’ is, 
suspects Sidgwick, ‘very similar to that which would be supplied by one or more of 
the physical sciences, carefully selected, limited and arranged for educational 
purposes’ (Sidgwick, 1868, p. 132).   
 
I think Sidgwick is right and there is much to be gained from the study of both 
the classical languages and the sciences. However - and here I return to my argument 
in the last chapter - the benefits of mental training can only accrue, the intellectual 
virtues are only cultivated, if the pupil or student is able to gain a degree of 
proficiency and mastery of the subject concerned; and this requires both aptitude and 
specialised study. In the case of the classical languages, the sort of discrimination 
                                                          
19 ‘We need something that will bring out in shape and form something like a view of a philosophical 
topic. We need an exercise which cannot be written quickly, which is sure to give the censor plenty to 
do, which will bring two minds, the older and the younger, into stimulative contact, which forces us to 




envisaged by Johnson could only be attained by pupils who were able to express 
themselves in Latin with a degree of clarity and eloquence. The danger is that pupils 
would, in fact, translate word-for-word with very little attention to the finer nuances 




.   
 
In summary, then, the cultivation of literary style and appreciation through a 
study of the classical languages (which was a principal aim of classical humanism 
and is often associated with rhetorical liberal education) has little to do with 
cultivating either the capacity to produce good modern prose or the citizen able to 
make a practical judgement. And though the specialised study of the classics is no 
doubt a fine means of ‘training the mind’, the same could be said of any specialised 
study, provided - as I argued in the last chapter - that its study involves the mastery 
of a coherent and complex body of knowledge and skill.     
 
(b) Literary culture 
 
I have argued that rhetoric draws for its subject matter on the stories of 
experience of the humanities, most notably literature and history, and therefore that 
the rhetorical aim of liberal education can be detached from the literary aim that has 
traditionally been associated with it – i.e. the aim of cultivating literary and aesthetic 
taste through initiation into a canon of recognised works. To argue a case forcefully 
and articulately does not require a sophisticated literary or aesthetic culture; the 
need, rather, is to express oneself with clarity in prose. And yet since the demise of 
classical humanism in the latter part of the nineteenth-century, debate in England 
surrounding the nature of liberal education has centred almost exclusively on the 
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 My occasional experience of reading scholars’ translations from Latin into English - and these are 
very able pupils who have studied Latin for four or five years - is precisely this: that their translations 
very often play havoc with the sense, structure and coherence of the passages concerned. These pupils 
are indeed too exhausted by their ‘linguistic struggles’ to pay very much attention to the meaning, let 
alone to the style, of the text. 
21
 A quite different argument can be made in support of the teaching of basic Latin as part of a general 
education on the grounds that it deepens our understanding of the English language, much of whose 
vocabulary is derived from Latin. But then one might simply teach Latin roots. Clive James argues (as 
does my mother) that the incorporation in Australia of ‘Latin roots’ as part of English language 




‘two cultures’ question: ‘what are the relative merits of literature and science in 
cultivating a person and educating him for modern life?’22  
 
The debate was not very illuminating partly because of its vitriolic nature and 
partly because no account was taken of the possibility that liberal education might be 
conceived as serving a rhetorical ideal. Nevertheless, the arguments are important 
ones, they are regularly rehearsed to this day, and they are worth revisiting. In 
Chapter 7, I argued that science should form part of a ‘general knowledge’ 
curriculum and be organised by topical theme rather than as a set of distinct 
academic disciplines on the grounds that the latter would only have value in ‘training 
the mind’ if subsequently specialised in. But what of the argument that it is the 
humanities - above all, literature – that humanise; and therefore the study of 
literature in the vernacular should be at the heart of a liberal education?    
 
Matthew Arnold began a tradition of thought (the most notable twentieth-century 
representatives of which are perhaps T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis) which holds that 
the specialist critical study of canonical literature not only develops aesthetic 
appreciation and taste, but humanises; that with the demise of religion, ‘high culture’ 
can perhaps even take the place of religion as a moralising force. Now, the critical 
study of great works of literature, the engagement in literary criticism, might well 
constitute ‘a training of sensibility and intelligence’ and cultivate ‘a sensitiveness 
and precision of response’ as Leavis claims (Leavis, 1943, p. 34). But should liberal 
education centre on literary study, as Leavis argues? There are several objections to 
this position that we need to consider.  
 
The first, which is the main criticism of Leavis from the perspective of cultural 
theory, is (1) that he regards high literary culture as the minority culture of an elite 
sustainable only in a hierarchical society – i.e. he is anti-democratic; and (2) that the 
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 The two cultures question famously surfaced in the 1870s and 1880s, and again in the late 1950s 
and 1960s. The original protagonists were Matthew Arnold and Thomas Huxley, representing the 
claims of literary and scientific culture respectively, who carried on a long-running debate in both 
Britain and America. Some 80 years on, F R Leavis and C P Snow debated the same question. Snow 
coined the expression ‘the two cultures’ in his celebrated Rede Lecture of 1959 - ‘The Two Cultures 




notion of a rich folk culture of the past – which, according to Leavis, coexisted 
symbiotically with the high culture of the elite and unlike the debased popular 
culture of today was a truly common culture - is a romantic myth that takes no 
account of the oppressed and impoverished lives of the mass of people (see Storey, 
2009, Chapter 2). There is some truth in both these arguments. However, Leavis’s 
account of the cheapening and debasing effects of much popular culture
23
 and of 
modern living in general, particularly of commercial advertising, will resonate with 
many people, and is shared by a host of radical critics - Theodor Adorno and Jean 
Baudrillard are notable examples. A more measured account that does not dismiss 
popular culture and mass media out of hand, but rather seeks to cultivate 
discrimination between the good and the bad within it, is Stuart Hall and Paddy 
Whannel’s. Hall and Whannel argue not only that there is much of value in popular 
culture but that for many pupils, it is only by engaging with their experience of 
‘mass culture’ that we can begin to foster discrimination and re-shape their values 
and interests (Hall and Whannel, 1964); in fact, that a widening of taste and 
sensibility within the field of popular culture will lead also to an appreciation of 
traditional ‘high’ forms of culture. Hall and Whannel have been criticised for not 
escaping the ‘Leavisite’ position that culture is essentially hierarchical (Storey, 2009, 
p.55). But the position suggested by this thesis (a full exploration of cultural theory 
being unfortunately beyond its remit) is that it is only in practices and traditions, in 
the process of apprenticeship to practices and traditions, that values and criteria of 
judgement (both moral and aesthetic) are developed. The broad postmodern-relativist 
position that all works of art or creative expression have aesthetic or cultural value 
merely because they are acts of self-expression is not a tenable one.   
 
The second problem relates to the argument of Chapter 7 that only a highly 
specialised study, a sustained apprenticeship, is likely to produce goods in the 
Hirstian sense – i.e. forms of knowledge, the structuring of experience, mental 
training, high critical standards and so forth; and Leavis, in effect, recognises this by 
limiting his argument to the study of literature at university, specifically to making 
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 In cultural studies and cultural theory, ‘popular culture’ is a notoriously problematic and 
ideologically loaded term. Here, I am simply referring to all those cultural forms and works that are 
traditionally excluded from the school curriculum because they are not judged to be of sufficient 




the university school of English the ‘humane focus’ of the university. The sustained 
disciplinary study and immersion in a tradition that would be required to cultivate 
the requisite sensibility and powers of discrimination are simply not possible at 
school, and therefore cannot form the core of a liberal school education. It might be 
argued that literary study at school is merely preparatory to later specialist study or 
that pupils might specialise early. But then we are faced with the problem that, 
inevitably, specialised study involves having the requisite motivation and aptitude. 
There is a tendency amongst educationalists [this is certainly true, in my experience, 
of those who attend philosophy of education seminars at the Institute of Education in 
London] to assume that if only teachers are sufficiently inspired, they can make 
works of the literary canon accessible to all their pupils; indeed, that they can make 
any subject accessible to quite a high level. Perhaps there is something about 
Shakespeare’s genius that does make him universally accessible - though I would 
question how many school leavers continue to read Shakespeare in their leisure time. 
However, I fear that Harold Bloom is closer to the mark when he writes that the 
appreciation of the Western literary canon – that ‘real reading’ - is only ever going to 
be open to a small minority of people, and hence pupils, who have both the need and 
the cognitive and imaginative capacity to read works of aesthetic value (Bloom, 
1995, pp. 519-20)
24
, a view with which Leavis concurs. I do not think it is 
necessarily a matter of ‘aptitude’ or ‘intelligence’ or even ‘imagination’. A person 
can be highly intelligent and articulate, even highly cultivated in many respects, and 
yet simply not have ‘a literary sensibility’, just as he or she might not have any 
particular desire or need to engage in art, music, sport or mathematics. It is a matter 
of psychological make-up and personality as much as some putative aptitude; which 
is why it is rare to find an educated person equally passionate about literature, art, 
music, dance, mathematics, science and philosophy - let alone about engineering, 
gardening, climbing, military history and sport.  
  
The third problem with the position of Leavis is that even if we allow that the 
trained literary critic has judgement, sensitivity and discrimination to a high degree, 
the judgement is of a particular sort: it is literary judgement. My concern is with 
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 Bloom defines ‘aesthetic strength’ as an amalgam of ‘mastery of figurative language, originality, 




practical judgement, and as I have argued in this thesis, the keys to developing this 
in school education are some combination of rhetorical training (encompassing 
grammar and prose argument), stories of experience drawn from the humanities, and 
specialist study. Canonical works of literature – the literary classics – might well be 
superb funds of stories of experience and might well depict human nature in all its 
complexity but the literary canon is not our only resource; and the cultivation of the 
skill of the literary critic who possesses a refined literary sensibility is not our 
primary aim
25
. On the other hand, it is important that authentic accounts of human 
experience are distinguished from the inauthentic – from that which is designed 
merely to entertain or titillate (the melodrama, the thriller and so forth); and one of 
the distinguishing characteristics of a literary classic is, precisely, that it is authentic 
- that it illuminates vividly some truth about the human condition. Therefore literary 
and artistic judgements still have to be made. But it is possible to recognise a work 
as ‘authentic’, and therefore of literary or artistic merit, without necessarily engaging 
in a detailed and exhaustive analysis of how the author has achieved their effects - 
without some complete or perfect reading of the work in question as envisaged by 
advocates of literary culture as a civilizing force, such as Leavis and George Steiner. 
Moreover, a work can be authentic and illuminate the human condition without it 
necessarily being a literary classic; indeed, without it being a work of literature at all. 
This particularly applies to non-fiction, history, biography and television 
documentaries. A person does not have to be a literary critic – or, indeed, a historian 
- to appreciate the power of Anne Frank’s diary. Likewise, we have in film and 
television drama a rich resource of stories of human experience.  
 
However, there is judgement involved in recognising and appreciating the 
difference between a melodramatic soap opera or a fantasy-thriller or a romantic 
comedy populated with stock characters issuing pat lines (clichés), and a well-
directed well-scripted film adaptation of a novel or dramatisation of a true story. The 
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 It could even be argued that training in literary criticism does not train a person to construct an 
argument and write good prose. Graves and Hodge’s subjection of the prose of F R Leavis, T S Eliot 
and I.A. Richards (the most eminent literary critics of their day) to critical analysis is very revealing 
in this respect. For example, in the case of Eliot, they tabulate over thirty errors in clear statement in 
the course of three short prose paragraphs. They note that ‘by the standards of ordinary intelligible 
English, his failures to choose the appropriate word and to connect his argument lucidly are more 
frequent here than in any passage we have examined’ (Graves & Hodge, pp. 262-7). Leavis and 




very discussion of ‘which is better’ is valuable because it encourages pupils to 
discriminate between the work that is authentic and the work that is melodramatic or 
exploitative – or merely ‘kitsch’. Of course, fantasy, escapism and the peddling of 
dreams have their own value, whether as entertainment or as vehicles for delivering a 
moral message, and this is another theme to be explored. The field of cultural studies 
is, of course, highly politicised; the concept of ideology is a central one. There is 
always the danger that the study of popular culture and mass media will degenerate 
into a course in political indoctrination. But the same is true of the study of literature 
and history. All we can hope, or expect, is that teachers consider a range of political 
and ideological interpretations without detracting from or politicising too much the 
central human drama of the situation – unless, of course, the drama is essentially 
political. 
 
The fourth and last problem, however, involves a more profound concern. It is 
often argued that the study of science, whatever its undoubted value and importance, 
cannot itself humanise; that it cannot produce the capacity to make a humane or 
moral judgement; and conversely, that the great value of the humanities - of 
literature above all - is that they can perform this function; that they can humanise. 
But does a training of literary-aesthetic sensibility, of literary intelligence and 
discrimination, necessarily humanise in the sense of producing a moral person and a 
good citizen able to judge well and act on his judgement? Leavis’s argument that a 
high degree of critical judgement is ‘inseparable [my italics] from that profoundest 
sense of relative value which determines … the important choices of actual life’ 
(Leavis, 1943, p. 35) is seriously open to question.  
 
C P Snow alluded to the problem when he questioned the value judgements of 
many of the twentieth century’s most famous writers:  
 
Yeats, Pound, Wyndham Lewis, nine out of ten of those who have dominated 
literary sensibility in our time - weren’t they not only politically silly, but 
politically wicked? Didn’t the influence of all they represent bring Auschwitz 




George Steiner puts the problem just as starkly. We are faced, he writes, with ‘the 
simple yet appalling fact’ that we cannot be certain, knowing what we now do, 
‘whether the study and delight a man takes in Shakespeare [makes] him any less 
capable of organising a concentration camp’ (Steiner, 1984, pp. 30-1). The reason for 
this, conjectures Steiner, might well be that by cultivating our imaginative response, 
our ‘actual moral response’ is deadened; that  
 
... the cry in the poem may come to sound louder, more urgent, more real 
than the cry in the street outside. The death in the novel may move us more 
potently than the death in the next room. Thus there may be a covert, 
betraying link between the cultivation of aesthetic response and the potential 
of personal inhumanity. (p. 31)  
 
Harold Bloom draws the same conclusion. The study of great literature cannot make 
the reader a better person or a better citizen, not least because it is just as likely to 
subvert accepted norms and values as to affirm them. He goes on 
 
The true use of Shakespeare or of Cervantes, of Homer or of Dante … is to 
augment one’s growing inner self … All that the Western Canon can bring 
one is the proper use of one’s own solitude, that solitude whose final form is 
one’s confrontation with one’s own mortality. (Bloom, 1995, p. 30).   
 
But perhaps the most powerful support for this line of argument comes from a 
consideration of the German experience of self-cultivation or ‘Bildung’. As W. H. 
Bruford notes in his classic study The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation (1975), 
the German tradition of Bildung had great cultural achievements to its credit but was 
always deeply introspective and inward-looking in spirit. The aim, contra Cicero, 
was never to produce a citizen who could make right judgements and act in the 
political arena, but to cultivate the self as an end in itself. Wilhelm von Humboldt, a 
pivotal figure in this tradition, epitomised this in his letters, writing that the purpose 
of life was not to change the world (though, in fact, Humboldt did involve himself 
actively in politics), but through contemplation and reflection, and by holding life at 
a distance, to distil one’s experience into wisdom and ‘to take away … a living 




There is only one summit in life, to have taken the measure in feeling of 
everything human, to have emptied to the lees what fate offers, and to remain 
quiet and gentle, allowing new life freely to take shape as it will within the 
heart. (Humboldt cited in Bruford, p. 25)  
 
Indeed, Thomas Mann, lecturing in 1923 and bemoaning the lack of interest in 
politics of educated people, noted that the German culture of Bildung implied by its 
very nature a certain ‘introspectiveness’ and involved an almost religious quest to 
deepen and perfect one’s own personality in order to attain salvation: 
 
… the political world is felt to be profane and is thrust aside with 
indifference, ‘because’, as Luther says, ‘this external order is of no 
consequence’ … the ordinary middle-class man here, if he ever thought about 
culture, never considered politics to be part of it, and still does not do so 
today. (Mann cited in Bruford, p. vii) 
 
Bruford concludes that this ‘inherent defect’ in the culture of the inward man is, 
ultimately, the explanation for the fact that, despite there being ‘a considerable 
resistance movement towards the end which deserves all credit’, ‘highly cultivated 
men … in whole groups, so it seems to us’ raised hardly a murmur of protest against 
the rise of Hitler (Bruford, p. ix).  
 
Roger Scruton, another apostle of high culture and literary art, follows Leavis in 
eliding our aesthetic and moral senses. Scruton argues that an artistic tradition, as 
well as being ‘an exercise of imagination’ that ‘idealises human emotion’ and 
‘rehearses the possibilities of feeling on which an ideal community … is founded’, is 
‘a meditation on human experience and an attempt to build a shared conception of 
what is worthy of our concern’ (Scruton, 1998, pp. 41-2). It helps to clarify for us 
‘the things that are worth doing for their own sake, like [in the case of Homer] 
grieving and loving and honouring the gods’ and to answer ‘the question what to feel 
or do’ (p. 30). But central to the notion of a common culture is that people not only 
know how and what to feel but are compelled to act on their feelings and put their 
right judgements into practice. And for this to happen, their moral feeling must be 




then is ‘why should the cultivation of a literary sensibility lead people to act 
morally?’ Scruton seems to elide the two: aesthetic interest, being disinterested, 
concerns intrinsic values; in adopting the aesthetic stance, we ask ourselves ‘is it 
right to take pleasure in this?’; and therefore our aesthetic response is the ‘expression 
of moral character’ (see pp. 32-3). Scruton cites Kant and argues that morality too is 
disinterested. But contra Kant, morality cannot be disinterested but must involve our 
desires and emotions; otherwise, as Aristotle argues (and as I have argued in this 
thesis), there is no motive to act.  
 
Moreover, isn’t there a fundamental disjunction between the aesthetic and the 
moral
26
?  The aesthetic, even when its subject matter is moral feeling and right 
action (for example, on the part of the characters of a novel or an epic), concerns the 
contemplation of the beautiful. The moral, by contrast, concerns feeling that issues in 
right action. And though, because the aesthetic and the moral both concern intrinsic 
values, we might argue that they ultimately coincide, their sources are quite 
different; which is why people who do not engage in contemplation, who have little 
concern with ‘aesthetics’, who in philosophical and literary-aesthetic terms lead ‘the 
unexamined life’, can nevertheless be deeply moral; and, conversely, why aesthetes 
can be utterly immoral in their actions, or their inaction. As I noted in Chapter 7, the 
person who has not consciously examined their ethical first principles, who has not 
consciously tried to cultivate their inner self or examine their life, is not necessarily 
inferior, morally or ethically, to the person who has.      
 
In summary, then, I think that those pupils who have the aptitude, motivation 
and interest might well choose to engage in the specialist critical study of literature - 
just as others might choose to study the classical languages. But the core curriculum 
of a modern liberal education should not be ‘literary’ in the sense of aiming to 
cultivate literary taste or sensibility. 
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 Here I use the term ‘moral’ rather than ‘ethical’ because the ethical in its widest sense could be 




Some objections to a rhetorical education 
 
There are, however, a number of objections that might be raised to the institution 
of grammar and rhetoric as core disciplinary studies. These include concerns (1) that 
rhetoric panders to the emotions and prejudices of the audience (Plato’s charge); (2) 
that one can develop the capacity to think clearly and argue a case without making a 
formal study of the art of rhetoric, an intellectually demanding discipline that, it 
could be argued, is no more relevant to the needs and interests of most pupils than 
the specialist academic subject disciplines; and (3) that if one wanted to formally 
train pupils how to think clearly and argue a case, a course in ‘critical thinking’ 
would be better suited to the task in the modern age. I shall consider these objections 
in turn. 
 
(1) The abuse of rhetoric 
 
It might be well argued that an argument can be perfectly coherent and 
eloquently expressed, and yet at the same time plain wrong. We think, for example, 
of Hitler mesmerising his audience with his oratory. And yet there seems to be 
something contradictory about asserting that an argument is well reasoned and well 
constructed, and yet that its conclusions are wrong, even morally abhorrent. Our 
expectation is that there is a moral or ethical dimension to reasoning well, and that 
all the relevant facts as well as a range of different standpoints have been taken into 
consideration; and, in fact, this is precisely the aim of rhetoric properly conceived. 
Despite Plato’s fierce denunciation of rhetoric and the Sophists who practised it (and 
whom he blamed for the death of his teacher Socrates), which still colours 
perceptions of rhetoric to this day, it was always the case in classical times that (a) 
one should only attempt to argue aspects of the case that had intrinsic merit – i.e. that 
the aim was to arrive at a right and proper judgement, and (b) the orator should not 
only speak well but be a good person (see Miller, 2007, pp. 5-8). It was also 
believed that it was perfectly legitimate to appeal to the emotions of the audience (as 
well as to their reason) on the grounds that, as Cicero argued, people are guided in 




fear or delusion or some other emotion’ as much as by reasoned argument (Cicero, 
2001, p. 170); that, contra Kant, both reason and emotion are integral to human 
nature. I think this is essentially correct; that, as I argued in Chapter 1, the 
Enlightenment move to reduce human beings to disembodied reason, to detach them 
from obligations, commitments, interests, passions, practices and traditions (and 
from the values and beliefs that derive from these), in order to arrive at a perfectly 
rational, objective judgement, is to deprive people of the motivation to act at all
27
. Of 
course, in a liberal society, people will adhere to a variety of values and political 
beliefs and arrive at quite different conclusions and standpoints on the same issue. 
There may well be no single right solution on which all can agree; but so long as the 
viewpoint is justified and the assumptions or first principles on which the argument 
rests (and with which we might well disagree) are made clear, then the conditions of 




As for the danger that politicians, ‘spin doctors’ and marketing people will 
utilise the art of rhetoric to embellish their story, appeal to the worst instincts of their 
audience, or engage in straightforward deception, there is no simple answer or 
antidote – except to argue that if people are properly educated in the art of rhetoric to 
begin with and habituated in the virtues, they will be less susceptible to its misuse by 
themselves or by others, and to trust that in a free society with a free press, some 
approximation to the truth will ‘out’ in the end. It is a moot point whether we place 
our trust in those who appeal to the common sense, instincts and prejudices of the 
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 Evolutionary psychologists carry the argument even further. Steven Pinker writes that the emotions 
are not ‘untamed forces or vestiges of our animal past’ but evolved adaptations that ‘work in harmony 
with the intellect and are indispensable to the functioning of the whole mind’ (Pinker, 1999, p. 370). 
He goes on ‘without goals, the very concept of intelligence is meaningless’ and notes that ‘the 
emotions … set the brain’s highest-level goals’.  
28
 Graves and Hodge make some effort not to allow their own literary and political opinions to colour 
their analysis; and they make a mental apology to those authors they had suspected of writing badly 




(2) Is a formal study of rhetoric necessary for all pupils? 
 
Another objection concerns whether the formal study of grammar, logic and 
rhetoric is essential at all to the development of the capacity to think clearly and 
develop arguments. Can’t ordinary people with little formal education articulate 
profound thoughts and cogent arguments just as well as intellectuals, scholars and 
artists? Moreover, I argued in Chapter 4 that good moral judgement arises out of 
experience, moral sentiments and moral intuition; it does not require the formal 
articulation of the ethical principles involved.  
 
The real point at issue here, I think, is the distinction between conversation and 
prose. Profound thoughts, acute insights and wise judgements can all be arrived at 
and expressed in everyday conversation. The problem is that when a complex 
argument or case needs careful consideration, and when there is a need for precision 
in the defining of one’s terms and for clarity of expression - for the separating out of 
fine strands of argument and nuances of interpretation, for the careful weighing up of 
a range of relevant issues and factors, and for the avoidance of ambiguity  (as, for 
example, in the framing of ethical guidelines or legislation) – prose is evidently 
much better suited than conversation for the purpose. And as we have seen, to write 
good prose requires, on the one hand, an understanding of grammar and syntax (i.e. 
of the meaning of words and of the quality of connection or logical relation between 
words, phrases and sentences) so that we can express ourselves clearly; and on the 
other hand, some mastery of rhetoric or prose composition (i.e. the capacity or skill 
of being able to logically organise our thoughts and ideas, and so structure an 
argument).   
  
But what of those who are highly educated, who are specialists in their 
respective fields, but who have little or no formal training in grammar or rhetoric? 
This applies I think to almost anyone who has attended school in England since the 
late 1960s
29
, which is when formal exercises in grammar were dropped from school 
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 This is certainly my experience. I attended grammar school in the 1970s and learned next to no 




examination papers and when grammar came to be regarded as best taught, not by 
the analysis of sentences into their component parts (i.e. by parsing), but rather 
through use in meaningful contexts
30
. Has their capacity to develop an argument and 
express themselves with clarity been impaired? The answer is ‘probably not’. The 
disciplined study of a subject to a high level and the acquisition of an organised, 
structured body of specialist academic knowledge necessarily involves cultivating 
the capacity to understand complex ideas and arguments, and to articulate them. This 
is borne out, I suspect, by our experience of conversing with people who are highly 
educated in scientific and technical subjects, who are highly articulate, but who have 
not received a literary education – indeed, who quite often have little or no interest in 
literature, art or aesthetics. There is, it seems, no particular requirement here for a 
liberal education centred on the study of grammar and rhetoric, literature and history, 
unless one is going to specialise in the humanities or enter politics. On the other 
hand, research graduates in scientific or technical subject may need to convey their 
thoughts to a general audience or to specialists in another field, as well as deliberate 
on matters of humane and political interest. And in articulating the interests of 
human beings, we draw primarily not on a technical or scientific vocabulary but on 
the resources of the ordinary everyday language in which these interests are 
expressed. The needs, interests, ends, goods, experiences and dilemmas of human 
beings are necessarily described in ordinary everyday language; and, therefore, the 
quality of connection between words, phrases, clauses, sentences and paragraphs is 
vital to the structuring of thoughts relating to these needs and interests - and this is 
the currency of the humanities. Training in rhetoric may therefore be of more general 
use, particularly to those going on to specialise in academic subject disciplines.  
 
The other side of the coin is that for pupils who do not have the aptitude for or 
interest in specialised academic study, who do not intend to go into politics or the 
law, but whose interests and talents lie elsewhere, there is little purpose in foisting 
on them a full-blown rhetorical training on the Roman model – a training which, as 
                                                                                                                                                                    
parents (neither of whom is particularly academic), who both learned how to parse sentences and who 
never make a grammatical error. 
30
 Though the teaching of grammar has been recovered in recent years, particularly in primary 
education, there is still nothing approaching the discipline of the classical method. Grammar remains 





we have seen, is potentially highly intellectually demanding, and which, for 
example, would involve extended and highly analytical essays on complex political, 
ethical and philosophical themes. However, there is another dimension to rhetoric, 
and that is the subject matter on which it draws for its examples, analogies and 
arguments, a subject matter that comprises stories of human experience drawn from 
the humanities. These stories embody and encapsulate our collective experience of 
the nature of moral dilemmas, human tragedy, good and evil, the goods after which 
we strive and the virtues we display; in short, they illuminate the human condition, 
and as such, they have relevance to all pupils. A rhetorical treatment of these themes 
need not involve complex essays or a complete mastery of the art of writing prose, 
but could still involve discussion (both verbal and in writing) of the pros and cons of 
this or that course of action, or of whether the protagonist was right in behaving as 
he or she did. The manner of treatment required could be less formal and elaborate; 
the themes discussed could be more topical and relevant to everyday life – to life 
both as a private individual and as a citizen.  
 
In fact, perhaps what is needed is a conception of rhetoric that is removed not 
only from classical, literary and academic concerns but also from a narrow concern 
with political deliberation. In other words, a conception that is broadened to 
encompass, and to put more emphasis on, the concerns and interests of ordinary 
people in their daily lives: not the humdrum exigencies of managing money or of 
managing one’s diet (these ‘life skills’ are, I think, better learned ‘on the job’), but 
those things that might contribute morally, spiritually, emotionally, psychologically 
and imaginatively to a good life – as well as contribute to our understanding of the 
difficulties, dilemmas and tragedies that are inherent in human life
31
. This is 
precisely why the stories of experience on which rhetoric draws can be derived from 
wider sources than literature and history - for example, from film and television, 
which are both highly accessible to all pupils and central to our experience of the 
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 Martha Nussbaum argues that there need not be a sharp division between the private and the public 
or political spheres. She cites the Athenian polis as an example: ‘The public sphere was suffused with 
the emotional and imaginative energy that we sometimes associate, instead, with the private sphere, 
just as the sphere of the household was itself suffused with public concern’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 98). 
And she notes that in Aristotle’s ethical conception ‘there is no strong distinction between the public 
and the private’ (p. 98). The problem, as I argued in Chapter 4, is that modern society bears little 




modern world. In fact, the themes of Roman school oratory were often of this nature: 
‘should a person marry?’, ‘should we have children?’ and ‘is it better to engage in 
this or that profession?’    
 
The study of rhetoric might therefore be engaged in at two levels: a general level 
accessible and relevant to all pupils, and a more advanced level suitable perhaps for 
pupils intending to specialise in the humanities or politics or law. How then would 
rhetoric be integrated into the curriculum? On the one hand, rhetoric would be taught 
as a distinct subject discipline, and the teaching of English language and ‘literacy’ 
would need to be reformulated to reflect this; and on the other hand, the teaching of 
the humanities – in particular English and history – would need to be reconceived to 
reflect rhetorical aims. So, for example, in English language, instead of pupils aping 
the externally conspicuous stylistic features of various ‘genres’ of prose writing 
(newspaper reports, recipes, instructions and letters etc.), pupils are taught 
progressively and systematically how to structure an argument. In English literature, 
the emphasis is not on engaging in literary criticism and aesthetic judgement, but on 
discussing whether the protagonists were right to act as they did, and going on to 
consider the question ‘what would you have done in that situation?’ In history, there 
would be an emphasis on narrative and on how particular personalities or peoples 
faced particular problems and dilemmas; and topics would culminate in essays 
requiring a rhetorical treatment of the subject matter – for example, ‘what would you 
have done if you were Henry VIII in those circumstances?’, or ‘are wars ever 
justified?’ Debates in which pupils argue their respective positions might either be 
preparatory to essay writing or constitute the culmination of the whole process. 
 
Rhetoric, the art of making practical judgements in human affairs, is thereby 
cultivated and practised through history, literature and the various subjects and topics 
that together constitute the humanities; and English language or ‘ literacy’ is 
reformulated something on the old Roman lines so that it systematically develops the 
capacity to structure an argument and write clear prose at a basic level - a process 
beginning with the formal study of grammar and simple exercises in narrative 




(3) Rhetoric or critical thinking 
 
On the face of it, critical thinking has much in common with rhetoric. Both share 
a concern to cultivate the capacity to analyse, evaluate and construct an argument, to 
reason well and to identify fallacious reasoning. And yet proponents of critical 
thinking are apt to dismiss rhetoric as the antithesis of reasoned argument. For 
example, Tracy Bowell and Gary Kemp, who have produced a critical thinking 
manual for undergraduates, dismiss rhetoric as ‘sham-reasoning’, an ‘attempt to 
persuade … that does not attempt to give good reasons’ but rather that appeals to 
‘feeling and emotion’ (Bowell & Kemp, 2002, p. 114). Since numerous courses are 
now available in critical thinking at GCE, AS and degree level (notice that the 
‘skills’ of critical thinking are thought to exist quite independently of the ‘skills’ of 
literacy) it is important that we consider how rhetoric differs from critical thinking as 
a means of cultivating the capacity to reason well and form a practical judgement.  
 
Critical thinking has its origins in John Dewey’s concern that thinking should be 
an active process in which received ideas and beliefs are submitted to critical 
scrutiny rather than a passive process of transmission and reception. Edward Glaser, 
one of the key figures in the Critical Thinking movement, followed Dewey’s lead in 
defining critical thinking as involving ‘a persistent effort to examine any belief or 
supposed form of knowledge in the light of the evidence that supports it’ (Glaser 
cited in Fisher, 2001, p. 3); and went on to identify a corresponding set of thinking 
skills or abilities. These included ‘to recognise problems’, ‘to gather and marshal 
pertinent information, ‘to recognise unstated assumptions and values’, ‘to 
comprehend and use language with accuracy, clarity and discrimination’, to interpret 
data’, ‘to appraise evidence and evaluate statements’, ‘to recognise the existence of 
logical relations between propositions’, ‘to draw warranted conclusions and 
generalisations’ and ‘ to reconstruct one’s patterns of beliefs on the basis of wider 
experience’ (Fisher, 2001, p. 7). Similar lists of skills have been produced by others 
working in the same tradition. However, though it shares some of the subject matter 
of rhetoric, and though its aims are laudable, critical thinking is, I think, 
fundamentally misconceived in a number of respects. There are three particular 




First, critical thinking aims to teach a set of transferable thinking skills 
applicable to any subject. The problem with this is that in order to assess what 
information is pertinent or relevant to the argument, in order to assess and evaluate 
the assumptions, logical structure and conclusions of the argument according to 
relevant criteria and standards (both of which are identified as key critical thinking 
skills), specialist knowledge of the subject matter of the argument is required. 
Indeed, without some degree of specialist knowledge of the subject, it is quite 
probable that a person would not recognise that a problem existed to be addressed in 
the first place
32
. The situation is made even worse when the requirement is added 
that the critical thinker be creative; that one has to be ‘imaginative and creative about 
other possibilities’ and ‘think of relevant considerations other than those presented’ 
(Fisher, 2001, p. 13). True, Plato levelled the same criticism at rhetoric. In Gorgias, 
Socrates complains that instead of listening to the orator attempting to persuade on 
subjects in general, it would be better to listen to the relevant subject expert. Rhetoric 
on this account boils down to no more than ‘a knack of convincing the ignorant that 
he knows more than the experts’ (Plato, 1960, p. 38). But, in answer to Plato, the 
orator has no need to possess expertise in every subject, because his true expertise is 
in the art of making practical and political judgements. Unlike critical thinking, the 
study of rhetoric is integrated with a study of the humanities, the purpose of which is 
to provide the ethical and psychological insights into human behaviour and human 
nature on the basis of which a particular kind of judgement – a practical judgement 
concerning human and political affairs - might be formed. 
 
Second, critical thinking associates good argument exclusively with deductively 
or inductively valid reasoning. Good argument is founded on good reasoning and 
good reasons have deductive validity or ‘inductive force’ – the latter meaning that a 
certain probability can be attached to the conclusion being true, that the 
generalisation is valid but there will be exceptions, and that a rational expectation 
can therefore be said to apply (Bowell and Kemp, pp. 82-4). Now, such reasoning 
certainly has its place in rhetorical argument. The difference is that in rhetorical 
argument, it is legitimate also to appeal to emotion, custom, precedent and a range of 
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 Robert Glaser [not to be confused with Edward Glaser] notes that the thinking and problem solving 
ability of the expert is qualitatively different from that of the novice precisely on account of his 




values, interests, commitments and moral obligations that cannot be given a rational 
justification in the sense just described. Practical judgements must take these 
considerations into account, first, because - as I argued earlier -  human nature is 
compounded of reason and emotion; and second, because people’s beliefs and 
values, their interests and commitments, are inevitably formed in a social, cultural 
and linguistic inheritance. In fact, all deductive reasoning must ultimately be 
founded on certain original premises (or archai) that cannot themselves be rationally 
justified; and, as I argued in Chapter 2, ethical first principles fall into this 
category
33. To adopt a ‘critical thinking’ approach to evaluating and formulating 
arguments is to condemn us to instrumental utilitarian means-end cost-benefit 
analysis in pursuit of our appetitive desires and material wants. So, for example, 
Bowell and Kemp argue that charities that play on our compassion, pity and guilt by 
displaying pictures of pitiful starving children in their advertisements are engaging in 
a ‘rhetorical ploy’ rather than in reasoned argument; whereas a reasoned argument 
would incorporate the premise ‘I should try to alleviate extreme suffering where it’s 
possible for me to do so’ (pp. 117-8). But why assume this premise? Why should we 
try to alleviate suffering or help others in need? Is there any rational justification for 
this altruistic behaviour? The answer, surely, is that there is no rational justification; 
we are speaking, rather, of ethical first principles. The only reason to help is that it is 
right to do so; and we know that it is right to do so precisely because our feelings of 
compassion, pity and guilt are aroused. To act out of compassion is to act morally. 
Indeed, we would think it very odd if parents thought it necessary to establish a 
rational justification for caring for their children or people thought it necessary to 




Third (as I argued earlier in this chapter), in rhetorical argument, weight or 
preponderance of evidence is usually the deciding factor, just as it is in a court of law 
- in which case, there can be no requirement that each strand of the argument has 
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 Even if we allow the possibility of Kantian transcendental moral imperatives (for example, in 
framing universal human rights), there still remains the need to address a range of broader ethical 
questions concerning how we should live our lives - as I argued in Chapter 1. 
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 Bowell and Kemp admit at one point in their guide to critical thinking that expected value cost-
benefit calculations might be ‘overridden by the existence of rights or moral rules’ (p. 206), and that 
courses in ethics or moral philosophy might help with moral dilemmas. But they do not attempt to 
incorporate a moral or ethical dimension into critical thinking. I think the implications are much more 




deductive validity or inductive force
35
. So, for example, generalisation to the present 
on the basis of past evidence or experience is an important part of rhetorical 
argument, but as reasoning it has neither deductive nor inductive validity. 
 
In summary, then, critical thinking is useful in so far as it identifies valid and 
invalid inferences, but it needs to be incorporated as part of the much broader 




In this chapter, I have argued that the practical judgement necessary to lead a 
virtuous life and to reconcile or choose between conflicting goods might, in part, be 
cultivated by a liberal education in the spirit of the rhetorical ideal. This would 
involve, on the one hand, reconceptualising literacy as the art of developing and 
structuring an argument (the art of prose composition or ‘rhetoric’), and, on the 
other, of reconceptualising the humanities as funds of stories of human experience – 
a moral and cultural inheritance - whose ethical and political themes could be treated 
rhetorically. Rhetoric would thereby become the organising or ‘core’ discipline of a 
school curriculum centred on the humanities, the aim of which was to cultivate 
practical judgement; and it would achieve this end by considering the judgements 
made by real and imaginary people in the light of the core virtues whose habituation 
I argued for in Part 1.  Though a full-blown training in rhetoric – a training in the art 
of political oratory - would require specialist disciplinary study of an intellectually 
highly demanding nature, the core of the school curriculum could be reconceived in 
the spirit of the rhetorical ideal, with the discipline of rhetoric taught to a basic level 
(i.e. as a sort of basic literacy) and applied to themes of general interest and 
relevance, and thereby be made accessible to all pupils. It follows that neither the 
cultivation of literary taste, nor a training in the classical languages, nor a training in 
                                                          
35
 It is curious that Bowell and Kemp allow that weight of evidence can apply in a court of law – that 
several items of evidence might ‘point jointly to the defendant’s guilt’ even though, taken 
individually, they lack inductive force in the sense of appealing to definite probabilities or rational 
expectations (pp. 98-101); but fail to recognise that this is precisely the nature of rhetorical argument 




the scientific method (whatever its undoubted merits) is central to the task of liberal 
education conceived in the rhetorical sense – i.e. as aiming to cultivate the capacity 
to make practical judgements on human affairs as part of a general education 
accessible to all pupils.  
 
An important question however remains to be addressed. I have argued in this 
chapter that a liberal rhetorical education cultivates the capacity to make practical 
judgements that are informed by a rich vein of moral or ethical knowledge 
concerning the nature of the good life, human nature, the virtues, and the conflicting 
ends and moral dilemmas that characterise human life. And I argued in the last 
chapter that a liberal education conceived in the spirit of the research ideal, and 
realised through specialist study, is an excellent way of cultivating the intellectual 
virtues necessary for engaging in the practices of adult life, and thereby realising the 
goods that are central to leading a fulfilled life. But going back to the argument I 
developed in Chapter 2, the realisation of all these liberal aims is dependent crucially 
on the habituation of moral virtue – i.e. the formation of character. Stories of 
experience are all very well but it is through real, not vicarious, experience that the 
moral virtues are habituated and a person is endowed with the will to put judgements 
into action.    
  
This is the realm of character training. The question we now need to address, 
then, is ‘what form might this character training take?’ I shall explore this in the next 








In Chapter 4, I proposed that the core virtues necessary for human flourishing in 
a liberal democracy might be grouped into five broad categories: the intellectual 
virtues; the caring virtues; justice; courage and honesty (the virtues of moral 
integrity); and temperance. We saw in Chapter 6 how the intellectual virtues (the 
virtues of work) might be cultivated through specialisation and the engagement in 
practices at school. Here, I shall consider how the other categories of virtue - the 
moral virtues - might best be cultivated.  
 
I argued in Chapter 7 that ‘stories of human experience’ drawn from literature 
and history, and from film and television, are invaluable in providing ethical models 
and exemplars on which a practical judgement might in part be founded; or 
alternatively, in providing examples of situations in which a different or a better 
judgement could have been made, or in which a moral dilemma arose. In Roman 
education, carefully graduated exercises in composing a rhetorical argument (the 
progymnasmata) drew on the humanities in precisely this respect – for example, the 
suasoria, in which students had to imagine themselves facing a critical situation or 
dilemma drawn from history and making a judgement. But models and exemplars of 
ethical behaviour, of virtuous action, are perhaps of less use in fostering the will to 
act on a moral judgement, in translating good intentions into action. Even more 
problematic in this respect are forms of moral education that attempt to provide 
principles of moral action and examine how a range of (apparent) moral dilemmas 
might be resolved through the application of these principles. As Nel Noddings and 
Michael Slote note, students often find it difficult to engage in moral analysis of 
artificial problems because these lack real characters and real settings; in fact, they 
are apt to find the whole exercise boring (Noddings & Slote, 2003, p. 354). Paul 
Standish refers to the ‘air of unreality’ that classroom discussions of ethical 
dilemmas can take on - discussions that are too abstract and remote from the lives of 




pupils need to be engaged at a deeper level of interest and motivation that ‘virtue 
ethics’ - a tradition of ethical thought originating with Aristotle that insists that 
central to moral education is the habituation of certain desirable ethical dispositions, 
or virtues - has arisen. In order to develop the will to act morally, we need to 
concentrate on training, forming or building ‘character’.  
 
However, talk of character building in education (or ‘character education’) tends 
to conjure up images of team sports, long-distance runs, cold showers, adventurous 
activities, military training, and the inculcation of self-control and self-discipline – 
all things that are traditionally associated with the English public school. Nowadays, 
this sort of character training carries with it connotations of mindless conditioning 
and it is generally disparaged by educationalists. Yet if it is accepted that moral 
values in the form of certain virtues need to be habituated (the position I argued in 
Chapter 2) there is no alternative to some form of character training; and there may, I 
shall argue, be much to be learned from the public schools in this respect. I shall also 
argue in this chapter that the most radical and cogent critique of liberal education - 
liberal in the academic disciplinary sense - comes from Nel Noddings, who argues 
that education should be founded on an ethics of care; that its prime aim should be to 
produce, not rational decision-makers (important though this is), but caring people; 
and that to develop the capacity to respond caringly to others involves the 
habituation of certain moral virtues
1
, albeit rather different ones from the stoic 
virtues implicated above. One way or another, moral education in the form of 
character training – or ‘character building’, as I shall henceforth term it2 - is central 
to the educational endeavour.  
 
In this chapter, I shall consider three specific approaches to character building: 
(1) through character training, (2) through challenging activity, and (3) through 
service to others; and I shall, in the process, reflect further on the nature of the 
virtues and on whether the Aristotelian conception of their acquisition – habituation - 
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 Noddings specifically emphasises the need for certain attitudes and ways of looking at the world to 
be induced, for minds to be shaped, through practice (Noddings, 1992, pp. 23-4). 
2
 The term ‘character training’ carries connotations of militaristic discipline and mindless 
conditioning that I wish to avoid; I shall therefore distinguish it from ‘character building’. The 
‘experience learning’ I am largely concerned with in this chapter does not involve any such training or 




is an adequate one. I conclude by considering two radical challenges to traditional 
notions of character building: the ‘ethics of care’ of Nel Noddings, and the ‘ethics of 
the Other’ associated with the work of Emmanuel Levinas.  
 
Virtue through character training 
 
A range of virtues has traditionally been fostered in English public schools by 
means of a strong ethos, generally Christian, which permeates the life of the school. 
This ethos is centred on various virtues (these include the selfless moral virtues of 
kindness, thoughtfulness and consideration of the feelings of others; respect; and a 
host of other virtues centred around hard work, self-discipline, perseverance and 
endurance) that are constantly reinforced in all the activities pupils undertake, both 
inside and outside the classroom - through teaching, through modelling and example, 
and through reward systems. State schools in England have come increasingly to 
recognise the value and importance of having some such ethos. Primary schools put 
great emphasis on fostering caring virtues and attitudes, often in very difficult 
circumstances, and not always parental support. Programmes of personal, social and 
health education (PSHE) are an important vehicle for this and complement the 
reinforcement of the values of the school mission statement and code of behaviour in 
all aspects of school life. Central to the success claimed for academy schools 
(independently sponsored state funded secondary schools) is a renewed emphasis on 
ethos. Though driven by the need to raise standards of achievement and maximise 
exam results (in the form of the percentage of pupils gaining five or more ‘good 
GCSEs’), the emphasis on ethos clearly involves the inculcation and reinforcement 
of a range of values and virtues. At Mossbourne Academy, for example, the core 
values are ‘discipline, respect, hard work and politeness’ (Adonis, 2012, p. 4). 
Though the academy programme is controversial (the claims made for it regarding 
academic performance particularly so), most commentators would agree that there 
have been marked improvements in behaviour and attitude in schools such as 
Mossbourne, whose predecessor, Hackney Downs School, was shut down after 




However, ‘character education’ has had its greatest impact in American schools. 
A concern shared across the political spectrum to address growing violence and lack 
of respect in schools, has led over the past two decades to a wholesale rejection of 
the ‘values clarification’ approach to moral education (the notion that pupils should 
be given the intellectual tools to make their own value judgements) that became 
prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s and its replacement by a host of ‘character 
education’ programmes designed to instil certain core values3. And this has led, in 
turn, to a wealth of research literature and commentary, both supportive and critical.  
 
Before considering the arguments for and against character education, we need 
to identify the various methods and strategies that are most commonly incorporated 
under the general rubric, not all of which strictly involve ‘character training’. I 
would identify five conceptually distinct dimensions to character education, five 
distinct components that frequently form part of programmes of character education: 
(1) character training through modelling and external reinforcement; (2) moral 
education, involving direct instruction and discussion; (3) behaviour management 
programmes; (4) the cultivation of democratic civic values through the institution of 
a democratic community (the school becomes a democracy in miniature); and (5) 
community service. Character training is premised on the Aristotelian belief that 
virtue is cultivated through repeated practice – through a sort of ‘moral calisthenics’ 
that develops ‘the appropriate moral muscles’ (Davis, 2003, p. 37). The pedagogic 
means by which the virtues are habituated include teachers ‘modelling’ the virtues; 
the explicit statement and reiteration of specific core virtues of character; strict rules 
of conduct; positive reinforcement through praise, reward and recognition; stories 
that exemplify the virtues; and the use of motivational posters, slogans and mantras. 
In these ways, a strong ‘ethos’ is created that permeates the school. Moral education 
involves direct instruction in the virtues, and might well include the straightforward 
telling of stories that exemplify the virtues; but it also extends to incorporate 
discussion of the nature of the virtues, of how they might be exercised in particular 
situations, and of moral dilemmas. The aim is to cultivate good character by 
cultivating the capacity to make moral judgements. Behaviour management 
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 Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were both strong supporters of ‘character education’ 




programmes aim to promote positive behaviour and positive attitudes by developing 
‘emotional literacy’, well-being and specific social skills (e.g. ‘conflict resolution’ 
and ‘stress management’), rather than character dispositions or virtues as such. Civic 
and democratic virtues (e.g. respect for others, the willingness to subject beliefs and 
opinions to rational scrutiny) are fostered through the institution in schools of a 
democratic community. And, finally, community service fosters respect for others, 
an understanding of the needs of others, and the caring virtues.  
 
It is important to recognise that criticism of character education centres largely 
on the first of these dimensions or elements, namely on ‘character training’. With the 
exception of what I term behaviour management programmes (which fall outside the 
ambit of this thesis, and are therapeutic rather than ‘character building’), the other 
elements of character education I have listed are not particularly controversial. I have 
already argued for moral education, in the sense of equipping pupils with the 
capacity to make practical judgements (through moral instruction and rhetorical 
training drawing on the humanities), and I will argue later in this chapter for service 
education. Few would dispute that the classroom should, among other things, be a 
forum for debate, rational discussion and the cultivation of democratic values. The 
real problems arise with character training; and I shall henceforth refer to criticisms 
of ‘character education’ as criticisms of ‘character training’, unless any of the other 
elements listed above are implicated.  
 
Let us review the main criticisms that have been levelled at character training 
programmes in schools.  
 
First, it is argued that there is no evidence that character training programmes 
work. The most thorough and extensive piece of research is probably that 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education and carried out by the Social 
and Character Development Research Consortium (2010) into school programmes 
designed to promote social and character development - or ‘SACDs’. The project 




and the report (published in October 2010) concluded that there was ‘no evidence 
that the SADC programmes improved student outcomes’ (p. xli).4 
 
Second, it is unclear how behaviourist conditioning would promote the 
internalisation of moral attitudes, so that moral behaviour could be sustained outside 
school and into adult life. Michael Davis argues that even if there were evidence of 
significant short-term effects on pupils’ behaviour at school, this would not 
constitute evidence of significant long-term effects on pupils’ character - i.e. of 
effects that outlast school and influence the behaviour of pupils in the adult world. In 
fact, there has been no such long-term research, and it is in any case unclear how 
long-term character effects could be measured or tracked once pupils leave school 
(Davis, 2003, pp. 39-42). 
 
Third, for pupils and adults to exercise the virtues in the complex situations of 
real life requires not merely habituation but moral judgement (Davis, 2003, pp. 42-
5), not merely imitation but emulation (Sanderse, 2013, pp. 36-7). Emotion, instinct 
and habit are not enough. Otherwise, as Aristotle warns, virtues can easily become 
vices, which is why Aristotle appointed practical reason (phronesis) the architectonic 
virtue
5
. Otherwise, there is nothing to distinguish good character education from 
totalitarian indoctrination. The point is not that there should be no reinforcement of 
‘good’ behaviour in schools or that there should be no rules and rewards; rather that 
character education and moral education must go hand in hand if the former is to 
have any long-term effect.
6
   
 
                                                          
4
 The student outcomes used to evaluate the effectiveness of SACD programmes in developing 
character and social skills include ‘altruistic behaviour’, ‘self-efficacy for peer interaction’, ‘positive 
social behaviour’, ‘positive school orientation’ and ‘feelings of safety’ along with the corresponding 
negative behavioural attributes. These are measured using sets of scales completed by pupils, teachers 
and parents (Social and Character Development Research Consortium, 2010, pp. xxx-xxxi).   
5
 ‘Virtue then is a settled disposition … consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative 
to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it. And it is a 
mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect’ (Aristotle, 1996, p. 41). 
6
 I argued in Part 1 that practical judgement (phronesis) could not usefully be conceived as an 
architectonic virtue, rather that it is the outcome of a concurrent process of habit formation and moral 




Fourth, character training represents the re-assertion of traditional conservative 
values and, as such, is an unjustified reaction to perceived moral decline. The 
argument is (1) that there is no ‘moral decline’ or ‘moral crisis’ as such; and (2) that 
if there are social and behavioural problems in schools, the root causes lie outside in 
social and economic conditions, particularly in growing levels of inequality. It is 
these that need to be addressed.  
 
Fifth, Michael Davis argues - convincingly I think - that the notion that teachers 
can ‘model’ the character virtues - is inherently flawed. The problem is that to act 
virtuously in the Aristotelian sense involves acting for the right reason, with the right 
motive, and as the situation demands - and therefore cannot be consciously staged 
for imitation. Either a person (i.e. the teacher) is virtuous and has no need to ‘model’ 
virtuous behaviour, or they are not virtuous and the attempt to model virtuous 
behaviour will be a charade (Davis, 2003, p. 45-7).  
 
Sixth, the practice of ‘catching’ pupils or students doing the right thing and 
praising or rewarding it can backfire. On the one hand, there is the danger of 
focusing attention on extrinsic rewards rather than intrinsic motives (that virtue is its 
own reward); and on the other, there is the danger of embarrassing the pupil 
concerned and making them reluctant to act virtuously (at least in public) in the 
future (Davis, 2003, p. 48-9).   
 
There is, I think, force to all these objections to character training programmes
7
 - 
though it could be argued that good behaviour is still of value because it enhances 
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 There is a more general ‘situationist’ critique of virtue ethics as a whole from the perspective of 
social psychology. The argument is that people’s behaviour is usually better explained by the situation 
or role they find themselves in than by putative character virtues. A famous series of experiments 
conducted by Milgram (in which participants feel obliged to give the supposed victim electric 
shocks), Zimbardo (in which participants acting as prison guards engage in various barbarities under 
the influence of their supposed peers) and Darley and Batson (in which students who believe they are 
in a hurry fail to help an apparently distressed bystander) appears to confirm this thesis (see Oakley, 
2013, pp. 1-3). But all these experiments assume that the ordinary person is ordinarily virtuous. Little 
or no attempt is made (and perhaps none could practically be made) to distinguish between people 
who really are virtuous (who have had had character virtues instilled deeply in them - assuming this to 
be possible) and those who have not. As Thomas Nadelhoffer remarks, that ‘situational forces can 
sometimes trump dispositional traits when it comes to moral behavior’ is merely ‘a reminder of just 




pupils’ learning, which enables a range of moral and intellectual virtues to be 
acquired through the engagement in practices, and that in this indirect way, the 
enforcement of high standards of behaviour can potentially have a significant effect 
on character. However, contrary to the research I cited concluding that character 
training programmes do not work, Wouter Sanderse has argued that character 
education in the form of role modelling (‘understood as a kind of Aristotelian 
habituation’ – Sanderse, 2013, p. 35) is potentially highly effective; and in its 
‘Framework for Character Education in Schools’, Birmingham University’s ‘Jubilee 
Centre for Character and Values’ argues that ‘character is largely caught through 
role-modelling and emotional contagion: school culture and ethos are therefore 
essential’ (Jubilee Centre for Character & Values, n.d.). I think that school ethos is 
indeed essential, and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the behaviour of 
pupils in schools, along with their academic performance, can be transformed by 
instilling certain core values. However, as Michael Davis warns, improved behaviour 
at the school level does not necessarily translate into a lasting effect on students’ 
characters; and we have ‘no widely accepted scientific study showing the 
effectiveness of simple character education [character education understood as 
habituation] in or out of schools’ (Davis, 2003, p. 40).  
 
I suspect that much of the problem lies in an over-emphasis in character 
education programmes on the possibility that teachers can consciously model the 
virtues and thereby habituate them in pupils and students. Sanderse points to the 
need for teachers ‘to model moral actions and emotions’ (Sanderse, 2013, p. 36) both 
through behavioural conditioning (with rewards and incentives) and through a ‘more 
cognitive kind of modelling’ in which they ‘explain to children why they act the way 
they do’, ‘verbalise their goals and strategies as they deal with moral quandaries’ (p. 
35). Students thereby learn not merely to imitate but to emulate their role models, to 
apply their moral understanding intelligently and flexibly. In order to be effective 
role models, teachers also need to reflect individually and as a team on such 
questions as ‘What virtues do I/we want to be a model of? Why do I/we want to 
model these character traits? How can I/we model these virtues best?’ (p. 38). But as 
Davis notes, the very notion that virtues can be modelled is conceptually and morally 




circumstances; to attempt to exemplify the virtues by modelling is therefore not to 
behave virtuously. For example, to treat a person with respect ‘cannot be modelled 
because ... treating with respect includes an intention or motive that cannot be 
staged’ (Davis, 2003, p. 46). I think teachers and parents should certainly try to 
behave virtuously, to serve as good role models for their students and children, and 
to engage in moral instruction and discussion. But the sort of modelling proposed by 
Sanderse has a lack of authenticity about it that might well prove counterproductive.  
 
Moreover, there is, in the absence of empirical evidence, an over-reliance on 
Albert Bandura’s social learning theory in justifying modelling as a means of 
learning. According to Sanderse, Bandura’s research affirms ‘that modelling is a 
powerful process that can account for diverse forms of learning’ and that ‘Children 
can learn new patterns of behaviour vicariously, that is without actually performing 
actions or receiving rewards’ (Sanderse, 2013, p. 35). Bandura’s celebrated Bobo 
doll experiment is the one usually cited. Young children who were shown a film of 
adults behaving aggressively towards a large inflated clown that sprang back upright 
when knocked down subsequently behaved aggressively towards it themselves. But 
as Michael Eysenck notes, caution is needed in interpreting the experiment. First, 
‘children tend not to imitate aggressive behaviour towards another child’; and 
second, ‘children who had not seen such a doll before were five times more likely to 
imitate the aggressive behaviour of an adult model against it than were children who 
were familiar with it’ – in other words, ‘the novelty value of the Bobo doll is 
important’ (Eysenck, 1998, p. 457). This suggests that vicarious modelling might not 
be as effective as Sanderse assumes, and that habituation is most likely to be 
effective when virtuous acts are habitually performed in meaningful circumstances.   
 
However, my main interest in this chapter is a form of character building that 
does not involve the modelling and reinforcement of certain ‘target virtues’, but 
rather that forces the participant to draw on their own inner resources (to find 
character strengths within themselves), to realise their interdependence on others, 
and so discover for themselves the value of selfless action. This form of character 




emphasis in schools on character training has been complemented more recently, 
particularly in some public schools (Gordonstoun was the pioneer), by an emphasis 
on the value of experiential learning as a means of cultivating character, not only in 
the traditional form of team games, but in the form of adventurous and challenging 
activities, and service to the community. The educational and therapeutic value of 
learning through experience has, of course, other antecedents than the English public 
school. John Dewey was an influential advocate (though we should, I think, take care 
to distinguish the argument that all pupils should be ‘active learners’ in the 
classroom, which I questioned in Chapter 7, from the argument that character might 
be developed through challenging activity outside the classroom); and experiential 
education is now widely used as a form of psychotherapy in dealing particularly with 
troubled teenagers. Here I shall consider the value of the two main forms of 
experiential education: (1) learning through the engagement in adventurous and 
challenging activities, and (2) learning through service to the community.  
 
Virtue through challenging activity  
 
In Ancient Greece, physical education and athletics played an important role in 
education, in part because the Greeks had an ideal of physical beauty, and in part out 
of military necessity. However, the idea that character might be formed through 
physical activity, in particular through team games, has its origins in the nineteenth-
century English public school. Thomas Arnold of Rugby School was the first to 
recognise the potential educational value of organised team games and the idea was 
quickly taken up by other public schools. Inspired in part by notions of medieval 
chivalry, it came to be believed that, if played in the right spirit, team games were a 
superb means of building character - of fostering courage, endurance and, above all, 
the willingness to sacrifice one’s own selfish interest to the common good. Cyril 
Norwood, then headmaster of Harrow School, encapsulated this ideal in the 1920s in 





Selfishness, the desire at all costs to shine individually, is the cardinal sin … 
It can only be played by those who are … gentlemen. It is a test of character. 
(Norwood, 1929, p. 104) 
 
A whole culture of sportsmanship and gentlemanly behaviour grew up around 
these team games and stock idioms like ‘it’s not cricket’ and ‘he’s a good sport’ 
became part of the language. Team games continue to be valued, especially in 
English public schools (witness the ritual of ‘three cheers for the opposition’), 
largely for their character building value; and the sentiment that team sports should 
remain the province of amateurs (or ‘gentlemen-amateurs’) - that they should not be 
professionalised - still finds expression today.    
 
However, it is obvious to anyone who has taught games (I am speaking here of 
the traditional team ball games) that not all pupils have the aptitude or personality to 
gain very much from the experience; indeed, many adults look back with loathing on 
their experience of enforced team games at school. This often applies to pupils who 
have artistic or intellectual sensibilities, but also applies to those who, by virtue of 
their personality, are simply not ‘team-players’8. Moreover, it is not clear that those 
who are most proficient at team games are necessarily always the ones with the most 
admirable or virtuous characters
9




Kurt Hahn and ‘Outward Bound’ 
 
The idea that character might be formed through a range of challenging activities 
and experiences, not merely through team games, came a little later and formed the 
                                                          
8
 The Duke of Wellington is a good example. He refused to participate in team games throughout his 
school career at Eton, preferring to spend his time jumping backwards and forwards over a ditch. And 
yet his courage and leadership qualities came to be renowned.   
9
 I speak here from personal experience of teaching rugby, football and cricket to boys some three 
afternoons a week over ten years.  
10 I think that Anthony O’Hear and Marc Sidwell’s argument that ‘music and dance, gymnastic and 
sporting instruction’ will produce a ‘liberally educated character’ is even more optimistic (O’Hear & 
Sidwell, 2009, p. 15). One thinks of Reinhard Heydrich, the liberally educated Nazi, who was well-





core of Kurt Hahn’s programme at Gordonstoun. Hahn’s educational philosophy 
centred on the notion that that through being physically tested and challenged, and 
through serving others, pupils might discover and realise themselves. On the one 
hand, they learn the value of cooperation and teamwork; on the other, they learn self-
reliance. Prince Philip, a famous product of Hahn’s schools, writes that it was 
probably Hahn’s experience of Nazi Germany (from which he had to flea) that 
‘made Hahn so aware of the need to encourage boys to develop as responsible 
individuals; strong enough in mind and character to reject the standards of the mob 
and to resist the temptation to run with the herd’ (Philip, 1970, p. xi). Robert 
Skidelsky, on the other hand, complains that Gordonstoun boys are ‘not remarkable 
for their independence of thought’, even that ‘his [Hahn’s] products do not go out 
into the world with the object of changing it: they retreat into worlds of their own’ 
(Skidelsky, 1969, pp. 237 & 239). There is no way of telling whether or not 
Skidelsky is right here, but if there is truth in what he says, two possible reasons are 
(1) an over-emphasis in the Gordonstoun curriculum on physical as opposed to 
mental challenge (the great outdoors as opposed to the life of the mind), and (2) the 
fact that whereas a great deal of time is devoted to physical training and games, 
relatively little is devoted to expeditions and service. Skidelsky criticises Hahn for 
his totalitarian approach to realising his vision of the active responsible citizen, an 
approach that would seem to militate against pupils working out their views and 
beliefs for themselves; but Hahn’s concern (perhaps obsession) with training plans to 
produce physical fitness and team games to produce a spirit of cooperation and 
mutual interdependence (the source of much of what Skidelsky finds objectionable) 
can probably be detached from the ‘experience therapy’ itself. In fact, teamwork and 
physical fitness can just as well be fostered through the engagement in challenging 
expeditions and adventurous pursuits, activities that do not require formal discipline 
or compulsion. 
 
The original and valuable insight of Hahn’s - muddied perhaps by his 
authoritarian insistence on training plans, cold showers and team games - is that self-
realisation is best achieved through challenging activity and through service to 
others. The contribution that ‘experience therapy’ might make to character building 




Tom Price (1970), who describes his experience of Outward Bound schools - schools 
which were directly inspired by Hahn’s educational thinking. The first thing Price 
insists is that the aim is not to produce a certain sort of person with a particular code 
of values; not even (contrary to what one might have expected) to produce 
‘leadership qualities’ - he notes the unpleasant connotations, the suggestion of 
superiority; rather, to help and encourage young people to discover for themselves 
‘what are life’s truest values’ (Price, 1970, p. 87). For this reason, none of the 
activities are compulsory and nobody is excluded on grounds of lack of fitness, 
physical strength or aptitude. He even objects to the term ‘character building’ on 
these grounds, though he admits that ‘character training’ would be even worse. 
However, Price testifies to the remarkable transforming effect that a month’s 
residential course can have on pupils usually aged 14 to 16, and chosen from a wide 
range of backgrounds. Among the benefits he details are the following: perseverance 
and commitment to seeing a task through; learning to trust and cooperate with others 
as part of a team; enlargement of mind and spirit; willingness to take on 
responsibility and lead if the situation demands; self-confidence and self-belief; 
optimism and hope for the future; enterprise and energy; and the courage to face fear 
and overcome it (pp. 81-91). This is an impressive list. If only some of what Price 
claims is true, the potential value of ‘experience therapy’ goes well beyond the 
‘mere’ habituation of certain desirable behavioural dispositions (the selfless virtues) 
to include a deeper sense of well-being – psychological, emotional and spiritual.    
 
It might be objected that some pupils – the more introverted ones, perhaps – 
would hate this experience. But I think the lack of compulsion and formal discipline, 
things that markedly distinguish Outward Bound from organised team games in 
schools, tell against this. It is the element of challenge and subsequent sense of 
achievement that is paramount.      
 
Virtue through service 
 
If adventurous and challenging activity is one side of the coin of experience 




public school curriculum; indeed, Cyril Norwood thought it important enough to 
make it one of five pillars of his English ideal of education (the others were religion, 
discipline, culture, and athletics). The public school conception of service was a mix 
of the Christian ideal that one should ‘love thy neighbour’, the civic ideal of public 
duty, and practical community service. The latter took the straightforward form of 
charity and was focused on helping the unfortunate poor. A more sophisticated 
notion of service to the community later formed the other part Hahn’s ‘experience 
therapy’. At Gordonstoun it originally took the form of sea and mountain rescue, and 
the manning of the school’s own fire brigade. The idea was that by working as part 
of a team and risking one’s safety in order to help others, pupils would, once again, 
realise themselves. The problem was that opportunities to rescue people were not all 
that frequent, and so a number of other types of service have subsequently been 
introduced, ranging from community service with the elderly or children with special 
needs, to conservation work and first aid. The Duke of Edinburgh’s award scheme, 
also inspired by Hahn, has had an impact in schools across the country. Service 
features strongly in it, and hundreds of thousands of young people have undertaken 
it, but it is of course voluntary. Service volunteers have also long been a staple of 
school clubs and societies, but their role has been only extra-curricular.  
 
However, the most significant examples of service being incorporated into the 
curriculum in more recent years are probably in America, both in schools and in 
colleges – particularly liberal arts colleges.  
 
Thomas Lickona (1992) documents a range of ways in which American schools 
have sought to foster a caring attitude through service to others: older pupils acting 
as referees and games coaches for younger pupils
11; the ‘buddy’ system in which 
older pupils ‘adopt’ younger pupils and engage in activities ranging from reading to 
field trips
12
; cross-age tutoring; big brother and big sister programmes in which 
younger children from deprived or difficult backgrounds are paired with older 
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 I have seen this in action in a neighbouring primary school here in England and was impressed by 
the sense of responsibility demonstrated by some quite young pupils – 10 and 11 year-olds - in these 
roles.  
12





teenagers to ‘play ball, take a walk, go for an ice-cream, or just talk’ once a week; 
and special service projects in the community (community service programmes) - for 
example, caring for young children in neighbouring day-care centres, leading 
learning activities in elementary school classes, caring for handicapped children, and 
visiting elderly residents (Lickona, 1992, pp. 312-8). However, he notes that 
‘educating children to care about others ultimately means educating them in social 
justice’ (p. 319). Service learning has the dual aim of fostering caring individuals 
and concerned citizens.  
 
The ‘service-learning’ movement in American liberal arts colleges (documented 
by Joseph DeVitis, Robert Johns and Douglas Simpson in To Serve and Learn 
(1998)) is particularly impressive; and thought it is college rather than school based, 
there is, I think, much to be learned here that is relevant to school education. The 
programmes are integrated into the curriculum (as opposed to being extra-
curricular), organised with great care and thoroughness, and have been subject to 
evaluation and research studies for many years. If one had to encapsulate the aim in a 
single phrase, it would be ‘to unify liberal learning with moral purpose’ (I am 
quoting from the mission statement of the Salem College service programme - Farris 
& Kelly, 1998, p. 43).  
 
The interest, so far as this thesis is concerned, is whether a corresponding 
programme could be implemented in schools in this country. American ‘service-
learning’ is generally at second-year undergraduate level, but this is, in part, because 
of the perceived need to underpin practical experience with relevant social and 
political theory. Pupils or students obviously need a certain level of maturity to be 
able to engage in community service and to be able to reflect on their experiences, 
but it may well be possible to integrate a service component into the last two years of 
the secondary curriculum – i.e. for all 14 to 16 year-olds.   
 
The American service-learning programmes involve a range of domestic and 
international placements – for example, working with the homeless, illiterate adults, 




from 30 hours (considered much too short by those involved) to 3 months, typically 
in the second year of study at a liberal arts college. For example, at Goshen College 
in Indiana, students are put on placements of several months in countries such as 
Costa Rica, Indonesia, and the Ivory Coast, where they live with local families and 
after an initial period of formal cultural and language studies, in which they are 
acclimatised, are relocated to a second host family in a rural area on a service 
assignment. On the assignment they might have to work, help, instruct or simply act 
as ‘a presence’ – for example, living in a refugee camp or accompanying an 
ambulance driver on long runs, or joining the staff of a reform school. At Goshen, 
ten different possible ‘models of service’ (roles they might have to play) are 
identified for students to think about in the course of their preparation: student (who 
is there to learn about the host culture), neighbour, servant (who does the chores), 
healer, teacher, batting coach (who shows people how to do things better), animator, 
good Samaritan, inquirer and diplomat (Hess, 1998, p. 132) – though, of course, 
these roles are not mutually exclusive (and perhaps ‘friend’ could have been added 
to this list). Other colleges place more explicit emphasis on developing students’ 
political awareness of the needs of minorities, to the extent that at Trinity College, 
Vermont, the Christian creed of faith, hope and love is translated into a call for 
social, economic and political transformation (i.e. they are taught liberation 
theology) and students are called on ‘to be in solidarity with those who are 
oppressed’ (Davis & Dodge, 1998, p. 95); and at West Virginia Wesleyan College, 
where there is a ‘Student Literacy Corps’, Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed is the 
core text of the preparatory class-based course (O’ Halloran, 1998, p. 78). There is a 
distinct flavour of political indoctrination here, and there are obvious dangers in the 
automatic association of poverty or minority status with oppression, as in the 
assumption that the solution involves the wholesale rejection of existing ‘power’ 
structures and the institution of a utopian state in which all are freed from 
exploitation. But there is no reason that liberation theology, critical pedagogy and 
Freire should not be studied, discussed and argued – so long as the argument is a 
balanced one.   
 
Research undertaken on the outcomes of the Goshen programme suggest that 




ways: their ‘world view’ - including their awareness of peoples and cultures other 
than their own, and their awareness of the experience of minorities - has changed; 
their interest in the welfare of others, together with their empathy for and their sense 
of identification with others whose situations are very different from their own, has 
increased; and their sense of self-belief, vocation and autonomy (their personal 
development or growth) has been enhanced. Students typically rank service as ‘the 
best of their college experiences’ and interestingly ‘after graduation, that valuation 
seems to rise’ (Hess, 1998, p. 138). Programmes at other liberal arts colleges seem to 
produce similar results. Rick Fairbanks and Tim Foss report that at St Olaf College 
in Minnesota, students returning from service in Indonesia ‘talk in terms of self-
transformation … but we are hard-pressed to understand or explain this 
transformation’ (Fairbanks & Foss, 1998, p. 159); students there ‘typically describe 
the experience as life-changing’ (p. 155). Barbara Tazewell reports that at St 
Augustine’s College in North Carolina (where, interestingly, England and France 
rank with Jamaica and Ecuador as destinations for service), the benefits deriving 
from ‘increase in self-esteem … are immeasurable’ (Tazewell, 1998, p. 153); and 
students talk movingly of experiences that will affect them and stay with them for 
the rest of their lives (Schultz & Brown, 1998, pp. 149-52). Steven Schultz and 
Stacia Brown report that at Westmont College in California, which operates an urban 
programme in San Francisco, students typically describe their experiences in phrases 
such as ‘my most important semester at college’ and ‘the most vital learning I have 
ever done’ (p. 64).  
 
So what are we to make of service-learning? The testimonies of the volunteers 
are impressive. As in the case of Hahn’s challenging activities (as implemented in 
the Outward Bound schools), experiences are invariably life transforming. A key 
difference is that in the case of service, there seems to be a greater emphasis on the 
fostering of a social and political conscience – as perhaps one might expect; on a 
willingness to engage politically with issues such as poverty and injustice as well as 
a desire ‘merely’ to serve others in need. How much this results from the experience 
of service and how much from the accompanying programme of seminars and 
discussions on wider political and social issues is difficult to say. On the other hand, 




different in nature, they have an important thing in common: by facing challenge and 
adversity, pupils or students have to draw on their inner resources – personal, 
intellectual and spiritual - and in so doing ‘grow’ as people. In fact, service 
assignments are quite possibly the more challenging in the physical, emotional and 
psychological demands they make: compare, for example the challenge of climbing a 
mountain with the challenge of working in a refugee camp. Moreover, in the course 
of a service assignment, the student might be on their own for weeks on end – which, 
of course, makes the demands that much greater. The words of Tom Price in relation 
to Outward Bound therefore apply just as well to service: young people ‘discover for 
themselves … what are life’s truest values’ (Price, 1970, p. 87).  
 
Habituation or experience? 
 
The language used in evaluating experience (or experiential) learning of any 
kind is inevitably fuzzy and imprecise - we talk in terms of personal growth, inner 
resources, self-belief, self-reliance, self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-perceptions and 
self-concept - because we are trying to describe what is going on when a person’s 
attitudes and behaviour are transformed as the result of an experience. We do not 
understand exactly what is going on and we are unsure in what terms to describe it. 
For one thing, the words and their concepts overlap quite a lot. Do we talk of the 
emotions, the intellect, or behavioural responses? Do we talk of attitudes, 
dispositions, motives, values or beliefs? Do we speak of personal qualities, 
attributes, capacities, virtues or personality traits? Or do we speak of some 
combination of all of these? To even attempt to explain human behaviour in terms of 
internal psychological processes and various ‘constructs’ (which research seems to 
demand) may be misconceived since self-categorizations – our perceptions of 
ourselves - are not determined by some fixed mental structure or set of personal 
attributes, but are social representations that depict the individual relative to social 
relationships and social contexts that are inherently dynamic and variable (Lyons, 
1998, p. 337). This in turn would explain why experiential learning apparently has 




A particular concern so far as this thesis is concerned is whether we should 
speak of habituating certain virtues – or whether it is better to speak of discovering 
values in ourselves. In this respect, it is significant that Outward Bound type courses 
have marked and long-lasting effects on teenagers typically aged between 14 and 16, 
and that the transformation can be even greater for older students in their early 20s; 
this seems to run against the Aristotelian notion that the virtues must be habituated 
from an early age. Certain virtues - courage, kindness, compassion, a concern for 
fairness and justice, and humility, for example - might well be better conceived as 
inner or latent resources that come to the fore in certain challenging circumstances 
and as a result of certain experiences than as dispositions that must be trained or as 
habits that must be formed and reinforced over a long period of time. The person 
who has had the experience of drawing on these inner resources, and has experienced 
a measure of satisfaction, fulfilment or self-belief as a result, will want to continue to 
test himself in the future. However, there are other virtues that probably do require 
practice and continual reinforcement (i.e. that must be habituated): temperance, 
honesty and good manners, for example – as well as the intellectual virtues. Most of 
the others probably fall somewhere in between.   
 
There are also differences in personality to consider. Introverts generally prefer 
to work alone rather than as part of a team, and therefore team activities (as opposed 
to individual challenges) are likely to appeal less, and consequently be less effective 
as means of ‘character building’13. Moreover, differences in personality and 
temperament – differences which are often apparent from a very early age and which 
may be marked even between siblings – quite possibly do affect the nature of the 
inner resources people have to draw on. People do seem to be more or less 
courageous, fearful, generous or considerate to others – though these dispositions 
can take on different forms in different circumstances. So, for example, to be an 
adventurous sort of person (which is a quality of personality) is to be courageous in 
some circumstances, but not necessarily in others. Another consideration is that to be 
driven by a particular passion or commitment, even to be absorbed by an interest – 
particularly when it is intellectual or artistic – is necessarily to be a selfish person in 
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 Some of the greatest heroes, the greatest models of virtue and character, have been introverts: 




some respects, because unless one is single-minded, the work will never get done. 
And many of the virtues are essentially about being selfless – about considering the 
needs of others.   
 
There are, then, all sorts of complications to consider in relation to the 
habituation of the moral virtues. We cannot simply educate all children (or adults) to 
be a certain sort of person, not because it cannot be done, but because to do so would 
be antithetical to Enlightenment principles of liberal democracy and individualism. 
We can certainly, through the ethos of a school, project and reinforce the values and 
virtues we regard as essential to a civilized liberal democratic society and to 
individual flourishing (including the virtues necessary for engagement in practices). 
And, as I have argued, there are some virtues that probably do require constant 
practice and reinforcement. But beyond this, all we can do is offer a range of 
experiences that will bring out the virtues latent in each child. And activities that 
challenge the child, young person or student – whether adventurous or service-
orientated - seem to be uniquely well suited to the task.  
 
Nel Noddings and an ethics of care 
 
A radical challenge to traditional notions of character training and character 
building is represented by Nel Noddings’ ethics of care. Noddings argues that 
education should be founded on an ethics of care, which reflects the fact that to care 
and be cared for (which might take the form of recognition, understanding, 
compassion, affection, empathy, sympathy or love) is a basic human need 
(Noddings, 1992, pp. xi & 17) - a need that is even more fundamental to our nature 
and humanity than rationality. And yet this essential truth is neglected in a school 
curriculum of academic subject disciplines premised on ‘a narrow form of rationality 
and abstract reasoning as the hallmarks of human life’ (p. 43). This leads Noddings 






First, pupils should be able to engage in activities (whether academic, practical 
or vocational) that reflect their interests, talents and strengths rather than some 
idealised and narrowly intellectual conception of what constitutes an educated 
person; otherwise, many pupils are condemned to failure and inequality. I agree with 
this argument and have argued something very similar in this thesis - though, as I 
argued in relation to Rawls’ egalitarian liberalism, to expect equality of public 
valuation of people’s occupations is unrealistic.  
 
Second, moral education should be re-focused on the need to foster caring 
attitudes (1) by means of teachers establishing (and modelling) caring relations with 
their students, and (2) by providing plenty of opportunities for students to have 
experience and practice in caring - for example, through community service (pp. 24-
5).  
 
The problem with traditional approaches to moral education, argues Noddings, is 
that they either seek to equip pupils with certain virtues, armed with which they can 
go into the world and lead exemplary lives (often with an emphasis on the heroic 
male virtues of courage, perseverance and endurance - rather than on the quieter, 
more feminine, ‘domestic’ virtues); or they seek to equip pupils with the capacity to 
make optimal rational decisions premised on universal moral principles in situations 
of ‘high moral conflict’. In both cases, what is ignored is who we are as individuals, 
the situation we are in, and, above all, the reciprocal nature of caring human 
relations. The aim of moral education is not to equip pupils to pursue some pre-
formulated ideal of the good life but rather to foster the capacity to establish and 
sustain caring relations between people.    
 
As I noted in the Introduction, this amounts to a radical critique of liberal 
education with implications both for its moral dimension and for the content of the 
curriculum. On the face of it, Noddings’ proposition is (I think) an attractive one; 
and it chimes in many respects with what I have argued in this thesis – in particular, 
with my argument that we should recognise the value of ordinary people’s 




Critics have highlighted a number of potential problems with care ethics: that it 
does not constitute a distinct moral theory but rather is an amalgam of others; that 
virtue ethics can easily incorporate care as one of the virtues; that care ethics focuses 
on personal relations rather than distant others and therefore lacks a broader sense of 
social justice; and finally that it provides little concrete guidance on how to act 
morally or ethically (a criticism that could also be levelled at virtue ethics). 
However, I think there are some specific problems with conceiving the moral or 
ethical life solely in terms of ‘an ethics of care’ – problems that relate to the themes I 
have been developing in this thesis.  
 
First, ‘care’ as conceived by Noddings incorporates and conflates a multitude of 
overlapping dispositions, attitudes, qualities, feelings, interests, passions, 
commitments, values, beliefs, traits and causes. These include love, affection, 
sympathy, compassion, empathy, benevolence, agape, charity, kindness, pity, 
respect, humility, recognition, tolerance, a sense of fairness, courtesy – all of which 
are conceptually complex and arise out of some combination of self-interest (the 
hope of reciprocal favours), rational utilitarian calculation (for example, ‘will I be 
happier as a consequence?’), Kantian moral obligation (or some other set of moral 
first principles), innate moral sympathy, raw emotion, religious or quasi-religious 
calling and habituated virtue. To argue that the prime aim of education should be to 
‘encourage the growth of competent, caring, loving and lovable people’ (Noddings, 
1992, p. xiv) is a sentiment with which few would disagree, but it could not serve as 
a practical curricular aim – an aim that could be realised through a particular kind of 
curriculum.   
 
Second, Nodding’s umbrella term ‘care’ conflates the attitudes and dispositions 
listed above with something that is categorically quite distinct: the emotional 
capacity to form relationships. I would question the extent to which the capacity to 
form relationships (which is central to Noddings’ ethics of care) can be trained or 
cultivated at all. Most people learn to form healthy personal and work relationships 
through normal social forms of interaction. It is the mark of a normal person, of a 
person who enjoys ‘mental health’, to have precisely this capacity. People who have 




some form of psychiatric disorder, from mental ill-health, and possibly as benefiting 
from therapeutic or medical treatment. Such difficulties are often connected with a 
failure to develop the intrinsic self-esteem that flows from unconditional parental 
acceptance or from other forms of traumatic childhood experience. Differences in 
innate personality and temperament are also relevant here. For example, Susan Cain 
has documented how natural introverts are particularly susceptible to low self-esteem 
as a result of adverse childhood experiences, and how they differ from extraverts in 
their manner of expressing their feelings depending on the setting and the 
circumstances; so whereas in certain circumstances and social settings, extraverts 
will be in their element, in other settings, it will be introverts (Cain, 2013). My point 
is that very different sorts of caring relationships are possible depending on the 
personalities, backgrounds and circumstances of the people involved; and the 
attempt to foster particular types of caring attitude or to hold up particular types of 
relationship as models of care would therefore be difficult. It would be more 
practicable, educationally, to forget about relationships and simply foster the virtues.  
 
Third, why should a curriculum of academic subject disciplines necessarily be 
antithetical to the fostering of caring relations between pupils and teachers, or to an 
ethos of care in a school? Equally, why should the institution of a curriculum 
consisting of practical and domestic subjects or topics produce more caring relations 
between pupils and teachers? Good schools regard pastoral care as central to their 
mission. The nature of the subject matter does not necessarily determine the nature 
of pupil-teacher relations at all. 
 
Fourth, and finally, I have argued in this thesis that any activity, any engagement 
in learning (academic or non-academic), must have something of the nature of 
initiation into a practice if it is to be really worthwhile. And central to the notion of a 
practice is that the novice recognises the authority and expertise of the master – at 
least in the early stages of learning. Now the master or expert may well care deeply 
for the pupil or novice, but I doubt very much whether the nature of the relationship 
or the care involved will be of the kind Noddings envisages, particularly since she 
argues for an integrated curriculum cooperatively constructed by teachers and 




inquiry (Noddings, 1992, pp. 175-9). I think there is a strong case for an integrated 
curriculum so far as ‘general knowledge’ is concerned (as I argued in Chapter 7), but 
grammar and rhetoric are very much disciplines, the stories of experience contained 
in the humanities cannot be chosen by pupils (though there is an element of inquiry 
contained in any discussion of them), and specialist study must have the nature of 
engagement in a practice, and hence involve a measure of submission to authority, if 
it is to be worthwhile. 
 
For all these reasons, I have doubts whether an ethics of care holds the answers. 
However, as I have argued, I think Noddings is right to question the value of a 
universal academic curriculum, right to value ordinary people’s engagement in 
ordinary activities, and right to emphasise the need to ‘provide all our children with 
practice in caring’ (p. 52).  
 
An ethics of ‘the Other’ 
 
Another radical challenge to traditional virtue ethics, to notions of character 
building and habituation, comes from proponents of an ethics of ‘the Other’. This 
approach, closely associated with the work of Emmanuel Levinas, has attracted 
considerable recent interest in philosophy of education because it rejects liberal 
utilitarian assumptions concerning the autonomous desire-satisfying individual 
endowed with contractual rights and it rejects romantic notions of the authentic 
subjective inner self in search of expression (both of which have the effect of 
detaching people from their social attachments and relationships with others
14
), and 
instead asserts, or reasserts, ‘ethics as first philosophy’. It does not have recourse to 
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 At the beginning of Chapter 1, I characterised the reaction to ‘Enlightenment rationality’ as a 
‘broad humanist-communitarian-Aristotelian’ revival, and located my (starting) position as broadly 
Aristotelian. In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor identifies the Enlightenment and Romantic 
traditions as constitutive of the modern conception of self, according to which our identity is located 
in an authentic subjective inner self and the purpose of life is the pursuit of self-fulfilment on the part 
of autonomous beings; the result is that there is a deficit of ‘moral sources’ in relation to which goods 
worth striving for might be located, and people turn to therapy for a cure (Taylor, 1992). Paul 
Standish argues that the result of this ‘presumption in favour of the primacy of ontology over ethics’, 
this naturalising of ethics, is the ‘emptiness, indeed nihilism’ that characterises so much of 




initiation into a moral tradition (with its connotations of transmission and habituation 
- or ‘reproduction’, as critical theorists would have it), or to ‘totalising’ systems of 
morality, or to the crude calculus of the critical theorists, who would reduce all 
relations to power struggles and who seek justice through the abolition of inequality. 
Instead, it locates the ethical in a person’s face-to-face encounters with ‘the Other’, 
encounters that awaken a sense of responsibility and transcendence of self that is 
constitutive of our very consciousness and sense of subjective being, and therefore 
stands prior to our rationality; in other words, it is constitutive of our ends or goods. 
 
A full exploration of this radical yet thoughtful approach to ethical education is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but I would like to make some comments in the light 
of the broadly Aristotelian position I have argued. First, it seems to me that in 
regarding ethics as arising out of the primordial pre-cognitive experience of face-to-
face encounters with the Other, Levinas neglects that from the very beginning human 
beings come into consciousness as social beings, as persons and as selves who exist 
and define themselves in relation to others. They are progressively socialised 
through upbringing, through schooling and through their engagement in a variety of 
practices, all of which play a part in forming them as ethical beings. Since their 
encounters with others are necessarily mediated through social structures and 
practices, the structures and practices that mediate their perceptions, I cannot see 
how these encounters can be regarded as giving rise to some pre-cognitive ethical 
experience. Second, I think that too much ethical significance is read into this 
putative relation with ‘the Other’. Why should a mere encounter or series of 
encounters cause us to recognise the Other’s vulnerability, evoke a sense of ethical 
responsibility on our part, or release us from enslavement to our selfish interest? 
Would any encounter with any person in any circumstances contain the possibility of 
producing or contributing to the desired effect; or must we be pre-disposed to being 
affected, perhaps by our personality, needs and interests, character or sensibility? I 
suspect that the same sorts of objections can be raised against the ethics of the Other 
as I detailed in Chapter 1 in relation to the Kantian notion of the autonomous actor 
willing the Moral Law out of rational necessity; namely, that there is no explanation 
supplied of why a person should behave rationally, or ethically, in the first place. We 




‘Relational pedagogy’ could be criticised on similar grounds. Education is seen 
as comprising a series of encounters in which the pupil or student is awakened to 
‘new beginnings’ (Jones, 2014, p. 198), ‘journeys of transformation’ (p. 194), and 
‘transcendent aspects of becoming’ (Todd, 2014, p. 231). The prosaic task of 
initiating into established practices within a cultural tradition, and mastering bodies 
of knowledge and skill, is, by contrast, merely reproductive. That education might 
prepare pupils to lead ‘a good life’, and that this need not involve ‘transformative’ 
experiences (though it will certainly be a ‘formative’ experience), has been 
overlooked. Overblown talk of the pedagogic encounter and its centrality to human 
existence neglects that the defining experiences and encounters in a person’s life 
may have nothing to do with teachers or with ‘education’ at all.  
 
Christine Winter (2014) distinguishes traditional forms of curriculum knowledge 
(prescriptive, ‘totalising’ and instrumental) that are ‘imposed’ on the student without 
regard for his or her needs from the sort of knowledge that might be developed if the 
pedagogical relation between teacher and student were recognised as ethical (or 
‘ethically just’) in the sense imagined by Levinas. A range of alternative ways of 
knowing that ‘respect the life-worlds and perspectives of the other’ could thereby be 
opened up - ways of knowing that ‘fascinate, puzzle and excite the learner’. Students 
would be involved in ‘making meaning for themselves’ and ‘learning to become’; 
teachers would acknowledge that school subjects ‘adopt a questioning role towards 
their own other knowledge’, ‘open knowledge up’ and ‘find a way to read 
“otherwise”’; and they would generate ‘inventive responses to the needs of the other’ 
and open up language ‘to fresh understandings of the world’ (Winter, 2014, pp. 286-
9). But how do we go about identifying ‘the needs’ of the student? How for that 
matter do students identify their own authentic needs? Is the student assumed to be 
an autonomous sovereign chooser making rational choices; or are the student’s needs 
assumed to be defined by pre-existing ‘life-worlds and perspectives’, in which case, 
are all life-worlds and perspectives to be regarded as equally valid? Perhaps the 
intention here is to encourage a greater awareness of the needs of oppressed or 
marginalised minorities, ‘to see what or who may have been overlooked, 
marginalised and omitted in the process of curriculum-making’ (p. 280), and this is a 




Other in the classroom, the pedagogic relationship, could realistically be the source 
of this greater awareness. Teachers and students alike would, I suspect, learn far 
more from the experience of service learning – i.e. through real life experience.  
 
Moreover, how can one question a body of knowledge or ‘read it otherwise’ 
without prior acquaintance with it? And don’t existing subjects already encompass a 
range of alternative views and traditions? My point is that without prior initiation 
into subject disciplines and practices in general, a process that inevitably involves an 
element of ‘coercion and compliance’, talk of re-creating and reimagining them is 
little more than pie in the sky. Even for students who have gained a degree of 
mastery of their subject, the expectation that they will be fascinated and excited by 
their engagement in the critical and creative exploration of alternative 
understandings assumes (as I have argued throughout this thesis) that everyone ought 
to be a philosopher or a research scientist; and this is simply unrealistic.    
 
The approach of Paul Standish in ‘Ethics before Equality: moral education after 
Levinas’ (2001) is, I think, more measured and thoughtful than that of some of the 
proponents of relational pedagogy. I agree with much of what he says concerning the 
primacy of ethics over atomising ontology, and I am in complete accord with his 
concluding words: 
 
Education at its best … must be suggestive of the good life and of the 
compelling and absolute obligation that this imposes on us. (Standish, 2001, 
p. 346) 
 
But I do not see how Standish’s recognition that the background on which our 
deliberations rely comprises ‘our accustomed practices’ can be squared with his 
statement in the same paragraph that this same background ‘could never be the scene 
of foundational activity’ (p. 347). Standish argues that this background is ‘one of 
provisionality, of taking things this way or that through our accustomed practices’, 
but aren’t our accustomed practices necessarily foundational? The person who is 




with a view to formulating (in Kuhnian terms) ‘a new paradigm’ - though even in 
this case, their education would have begun with initiation into the existing 
paradigm. But as I have argued in this thesis, this is the exception rather than the 
rule. Again, the tacit assumption is that to lead a good life, everyone must be a 




The philosopher might well find the ethics of the Other fruitful as a form of 
discourse, as an approach to conceptualising ethics that seems to capture certain 
truths concerning the human condition without recourse to discredited ‘foundational’ 
belief systems; and this outlook is understandable for a person who by profession 
and by nature is given to engage in critical thinking, or ‘rationally critical thinking’ 
or ‘thinking about thinking’ (Quinton, 1995, p. 666). But to argue that people, 
including philosophers, can be motivated to lead ethical lives on this basis, or that 
children should be educated on this basis, is, I think, unrealistic and misguided. 
Standish’s concern is that virtue ethics is ‘foundational’, that this implies a defence 
of the status quo, ‘a resignedness to what cannot be changed’ (Standish, 2001, p. 
347). My argument in this thesis is neither radical nor conservative; rather, it is, quite 
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recognises that it is only through repeated practice from an early age that values and virtues 







I have set out in this thesis to justify a conception of education that is liberal in 
the sense that it involves the formation or cultivation of a person in a moral and 
cultural inheritance. However, whereas liberal education has traditionally been 
associated with producing a governing elite and has involved a curriculum that is 
literary and academic in nature, my conception of a moral and cultural inheritance 
into which pupils might be initiated incorporates the practical engagements of 
ordinary life and work - engagements which have just as much value as philosophy 
and politics. In this respect, I differ from those philosophers of education who 
conceive the aim of education to be the production of autonomous citizens and 
critical thinkers, and who, though they might not subscribe to a liberal education in 
the formative sense or to a curriculum of academic subject disciplines, nevertheless 
conceive education in distinctly intellectualist terms - i.e. as producing critical 
thinkers and problem solvers. My approach opens up the possibility of a quite 
different sort of curriculum, a curriculum incorporating core subjects and activities 
other than the literary and academic, yet serving liberal ends; in other words, a 
curriculum that forms or cultivates pupils morally and intellectually, and that 
prepares them to lead a good and fulfilled life, but does not ‘train’ them for any 
specific occupation.   
 
In  Part 1, I questioned the assumption of many philosophers of education that 
the overriding aim of education should be to endow people with ‘personal autonomy’ 
- autonomy in the sense of possessing the capacity to articulate and justify (i.e. to 
reflect ‘critically’ on) one’s underlying moral principles and values. There were 
several strands to my argument: (1) that the values and interests that might enable 
people to transcend their appetitive desires and lead a worthwhile life – a ‘good life’ 
- cannot be deduced a priori by appeal to pure reason but must be located in a social, 
cultural and linguistic tradition; (2) that these values must in large part be habituated 
in upbringing and schooling – otherwise people will not be sufficiently motivated to 
act on them; (3) that the reflective engagement in the practices of ordinary life 




the underlying ‘paradigmatic’ principles, values and goods of these practices; (4) that 
since the goods of practices are heterogeneous in nature, and can only be fully 
appreciated by engagement in the respective practices, rational deliberation and 
critical reflection cannot on their own furnish optimal solutions to moral conflict - to 
live ethically is as much a matter of discharging the duties, obligations and 
commitments that one has chosen to undertake; and (5) that it is in the nature of a 
moral and cultural tradition (particularly when it is liberal and secular, less so when 
it is tribal or theocratic in nature) that it encompasses people’s experiences of 
pursuing heterogeneous goods and living with moral conflict, even with tragedy. 
Instead of personal autonomy, I concluded that the primary aim of school education 
should be the cultivation in pupils of certain core virtues, moral and intellectual – 
virtues that would enable pupils to engage in worthwhile activities (i.e. in activities 
from which the goods of ‘practices’ can be derived) and thereby gain the sense of 
justified self-worth and self-respect that is essential for human fulfilment, as well as 
being the essential pre-condition for active and responsible citizenship in a liberal 
society. 
 
In Part 2, I supplemented this aim of cultivating the virtues with a second aim, 
namely that of cultivating - through a training in rhetoric, through insights drawn 
from the stories of human experience of the humanities, and guided by the virtues - 
the capacity to make practical judgements on human affairs, particularly where 
conflicts arise between rival goods
1
. I also explored the possible nature of a 
curriculum that would realise these liberal aims, and concluded that it should have 
the following characteristics. First, it should involve the specialised study of at least 
one subject, a subject that need not be academic in nature but that must have the 
characteristics of a practice and, so far as possible, be wholeheartedly engaged in. It 
would thereby serve to cultivate the virtues, primarily intellectual but also moral, that 
are essential for adult engagement in practices. Second, literacy should be conceived 
primarily in rhetorical terms as the capacity to exercise practical judgement, a 
capacity developed in part by training in the art of prose writing and in part through a 
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optimal judgements (I argued against this in Chapter 2), but rather in the sense of the capacity to make 
practical judgements - judgements that are ethical in that they issue from a person who has a virtuous 




study of ‘the stories of human experience’ of the humanities - primarily history and 
(English) literature. Third, the moral virtues should be cultivated through a school 
ethos that reinforces and habituates them, through adventurous and challenging 
activity outside the classroom, and through service to others. The last two are 
particularly powerful in that they force pupils to discover for themselves the value of 
the virtues. Fourth, if as I have argued there is little value in a curriculum of subject 
disciplines as a means of training the mind or introducing ‘forms of knowledge’, 
then much of the curriculum might be reorganised into courses that are general, 
descriptive and practical in nature, with material organised by topical theme where 
appropriate, and with optional as well as compulsory components. Theoretical 
disciplinary treatment would be delayed till later.  
 
A legitimate concern with the sort of curriculum I am advocating here would be 
that it closes down options for academic or literary study too early. My counter 
argument would be that by seeking to introduce disciplinary study too early, the 
current curriculum actively alienates those pupils who do not have a particular 
aptitude for it and who are not going on to specialise in academic subjects at 
university; and that it fails to provide a satisfactory general education – a liberal 
education – for anybody. Certainly, the great canon of Western literature, art and 
science (incorporating the academic subject disciplines) is an integral part of the 
moral and cultural inheritance; and a liberal curriculum should introduce these to 
pupils. But there is no way (I have argued) that the school curriculum can do any 
more than introduce them and perhaps whet the appetite for further study on the part 
of those pupils who have the aptitude and the interest. There is, however, value to all 
pupils in learning something of the goods worth striving for, the virtues worth 
exercising, and of the conflicts, dilemmas and tragedies that result when these goods 
and virtues come into conflict; and it is the supreme value of the humanities that they 
constitute a compendium of human experience in these areas. The study of novels, 
plays, poems and shorter stories belonging to the literary canon may well form part 
of this humane education, but the main purpose of the study is not to engage in 
literary criticism or aesthetic appreciation, rather to illuminate the human condition - 
and therefore popular literature, film and television would also form an integral part 




The most significant critique of the current school curriculum in recent years is 
Rethinking the School Curriculum (2004) edited by John White. Though particular 
details might be disputed, the central argument – which is that the curriculum of 
academic subject disciplines as currently constituted does not match the stated aims 
of the National Curriculum, that in fact the curriculum has no reasonable or coherent 
rationale other than that it has existed roughly in its current form for around a 
hundred years
2
 – is, I think, indisputable. One only has to consider the 
pronouncements of policy makers, both on the right and the left. In so far as any 
aims are attributed to school education (apart from the ‘basic skills’ of literacy and 
numeracy, ‘five good GCSEs’, and a higher position in the international league 
tables) they seem to revolve around ‘rigour’ – that academic subjects have the 
greatest rigour and that the more ‘rigorous’ the content, the greater is their 
educational value. However, the nature of the mental training and intellectual 
demands involved in the average pupil scraping a grade C in a GCSE, or the value of 
the knowledge and skill thereby acquired, is questionable. For example, proponents 
of the traditional curriculum generally assume that it should include the study of a 
modern foreign language on vocational grounds (one acquires a useful skill), 
educational grounds (intellectual rigour is involved), ethical grounds (pupils should 
be exposed to other cultures) and on grounds of personal fulfilment. But as Kevin 
Williams argues, it is questionable whether any of these aims, valuable though they 
are, are achieved other than for a minority of pupils - and then only to a very limited 
degree; in any case, there are much better ways of attaining these aims (for example, 
intensive summer courses and exchanges) than teaching a foreign language four 
times a week in a classroom. Young people might be compelled to study a foreign 
language for a year or two on the grounds of entitlement, but further classroom study 
should be optional (Williams, 2004, pp. 117-27). The same types of argument can be 
adduced for a range of other traditional subjects. 
 
Where I disagree with John White, is in his proposition that the fundamental aim 
of school education should be to prepare pupils for lives as autonomous citizens in a 
liberal democracy. In one sense, no reasonable person could dispute this proposition. 
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As I argued in the introduction, it would be odd to argue that the aim of education 
should be to train people for pre-allotted roles in a totalitarian state. The problem lies 
in what is entailed by ‘personal autonomy’. The question is how we are to prepare 
pupils for lives as autonomous citizens leading fulfilled and flourishing lives. The 
central argument of my thesis is that the best way to prepare pupils is not to seek to 
arm them with the capacity to make rational choices concerning their preferred ends 
and the means that would best attain these ends, or to choose between ‘competing 
ways of life, activities, belief systems, careers’ (White, 2004, p. 22)3; but to cultivate 
a range of moral and intellectual virtues – virtues that are mediated through a moral 
and cultural inheritance and can only be fostered through a process of habituation.   
 
Perhaps the most significant attempt to reconceptualise the traditional idea of a 
liberal education, to frame a curriculum that prepares for life by cultivating the 
whole person (as opposed to merely the intellect), is D G Mulcahy’s in The Educated 
Person: Toward a New Paradigm for Liberal Education (2008a). The value of 
Mulcahy’s study lies, I think, in its taking us beyond the traditional battle lines (i.e. 
of being either for or against liberal education narrowly conceived as a curriculum of 
academic subject disciplines) and engaging in an analysis of the liberal ideal that is 
critical but also appreciative of its potential value. However, like White, Mulcahy 
sees people as being engaged in a sort of managerial planning of their lives for 
optimal results: ‘To live as a human being is to be seeking goals and to be active ... 
in their pursuit’ (Mulcahy, 2008a, p. 106); and ‘the rationally inspired life of a 
human being ... requires of us that we select means appropriate to the ends that we 
have in view’ (p. 167). As for these goals and ends, ‘the ultimate purpose of liberal 
education as conceived here is to enable the student to define for himself or herself ... 
the good life [my italics]’ (p. 188). By contrast, I am arguing that the only source of 
ends (unless the ends in question are material and appetitive) is a moral and cultural 
inheritance into which a person has been initiated; that activities are worthwhile 
because they initiate into practices whose goods can only fully be appreciated by 
practitioners; and that to become a successful practitioner, and to lead a good life, 
requires prior habituation into the requisite virtues. That it initiates into a moral and 
cultural inheritance, and that it thereby cultivates a person as a moral and rational 
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being, is, for me, the essential characteristic of the idea of a liberal education. By 
neglecting this central characteristic, Mulcahy has been able to incorporate in his 
paradigm a range of new aims and concerns: interdisciplinary areas of study, the 
caring virtues, building on the experiences of students as starting points for learning, 
knowledge creation through problem solving, and the insights of critical pedagogy - 
as well as the study of the academic disciplines and the attitudes associated with 
them (p. 187). But without the initiation into a moral and cultural inheritance in 
some shape or form, it is difficult to see how these disparate aims can be integrated 
into a coherent whole, or judged liberal in any meaningful sense.   
 
The best known proponent of the argument for bridging the traditional divide 
between liberal education and vocational preparation – for ‘liberalising the 
vocational track’ and ‘vocationalising the liberal one’ – is Richard Pring in Closing 
the Gap: Liberal education and vocational preparation
4
 (Pring, 1995, p. 65). Many 
of Pring’s underlying assumptions and concerns are ones that I share and have 
sought to address in this thesis: that liberal education’s traditional conception of the 
educated person is narrowly intellectual and elitist; that it ignores (even disdains) the 
goods and dimensions of experience associated with the vocational, the practical and 
the useful; that it does little to prepare for citizenship or for life; and that it is only 
accessible to a minority, with the consequence that either we assume that ‘only a few 
are capable of being educated’ and the rest must be consigned for vocational 
training, or we assume that since academic subjects are the only ones that are worth 
studying at school, all will benefit from studying them ‘irrespective of the interest 
that young people find in them’ (pp. 120-1). Above all, I agree with Pring that any 
discussion of education or curriculum must begin by asking what it means to be an 
educated person – or to put it another way, by asking what it means to be a person 
capable of leading a life that is fulfilled and worthwhile in the broadest sense.  
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However, I differ from Pring in a number of important respects. Though I have 
argued that all pupils will benefit from the study of the humanities conceived as 
stories of human experience, and from the study of a range of subjects and topics 
treated at a level that is general and descriptive in nature, I do not think that 
specialised study can or need be conceived as requiring ‘the liberal to be 
vocationalised’ or ‘the vocational to be liberalised’. There is no need for the student 
who engages in a specialised study of the classics or physics to be concerned with 
the practical or the useful any more than for the student who engages as an 
apprentice in a practical study of building crafts or digital media or fashion design to 
be concerned with the pursuit of the truth for its own sake.  So long as the activities 
engaged in are conceived as practices in the fullest and broadest sense (and not 
merely as ‘on-the-job’ training) and involve the disciplined acquisition of a complex 
body of knowledge and skill, a range of virtues and capacities are cultivated; and it is 
the acquisition of these virtues and capacities that justifies the engagement in 
specialist study. Pring argues that a broadly-based general education that prepares for 
life and work (i.e. that is ‘prevocational’) might involve activities in school that 
‘reflect the activities of the world outside the school, arise from the students’ own 
interests and problems, and have the same sort of ‘messiness’ that real-life problems 
have’ (p. 64). But though this might be argued up to a point, the danger is that such a 
curriculum would lack any real academic discipline and thus degenerate into 
‘watered-down life-adjustment courses’ that ‘bear very little resemblance to genuine 
education’ (Lawton, 1973, pp. 112-5)5. Pring argues that the emphasis ‘is not upon 
the content to be covered , as in the academic tradition, nor upon specific 
competences as in the vocational tradition, but upon general capacities for living 
effectively  and upon the processes of learning, of problem-solving, of cooperating 
and of enquiring’ (Pring, 1995, p. 79). But this misses the point that general 
capacities - and the intellectual virtues in particular - are best developed through 
specialised study that involves the mastery of specific skills and competences.  
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Finally, Pring’s catalogue of the qualities needed to be ‘a whole person’ - an 
educated person - reveals the very intellectualist bias that he identifies in the 
traditional conception of liberal education. According to Pring, to be a whole person 
requires, among other things, the disposition ‘of testing out and sharing beliefs, of 
openness to new ideas but also scepticism towards untested claims’; ‘welcoming 
clarity and analytic sharpness and disdaining the bland and obfuscating’; ‘the ability 
to think beyond the given, to make links between the present and the past often in a 
most unlikely way’; the ability ‘to re-interpret experience ... through metaphor drawn 
from other fields of discourse’; ‘the skills of inquiry’; ‘the habit of self-reflection and 
the readiness to face one’s interior thoughts’; and a ‘seriousness’ in ‘coming to 
understand and to articulate’ one’s ‘experience of living’ (pp. 130-1). Of course, all 
these things are laudable; but, once again, we have the philosopher of education’s 
over-intellectualised vision of the good life. The possibility that the good life need 
not involve the sort of critical reflection and self-examination that the academic or 
intellectual or literary critic is given to engaging in has been neglected. Once again, 
it has been overlooked that ‘the unexamined life’, too, might be worth living.     
 
I have not addressed the claims of postmodern and critical theory in this thesis – 
claims that, if upheld, would undermine much of my argument. A full consideration 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but my main concern is a straightforward one: the 
failure (as I see it) to specify the nature of the emancipating utopia that would 
replace capitalism and liberal democracy as currently conceived, and thereby abolish 
inequality and injustice. To answer that ‘the point of Critical Theory is not that it 
envisages “a positive utopia” but that it is informed by a sharpened experience of the 
actual and intolerable injustice of the world as it currently exists’ (Blake & 
Masschelein, 2003, p. 55) – i.e. that there is no need to specify any alternative, 
merely to question the status quo and to exercise one’s transformational and 
consciousness raising capacities - is, I think, an evasion given what we know of the 
Holocaust and the horrors of twentieth-century totalitarianism. Service learning, the 
engagement with real people – people who, it could be argued, are the victims of 
injustice or oppression - is, I would argue, a more effective means of raising 
consciousness of the possibility of transformation (personal, social, economic and 




Chapter 4, the question of how to improve in practical ways the quality of people’s 
lives and working conditions, and how to create opportunities for people to lead 
more fulfilled lives (both at home and around the world), is essentially a political one 
and demands political action; and my arguments in this thesis certainly do not 
preclude the possibility of more radical transformation.  
 
I do not claim in this thesis to have constructed ‘the definitive curriculum’. I am 
simply exploring the educational and curriculum implications of adopting a certain 
philosophical view of what would constitute a good life for any human being. 
Indeed, I think that even to ask the question ‘what is a good life?’, to recognise that 
the question is worth asking, leads us ineluctably to postulate that the good life is the 
life of a person cultivated in some sense as a moral and rational being; and therefore 
that education must be liberal if it is prepare people to lead a good life. 
Unfortunately, the education debate has been beset here by a lack of clarity 
concerning justified educational aims, the nature of liberal education, the nature of 
‘mental training’, the value of practical subjects, the nature of moral knowledge and 
ethical life, the nature of worthwhile activity - and, above all, concerning what might 
constitute ‘a good life’. My hope is that this thesis will shed at least some light on 
these questions and contribute ultimately to a more coherent school curriculum and 






Some reflections on teachers as critical inquirers 
 
These reflections arise out of informal observations of my teaching colleagues in 
a variety of schools over a 20-year period. I have come to the conclusion that despite 
education being riven to a much greater degree than most other professions and 
practices by competing theories and claims, often highly politicised
1
, and being 
characterised by a succession of initiatives and models of ‘best practice’, the vast 
majority of teachers have minimal interest in the philosophical, theoretical and 
political underpinnings of their practice. My experience is that they are only 
interested in these underpinnings when they impinge directly on classroom practice, 
and even then, they are rarely motivated to engage in any sort of sustained critical 
consideration of them. Their concern is simply to get on with the job within the 
constraints imposed, to do the best job they can in the classroom by drawing on their 
knowledge, skill and experience of what works in practice. Headteachers, subject 
coordinators and local authority coordinators might have more of an interest in the 
underlying theory of their respective subjects, but even then, the concern is 
overwhelmingly with research findings, initiatives and projects that might contribute 
at a practical classroom level to improved teaching and learning.  
 
If some philosophers of education are to be believed, teachers (so long as they 
are given the opportunity and the encouragement) are reflective practitioners who 
wish to engage in sustained critical reflection on the nature of their practice, 
reflection that might well take the form of action research; who wish to engage in 
critical reflection not merely on the theory underlying classroom practice and subject 
teaching (‘didactics’), but on the very nature of teaching and learning as 
engagements – i.e. on the nature of the  goods associated with education. Teachers 
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might even effect a radical re-conceptualisation of their practice from the grass roots. 
Chris Higgins, for example, argues that if teachers are to flourish as professionals, 
they need to ‘confront a fundamental existential tension: we exist for ourselves and 
for others’, and if they are to foster self-cultivation in students they need to be 
engaged in an ongoing process of self-cultivation themselves (Higgins, 2001, pp. 
190-1). But my experience is (1) that the vast majority of teachers have no interest in 
such ‘critical’ reflection - they just want to get on with the job; and (2) that their 
ordinary (as opposed to ‘critical’) engagement in the practice of teaching in no way 
diminishes their capacity to realise its goods and lead a fulfilled life, or their moral or 
ethical stature. By the same token, those few practitioners who do choose to engage 
in research or philosophy of education, because they happen to have the interest, the 
motivation and the aptitude to do so (and perhaps because their personality inclines 
them to close analysis and theoretical abstractions) are not on that account realising 
greater goods or attaining a superior level of moral judgement. It is in the very nature 
of a practice that though its goods are continually evolving in response to needs and 
circumstances, and though particular practitioners – usually researchers or 
philosophers (or teachers engaged in research) - might be engaged in ‘critical’ 
reflection on the nature of these goods and in radical innovation, the goods 
themselves can only be realised through the ordinary engagement in practices.   
 
That most teachers prefer to escape completely from teaching in their spare time 
to engage in other activities, pastimes or practices (rather than engage in research) is 
therefore not a sign that they are lesser professionals; it might even be considered a 
sign of mental health. One colleague (a historian) told me that he had once been on a 
philosophy of education course but that he could not ‘see the point’. I think this 
attitude, which is a perfectly healthy and normal one, and which I suspect would be 
shared by most practitioners, illustrates my argument.  
 
The same lack of interest applies to the Times Educational Supplement. There 
are often multiple copies on staff room tables but teachers rarely look at it except for 






. I fear that a copy of the Journal of Philosophy of Education would evoke a 
mix of laughter and anger (anger at the apparently irrelevant, even indulgent, nature 
of the themes – themes that could only be taken seriously by those who do not have 
to teach in schools). True, some philosophers of education express concern that their 
discipline is too detached from practical educational concerns. John White attributes 
the problem to philosophers failing to address the practical consequences of their 
speculations – in particular, the consequences for the school curriculum. I agree this 
is one aspect of the problem; but I think there is an even more fundamental problem, 
the one that has formed a central theme of this thesis, namely that many philosophers 
of education mistakenly assume that only the life of critical inquiry and reflection 
(‘the examined life’) is worth living.   
 
My argument so far is premised on the assumption that teaching is a practice 
with an agreed though evolving body of knowledge and skill into which practitioners 
must be initiated. However, it could be argued that teaching has the characteristics of 
a practice only to a limited degree; in particular, that it does not have the 
accumulated conceptually complex body of knowledge and skill that characterises 
such practices as medicine, accountancy, law, engineering or plumbing. Dan Lortie 
argues that teaching cannot be regarded as a full profession because it lacks the 
codified, systematic body of professional knowledge and technical language, the 
‘distillation of generations of practitioner effort’, that characterises other professions 
(Lortie, 1969, pp. 24 & 29). And Lee Shulman notes that ‘one of the frustrations of 
teaching as an occupation and profession [sic] is its extensive individual and 
collective amnesia … It is devoid of a history of practice’ (Shulman, 1999, p. 68). 
There is nothing comparable to the sort of sustained study or apprenticeship that 
doctors, nurses, lawyers and plumbers (for example) have to undergo; rather, a mix 
of theory, history, information, practical tips and on-the-job training which often 
leaves trainee teachers complaining that their training is irrelevant to their practical 
needs - apart, that is, from the ‘on the job’ element. So, for example, the constant 
complaint of fellow students on my PGCE course was that they were not being told 
what to teach or how to teach it – i.e. they were not given practical training; instead, 
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they were getting theoretical abstractions and idealistic visions which left them 
reflective but practically clueless in the classroom. Twenty years on, teacher training 
is much more akin to practical training and there is more emphasis on training ‘on 
the job’. There is a clear and detailed conception of the ingredients of a successful 
teacher and a successful school – i.e. of what constitutes ‘best practice’. 
Unfortunately the model is also highly bureaucratic and politicised. Teachers have, 
in the process, become little more than functionaries who have to meet performance 
and competency criteria, to ‘deliver’ model lessons and model schemes of work that 
accord with whatever happens to pass currently for ‘best practice’3. As a result - and 
this is one of the most depressing features of teaching in the English state sector - the 
experience and judgement of the individual practitioner seem to count for nothing.  
 
One possible solution would be to found teachers’ professionalism on teachers’ 
capacity to transform and reformulate their subject knowledge into a suitable form 
for teaching and learning (Shulman, 1999, pp. 70-75). ‘Pedagogical content 
knowledge’ would thereby serve as the knowledge base that teaching lacks and 
enhance its professional status (p. 64). Such an approach would accord well with the 
apprenticeship model of learning that I have argued for in this thesis. It is the root of 
teachers’ professionalism in the private sector, where teachers are by and large 
trusted to get on with the job, instead of being micromanaged. And it goes some way 
to answering MacIntyre’s concern that ‘teaching does not have its own goods’ (and 
is therefore not a practice), rather that the goods of teaching reside in the subject 
matter into which pupils are initiated (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 9). But it 
assumes a liberal ‘transmission’ conception of education, a conception that involves 
‘the whole cultural formation of the student’ – the antithesis of the current 
conception of school ‘as an input-output machine’ (p. 4).  
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 By ‘best practice’, I mean the teaching methods that are thought by researchers to be most effective. 
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effectiveness is measured, are of course selected by politicians, bureaucrats and their educational 
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social sciences (particularly in education) is notoriously unreliable and subject to innumerable sources 
of error and bias. The underlying problems are, first, that it is impossible to conduct a fair test by 
isolating and controlling the variables; and, second, that it is questionable whether variables of any 





It could be argued, then, that it is precisely because teaching lacks a substantive 
body of professional knowledge and skill (as opposed to various classroom skills 
that can only be learned ‘on the job’), that it is because it is not a practice (or a 
profession) in the full sense of the term, that it is prey to the imposition of 
bureaucratic managerial ‘systems’ models of best practice, and to a continual stream 
of initiatives all of which, it is claimed, are based on the latest ‘research evidence’. It 
does not help that education itself is, perhaps inevitably, highly politicised; that 
educationalists and politicians dispute the very aims of education, with some 
regarding education in traditional liberal terms (as constituting an end in itself) and 
others seeing education as a means of instituting egalitarian ideals of social justice. 
Teachers frequently complain that their ‘professionalism’ is being undermined by the 
employment of those without ‘proper’ teaching qualifications or who have been ‘fast 
tracked’ into teaching from other professions. But that this debate is even taking 
place is symptomatic. One would be hard put to imagine anyone suggesting that 
people could be ‘fast tracked’ into medicine, law, plumbing or hairdressing with 
minimal training and yet that their performance would be unimpaired.  
 
However, despite all this, and despite the contested nature of education in 
general (which one might have thought, or hoped, would prompt practitioners to 
engage in critical reflection on the nature of their practice), my experience is that 
most teachers remain concerned almost exclusively with day-to-day practice. Their 
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